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Abstract 
The thesis argues for a form of kynical cosmopolitanism in the late work of Jorge Luis Borges, Samuel 
Beckett and J.M. Coetzee. Broadly sympathetic responses to these three writers conflate their writing 
style and their personal habits, and identify them as stoics. Broadly unsympathetic responses conflate 
their choice of theme and their apparent political quietude, and identify them as cynics. Instead of finding 
them aligned with stoicism or contemporary cynicism, the thesis draws on work by Peter Sloterdijk and 
Michel Foucault to recuperate kynicism (ancient cynicism) as a heuristic to explain how the writers 
consciously exploit a combination of style, theme, habit and political perspective in their late works. The 
late works of all three writers turn on a performance of the self that takes autobiographical enactment as 
the starting point for exploring political subjectivity. Following Diogenes of Sinope, who labelled this 
performative political subjectivity ‘cosmopolitanism’, this thesis argues that the late works of Borges, 
Beckett and Coetzee must be understood as creating a self-reflexive kynical cosmopolitanism, in which 
the role of the writer in the world becomes an aesthetic device for engaging with cosmopolitan political 
subjectivity. 
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So great and genuine a man is not to be accused of  
a merely cynical cosmopolitanism;  
still, his cosmopolitanism is his weakness. 
- G.K. Chesterton, Heretics 
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Introduction 
Towards the Cynical Cosmopolitan  
 
G.K. Chesterton, in trying to distinguish Rudyard Kipling’s ‘greatness’ from his 
‘cosmopolitanism’, presents us with our underlying question for this thesis: how may ‘a 
great writer’ be distinguished from ‘a merely cynical cosmopolitan’?1 For Chesterton, 
Kipling encapsulates his cosmopolitanism in the famous line, ‘what they can know of 
England who know England only.’ Chesterton rejoins, ‘What can they know of England 
who know only the world?’2 Cosmopolitanism, in its effort to know everywhere, ends 
up knowing nowhere. ‘Cosmopolitanism’ is Kipling’s weakness, Chesterton claims, 
‘because he does not have the patience to be part of anything’ and his view of the world 
is narrowed by this impatience.
3
 But Kipling’s impatience should not be treated as a 
‘merely cynical’ attitude to particularity, because ‘above all, he has had something to 
say, a definite view of things to utter, and that always means that a man is fearless and 
faces everything. For the moment we have a view of the universe, we possess it’.4 This 
gives us a starting point for discussing the work of Jorge Luis Borges, Samuel Beckett 
and J.M. Coetzee, three late modernists who are fearless in saying what they mean to 
say.  
To each, we can apply Chesterton’s axiom on Kipling: ‘No one can reasonably 
doubt that he means steadily and sincerely to say something, and the only serious 
question is, What is that which he has tried to say?’5 It is apparent, then, that our task, 
                                                          
1 G.K. Chesterton, Heretics (New York: John Lane Company, 1909), 50. For the duration of this thesis, I 
adopt an exploratory ‘we’. I will mark this periodically with modalities such as ‘can’, ‘may’ or ‘might’, to 
indicate the contingency, and fragility, of the plastic community we begin to form when you read what I 
write.  
2 Ibid, 48. 
3 Ibid, 50. 
4 Ibid, 43. 
5 Ibid. 
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though voluminous, is by no means theoretically challenging: all we must establish is 
that Borges, Beckett and Coetzee have tried to say something ‘steadily and sincerely’, 
identify what that ‘something’ is, and we have recuperated these writers from ‘a merely 
cynical cosmopolitanism’. We might even extend this analysis to formulate Borgesian, 
Beckettian or Coetzeean cosmopolitanism. Proof that they have the patience to be part 
of something will show their cosmopolitanism to be stronger than Kipling’s, since they 
are alive to the sense of the world’s actual substance. We may establish this substantial 
concern with the world in Borges’s commitment to Argentina and the politics of 
Argentinian letters, Beckett’s commitment to the French Resistance and to ‘going on’, 
and Coetzee’s commitment to a particular anti-totalitarian aesthetic, during and after 
Apartheid in South Africa. Must this come at the expense of their more generic 
cosmopolitanism: Borges’s travels from Buenos Aires to the US, Europe and Asia, 
Beckett’s translocation from Dublin to Paris and Coetzee’s migration from Cape Town 
to Adelaide? Perhaps we can reconcile these elements of biography. But this 
biographical material seems vaguely dissatisfying, as does Chesterton’s schema for 
analysis, not least because it neglects what is even more interesting in late modernist 
writers: how does one write whatever it is that one is trying to say steadily and 
sincerely? 
This seemingly innocuous question raises an underlying issue of risk: how are 
we to mark the difference between ‘greatness’ and ‘cynical cosmopolitanism’ in three 
writers who, in considering how to write, consciously and expressly challenge bases of 
sincerity, eschew definitive views on the world, and even undermine assumptions that 
they have something to say? Chesterton’s Edwardian distinction may give us a starting 
point, but it certainly will not provide a theoretical solution for situations where 
‘greatness’ is inextricably linked to forms of cynicism and cosmopolitanism. The issue 
might be more productively addressed if we forego our efforts to recuperate Borges, 
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Beckett and Coetzee from a ‘merely cynical cosmopolitanism’, and begin to consider 
how their work plays across the boundaries of such rigorous differentiation. Perhaps 
there are forms of cosmopolitanism that exceed Chesterton’s pejorative understanding 
of cynicism. We may need to challenge our understanding of both cynicism and 
cosmopolitanism. This challenge would lead us to reconsider the way in which Borges, 
Beckett and Coetzee face the universe fearlessly. 
Chesterton conceives of a cosmopolitan knowledge of the world as quite separate 
from the knowledge of any and all countries that make it up. He presents us with a 
paradigm for cosmopolitanism that many are eager to challenge. In fact, for thinkers 
like Paul Gilroy, Kwame Anthony Appiah and Homi Bhabha, cosmopolitanism is 
intimately linked with the local, whether ‘convivial’, ‘rooted’ or ‘vernacular’, which 
expresses already existing connections to the wider world.
6
 If this trend has pushed 
cosmopolitan thinking away from a ‘dislocated’ form towards an ‘integrated’ one, it still 
sees cosmopolitanism as primarily an ethos of worldliness, where the prevalent concern 
is making oneself at home in the world. 
However, there have always been two trends in cosmopolitan thought and 
practice. One, marked by this ethos of worldliness, has focused on the actions and duties 
of its Weltburgers.
7
 This trend identifies a human duty to care for others. It favours 
loyalty to this duty over any loyalty to a polis or a nation-state. But there is another 
                                                          
6 For an account of ‘convivial cosmopolitanism’ see Paul Gilroy, After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial 
Culture? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004); ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ occurs in Kwame Anthony Appiah, 
Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006); ‘vernacular 
cosmopolitanism’ is Homi Bhabha’s phrase in his preface to the revised The Location of Culture, rev. ed. 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2004). Bhabha uses the poetic technique of enumeration to argue for his form of 
cosmopolitanism, a technique that is characteristic of many attempts to ‘list’ cosmopolitan attributes: in 
Chapter 2, I will discuss how Borges uses enumeration to disrupt the very site on which such attributes 
are held in common. 
7 Weltburger, literally ‘world citizen’, is the term developed by Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schiller and 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in reference to the ‘cosmopolitan’. Their immediate antecedent in this 
tradition of translation was Christoph Wieland, whose work on cosmopolitanism intersected with his 
work on cynicism, particularly in his novel, Sokrates Mainomenos, oder, die Dialogen des Diogenes von 
Sinope [Socrates out of his senses; or, the Dialogues of Diogenes of Sinope] (1770). 
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trend that exposes an implicit complacency in this style of living.8 This thesis argues 
that Jorge Luis Borges, Samuel Beckett and J.M. Coetzee are cosmopolitans of this 
second, ‘negative’, bent.  
The first trend is what we will refer to as ‘stoic cosmopolitanism’. Stoic 
cosmopolitanism is, according to Martha Nussbaum, the stoic development of a phrase 
by Diogenes of Sinope: ‘Asked where he came from, Diogenes the Cynic replied “I am 
a citizen of the world [kosmopolitês]”’.9 ‘The Stoics’, Nussbaum writes, ‘developed the 
image of the kosmopolitês (world citizen) more fully, arguing that each of us dwells, in 
effect, in two communities: the local community of our birth and the community of 
human argument and aspiration’.10 Christopher Gill has argued that stoicism aims for a 
structured self, in which the stoic forms a psychophysical whole that extends to 
relations with the human community.
11
 Stoic cosmopolitanism seeks to expand the 
integrated self to an integrated world community. 
Immanuel Kant adapts this stoic community of structured individuals to a form 
of international law, which will regulate relations between states and individuals that are 
not their citizens. Cosmopolitanism, for Kant, is defined by a duty of hospitality 
towards others.
12
 In ‘Perpetual Peace’, Kant outlines as his third article: ‘Cosmopolitan 
Right [ius cosmopoliticum] shall be limited to conditions of Universal Hospitality’.13 
Kant’s limitation of the ius cosmopoliticum presupposes the existence of a law that will 
regulate relations between states and individuals on an international scale. This 
                                                          
8 Gilbert Leung also understands there to be a division between stoic and kynical cosmopolitanism, but he 
does not extend his analysis to consider embodied textuality. Gilbert Leung, ‘Towards a Radical 
Cosmopolitanism’, New Critical Legal Thinking: Law, Politics and the Political, eds. Costas Douzinas, 
Illan Wall, and Matthew Stone (London: Routledge, 2012). 
9 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Kant and Cosmopolitanism’, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan 
Ideal, eds. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 29. 
10
 Ibid, 29.  
11 Christopher Gill, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006). 
12 Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’, Kant: Political Writings, ed. H.S. Reiss [1971] (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1991). 
13 Ibid, 105. 
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distinguishes it from national law, which involves relations between states and their 
citizens, and international law, which involves relations between states and other states.  
Post-Kantian developments of Kantian cosmopolitanism have challenged Kant's 
limitation of the law but not the existence of the duty, nor its presupposition of a 
‘coming community’ of human argument and aspiration.14 Jacques Derrida, for instance, 
critiques the metaphysics of a law that limits itself to conditions of universal hospitality. 
He prescribes those conditions in a way that always necessarily falls short of ideal 
hospitality, but does not question the necessity of such laws (perverted though they 
might be) in the founding of a community.
15
 Rather, he explicitly avows their necessity. 
Stoic cosmopolitanism, even as a critique, concerns itself with supra-national 
communities and hospitality. However, there are also those cosmopolitans who remain 
skeptical about any identification with a community and who feel as uncomfortable 
with the implicit ideality of unconditional hospitality as the necessary compromises of 
actual hospitality.  
‘The cosmopolitan’ existed before cosmopolitanism,16 and it was the cynic, 
Diogenes of Sinope who coined the term.
17
 Before ‘cosmopolitanism’ was a coherent 
                                                          
14 Katherine Hallemeier begins her study of Coetzee and cosmopolitanism by noting that there are almost 
150 extant forms of cosmopolitanism in recent scholarship. Therefore I develop my discussion around the 
writers’ own utterances on the topic in Chapter 2. But, it is worth noting the significant work of David 
Held (2010), Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006) and Ulrich Beck (2006) in developing cosmopolitanism as, 
respectively, a liberal response to global capitalism, a rooted identification with both the local and the 
global and a sociological description to actually existing circumstances. In each, very different, case, 
there is an implicit understanding of cosmopolitanism as heralding multiple sites of belonging, or ‘stoic’ 
cosmopolitanism. Katherine Hallemeier, J.M. Coetzee and the Limits of Cosmopolitanism (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 4. 
15 Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, pref. Simon Critchley and Richard Kearney 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 2001). 
16 Robert Fine has argued that even emerging models of cosmopolitanism risk turning genuine insight 
into ‘something fixed, abstract and absolute [...] Sometimes they seem to construct an image of the world 
as it ought to be that has little connection with the world as it is’. Fine’s assessment of the trend follows 
the institution of cosmopolitanism as a political or social order, where this thesis focuses on cosmopolitan 
writers navigating existing national and international situations. Robert Fine, ‘Taking the ‘Ism’ Out of 
Cosmopolitanism’, European Journal of Social Theory Vol. 6, No. 4 (2003), 465; 466. 
17 Scholarship is divided on whether Diogenes had a positive theory of cosmopolitanism: R. Bracht 
Branham argues that the utterance should be read as a form of playful rhetoric, while John Moles 
maintains that Diogenes’s ethics are consistent with a more systemic cosmopolitanism. Since Diogenes 
exhibits a habitual ethic, but there are no extant works, between Bracht Branham and Moles there falls an 
unreconstructed, anti-systemic cosmopolitanism that follows an ethic of virtuous practice. R. Bracht 
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doctrine, theory or practice, ‘the cosmopolitan’ was a neologism adopted by an exile to 
critique his own position within the Greek polis. The second position predates the first. 
The second position we refer to as ‘cynical cosmopolitanism’. However, to refer to it as 
‘cosmopolitanism’ ascribes to the position a doctrinal unity or substance that it does not 
have. Since the trend describes a method (rather than a doctrine) that uses the material 
position of the body, and the political position of speaker, to critique existing political 
structures, it cannot found a new community or extend hospitality to those who do not 
‘belong’ to it. For this reason too, it is only via a contested relationship with states and 
stoic cosmopolitanism that the cynical cosmopolitan may be identified. Hence our 
anachronistic description of the first trend, the cynical cosmopolitan, follows after the 
second trend, stoic cosmopolitanism.  
All this still begs the question: what relation does either trend have to Borges, 
Beckett or Coetzee? It is something of a platitude that these writers are broadly 
described as ‘cosmopolitan writers’, because their work enjoys a certain ‘universal’ 
reception (by adherents of literary models that favour ‘universalism’), because they 
have a certain linguistic freedom in reading and writing across a number of languages, 
and because they also lived in different countries.
18
 But the description ‘cosmopolitan 
writer’ belies how fractious the term ‘cosmopolitan’ might be. Often, the term denotes a 
variety of traits (universal significance, linguistic competency, national porosity), 
without explanation of what it connotes. A detailed discussion relating either the stoic or 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Branham, ‘Defacing the Currency: Diogenes’ Rhetoric and the Invention of Cynicism’, The Cynics: The 
Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy, ed. R. B. Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley: 
California UP, 1996); John Moles, ‘Cynical Cosmopolitanism’, The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in 
Antiquity and Its Legacy. 
18 George Steiner’s Extraterritorial argues that Borges and Beckett are exemplars of ‘the emergence of 
linguistic pluralism or “unhousedness” […] the more general problem of a lost centre’. While I agree with 
Steiner that Borges and Beckett challenge the Romantic notion that ‘of all men, the writer most obviously 
incarnates the genius, Geist, quiddity of his native speech’, I do not agree that this challenge heralds a 
new internationalism. Rather, it disrupts the sites on which either linguistic ‘housedness’ or 
internationalism might take place. George Steiner, Extraterritorial: Papers on Literature and the 
Language Revolution [1971] (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), 10; 14.     
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the cynical to the cosmopolitan seems to be irrelevant when it appears to be a term 
deployed as mere description, apparently lacking critical depth. 
Excavating this ‘mere description’ addresses an anxiety surrounding these 
writers, as much as it identifies ‘the cosmopolitan’ in their writing. The anxiety relates 
to the ease with which the term ‘cosmopolitan’ conceals concerns about belonging, 
identity and textual reception. For Borges, Beckett and Coetzee have enjoyed a critical 
response that, if not unique in its commonality (we might equally refer to Joyce, Kafka 
or Proust here, since many critics have), certainly has a markedly similar trajectory. 
Each was first received as primarily a universal writer who tests the limits of 
philosophical thinking in fiction that is, above all else, without context. Following the 
initial exegeses of their philosophical fiction, efforts were made to (re)historicise their 
work: the cosmopolitan philosopher-writer working in avant-garde extremes was 
reformulated as an uneasy national, depicting his homeland in an avant-garde fashion in 
order to engage with political exigencies he was not altogether comfortable addressing 
directly. Finally, with the apparent exhaustion of the published material, the archives of 
the cosmopolitan-cum-national have been mined to produce a ‘final reading’ of his 
actual philosophical influences and his real (epistolary) thoughts on his homeland.  
The anxiety may be framed with the following question: in a binary system, in 
which writers are either representative of a national literature or exponents of an 
ahistorical universal literature, how are we to define writers who subvert both identities 
by occupying each role in a way that, if all too comfortable in itself, cannot help being 
uncomfortable for observers committed to one camp or the other? Here, we might raise 
the example of Borges, who is hailed as an exemplary Argentinian writer by the Military 
Junta, in power from 1976-1983, after his canonisation as anti-totalitarian post-
structuralist thinker avant la lettre by Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Jacques 
- 9 - 
Derrida.
19
 We may also think of the paradox of division raised by Karl Ragnar Gierow 
during the presentation of Beckett’s Nobel Prize in 1969, ‘a single award being 
addressed to one man, two languages and a third nation, itself divided’:  
Mix a powerful imagination with a logic in absurdum, and the result will 
be either a paradox or an Irishman. If it is an Irishman, you will get the 
paradox into the bargain. Even the Nobel Prize in Literature is sometimes 
divided.
20
  
 
Gierow’s jocular anxiety about whether the award is to an Irishman or to a great writer 
of ‘a logic in absurdum’ illustrates the endemic anxiety about both Borges and Beckett 
as philosophical writers, who have also been used by their nations to gain a certain 
literary cachet. J.M. Coetzee, whose resistance to being labelled a South African writer 
has done nothing to limit his reception as such, also played fast, if not loose, with 
national identities when he accepted both the Order of Mapungubwe for ‘putting South 
Africa on the world stage’ (2005) and Australian citizenship (2006).    
These paradoxes are compounded by the ‘postcolonial exotic’ of these particular 
writers: coming from Argentina, Ireland and South Africa, Borges, Beckett and Coetzee 
also battle against a distinction between the metropole and the periphery.
21
 Studies such 
as Pascale Casanova’s The World Republic of Letters, in recreating the geographical 
centrality of the metropole, prove that the metropole was only ever a milieu made up of 
people from peripheries.
22
 However, there is still the sense that reading Borges, Beckett 
or Coetzee as ‘postcolonial authors’ critiquing a ‘colonial history’ must come at the cost 
of their contribution to literature-qua-philosophy. Efforts to historicise the tradition of 
philosophical structuralism particularly complicit with the reputation of these authors as 
philosophes avant la lettre, although important in upsetting the distinction between an 
                                                          
19 This is discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. 
20 Karl Ragnar Gierow, ‘Award Ceremony Speech: Samuel Beckett’, Nobelprize.org. Accessed: 23 Apr 
2014. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1969/press.html 
21 See Graham Huggan’s dilemma of ‘account[ing] for cultural difference without at the same time 
mystifying it’. Graham Huggan, The Postcolonial Exotic: Marketing the Margins (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2001), 31. 
22 Pascale Casanova, The World Republic of Letters, trans. M. B. DeBevoise (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 
2007). 
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ahistorical metropole and a periphery all too steeped in history, still prioritise a 
historical truth over the distinctive form writing takes in dealing with this truth. We will 
find the comment c’est of writing by Borges, Beckett and Coetzee in a cosmopolitan 
response that is distinctly cynical. If their cosmopolitanism requires a more nuanced 
explanation, then together we must define what we mean when modifying it with the 
terms cynical and cynicism.  
For cynicism also has a dual history. Peter Sloterdijk, following the example of 
Hans Probsting, has noted the difference between cynicism (Zynismus), in the 
contemporary sense of an enlightened false consciousness, and kynicism (Kynismus), in 
the classical sense of embodied critique.
23
 Prior to the 18th century, the term Cynic only 
designated (whether positively or negatively) those Greek and Roman philosophers who 
followed a cynical life characterised by askēsis (practice), arête (virtue) and parrhesia 
(frank speech).
24
 To call someone a cynic was to refer to a likeness with these 
philosophers. Increasingly, however, the term became associated with a jaded world-
weariness. In the wake of the ‘eight turbulent and hard-won advances of reflective 
enlightenment’, Sloterdijk identifies cynicism as an inevitable consequence of the 
insecurities these advances have brought: cynicism leads to our inurement to ideology 
critique, our realisation of our complicity within structures of political inequality 
                                                          
23 Following Sloterdijk’s translator, the distinction between embodied critique and disillusioned 
disparagement is marked as kynicism and cynicism respectively. While Sloterdijk sees the two terms as 
being incommensurable within a single subject, Borges, Beckett and Coetzee inevitably vacillate between 
kynicism and cynicism. Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1987).  
24 Louisa Shea has excavated Enlightenment responses to Diogenes in French and German writing. She 
shows how Diogenes is initially a model for the philosophes but later discarded because of the moral 
ambiguities that arise when his lived critique is translated into writing. It is worth noting Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and Denis Diderot amongst these, since Rousseau endeavours, in Book 8 of the Confessions 
(1769), to live the actual life of a kynic. Diderot, by contrast, finds that kynical bodily critique, when 
translated into writing, ceases to be verifiably sincere. Diderot’s Rameau’s Nephew (1763), in staging a 
dialogue between the sincere philosophe and the exploitative nephew, plays out the division of ancient 
cynicism into kynicism and modern cynicism. Hegel would recognise this in The Phenomenology of 
Spirit, when he takes Rameau’s Nephew as the signature text for ‘the groundless self’, or, in Terry 
Pinkard’s excellent gloss, ‘the cosmopolitan who attempts to live without any mediating institutions and 
to rely only on the force of his own talents […] the nephew is simply presenting to his noble and well-off 
employers only a mirror of the alienated, “pure selves” that they themselves are’. This thesis shows how 
Borges, Beckett and Coetzee play out the nephew’s role in a far more ethical and rigorous way. Louisa 
Shea, The Cynic Enlightenment: Diogenes in the Salon (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 2010); Terry 
Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994), 164. 
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combined with a general apathy about that complicity. This enlightened false 
consciousness inevitably follows a plebeian critique of authority he terms kynicism: 
In kynismos a kind of argumentation was discovered that, to the present 
day, respectable thinking does not know how to deal with. Is it not crude 
and grotesque to pick one’s nose while Socrates exorcises his demon and 
speaks of the divine soul? Can it be called anything other than vulgar when 
Diogenes lets a fart fly against the Platonic theory of ideas - or is fartiness 
itself one of the ideas God discharged from his meditation on the genesis of 
the cosmos? And what is it supposed to mean when this philosophising 
town bum answers Plato’s subtle theory of Eros by masturbating in 
public?
25
 
 
Kynismos is a critique of ideology using the truth of the body. What legitimates it is its 
emergence from the relatively powerless underclass. Cynismos, by contrast, is a critique 
of ideology performed by the master class themselves: ‘Modern cynicism [...] is the 
masters’ antithesis to their own idealism as ideology and as masquerade’.26 Where the 
kynical servant parodies the master, the cynical master parodies his own position to 
acquire precisely what little power remains to the underclass: the power of protest. The 
result is a particularly odious form of hypocrisy: white South Africans complaining 
about Affirmative Action from armchairs bought with Apartheid gold. Any kynical 
response risks turning, through its habituation, into a cynical response, since as a 
method, it may be taken up either to undermine political hegemonies or to reinforce 
them. But Sloterdijk also accuses stoicism, for instance, of a hegemonic cynicism, when 
he calls it ‘a philosophy of the comfortable’: ‘in the later Stoa, where in matters of 
possession kynical principles were cited absolutely (habere ut non: have as if you did 
not have), one often did not know how it was really intended, for one indeed had’.27 If 
Sloterdijk goes too far in characterising stoicism as a disavowed cynicism, he does 
uncover a difficult problem for any philosophy that identifies its ideals in the immanent 
body: without a particular system governing the body, such as stoicism, how does one 
                                                          
25 Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 101. 
26 Ibid, 111. 
27 Ibid, 165. 
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prescribe a treatment of the self that aspires to ideals without believing in them? Borges 
helps us to frame a response when he notes the ‘beauty’ of a phrase by Marcus Aurelius, 
the stoic Emperor of Rome: ‘“It is possible to live well even in a palace’. Now, this is 
not to say that one may live comfortably even in a palace; it is to say one can live 
correctly even in a palace’.28 Given the temptations of a palace, it becomes more 
difficult to live ‘as if one did not have’. Borges’s response does not eclipse Sloterdijk’s 
criticism so much as invert it; Borges’s rhetorical defence of stoicism creates a kynical 
irony. 
To our already existent dialectic between stoic and cynical cosmopolitanism, we 
can then add a related dynamic between the stoic, kynic and cynic. Moreover, this 
dynamic is particularly fraught when tied to the question of writing: if the kynic is 
characterised by immediacy and presence, while the cynic is characterised by distance 
and disillusionment, then the kynical writer, always battling with the impossibility of 
immediacy and presence, always risks either turning to stoic systems or collapsing into 
cynical inurement. While Sloterdijk’s distinction is useful for marking a difference 
between stoic governance, kynical engagement and cynical disengagement, it is not 
enough to say simply that kynical writers interrogate hegemonies, where stoic or cynical 
writers reinforce hegemonies. There must also be a sense of how the writer interrogates 
hegemonies, as with Borges’s reframing of Marcus Aurelius, without simply ripping 
away sustaining fictions or retaining those fictions in a cynical way. We must reflect on 
how kynical writing and kynical action connect to a mode of speaking frankly that does 
not simply conform to static rules of governance.   
This nexus of truth, subject, and method was developed, contemporaneously to 
Sloterdijk’s Critique, by Michel Foucault. In his last seminar, over 1983-4, Foucault 
turned to ancient kynicism as an exemplar of parrhesia or a mode of frank speech that 
                                                          
28 Borges; Osvaldo Ferrari, Reencuentro. Diálogos Inéditos (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 
1999), 102 
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did not conform to any particular discourse. Foucault was interested in kynical 
parrhesia because kynicism offered a form of ‘care for the self’ that was particularly 
focused on ‘bios [life]’ and because kynical parrhesia offered ‘an essential connection 
between living in a certain way and dedicating oneself to telling the truth [...] without 
doctrinal mediation’.29  
Foucault’s consideration of the kynics was primarily a historical excavation of 
their practices in Ancient Greece. In his session on 29 February 1984, however, he 
suggests three historical reemergences of kynicism:  
After religious movements, throughout the Middle Ages and over a long 
period, [after] political practice since the nineteenth century, I think there 
was a third great medium of [k]ynicism in European culture, or the theme 
of the mode of life as scandal of the truth. We would find it in art. And here 
again, it would be a lengthy and complex history. We would no doubt have 
to go back a long way [...] But I think it is especially in modern art that the 
question of [k]ynicism becomes particularly important. That modern art 
was, and still is for us the vehicle of the [k]ynic mode of being, of the 
principle of connecting style of life and manifestation of the truth, came 
about in two ways.
30
  
 
These two ways are ‘the modern idea that the artist’s life, in the very form it takes, 
should constitute some kind of testimony of what art is in its truth’ and the idea that art 
itself must establish a relation to reality that is not about ornamentation but one of 
laying bare, the ‘violent reduction of existence to its basics’.31 One of the examples 
Foucault gives, unsurprisingly, is Samuel Beckett. Yet if Foucault’s evocative ‘call to 
arts’ raises the possibility of finding, amidst contemporary cynics, modern kynics, it 
runs the risk of returning Beckett (or Borges or Coetzee) to the cabinet of philosopher-
sages, who will teach us stoic ‘truths’ through their art. Moreover, Foucault himself 
identifies this as an area that needs to be researched, since he neither justifies this claim 
nor offers any further explanation as to how this writing is to be characterised. His 
                                                          
29 Michel Foucault, The Courage of Truth: Lectures at the College De France 1983-1984, ed. A. I. 
Davidson, trans. G. Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011), 165. 
30 Ibid, 187. 
31 Ibid. 
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‘laying bare’ of art and the ‘artistic life’ are given no methodology. One reason for this, 
given by Edward McGushin, may be Foucault’s own desire to return philosophy to a 
form of askēsis or the practice of a style of living, from its modern incarnation as a 
methodology or normative system.32 When method and practice are separated, 
philosophy’s task – ‘the care of the self’ – is assumed by the state in the form of 
disciplinary experts (doctors, psychiatrists, teachers), and philosophy begins a ‘neglect 
of the self’.33 Rather than suggest a methodology, our challenge is to think how writers 
use style to attempt an artistic askēsis. To locate a modern kynical artist, we must 
consider style and its relationship to politics. This style must also somehow hark back to 
the Ancient kynics and their style of living, without reinvigorating naive notions of 
presence or immediacy.  
Borges, Beckett and Coetzee write late works that self-consciously critique their 
celebrity as established writer-sages. Modernism, according to Jonathan Goldblum, is 
the literature of celebrity, since modernist techniques of authorial self-fashioning are 
inextricably linked to cults of celebrity.
34
 Our argument in this thesis is that these late 
modernist kynical cosmopolitans trouble the waters of celebrity fetishism, by actively 
exploiting their reception as celebrity author-sages. Diogenes of Sinope provides a 
precedent. His most famous encounter was with Alexander the Great. Alexander comes 
to pay his respects to Diogenes after hearing of his philosophical practice. He finds 
Diogenes lying in the sun. When Alexander asks the dog-philosopher what in the world 
he might want, Diogenes replies that Alexander should get out of his sun. If Diogenes’s 
rejection of power exemplifies the strange dynamic that exists between the kynic and its 
purported ruler, he is only in the position to shirk Alexander’s offer because Alexander 
is captivated by Diogenes’s celebrity as a sage. Borges, Beckett and Coetzee are 
                                                          
32 Edward F. McGushin, Foucault’s Askēsis:An Introduction to the Philosophical Life (Evanston: 
Northwestern UP, 2007), 283. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Jonathan Goldblum, Modernism Is the Literature of Celebrity (Austin: Texas UP, 2011).  
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received as public intellectuals only because people have already endorsed their 
celebrity wisdom. 
This resemblance does not make Diogenes an ‘influence’ on these 20th century 
kynics. Although each writer has, at some point, indicated an awareness of and 
receptivity to the images associated with the kynics, it is more productive to think of 
Diogenes as a ‘dark precursor’ in the sense Gilles Deleuze gives the term. ‘Thunderbolts 
explode between different intensities, but they are preceded by an invisible, 
imperceptible dark precursor, which determines their path in advance but in reverse, as 
though intagliated’.35 Deleuze’s dark precursor ensures a communication between 
different entities without ‘rediscovering a privileged point at which difference can be 
understood only by virtue of a resemblance between the things that differ and the 
identity of a third party’.36 Rather than understanding identity and resemblance with the 
writers as the precondition for Diogenes’s function as a dark precursor, we understand 
them better as its effects. Precisely because the three writers are not kynics in a classical 
sense, we can apprehend their projects as different manifestations of a kynical attitude, 
germane to a particular cultural milieu and specific to a particular aesthetic project. 
‘Kynical attitude’ describes resemblance as an effect not a cause.  
There are four reasons for using Diogenes as a dark precursor for Borges, 
Beckett and Coetzee, and for considering the concept of the ‘dark precursor’ appropriate 
and relevant. First, it permits us to consider the heterogeneous ‘kynical attitude’ of 
Borges, Beckett and Coetzee via an antecedent that will not assume the function of an 
ancestor. Their kynical attitudes differ from Diogenes’s (and each other’s) but are only 
discernible in this difference. Second, the kynical cosmopolitanism we are tracing as the 
‘dark half’ of stoic cosmopolitanism functions only by virtue of its difference to stoic 
cosmopolitanism. Although we are tracing a double genealogy for the two terms, 
                                                          
35
 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2004), 145. 
36
 Ibid. 
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kynical cosmopolitanism does not have substance, history or a definite progression. It is 
pure occurrence: local, isolated and ill-disposed to treatment by an overarching meta-
narrative. Deleuze’s preoccupation with this non-hierarchical, non-historical 
presentation of difference gives us a narrative tool for discussing kynical cosmopolitans 
in a way that allows for a necessary meta-narrative, while remaining wary of its 
potential collapse into an eschatology. Third, Deleuze’s discussion of the ‘dark 
precursor’, tellingly concluded with an allusion to Borges, is anticipated by Borges’s 
notion of precursorship, as raised in his essay ‘Kafka y sus precursores [Kafka and his 
Precursors]’. ‘Each writer’, writes Borges, ‘creates his own precursors’ (TL 365). 
Deleuze’s elaboration is important because influence in Borges’s essay simply reverts to 
a retrospective effect, where Deleuze extends precursorship to the topic of causality: it 
is a causeless effect, without influence. This thesis considers what Diogenes brings into 
relief when Borges, Beckett and Coetzee are discussed as kynical cosmopolitans. It does 
not read traces of Borges, Beckett or Coetzee back into Diogenes. Nor does it excavate 
a direct influence of the kynics in the modern world. Instead, it attempts to recall, 
especially at moments in which it calls most explicitly on the priority of Diogenes, the 
insight of Maurice Blanchot about Greek myth in The Writing of the Disaster:  
The Greek myths do not, generally, say anything; they are seductive 
because of a concealed, oracular wisdom which elicits the infinite process 
of divining. What we call meaning, or indeed sign, is foreign to them: they 
signal without signifying; they show, or they hide, but they are always 
clear, for they always speak the transparent mystery, or the mystery of 
transparence.
37
 
 
Diogenes does not say anything about Borges, Beckett and Coetzee, in and of himself. 
He does not signify or mean. Like any of the works of Borges, Beckett or Coetzee, 
Diogenes seduces with his incompleteness; his openness to interpretation or divination.  
                                                          
37 
Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. Anne Smock (Lincoln: Nebraska UP, 1995), 126-
7. 
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As much as it reminds us of the dangers in reading modern subjectivity back into 
Greek myth and Greek philosophy, this insight also warns against ‘deep’ readings of 
works. Such ‘deep’ readings may impute too much ‘meaning’ to the work. Moreover, it 
is a warning that Borges, Beckett and Coetzee also raise allegorically in their work. 
Inspector Lönnrot falls into Red Scharlach’s trap in Borges’s ‘El muerte y la brújula 
[Death and the Compass]’ because he sees a Kabbalistic meaning in the seemingly 
random murders across a Paris/Buenos Aires cityscape. Lönnrot does not realise that 
Red Scharlach has orchestrated the Kabbalistic ‘meaning’ of the murders solely in order 
to lure him into an ambush. Moran, the certain father/investigator in pursuit of the 
feckless writer Molloy in Beckett’s Molloy, is convinced he sees signs of Molloy’s 
passing at every turn. During his journey, he degenerates into Molloy’s double, so that 
eventually he vacillates about verifiable narratives with a Molloy-like indeterminacy: ‘It 
is midnight. Rain is beating against the window. It was not midnight. It was not raining’ 
(SB2 184). In Coetzee’s Life & Times of Michael K., the Medical Officer observes 
Michael K.’s decision not to eat or speak with increasing levels of anxiety. His narrative 
breaks off with the imaginary projection of a ridiculous pursuit of K., where K. need 
only lift one arm or another to indicate whether the officer’s ‘interpretation’ has been 
correct or not. For each hermeneutist, the self-evident cannot rest on the surface; it must 
be granted significance. 
 The failure of hermeneutics in each example stems from the refusal to allow 
signals to remain on the surface; they must become signs, signifying something, and it 
is this ‘forcing’ of signification that leads to the undoing of the hermeneutist. It is a 
thematic trend in the creative work of Borges, Beckett and Coetzee that the 
hermeneutist is undone by a bifurcation of signal and signification.
38
 Samuel Durrant 
                                                          
38 Following Blanchot quoted above, ‘signal’ is used rather than the more conventional ‘signifier’ 
because the undoing of the hermeneutist ‘signals’ the arbitrary connection between signifier and signified, 
without necessarily ‘signifying’ anything.    
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has suggested of Coetzee’s ‘Eight Ways of Looking at Samuel Beckett’ that it is the 
account of a Cartesian Beckett in search of a monad, a unified body-subject.
39
 This 
observation holds for exploratory unities in all three writers. The desire for integrity 
between the subject and its body is evident in Borges’s librarian-turned-knife-fighter, 
Beckett’s intellectual-turned-tramp and Coetzee’s academic-turned-dog-man.40 
However, they always treat with some skepticism any absolution from thinking 
achieved through the pure mechanics of the body, whether through violence, habit or 
physical exertion. Diogenes, in this respect, serves as an interesting model because his 
body becomes the site of his thought, when he uses it to articulate ‘truths’ in specific 
social settings. 
We opened this discussion by considering how the difference between ‘greatness’ 
and a ‘merely cynical cosmopolitanism’ might be discerned in steadiness and sincerity. 
We supplemented the distinction by thinking about how cosmopolitanism may not be 
cynical (i.e. it may be stoic), and, when it is cynical, how this cynicism may not be a 
disinterest in ideology but an engagement with the material conditions resulting from 
ideology (i.e. it may be kynical). By interfacing the dialectic of stoic and cynical 
cosmopolitanism with the dialectic of cynic and kynic, we can postulate three forms of 
cosmopolitanism. Stoic cosmopolitanism is marked by a holistic ethos of worldliness, or 
a sense of belonging both to a locality and to a world state or system. Cynical 
cosmopolitanism disparages this sense of belonging, by exposing it as an ideological 
structure that reinforces certain hegemonic inequalities. But, in assuming the position of 
judgment, it risks disavowing its own complicity with these structures. Finally, kynical 
cosmopolitanism integrates its critique of ideological structures of belonging with a 
                                                          
39
 Samuel Durrant, ‘Eight Ways of Looking at Samuel Beckett’, Presentation at Quilting Points Reading 
Group (Leeds, 2012). 
40 Here I refer to types that recur throughout Borges, Beckett and Coetzee, although the specific examples 
refer to Juan Dahlmann from Borges’s ‘El sur [The South]’, Vladimir and Estragon from Beckett’s En 
attendant Godot [Waiting for Godot] and David Lurie from Coetzee’s Disgrace.  
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reflexive critique of its complicity. It justifies its double critique through a consistency 
of action that keeps true to an idea of truth, without attempting to define what this truth 
might be. So if we provisionally assigned Borges, Beckett and Coetzee to a negative 
form of cosmopolitanism, rather than ‘stoic cosmopolitanism’, it becomes our task to 
decide whether they are cynical, kynical or some combination of the two. 
Our concept of a kynical cosmopolitan is necessarily grounded in a socio-
political structure. An example of such a structure is described in the character 
constellation of David Lurie, Lucy, Ettinger and Petrus in Disgrace. We do not ascribe 
an allegorical intention to Disgrace, since we hesitate in attributing any direct 
allegorical significance to Coetzee’s work.41 We merely explain, using Disgrace, what it 
is we mean when we use the term kynical cosmopolitan. The descriptive moment occurs 
after the focalising consciousness of the book, the disgraced academic David Lurie, has 
survived an attack on his daughter’s farmhouse in which she, Lucy, has been raped. It is 
the moment when David is contemplating Petrus, Lucy’s employee and neighbour, and 
his possible role in ‘the new world they live in’ (D 117). David, who speaks French and 
Italian, is a cosmopolitan in the stoic sense of a ‘man of the world’. By contrast, Petrus 
and Lucy’s other neighbour, Ettinger, both peasants, are rooted in the soil, albeit that 
Ettinger, a German, has less ancestral right to this soil than Petrus, a Xhosa-speaking 
Black South African. Lucy, by comparison, is described by David as ‘chickenfeed: an 
amateur, an enthusiast of the farming life rather than a farmer’ (D 117). ‘Lucy is merely 
a transient; Ettinger is another peasant, a man of the earth, tenacious, eingewurzelt’ (D 
117; first emphasis ours). The pattern set out here is of the threat posed by the rooted to 
both rooted and unrooted as interpreted in the anthropology of the man of the world. 
Petrus, the ‘stony’ threat, will easily sweep aside Lucy, who is unrooted. ‘Ettinger will 
                                                          
41 Derek Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading: Literature in the Event (Chicago, London: 
Chicago UP, 2004). 
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be a harder nut to crack’ because he is rooted, despite his European origins. But, 
because that root has not produced similarly rooted offspring, Ettinger will be 
‘unrooted’ when he dies. Thus, according to David, things will eventually and inevitably 
pass to Petrus. Property rights pass from the idealists (the Luries) to the realists (Petrus 
and Ettinger), but only those realists who can perpetuate their roots with seed can retain 
these rights (Petrus). David, only tangentially involved from his position as a ‘man of 
the world’, nevertheless believes he can understand this relation because he 
‘understands’ that ‘country life has always been a matter of neighbours scheming 
against each other’, that the ‘real truth’ behind the attack ‘is something more [...] 
anthropological’ (D 118; first emphasis ours). In the ‘country life’ in ‘the new world’, 
there is a place for David (as commentator), Petrus (as recipient in the ‘new order’) and 
Ettinger (as unwilling dinosaur of the ‘old order’) but only a function for Lucy, since 
her property rights are so easily passed over. We argue, however, that it is Lucy who is 
the kynical cosmopolitan in this moment, though David will eventually develop aspects 
of the kynical cosmopolitan towards the end of the novel. By being merely a transient, 
Lucy avoids the imbroglio of land-ownership and the exclusive disjunctive syllogism 
(either-or) implicit in defining rootedness or unrootedness. Lucy, for David Lurie, is 
‘merely a transient’ compared with Ettinger who has a more ‘essential’ link to the soil 
and she needs to realise this (i.e. become more like David). Yet, the novel suggests that 
Lucy’s ‘mere transiency’ is more grounded in the realities of her situation than 
Ettinger’s ‘essential’ adherence to a tradition of white land ownership in South Africa or 
David’s understanding of the anthropology of country life. Lucy, seen by David to be a 
cosmopolitan by virtue of their shared transiency and opposition to nationalist rhetoric, 
is all the more kynically cosmopolitan for being able to give up her adherence to 
traditions of ownership by ceding her property rights to Petrus and becoming transient 
in a way that David cannot understand. ‘Mere transiency’, although intended as a 
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description of a shallow relationship by the deep-thinking David, becomes the means by 
which Lucy is able to live closer to the ground, ‘like a dog’. Here we should not think of 
Lucy’s pregnancy as the augury of a coming community – a standard trope in narratives 
seeking to instantiate a new nationalist future. The child, whom Lucy does not yet love, 
is less the cipher for some imagined community to come than a hostage to confirm 
Petrus’s good faith. Lucy is not seeking to create a community; she is simply seeking 
for the means to live within the community in which she already lives.  
One might find correlative kynical allegories in Beckett (Novellas) or Borges 
(Ficciones). But this thesis will not trace the idealised figure of the kynical 
cosmopolitan in the works of Borges, Beckett and Coetzee. The concern is to show how 
Borges, Beckett and Coetzee are themselves kynical cosmopolitans, of an etiolated, 
artistic sort, that communicate their kynical cosmopolitanism through their style. By 
style, we mean those impulses or habits of writing that accumulate in an oeuvre to 
distinguish the voice of a writer and associate that voice and that writer with a particular 
proper name (as an intratextual designation of a body of texts, a persona, or a textual 
practice and an extratextual commodity and figure of celebrity). A kynical style, then, 
would describe a style that has been trained or modulated by askēsis (practice of self-
discipline), in which a writer exploits those impulses or habits that distinguish his or her 
voice to lay bare three practices: the aesthetic tradition to which they adhere, the 
community politics to which they respond and the rhetorical devices which particularly 
concern them. Foucault identifies this as a quality of modern art not least because 
modernist art is concerned primarily with stripping away its pretensions. Stripping 
away, as prevalent in critics as in artists, is evident in our general understanding of 
Borges and Beckett as writers who respond to the influence of James Joyce, even as 
Coetzee is generally accepted as a writer who responds to Beckett’s influence. 
’Response’ is also an attempt to strip away this influence. But, since stripping away 
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another artist’s influence on one’s style is also the intensification of whatever is 
distinctive about that style, stripping away influence will not simply result in baring the 
material practice to critical scrutiny. The authors consciously exploit style to represent 
their own material practices of writing and performing. We will argue that the examples 
represent those moments where a career-long stylistic trend intensifies in the material 
practice of Borges, Beckett and Coetzee. Rather than reading the texts as organic wholes 
or as self-parody, we will show how the texts involve a plastic modification of stylistic 
preoccupations. They are exemplary of a shared tendency to redouble dominant stylistic 
concerns. They are often marked as texts that are typical of Borges, Beckett or Coetzee, 
precisely because they intensify recurrent concerns to allow a retrospective reading of 
the oeuvre in which this was always already what the oeuvre was about. Thus, if we 
follow Mercedes Blanco and Jaime Alzakaris in noting Borges’s preoccupation with 
metaphor or enumeration, or Anthony Uhlmann and Sarah West in reading Beckett as 
increasingly concerned with the image or the voice, or Julian Murphet in observing 
Coetzee’s interest in rhetoric, we can derive a trend in criticism to follow writers in 
reading their oeuvres as always already concerned with those stylistic devices that, by 
the late work, have become dominant.
42
 
We focus on work written by a Borges in his late fifties when he was already 
blind, on plays written to order by a Beckett in his late seventies, on lectures and essays 
written by a Coetzee whose career has reached its apogee (with Disgrace) and who is in 
transition, physically and emotionally, from South Africa. They are all then fairly late 
works. Edward Said wrote that at the end of the lives of great artists ‘their work and 
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Philosophical Image (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007), 15; Sarah West, Say It: The Performative Voice 
in the Dramatic Works of Samuel Beckett (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2010); Julian Murphet, 
‘Diary of a Bad Year: Parrhesia, Opinion, and Novelistic Form’, Strong Opinions: J.M. Coetzee and the 
Authority of Contemporary Fiction, eds. Chris Danta, Julian Murphet, and Sue Kossew (London: 
Continuum, 2011). 
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thought acquires a new idiom, what I shall be calling a late style’.43 This late style 
coincides with ‘the last or late period of life, the decay of the body, the onset of ill 
health or other factors that [...] bring on the possibility of an untimely end’.44 Deriving 
his term from Adorno’s essay on Beethoven’s late style, Said addresses ‘late style’ as ‘a 
moment when the artist who is fully in command of his medium nevertheless abandons 
communication with the established social order of which he is a part and achieves a 
contradictory, alienated relationship with it’.45 Is all late style kynical, if it ‘achieves a 
contradictory, alienated relationship’ to ‘the established social order’? Perhaps, but this 
sense of late style might as easily be applied to any and all of the works by Borges, 
Beckett and Coetzee. Reading late style as a response to mortality is similarly 
dissatisfying. Rather, we will see that late style is characterised thematically by a self-
reflexive casting of the author in a variety of roles, formally by a concern with the 
reception of the work, and structurally by a series of technical devices that function in a 
non-sublative dialectic and will not synthesise into a harmonious whole.  
If the works are thematically concerned with authorial self-fashioning, this also 
explains why they form themselves around a demonstrable concern with the nature of 
their audiences. By form, we simply mean the way they are presented or communicated 
to their public. Borges frames El hacedor (1960) with a preface and an epilogue that 
stress the work’s autobiographical nature and its contingency (it is compiled of poems 
written over years, rather than poems written with a book in mind) to an existing 
audience of Borges readers. By contrast, Beckett writes Ohio Impromptu (1981), 
Catastrophe (1982) and What Where (1983) by request and for particular occasions, the 
composition of the audience of which he can predict. Finally, Coetzee compiles 
Elizabeth Costello (2003) from a series of lectures given in response to invitations to 
                                                          
43 Edward W. Said, On Late Style: Music and Literature against the Grain, Fwd. Mariam C. Said, Intro. 
Michael Wood (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), 6. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid, 8. 
- 24 - 
perform the role of the public intellectual. He augments these oral responses with a 
series of ‘Strong Opinions’, framed by a narrative that will call into question the person 
behind these strong opinions, in the novel Diary of a Bad Year (2007). 
These interventions need to challenge their audiences without alienating them 
completely. In other words, there is an inherently plastic relationship between their 
stylistic continuities and their interruption of the reader’s or spectator’s expectations 
about that continuity. So our chapters are structured around particular techniques that 
are recurrent concerns across their oeuvres, which reach a greater level of intensity in 
the particular works under discussion. Moreover, this development of technique, with its 
particular relationship to habit, will allow us to conclude that their cosmopolitanism is 
properly plastic.46 For now, however, we should introduce, by means of example, what 
we mean by a kynical cosmopolitan style in Borges, Beckett and Coetzee.     
In an essay that has become more quoted than read, Borges once sketched out the 
efforts to create a synthetic language by a 17
th
 century speculative philosopher. ‘In the 
universal language conceived by Wilkins […] each word defines itself’ (TL 230). ‘He 
divided the universe into forty categories or classes, which he then divided into 
differences, and subdivided in turn into species’ (TL 230). Each species is given a 
vowel, each difference a consonant, each class a monosyllable of two letters. After 
enumerating a number of exemplary words constructed in this universal language, 
Borges demonstrates its inadequacy by likening it to an encyclopaedia. Suppose, he 
asks, we were to think of a certain Chinese encyclopaedia, which had a completely 
                                                          
46 We will conclude with Catherine Malabou’s notion of plastic cosmopolitanism, rather than posit it 
now, because this cosmopolitanism arrives as a consequence of our findings about style, politics and 
artistic practice. Of plasticity, Malabou writes:  
 
the capacity for self re-form. Is this not the best possible definition of plasticity: the 
relation that an individual entertains with what, on the one hand, attaches him originally to 
himself, to his proper form, and with what, on the other hand, allows him to launch 
himself into the void of all identity, to abandon all rigid and fixed determination? 
Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do With Our Brain? trans. Sebastian Rand (New 
York: Fordham UP, 2008), 80. 
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different and, some might say, irrational system of classification. He demonstrates the 
apparent irrationality by enumerating a series of categories that do not appear to have a 
single conceptual base. Just supposing such a system of classification erodes our 
certainty about a ‘universal’ system of classification, because we, within the system, are 
incapable of verifying it as if we were outside of the system: ‘we do not know what the 
universe is’ (TL 231). Borges responds to the impasse in a system of universal 
enumeration by using a metaphor to juxtapose it to another system. He responds to the 
impasse in the metaphor by using enumeration to make the second system demonstrably 
absurd. Metaphor and enumeration become the means by which he pushes through 
impasses of stoic knowledge (i.e. the confirmation of universal systems of knowledge), 
without simply cynically disregarding these systems of knowledge: ‘the impossibility of 
penetrating the divine scheme of the universe cannot, however, dissuade us from 
planning human schemes, even though it is clear they are provisional’ (TL 231). He is 
cosmopolitan because he engages with universal systems; he is kynical because he 
demonstrates their invalidity, or, better, provisionality. 
‘All Strange Away’, the peculiar 1964 ‘rotunda’ text that heralds a transition in 
Beckett’s prose, begins with the creation of place and person. It opens: ‘Imagination 
dead imagine. A place, that again. Never another question. A place, then someone in it, 
that again. Crawl out of the frowsy deathbed and drag it to a place to die in’ (SB4 349). 
Place must be established, but this place is contingent or provisional. Person, too, must 
be established, to warrant place, but this too must be contingent or provisional. If the 
absence of imagination, or the death of imagination, is itself to be imagined, this 
imagining process must still take place in an image of place and person. No sooner has 
the imagination formed this image than the voice interrupts with the disparaging coda, 
‘that again’. ‘That again’ affirms the contingency of the image of place and person by 
distinguishing a narrative voice from the situation. Nevertheless, the voice only 
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functions by virtue of its relation to the image of place and person. Beckett is more 
concerned with an aesthetic consistency to imagining ‘imagination dead’ than with an a 
priori system of knowledge. We can establish that Beckett’s thought requires a place 
and a person, but it will not accord either place or person the illusion of reality for more 
than a moment. Giving thought a place is a cosmopolitan idea, since cosmopolitanism 
establishes thought in relation to place. But disbelieving in that place means that it 
cannot be a stoic cosmopolitanism, because stoic cosmopolitanism seeks to establish a 
harmonious relationship between thought and place. Given that the cynical response 
would be simply to disparage the need for place, without attempting to establish it 
(albeit momentarily), Beckett’s aesthetic rigour shows him to be kynical. The dialectic 
between image and voice in these opening lines suggests too much hard work to be a 
‘mere’ cynicism. 
In Disgrace, Coetzee’s bathetic solution to the political dilemma facing post-
Apartheid South Africa seems to be Lucy’s ‘mere transience’: her willingness to forego 
land ownership marks her as kynical. However, if ‘mere transience’ is a solution to 
political inequalities, either we must dismiss the qualification ‘mere’ as a ploy to 
disguise Lucy’s ‘deeper’ significance or Coetzee’s rhetoric deconstructs distinctions 
between ‘surface’ and ‘depth’. By adopting the latter interpretation, and dismissing the 
pejorative connotations of ‘superficial’, we open up the possibility that Coetzee, in his 
kynical cosmopolitanism, constructs a system of knowledge where the need to act is 
patent, the action required obvious, and the only dilemma is whether we are prepared to 
put into practice what our reason tells us.47 Coetzee’s characters speak and opine when 
they should ‘merely’ act. ‘Mere act’, which must be distinguished from ‘bare act’, is an 
act that is sufficient in and of itself, without an investment of either hyperbole or pathos. 
                                                          
47 See Chapter 1, 41. 
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Instead of ‘bare acts’, which tend towards a hyperbole of the negative, Coetzee’s ‘mere 
acts’ invest negative rhetoric with litotes and bathos. 
In our first chapter we will examine cosmopolitanism and cynicism in work by 
Borges, Beckett and Coetzee. In addition to those references to cosmopolitanism and 
cynicism the three writers make in their critical and creative oeuvres, we will draw on 
five scenes from Diogenes Laertius’s account of Diogenes of Sinope to sketch out 
comparable concerns of Borges, Beckett and Coetzee. By taking these scenes as 
illustrative of a particular stance to politics, aesthetics and subjectivity, we will indicate 
how the three writers gesture in heterogeneous ways to a similar attitude to the position 
of the writer in relation to his world, his work and his understanding of subjectivity.  
In our second chapter we will elaborate on how the concept of the kynical 
cosmopolitan plays across political and aesthetic concerns in Borges’s El hacedor (The 
Maker; 1960). By contrasting Borges’s ongoing engagement with metaphor and 
enumeration in his criticism with their appearance in El hacedor, we will show how 
Borges’s kynicism occurs on a structural level within his artistic self-representations 
through an aesthetic act.    
In our third chapter we will show how Alan Schneider’s triptych of Beckett’s 
Ohio Impromptu, Catastrophe and What Where, performed in the Harold Clurman 
theatre in 1983, stages a kynical cosmopolitanism. By demonstrating how images and 
voices in this triptych are consistent with a career-long development of the image and 
the voice by Beckett, we will argue that Beckett creates a structural kynicism in his 
artistic self-representations through these theatrical acts. 
In our fourth chapter we will argue that the figure of the kynical cosmopolitan is 
critical to understanding Coetzee’s ambivalence about the role of the writer, as creator 
of fiction on the one hand and public intellectual on the other, in Elizabeth Costello 
(2003) and Diary of a Bad Year (2007). By examining Coetzee’s use of the words 
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‘mere’ and ‘merely’ in conjunction with his exploitation of genre, we will demonstrate 
how he raises concerns about surfaces and depth in his consideration of mere acts. 
We began this introduction with the incongruous presence of Chesterton and 
Kipling, two of Borges’s favourite writers. It is perhaps fitting to close, as Borges closes 
‘The Analytical Language of John Wilkins’, with Chesterton’s thoughts on language: a 
prescient consideration of the impasse at the heart of kynical cosmopolitanism in 
Borges, Beckett and Coetzee. 
Man knows that there are in the soul tints more bewildering, more 
numberless, and more nameless than the colours of an autumn forest… Yet 
he seriously believes that these things can every one of them, in all their 
tones and semi-tones, in all their blends and unions, be accurately 
represented by an arbitrary system of grunts and squeals. He believes that 
an ordinary civilised stockbroker can really produce out of his own inside 
noises which denote all the mysteries of memory and all the agonies of 
desire. (TL 232) 
 
This thesis will track the way in which Borges, Beckett and Coetzee rigorously and 
consistently face an impasse between ‘tints of the soul’ and the expression of these tints 
in an arbitrary system of grunts and squeals. The way they face this impasse will show 
them to be kynical cosmopolitans. 
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Chapter 1 
Kynical Precursorship in Borges, Beckett and Coetzee 
 
In this chapter, we will examine kynical cosmopolitanism in work by Jorge Luis 
Borges, Samuel Beckett and J.M. Coetzee. First, we will consider the three writers’ 
responses to a stoic form of cosmopolitanism. Each of the writers has made overt or 
implicit reference to cosmopolitanism, which they understand in the ‘stoic’ sense. 
However, these utterances also disclose a kynical disapproval with the stoic system of 
cosmopolitanism.  By reading them as tacit critiques, we will uncover a kynical trend in 
their treatment of cosmopolitanism.  
Second, we will review those references to the ancient kynics and contemporary 
cynicism in Borges, Beckett and Coetzee. To explain what they do as kynical 
cosmopolitans, we will establish how they refer to the kynics, kynicism and cynicism in 
their writings. This will provide us with historical and analogous bases for using notions 
of kynicism and cynicism to reflect on the cosmopolitanisms of Borges, Beckett and 
Coetzee. But it will also prepare us for our subsequent explorations into their kynical 
acts in their work, acts which will distinguish them as kynical even if they themselves 
are not kynics (in the ancient sense of the word). 
Third, we will begin to address their reception of a larger artistic tradition. We 
will compare two notions of reception to establish the basis for these relationships: stoic 
tradition and kynical precursorship. In our Introduction, we argued that cosmopolitans 
are stoic, cynical or kynical, and that Borges, Beckett and Coetzee are kynical. In this 
chapter, we will find literary forebears are treated stoically or kynically (cynicism, since 
it dismisses influence, will not feature in our discussion), and that Borges, Beckett and 
Coetzee treat their precursors kynically. To illustrate the distinction between stoic and 
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kynical antecedents, we will compare Borges’s notion of precursorship to T.S. Eliot’s 
notion of tradition.  
Finally, we will consider the direct and indirect relationships between these three 
authors, via the lens of this kynical precursorship. Although Beckett’s influence on 
Coetzee has been well documented, discussion of Borges’s influence on Coetzee has, 
thus far, been limited to generic comments on postmodernism, while efforts to construct 
a correspondence between Beckett and Borges have been frustrated by their apparent 
lack of critical commentary on each other. To turn ‘influence’ to kynical effect, we look 
for moments where each writer treats the others kynically. 
A Stoic Cosmopolitanism? 
 
In our Introduction, we made the bold claim that cosmopolitanism comes in three forms 
(stoic, cynical and kynical) across two modalities (positive and negative). We will show 
these forms and modalities at work in the comments Borges, Beckett and Coetzee make 
on cosmopolitanism, or cosmopolitan ethics. In reading these comments, we will find 
that a dialectic emerges. The three writers refer to what we have called a ‘stoic 
cosmopolitanism’. They highlight its systemic potential as a form of world-governance. 
But in these references, we can also trace an immanent critique of this system. Even if 
they use the word ‘cosmopolitanism’ to refer to its ‘stoic’ form, the writers are critical 
of this stoicism in a way that we identify as kynical. In this section, we will 
counterpoint references to ‘stoic’ cosmopolitanism with brief asides to reveal that their 
cosmopolitan ideologies are less stoic than kynical. 
Borges provides us with a starting point, since he misidentifies cosmopolitanism 
as a stoic ‘neologism’ and explicates it within stoic terms of world citizenship. Stoic 
cosmopolitanism, according to Borges, ‘signifies the generous ambition to want to be 
sensitive to all countries and all epochs, the desire for eternity, the desire to have been 
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many, which has brought about the theory of the transmigration of souls’.1 The stoic 
belief Borges refers to here is a belief in the trans-historical continuity of form; the stoic 
ideal is a universal continuity of presence, of awareness and of sensitivity. However, 
Borges’s cosmopolitan is always an exception to the standing order, which is, all too 
often, not sensitive to all countries (space) or all epochs (time):      
We should consider what that [the word ‘cosmopolitan’] means, we should 
consider that the Greeks defined themselves by the city in which they were 
born: Zeno of Elea, Thales of Miletus, later Apollonius of Rhodes and we 
should consider how strange it was that some of the stoics should want to 
change that and call themselves not citizens of a country, as miserably we 
still say, but citizens of the cosmos, citizens of the globe, of the universe, if 
it is that this universe is a cosmos and not a chaos as it often seems to be.
2
  
 
If the stoic cosmos indicates a universal order, Borges introduces it as dialectically 
linked to chaos. But Borges does not propose a stoic overcoming of chaos by cosmos. 
Writing on the eve of Argentina’s 1983 democratic elections, after seven years of rule 
by the Junta with its Guerra Sucia [Dirty War] against the civilian population, Borges 
observes that it is ‘almost a blasphemy to think that what was given to us on that date 
[the democratic election] is the victory of one party and the defeat of the other. We 
faced a chaos which, that day, made the decision to be a cosmos’ (TR3 307). This 
miraculous transition from dictatorship (chaos) to democracy (cosmos) overcomes, with 
‘an act of faith’, the illogical with the logical. However, Borges does not 
unconditionally accept this stoic logic, since he qualifies his statement by declaring ‘my 
utopia continues to be a country or a world without a state, or with the minimum of a 
state, but I understand, not without sadness, that this utopia is premature’ (TR3 307). 
Borges’s apparent stoicism is undercut by his disavowal of a world state. Despite his 
celebration of the cosmos, we find a veiled repetition of the difference between the 
European and the Argentinian, given in ‘Nuestro Pobre Individualismo [Our Poor 
                                                          
1 Borges, ‘Homenaje a Victoria Ocampo’, Borges en Sur: 1931-1980 (Buenos Aires: Emecé S.A., 1999), 
327. 
2 Ibid, 326. 
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Individualism]’ in Otras Inquisiciones [Other Inquisitions] thirty years before: ‘The 
world, for the European, is a cosmos in which each person fits intimately with their 
function; for the Argentinian, it is a chaos’ (OC2 40). While the Argentinian is capable 
of a miraculous transformation from chaos to cosmos, this transition comes at the 
expense of utopia, which operates outside of the state.
3
  
‘Cosmos’ becomes properly dialectical when Borges shifts his thoughts on 
democracy between 1976 and 1983. He closes his prologue to the poetry collection La 
moneda de hierro [The Money of Iron], dated 27
th 
of July 1976, with habitual disavowal 
and damnation: ‘I know myself above all unworthy to comment on political material, 
but perhaps I may be pardoned for adding that I do not believe in democracy, that 
curious abuse of statistics’ (OC3 136). Yet, he begins the aforementioned ‘The Ultimate 
Sunday of October’ by recanting this statement: ‘I once wrote that democracy is an 
abuse of statistics; I have invoked that opinion of Carlyle many times, that he defined it 
as chaos armed with ballot boxes. On the 30
th
 of October of 1983, Argentine democracy 
refuted me splendidly’ (TR3 307). Martín Plot attaches some significance to this 
                                                          
3 Borges almost certainly derives this binary from the division between ‘civilisation’ and ‘barbarism’ in 
the ‘founding’ text of Argentinian letters, Domingo Sarmiento’s 1845 biography, Facundo o Civilización 
y Barbarie en las pampas argentinas [Facundo; Or Civilisation and Barbarism on the Argentine 
Pampas]. Borges’s own gloss on this division, in his 1974 prologue to Facundo, is revealing:  
 
Facundo presents us with a dilemma [disyuntiva] – civilization or barbarism – which is 
applicable, I judge accordingly, to the entire process of our history. For Sarmiento, 
barbarism was the plains of the aboriginal tribes and of the gaucho; civilisation, the cities. 
The gaucho has been replaced by colonials and workers; barbarism is not only in the 
countryside but in the plebiscite of the greatest cities and the demagogue fulfils the 
function of the old caudillo, who was also a demagogue. (OC4 135) 
 
Civilisation, like the cosmos, always risks collapsing to the forces of ‘barbarism’ or chaos. Borges’s 
political conservatism in this regard is no more apparent than in his judgment that ‘barbarism is not only 
in the countryside’ and his references to the ‘demagogue’ and the ‘caudillo’. The caudillo, loosely 
translatable as ‘chief’ or ‘boss’, is a term for a figure in Argentinian history and literature who harnesses 
the ‘forces of barbarism’ to his own ends  through charisma and violence. The historical proximity of 
Borges’s Facundo prologue with Juan Perón’s return to power in 1973, when considered alongside the 
antipathy Borges felt for Perón, supports a reading of Borges’s comments on the caudillo as correlative to 
his criticisms of Perón as a figure of Argentinian barbarism. However, the prologue also recalls a division 
that operates from the very ‘beginning’ of Argentinian letters. 
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admission.
4
 For Plot, the essential distinction to be made is between politics, which did 
not interest Borges, and the political, ‘the form of society and not only the specific 
institutions and contingencies that characterize the sphere of politics in a given body 
politic’.5 Plot shows that Borges, in refuting the previous denunciation of democracy, is 
consistent with his essays of the 1940s, which condemn Nazism and totalitarianism. 
Plot’s argument is convincing, and might suggest that Borges is committed to a stoic 
recuperation of order from chaos. But two kynical points emerge in Borges’s notion of 
cosmopolitanism. First, the ideality of this cosmopolitanism is inconsistent with 
Borges’s notion of a historical generic. Second, in his openness to refutation, Borges 
suggests a problem with preconceived cosmopolitan ethics, since the surprising cosmos 
generated by historical events in 1983 refutes his earlier elitist cosmopolitanism, again 
by virtue of the historical generic. According to the historical generic, Borges’s 
cosmopolitanism seems less a belief in the transmigration of souls, which progresses 
successively and linearly, than the retrospective emergence of a series of historical 
eruptions, held together by a subject. Cosmos is not order because it follows a stoic 
world system; cosmos is order because it is redeemed from chaos by the faithful act of a 
kynical subject.6 We will return to this redemption when we unpack Borges’s ‘historical 
generic’ in our discussion of his kynicism.  
If Borges’s fractious relationship with Argentinian politics differentiates him 
from the stoic cosmopolitanism he talks about (we explore this relationship in detail in 
Chapter 2), Beckett’s understanding of cosmopolitanism must be introduced via his 
early satiric deprecations of the bourgeoisie. Beckett’s earliest work is marked by this 
satiric bent. His first presentation to Trinity College’s French department was a mock-
                                                          
4 Martín Plot, ‘Tlön as Political Form: Democracy and Totalitarianism in Borges and Lefort’, 
Constellations, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2012).  
5 Ibid, 463. 
6 My thoughts on Borges’s historical generic are indebted to Alain Badiou’s phenomenology of the 
subject in Logics of Worlds, trans. Alberto Toscano (London: Continuum, 2009). 
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analysis of the fictional artist, Jean du Chas: founder of the ‘art-movement’, 
‘Concentrisme [Concentrism]’ (Disj 35). His earliest dramatic contribution was to the 
1931 Trinity College parody of Corneille’s Le Cid, Le Kid.7 His earliest novel, Dream 
of Fair to Middling Women, parodies the bourgeois sensibilities the protagonist 
Belacqua encounters in his dreams across Dublin, Vienna and Paris.
8
 But it is in 
Beckett’s essay in Our Exagmination Round His Factification for Incamination of Work 
in Progress (1929), ‘Dante . . . Bruno. Vico . . Joyce’, that we find his kynical 
antagonism to bourgeois sensibility combined with some thoughts on cosmopolitanism.   
In ‘Dante . . . Bruno. Vico . . Joyce’, Beckett addresses the ‘Ladies and 
Gentlemen’ readers of Joyce’s Work in Progress, as ‘too decadent to receive it. You are 
not satisfied unless form is so strictly divorced from content that you can comprehend 
the one almost without bothering to read the other’ (SB4 502-3). He then goes on to coin 
the famous dictum: ‘Here form is content, content is form’ (SB4 503). He is addressing 
a complaint raised by potential uncomprehending readers: ‘You complain that this stuff 
is not written in English’ (SB4 503). He responds: ‘It is not written at all. It is not to be 
read – or rather it is not only to be read. It is to be looked at and listened to. His writing 
is not about something; it is that something itself’ (SB4 503). The value of Joyce’s 
writing, for Beckett, is not its capacity to represent, but its capacity to demonstrate. His 
justification for his support comes from the linguistic aspirations Joyce’s project shares 
with Dante’s De Vulgari Eloquentia [On Eloquence in the Vernacular].  
Beckett quotes De Vulgari Eloquentia in support of Dante’s (and Joyce’s) 
‘complete freedom from civic intolerance’ and as an attack on ‘the world’s 
Portadownians’: 
For whoever is so misguided as to think that the place of his birth is the 
most delightful spot under the sun may also believe that his own language 
                                                          
7 James Knowlson, Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett (New York: Grove Press. 1996), 123. 
8 Beckett, Dream of Fair to Middling Women, ed. Eoin O’Brien and Edith Fournier (Dublin: Black Cat 
Press, 1992). 
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– his mother tongue, that is – is pre-eminent among all others; and, as a 
result, he may believe that his language was also Adam's. But we, whose 
world is our homeland [Nos autem, cui mundus est patria] ... etc. (SB4 506-
7)
9
 
 
Here we find a stoic opposition between the parochial and the cosmopolitan: the 
cosmopolitan disrupts the parochial’s assumed superiority by exposing its ignorance 
and bias. It recalls the argument between Kipling and Chesterton at the beginning of our 
Introduction. But two points push Beckett’s use of Dante’s work on synthetic language 
beyond stoic cosmopolitanism.
10
 
 First, Beckett’s use of a banal etc. suggests that the remainder of the passage 
says nothing substantially different or interesting. But Beckett’s erasure is telling. The 
full quote continues with a statement of cosmopolitan purpose, where Dante invokes the 
world as a homeland. This invocation is central to his defence of writing in a synthesis 
of various vulgates, instead of either Latin (the hegemonic language of scholarship, and, 
ironically, the language of Dante’s ‘defence’) or the Tuscan dialect. Beckett, on the 
other hand, edits Dante into a critique where a misguided love of homeland simply 
equates to a misguided love of home language.
11
  
Beckett’s challenge to language leads us to a second moment of kynical 
cosmopolitan interest: Beckett’s use of the term ‘Portadownians’. Portadown, referred 
to by Drew Milne as ‘a town at the heart of political and religious intolerance in the 
north of Ireland’, ‘proves baffling to all but the most local readings, readings which 
                                                          
9 Translation taken from Dante Alighieri, Dante: De Vulgari Eloquentia, ed. and trans. Steven Botterill 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 11-13 [final line adjusted]. Similarly, Borges describes all the world 
as the Argentinian’s patria in ‘The Argentine Writer and Tradition’. 
10 Synthetic languages are deliberate linguistic constructions. Dante, who creates an Italian vulgate 
through a composite of the Italian dialects, is invoked as a precursor to Joyce, because they both aim to 
create new languages. Beckett, by contrast, is more interested in evacuating tired language of its meaning:    
11 Beckett’s edit justifies not including Joyce in this study of post-Joycean writers: where Joyce writes a 
synthetic cosmopolitan language to ‘ruric or cospolite’, Beckett, Borges and Coetzee unwrite and 
undermine existing languages. James Joyce, Finnegans Wake [1939] (Basingstoke: Penguin Books, 
2000), 309. 
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mistakenly return Beckett to contexts from which he is in flight’.12 Milne interprets this 
attitude as a ‘modernist resistance to provincialism’ that, in its specificity, ‘cannot [...] 
be assimilated to an apolitical resistance to politics or to “the political” as such’.13 For 
Milne, the resolution of the problems highlighted in ‘the precarious lack of context 
afforded by Parisian exile’ lies in Beckett’s decision to write in French: ‘unlike Joyce, 
however, Beckett came to position his writing practice within the French-speaking 
world, and not just within the exiled English-language communities of modernist 
Paris’.14 Since ‘there is a residual claim for moral agency in [Beckett’s] stress on the 
particular amoral qualities of literary language’, which ‘falls short of a politics’, this 
resolution leads Milne to the logical deduction that ‘Beckett’s fictions still appear less 
assimilable to the political narratives of literary history, perhaps because the negation of 
language as an ethical or aesthetic system is so central to his writing’.15 Since he 
chooses to write in French in later life, but his relation to language in this choice is 
negative, Beckett does not identify with one side or the other in the dialectic between 
the parochial and the cosmopolitan. Neither does he become the proponent for a 
universal European internationalism (as implied by the positive endorsement of 
language’s synthetic potential that characterises the work of Dante or Joyce). He is 
critical of both responses, since each is likely to develop its own ‘Portadownians’.  
This mutual critique corresponds to a description of Beckett’s cosmopolitanism 
by Nels C. Pearson, for whom it  
speaks less to an idealistic post-statehood cosmopolitanism than to the 
postponement of national belonging that is experienced within, and in 
transit from, the ideologically contested, unsettled terrain of a decolonising 
‘homeland’.16     
                                                          
12 Drew Milne, ‘Attacking the World’s Portadownians: Beckett’s Early Politics’, Samuel Beckett 
Today/Aujourd’hui, Vol. 9. (2000), 281. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid, 282. 
15 Ibid, 284. 
16 Nels C. Pearson, ‘Beckett’s Cosmopolitan Ground’, Irish University Review: a Journal of Irish Studies 
(Autumn/Winter 2010), Abstract. 
- 37 - 
 
For Pearson, Beckett’s cosmopolitanism is neither fully stoic, ‘idealistic post-
statehood’, nor cynical, since it endorses a contestation of ideology. It occupies a 
kynical cosmopolitan space between stoicism and cynicism since it suspends modes of 
belonging. However, Pearson’s use of ‘postponement’ suggests a weak messianism, in 
which national belonging may eventually be realised (as happened in the Republic of 
Ireland’s celebrations during the Beckett centenary in 2006). Contrary to Pearson, 
Beckett’s cosmopolitanism is characterised by a resistance to the violence inherent in 
systemic modes of reasoning, without recourse to this messianism.
17
 
Beckett manifests this resistance since he is less concerned with the 
accumulation of allegorical significance than with a human figure unencumbered by 
‘unimportant accidentals’. ‘Whether somebody has got a nice suit or not […] has 
nothing to do with his essential soul. And therefore if you put him into a tramp’s 
clothes, people don’t think about the suit’.18 P.J. Murphy shows how Beckett’s tramps 
reconfigure our understanding of this relationship between self and world in 
Reconstructing Beckett.
19
 Murphy argues that  
a radically new interpretation of Beckett’s prose would be possible if we 
proceeded from the ultimately more defensible assumption that he is trying 
to discover new means of integrating self and fiction and word and world, 
rather than being guided by the need to deny the power of the words to 
express, the so-called art of failure which has fascinated so many Beckett 
critics.
20
 
 
Murphy traces Beckett’s innovations of form in prose after L’Innommable (1953), 
noting particularly of Textes pour rien [Texts for Nothing] (1956), ‘There is an 
                                                          
17 Ruby Cohn links Beckett to Joyce on the question of cosmopolitanism. Cohn differentiates Joyce, for 
whom ‘Dublin becomes a cosmos’, from Beckett, for whom the cosmos is ‘always the monotonous 
human habitat’: ‘Joyce attempting to embrace all knowledge, all experience, all language; Beckett 
doubting all knowledge, all experience, all language, and doubting even the Cartesian tradition of doubt’. 
Ruby Cohn, ‘Irish Cosmopolitans: Joyce and Beckett’, James Joyce Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1971), 390; 
391. 
18 Martin Esslin, ‘On his debt to Joyce’, Beckett Remembering/Remembering Beckett: A Centenary 
Celebration, eds. James and Elizabeth Knowlson (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2006), 49. 
19 P.J. Murphy, Reconstructing Beckett: Language for Being in Samuel Beckett’s Fiction (Toronto: 
Toronto UP, 1990).  
20 Ibid, xv. 
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unmistakeable turning towards the world and the fundamental problem of relocating the 
self which has fallen into the no-man’s land of fictional being’.21 Contrary to many 
critics, Murphy argues that Texts for Nothing are not ‘failures’ but an attempt to use 
language and rhetoric to ‘integrate this self with the world’.22 Like the philosopher 
Alain Badiou, Murphy suggests a shift in Beckett scholarship away from Beckett as an 
‘artist of failure’ towards a more affirmatory Beckett.23 The difference between Badiou 
and Murphy lies in Murphy’s appeal to ‘reconstructing’ a link between self and world, 
where Badiou would understand the self/subject to be constructed by a new world 
brought into being by an event. Beckett falls somewhere between these points: however 
influenced he might be by Badiou’s artistic Event, Beckett is not an artist who 
constructs a utopian system; rather, he finds ways of creating art in an already existing 
world. Ultimately this is not done to reconstruct a link with the world, but to expose the 
flaccidity of claims that such a link ever ceased to exist.24  
Beckett’s kynical cosmopolitan impulse to expose some already existing thing is 
found in his short radio piece about the Irish Red Cross Hospital in the town of Saint-
Lô, written shortly after World War II for Radio Éireann and titled ‘The Capital of the 
Ruins’.25 This piece attempts to ‘correct Irish parochialism’ in ‘sensible people who 
would rather have news of the Norman’s semi-circular canals or resistance to sulphur 
than of his attitude to the Irish bringing gifts’, and thus resonates with earlier attacks on 
Irish parochialism in Che Sciagura and ‘Censorship in the Saorstat’.26 But it extends 
                                                          
21 Ibid, 34. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Alain Badiou, On Beckett, trans. Alberto Toscano and Nina Power (London: Clinamen, 2003). 
24 ‘For Beckett, the world is always already how it is’. Steven Connor, Samuel Beckett: Repetition, 
Theory and Text (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1988), 44. Connor, in his recent reconsideration of 
Beckett and ‘worlding’, notes that ‘the paradox of Beckett’s writing is that, while he continues to try, or 
feint to try, to detach his characters from “the world”, or to limn various forms of “little world” against 
the “big world” of the polis, a copular form of being-there is always necessary for him’. Steven Connor, 
Beckett, Modernism and the Material Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014), 180. 
25 Beckett, ‘The Capital of the Ruins’, As the Story was Told: Uncollected and Late Prose (London and 
New York: John Calder and Riverrun Press, 1990). 
26 Dougald McMillan, ‘Introduction’, As the Story was Told, 15; Beckett, ‘The Capital of the Ruins’, 22. 
- 39 - 
beyond a simple polemic on parochialism when it notes that ‘the therapeutic relation 
faded to the merest of pretexts’:  
What was important was [...] the occasional glimpse [...] of that smile at 
human conditions as little to be extinguished by bombs as to be broadened 
by the elixirs of Burroughs and Welcome, – the smile deriding, among 
other things, the having and the not having, the giving and the taking, 
sickness and health [...] They got indeed what they could hardly give, a 
vision and sense of a time-honoured conception of humanity in ruins, and 
perhaps even an inkling of the terms in which our condition is to be 
thought again. These will have been in France.
27
 
 
While Beckett links these observations to France, the insights are about a shared 
humanity that derides (without transcending) possession and lack. Thus their substance 
is not the revision of a ruined humanity into some utopian ideal. At best, it gives ‘an 
inkling of the terms’ needed to rethink our condition. ‘What they get’ is a vision of the 
world as it is, and what must be done for it. 
Coetzee presents his kynical cosmopolitanism in similarly pragmatic terms, as 
we will find in two presentations given twenty-seven years apart: Coetzee’s 1981 CNA 
Prize Speech and the uncharacteristically direct presentation at the 2008 literary festival 
Kosmopolis. Addressed to a local South African audience on the occasion of a local 
prize, the CNA Prize Speech might seem completely irrelevant to a speech given in 
Barcelona in 2008 to some transnational artists. However, a consistent ethic is present in 
both.  
Peter McDonald’s close reading of the CNA Prize Speech demonstrates 
Coetzee’s concern with creating a provincial writer not caught between ‘pitying 
ourselves our provincial lot, or plotting an escape to the metropolis’.28 Coetzee’s 
concern with provincialism, McDonald argues, proposes ‘a “more constructive” 
alternative both to these atavistic colonialist sentiments and to the cultural nationalizer’s 
                                                          
27 Ibid, 23-4; 27-8. 
28 Coetzee qtd. Peter D. McDonald, The Literature Police: Apartheid Censorship and its Cultural 
Consequences [2009] (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010), 305. 
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politically motivated counter-project’.29 In other words, Coetzee does not formulate the 
worldly cosmopolitanism of Chesterton’s Kipling (see Introduction).30 Nor does he seek 
to ‘root’ this cosmopolitanism, as Chesterton himself might. Rather than aim for ‘an 
“authentically South African” art’ – since ‘demands of this kind come out of a naive, 
idle and typically metropolitan yearning for the exotic’ – Coetzee ‘was attempting to 
position himself on an alternative, necessarily inexact, and specifically literary map and 
to create space for his own metropolitan “affiliations”’.31 Thus we may agree with 
McDonald’s assessment that Coetzee’s ‘identification with a cosmopolitan modernist 
literary heritage [...] was considered at best contentious, at worst politically 
irresponsible’.32 It ran counter to the ideals of ‘critical realism’ that prevailed in South 
African letters in the 70s and 80s. However, we advance McDonald’s complex layering 
of fiction and history by arguing that it is precisely the ‘cosmopolitan’ aspect of his 
project that is politically responsible. Accepting a redefined sense of provincialism is, in 
1981, a bid to rethink the provincial’s relationship to nation and metropole in a way that 
accepts ‘provincialism’ as being ‘without ignominy’, since the real problem for writers 
is the more prosaic, ‘daily problem of wedding subject matter, or content, to form’.33 
Coetzee’s cosmopolitanism undercuts the idealities of transnational, rooted, or 
vernacular cosmopolitanisms by insisting that what writers really share is the daily toil 
of writing. Coetzee’s pragmatic cosmopolitanism arises again in the Kosmopolis 
address, which stresses the need to approach problems (albeit problems of a more 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 This contradicts those valuable studies by Robert Spencer (2011) and Katherine Stanton (2005), who 
establish Coetzee within a cosmopolitanism defined as a multivalent form of belonging. Spencer, who 
reads a demand for action in Coetzee, comes closest to the argument about ‘mere acts’ in Chapter 4. 
However, Katherine Hallemeier (2013) convincingly shows Coetzee’s cosmopolitanism to be a critique of 
sympathy, rather than, as Spencer has it, engendering ‘imaginative sympathy’. If Hallemeier’s work on 
Coetzee’s cosmopolitanism is most consistent with this thesis, the directions diverge: she examines the 
limits of cosmopolitan feeling, where I argue for a cosmopolitanism based in the disruption of 
psychopersonal wholeness and comprehensive political systems. Robert Spencer, Cosmopolitan Criticism 
and Postcolonial Literatures (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 137.    
31 McDonald, The Literature Police, 305; 306. 
32 Ibid, 306. 
33 Ibid, 305; 304. 
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social, less ‘writerly’ nature) as part of daily life, from the ground, rather than through a 
rhetoric of high ideals.  
In the second address, Coetzee lays out the problems facing the world as he sees 
them: ‘the question of how we are to act in the face of global warming, rising food 
prices, famine and so forth’. But, Coetzee surprises us,  
the answer to [the question] is not obscure. We all know in broad terms 
how we should act. We should drive cars much less than we do, we should 
invest money in natural sources of energy like wind power, we should stop 
feeding grain to livestock etc etc. The sole question that remains is whether 
we, at an individual level and at a social and political level, are prepared to 
put into practice what our reason tells us? Whether we are prepared to 
act?
34
 
 
Coetzee puts forward a cosmopolitan ethics that does not aspire to a utopian ideal or 
celebrate an already-existing cosmopolitanism. Rather, it suggests that the questions 
facing humanity today are not obscure or difficult to answer or abstract in their 
consequences. The obligation is, in fact, quite evident: a mere obligation. The question 
is simply how prepared ‘we’ are to act.35 Coetzee’s insistence on the ‘concrete meaning’ 
of such questions, and on the role that writers have in bringing ‘that real meaning home 
to society’, suggests the local concerns of the CNA Prize Speech, and how such local 
concerns are connected with the wider world. Moreover, the position of the writer in 
this relationship seems very close to that of the kynic in Ancient Greece, since it 
addresses precisely those ‘comforts’ that we are not willing to give up: this kynical 
responsibility to bring truths home to society defines the practice of the kynic and gives 
purpose to his acts.  
                                                          
34 Coetzee, ‘Diari du mal any’, Kosmopolis: 2008. Centro de Cultura Contemporània de Barcelona. 
Accessed: 14 April 2013. http://www.cccb.org/kosmopolis/en/participant-j_m_coetzee-22441 
35 Carrol Clarkson examines how the ironic use of the ‘we’ in post-apartheid literature challenges 
dominant discursive attempts to construct community in South Africa (for instance, the reference to South 
Africa as ‘the Rainbow Nation’). In the Kosmopolis address, Coetzee acknowledges the need to question 
this ‘we’, while making humanity an inevitable community in its need to act. Carrol Clarkson, ‘Who are 
“we”? Don’t make me laugh’, Law and Critique, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Oct, 2007). 
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Between Kynicism and Cynicism 
 
Diogenes’s most demonstrative philosophical acts are his refutation of Zeno’s 
paradoxes and his response to the notion of Platonic forms.
36
 Faced with Zeno’s claim 
that motion was impossible, because all movement is infinitely subdivisible, he stood up 
and walked around.
37
 When Plato described his philosophy of forms using terms like 
‘tablehood’ and ‘cuphood’, he famously said, ‘Table and cup I see; but your tablehood 
and cuphood, Plato, I can nowise see’.38 Zeno’s paradoxes and the problem of Platonic 
forms fascinate Borges, Beckett and Coetzee. Zeno’s paradox of infinite divisibility 
places a gap between either individuals and groups or beginnings and endings that the 
writers can only leap over with an unequivocal gesture.
39
 The question of Platonic 
forms leads to the recurrent problem with nominalism: each writer, unable to see the 
ideal, seems to endorse the particular at the expense of the universal.
40
 At the same time, 
since each oeuvre evinces a particular ethos, this nominalism is not uncoupled from a 
belief in virtue and consistency. We will consider how this philosophical tension comes 
to the fore in a variety of different ways, not least in political response.   
                                                          
36 ‘Achilles runs ten times faster than the tortoise and gives him a start of ten meters. Achilles runs those 
ten meters, the tortoise runs one; Achilles runs that meter, the tortoise runs a decimeter; Achilles runs that 
decimeter, the tortoise runs a centimeter; Achilles runs that centimeter, the tortoise, a millimeter; Achilles 
the Nimble-Footed, the millimeter, the tortoise a tenth of a millimeter, and so on ad infinitum, with 
Achilles never overtaking the tortoise. This is the usual version’ (TL 43). 
37 DL, 6.39. 
38 DL, 6.53. 
39 Clov remarks on this gap in Endgame, when he observes: ‘Grain upon grain, one by one, and one day, 
suddenly, there’s a heap, a little heap, the impossible heap’ (SB3 92). When Red Scharlach kills Lönnrot 
in Borges’s ‘El muerte y la brújula’, Lönnrot makes an opaque reference to Zeno’s paradox of motion. 
This makes Scharlach’s gunshot at the end ambiguous: ‘He retreated a few paces. After, very carefully, he 
fired’ (OC1 544). Since one of Zeno’s paradoxes follows the flight of an arrow that can never reach its 
target, it is only the reader’s assumption of a resolution that permits Scharlach’s bullet to reach Lönnrot’s 
chest. In Coetzee’s Dusklands, Jacobus Coetzee contemplates a beetle that does not respond to its legs 
being pulled off: ‘It is only when you pull the head off his body that a tiny insect shudder runs through 
him’ (Du 96-7). This Zeno Beetle exemplifies how the secret of life regresses infinitely. 
40 Here, nominalism describes the metaphysical position in philosophy that accepts the existence of 
particular objects but not that of their universal or abstract counterparts. Realism, taken as the opposite of 
nominalism, designates a belief in universal forms, of which real objects are but shadowy imitations. 
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A certain political truculence in Borges may account for his interest in 
Diogenes’s encounter with Alexander the Great.41 This story forms the basis for our 
consideration of the relation between the writer and the state. But it is also part of a 
wider aesthetic of reduction in the work of Beckett and Coetzee, which has a direct 
impact on their considerations of politics and society. We find the counterpart of this 
reduction to essentials in Diogenes’s rejection of worldly possessions, epitomised by his 
encounter with a small boy.
42
 He sees a boy drinking water with his hand. This inspires 
him to break his drinking bowl, saying he obviously does not need it. This raises the 
theme of stripping away excess, but also of the recurrent figure in Borges, Beckett and 
Coetzee of the intellectual-brought-low, the beggar or the dog-man (which is to say, the 
kynic).
43
 
Hegel dismissed the kynics as ‘shameless’ because of their association with 
dogs. While he made an exception in his lecture for Antisthenes and Diogenes as ‘men 
of great culture’, he said that ‘the succeeding [k]ynics are not any the less conspicuous 
by their exceeding shamelessness, for they were, generally speaking, nothing more than 
swinish beggars’.44 ‘They deserve in its full the name dog [...] for the dog is a shameless 
animal’.45 Since Hegel’s diagnosis of the kynics’ shamelessness stems from their 
flaunting of social conventions, the kynics’ engagement with shame seems more 
complex than the simple ignorance or lack of shame. If shame is necessary, universal 
and ontological, as has been demonstrated by philosophers from Jean-Paul Sartre to 
Giorgio Agamben, then ‘shamelessness’ must be impossible, a disavowal or a highly 
                                                          
41 DL, 6.38. 
42 DL, 6.37. 
43 A cursory list would include Borges’s Homer, Beckett’s Molloy and Coetzee’s David Lurie. In ‘El 
inmortal [The Immortal]’, Borges depicts a Homer brought so low that he is ‘named’ Argos, after 
Odysseus’s dog. Molloy, in Beckett’s Molloy, ‘becomes’ the dog of Loy or Lousse after he runs the dog 
over with his bicycle. Coetzee’s work presents a variety of dog men, which we enumerate later in this 
chapter.   
44 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Greek Philosophy to Plato, 
trans. E.S. Haldane, intro. Fredrick C. Beiser (Lincoln: Nebraska UP, 1995), 481.  
45 Ibid, 481. 
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sophisticated engagement with that category. In a similar sense, shame problematises 
the subject in Borges, Beckett and Coetzee, as a number of studies have shown.
46
 But, 
shame also presents these subjects with the opportunity to become agents, since they 
often assert their subjectivity by avowing their shame.
47
 Moreover, it is generic to all 
three writers that the subject only becomes a subject by accepting intellectual 
humiliation through a renewed engagement with the body, an engagement that is often 
metaphorically associated with animals (usually dogs). 
This leads us to our examination of the role of the kynic in Borges, Beckett and 
Coetzee. Borges makes explicit reference to Diogenes of Sinope in a parable-essay 
entitled, ‘Dialogos del asceta y del rey [Dialogues of the ascetic and the king]’. ‘A 
king’, Borges writes, ‘is a plenitude, an ascetic is nothing or wants to be nothing; people 
like to imagine dialogues between those two archetypes. I have here some examples, 
derived from Eastern and Western sources’ (TR2 302). These archetypes appear to have 
an implicit universal history with a cosmopolitan ideal, as they purport to focus on the 
generic quality of the relationship, irrespective of cultural origin, rather than on the 
particularity of the parable examples Borges selects.
48
 However, the examples are 
themselves noteworthy, since the relationship evolves from situation to situation. This 
suggests that Borges creates a generic that adapts to historical circumstance. 
                                                          
46 The most comprehensive is Timothy Bewes’s treatment of Coetzee in The Event of Postcolonial Shame 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2011). Borges’s essay relating shame to history (‘El pudor de la historia [The 
Shame of History]’) has been mentioned briefly in Kate Jenckes, Reading Borges After Benjamin: 
Allegory, Afterlife, and the Writing of History (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), 107-8. Shame in Beckett has 
been considered in relation to Blanchot, Foucault and Agamben by Russell Smith (2007) and David 
Houston Jones (2011).  
47 See, for example, Emma Zunz’s use of shame to justify her murder of Aaron Loewenthal in Borges’s 
‘Emma Zunz’, the narrator of ‘Text 12’ in Beckett’s Textes pour rien [Texts for Nothing], whose ‘old 
shame that kept me from living’ does not keep the narrator from speaking, and Jacobus Coetzee who 
derides the Nama as failing to do much more in their assaults on his person than ‘fall upon my shame’. 
48 Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ develops nine theses in which 
history allows rational beings to discern ‘a steady and progressive though slow evolution’ in the 
appearances of the human will. Kant proposes a universal history to prove that a universal cosmopolitan 
condition is in a natural process of coming into being (a stoic prolepsis); Borges’s universal history 
satirises Kant’s understanding of nature, since, for Borges, any movement towards order is dialectically 
linked to the chaos that Kant’s cosmopolitanism seeks to efface. Immanuel Kant, ‘Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’, Kant: Political Writings, 41.      
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Borges’s first example is an exchange of letters between Heraclites and Darius 
the Great, in which Heraclites politely refuses an invitation from Darius to visit his 
palace. His reason for doing so is to avoid ‘palacial vanities’. Borges attaches a great 
significance to this ‘trivial’ reason. ‘Beneath the trivial surface lies the obscure 
contraposition of symbols and the magic that zero, the ascetic, could equal and 
overcome in some way the infinite king’ (TR2 302). This ‘magic’, Edwin Williamson 
glosses, ‘which gives the ascete the power to equal or overcome the “infinite king” is 
the idea that both self and world are transient and illusory’.49 Williamson then 
contextualises this response in Borges’s reaction against Argentina’s president of the 
time, Juan Domingo Perón. We will return to this context in due course, but Williamson 
is too quick to explain the encounter with reference to transience and illusion. Self and 
world are transient: the king is as aware of this as the ascetic, since it is this that 
fascinates him about the ascetic. The power is rather in the ability to oppose or deny the 
wishes of the king; that even though the self is illusory, it can still assert its agency by 
excepting itself from the rule of the state.  
Borges develops this possibility in his second example: the famous exchange 
between Diogenes and Alexander, where Diogenes asks Alexander to step out of his 
sun. Borges uses this second example to rework his initial notion of ‘overcoming’ into 
‘identification’.50 The opposition Borges constructs, between the ascetic (read kynic) 
and the king, is underscored by a secret identity. Not only is the ascetic able to match or 
even best the monarch, on some level the ascetic and the monarch are made one by 
virtue of their dialectical relationship.
51
  
                                                          
49 Edwin Williamson, ‘Borges against Perón: A Contextual Approach to “El Fin”’, Romanic Review, Vol. 
98, No. 2/3 (Mar-May 2007), 276. 
50 ‘This anecdote (repeated in the pages of Plutarch) opposes the two interlocutors: others, one would say, 
suggest a secret identity. Alexander says to the courtesans that if he were not Alexander, he would want 
to be Diogenes, and the day that one dies in Babylon, the other dies in Corinth’ (TR2 303). 
51 This unity of opposites or enemies is a particularly important theme in Borges’s ficciones, particularly 
‘The Theologians’, ‘The Waiting’ and ‘Three Versions of Judas’, where enemies often merge or turn out 
to be the same person. See Eva Horn’s account of how Borges dramatises this through his use of the duel. 
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The generic quality of the relationship is by no means fixed. Each example shifts 
the boundaries of the generic, which indicates that these types are not static nor do they 
conform to a regulative generic structure. The generic (tradition) is altered by the 
examples (individuals) that make it up. When this ‘tradition’ is translocated from a 
language of genus and individual to a language of universals and historical particulars, 
we find an interesting tension between Platonic forms and their manifestations. Any 
universal is necessarily in relationship with its historical manifestation. This tension 
between universal, realist form and its particular, nominalist example is one that 
occupies Borges at various points in his work. He calls it the precedent conflict between 
Platonists (universal realists) and Aristotelians (nominalists), a conflict Borges judges 
all but won by the Aristotelians.
52
  
Is Borges a nominalist who cynically dismisses Platonic ‘tableness’ and 
‘cupness’?53 Certainly, in his 1968 ‘Nota sobre los argentinos [Note on the 
Argentinians]’, Borges specifically disowns the generic and declares himself a 
nominalist: ‘To speak of the Argentinian is to speak of a generic type; I am, in the 
English way, a nominalist and disbelieve [descreo] generic types’ (TR3 270). This 
seems to be a dissimulation, as he then ‘hazards some approximate observation’, albeit 
with ‘the resigned conviction that hundreds and even thousands of objections may be 
raised against it’, that certain qualities distinguish the Argentinian: ‘imaginative penury’ 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Eva Horn, ‘Borges’s Duels: Friends, Enemies, and the Fictions of History’, Thinking with Borges, eds. 
William Egginton and David E. Johnson (Aurora: The Davies Group, 2009). 
52 ‘Coleridge observes that all people are born Aristotelians or Platonists […] Nominalism […] today 
includes all people; its victory is so vast and fundamental that its name is useless. No one calls themselves 
a nominalist because no one is anything else’ (OC2 131-2). 
53 Noé Jitrik also responds to Borges’s ‘kynicism’.  
 
In reality he is not concerned with Blacks or Indians or the disappeared or Alfonso Reyes, or 
even the Peronists, around whom a wealth of comments has been generated, or soccer players. 
What he is concerned about, in moderation, is or would be the way in which he channels 
something, which in order to be brief, we could call his ‘cynicism’. Noé Jitrik, ‘Complex 
Feelings about Borges’ [1981], The Noé Jitrik Reader: Selected Essays on Latin American 
Literature, ed. Daniel Balderston, trans. Susan Benner (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 2005), 8-9. 
 
I discuss this further in Chapter 2. 
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and ‘the lack of moral sense’ (TR3 270). Although he does not believe in generic types, 
he does observe that they exist as long as they have a basis in historical example. 
Returning to a moment of kynical clarity in ‘Nota sobre los argentinos’, we see the 
impact of the realist-nominalist dialectic in Borges’s response to political dictatorship:  
Every hundred years, Buenos Aires engenders a dictator that is in some 
mode always the same. At the end of a variable term, the provinces – let it 
be known I am from Buenos Aires [soy porteño] – have to come to save us. 
In 1852 it was Entre Ríos; in 1955 it was Córdoba. (TR3 270) 
 
History repeats itself, and this is what forms the generic for Borges. First, Buenos Aires 
was ruled by Juan Manuel de Rosas (until he was overthrown at the 1852 Battle of 
Caseros by an alliance between Argentina’s provinces and Brazil, under the leadership 
of Justo José de Urquiza of Entre Ríos). Then Argentina was ruled by Perón (until he 
was overthrown by a military coup on the 19
th
 of September 1955, organised from 
Córdoba and self-styled as the Revolución Libertadora [Liberating Revolution]).  
Borges, in asserting the repetition, is politically partisan. He uses the brutality of 
Juan Rosas’s reign (a historical given) to justify a personal antipathy to Perón.54 Perón, 
when he took power in 1946, ‘promoted’ Borges from the municipal library to 
inspecting chickens in the market. Borges responded in a succession of texts and 
interviews over the 1940s and 1950s with stories of an all-powerful ruler in conflict 
with a powerless poet or thinker.
55
 Sympathetic readings of Borges identify a repetition 
                                                          
54 This mutual antipathy may explain why Borges was himself temporarily won over by ‘palacial 
vanities’ in 1976. He accepted an invitation to dine at Argentina’s presidential mansion, La Casa Rosada 
[The Pink House], from the leaders of the ruling military Junta. Borges infamously thanked General Jorge 
Videla, leader of the Junta, ‘for what he had done for the patria, having saved it from chaos, from the 
abject state we were in, and, above all, from idiocy’, and later would remark to a newspaper in Spain 
(Cambio 16) that the Dictadura was ‘a government of soldiers, of gentlemen, of decent people’. Borges 
qtd. Edwin Williamson Borges: A Life (New York: Viking Penguin, 2004), 422; 425. Evidence of an 
extremely problematic conservativism on Borges’s part, these responses have been explained by his 
sympathisers as being less responses to the Junta than reactions against the perceived chaos of Peronism. 
See Beatriz Sarlo, Jorge Luis Borges: A Writer on the Edge (London: Verso, 1993); Daniel Balderston, 
Out of Context? Historical Reference and the Representation of Reality in Borges (Durham, NC: Duke 
UP, 1993). The Junta, between 1976 and 1983, would be responsible for the disappearances of over 8,000 
people. Lindsay DuBois, The Politics of the Past in an Argentine Working-Class Neighbourhood 
(Toronto: Toronto UP, 2005), 246. 
55 The examples worth noting are, on the one hand, the stories, poems and short texts, such as ‘El fin [The 
End]’ (1953), ‘Parábola del palacio [Parable of the Palace]’ (1956) through to the comparatively late ‘El 
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of Borges’s reaction to Perón during Perón’s first presidency, from 1946-1955, in 
Borges’s reaction to Perón during his second presidency, from 1973-1974, and in the 
aftermath of his death in 1974. But this repetition still suggests that the historical view 
of Perón impinges on Borges’s generic treatment of authority in particularly interesting 
political and aesthetic ways, not least because the generic, for Borges, is always affected 
by his own political subjectivity. Bruno Bosteels clearly marks this involvement 
between the generic and political subjectivity in Borges’s work.   
Bosteels historicises Borges’s subjectivity within a discourse of political 
economy that, if it does not mention the kynics specifically, relies on the aesthetic use 
of the liminal figure of the beggar.
56
 Although Bosteels does not deal with Perón in 
depth, he does identify a mode of political economy in Borges’s ‘Diálogos’ that is 
repeated in other work: ‘beggars, like madmen or the mentally insane for the philosophy 
of the modern cogito, are the limit-figures of classical political economy’.57 Even if 
                                                                                                                                                                          
espejo y la mascara’ (1976), and, on the other hand, the speeches, letters and newspaper articles Borges 
writes in response to his ‘promotion’ and to questions of systemic violence. 
56 Bosteels and Martín Plot have produced work that highlights the shift from the broadly historical and 
contextual work of Beatriz Sarlo, Daniel Balderston, and Jaime Alazraki to the contemporary interest in 
Borges’s political thought. Where the historical response, prototyped by Alazraki in the 1970s, saw its 
heyday following the publication of Sarlo’s Borges: A Writer on the Edge in 1993, the recent trend has 
been to focus that context into studies of Borges’s political thought. This distinction begins to be apparent 
with the publication of works such as José Eduardo González’s Borges and the Politics of Form (1998) 
and Antonio Gómez López-Quiñones’s Borges y el nazismo: Sur 1937-1946 (2004), anticipated by Edna 
Aizenberg’s examination of Borges’s affinity with Judaism and political writings against Nazism (1997).  
57 Bruno Bosteels, ‘Beggars Banquet: For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign in Borges’, 
Variaciones Borges, Vol. 29 (2010), 14. This is particularly true, Bosteels notes, in the works of Borges, 
where the beggar functions as a threshold figure. Bosteels distinguishes between the treatment of the 
beggar as a literal threshold figure in the earlier Ficciones [Fictions] and the beggar as a representation of 
‘formal imbalance and social inequality’ in the later parables. In ‘Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius’, first 
published in Sur in 1940, Borges writes:  
 
Things duplicate themselves in Tlön; in the same way they tend to erase themselves and lose 
details when those details are forgotten by the people. The classic example is of a threshold that 
remains while a beggar visits it and is lost from sight at his death. (L 39) 
 
The object, in Tlön, is only possible if there is an observer to acknowledge its existence. Bosteels 
interprets this beggar to be quite literally the man of the threshold at the limit of idealism and death. By 
contrast, he writes,  
 
In both ‘The Mirror and the Mask’ (1975) and ‘On Rigor in Science’ (1946) […] the beggar 
appears as a liminal figure in the immanent critique of the ideal of equivalence, as both mimetic 
correspondence and economic balance. (Bosteels, ‘Beggars Banquet’, 13) 
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beggars are the limit-figures of classical political economy, substantially more evidence 
would be necessary to link the subtle evolution of the Borgesian beggar to Borges’s 
reaction to the political economy of Peronism. But Bosteels does demonstrate the 
increased significance the beggar had for enacting precisely the critique of hegemonic 
structures Borges is developing in ‘Diálogos del asceta y del rey’, as evinced by the 
third and fourth examples, which Borges takes from China and South Asia respectively, 
and which involve the eventual decision by the king to become a beggar. This further 
development of the ‘universal’ fable or parable occurs through the repetition of the 
generic in a variety of historical contexts, leading to a historicised form of universalism. 
If Borges uses Diogenes to challenge political economies, Beckett’s Diogenes is 
simply one more character in the history of Western philosophy. He first appears in 
Beckett’s ‘Interwar Notes’, transcribed from Windelband.58 
DIOGENES OF SINOPE (413-323) [...] 
Walking through Athens at midday holding a lighted lantern: ‘I am looking 
for a man’. 
 
Characteristic by-figure in the history of civilisation rather than a man of 
science. Owed his paradoxical popularity to the ostentatious jest of 
attempting to live in civilised Greece as if in a state of Nature. 
 
Conducted the education of the son of Xeniades, a Corinthian Sophist, 
according to principles of Cynic naturalism, and not without success.
59
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
The beggar in Tlön permits the threshold to exist; the beggar in ‘On Rigor in Science’, in occupying the 
remnants of the giant map that once covered the whole Empire and replicated it at a scale of 1:1, uses this 
threshold to remind the prudent gentlemen of Suárez Miranda’s Viajes de varones prudentes [Travels of 
Prudent Gentlemen] of discrepancies between presentation and representation in the Geographic 
Disciplines. Mercedes Blanco notes the similarity between ‘El espejo y la mascára’ and ‘Parábola del 
palacio’ in ‘La parábola y las paradojas: Paradojas matemáticas en un cuento de Borges’, Borges Studies 
Online. Accessed: 31 July 2012.  
http://www.borges.pitt.edu/bsol/mb.php 
58 In his ‘Interwar Notes’, Beckett made extensive transcriptions from at least three histories of 
philosophy: Archibald Alexander’s 1907 A Short History of Philosophy; John Burnet’s 1914 Greek 
Philosophy, Part I: Thales to Plato; and, by far the most important, Wilhelm Windelband’s 1902 edition 
of A History of Philosophy. See Matthew Feldman, Beckett’s Books: A Cultural History of the Interwar 
Notes (London: Continuum, 2006). John Burnet, Greek Philosophy, Part I: Thales to Plato (London: 
Macmillan and Co, 1914); Archibald Alexander, A Short History of Philosophy (Glasgow: Maclehose & 
Sons, 1907); Wilhelm Windelband, A History of Philosophy, trans. James Hayden Tufts (London: 
MacMillan, 1902).  
59 TCD MS 10967/68 qtd. Matthew Feldman, ‘Returning to Beckett Returning to the Presocratics, or, 
‘All their balls about being and existing’, Genetic Joyce Studies, No. 6 (Spring 2006), Accessed: 12 April 
2013. http://www.antwerpjamesjoycecenter.com/GJS6/GJS6Feldman.htm 
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Beckett repeats, via Windelband, generalisations we find in Hegel’s lectures: Diogenes 
as a by-figure rather than a man of science, enjoying a paradoxical popularity while 
making a jest of living in Greece as if in a state of Nature. While it provides a fair 
reflection on how Diogenes has been received by histories of Western philosophy, this 
note does not provide an influence. Matthew Feldman recalls these notes in All Strange 
Away (1963), where Beckett makes sardonic reference to the significance city names 
have to citations of ancient philosophers, recalling our previous citation of Borges on 
stoic city names: 
Imagine as needed, unsupported interjections, ancient Greek philosophers 
ejaculated with place of origin when possible suggesting pursuit of 
knowledge at some period [....] leaving sometimes in some doubt such 
things as which Diogenes. (SB4 354; emphases Feldman) 
  
Since Beckett also has a section on ‘Diogenes of Apollonia’, Feldman reasons that the 
‘Notes’ play a role in the evolution of this ‘monologue’ about a female interlocutor who 
‘leaves in some doubt such things as which Diogenes’. She ejaculates Greek 
philosophers ‘with place of origin when possible’ to suggest ‘pursuit of knowledge at 
some period’, as if naming a philosopher were the equivalent of understanding his or 
her work. While it is not unreasonable to assume a relationship with the ‘Notes’, 
Beckett had also received, on the 2
nd
 of July 1959, an honorary doctorate from Trinity 
College, Dublin, in which the public orator referred to him as ‘a modern Diogenes’.60 
Described as ‘amused’ by James Knowlson, Beckett might have also wondered to 
which Diogenes the orator was referring. This biographical criticism opens up a nexus 
of subject, art and material: the transformation of Beckett’s notes and/or the association 
made by the Trinity oration into a phrase that is less about Diogenes than about the 
deployment of names like Diogenes. Less influence than affinity, Beckett’s use of 
Diogenes’s name resonates with Diogenes’s desire to ‘deface the currency’ of names 
like Zeno and Plato.  
                                                          
60 Knowlson, Damned, 470. 
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We find this affinity again in an earlier comment that Beckett makes, structurally 
equivalent to the nominalist’s cynical preference for tables over the realist’s tablehood. 
It occurs in ‘La peinture des van Velde ou le Monde et le Pantalon [The Painting of the 
Van Veldes or The World and the Pants]’, an essay on the art of the Van Velde brothers, 
written for Cahiers d’art at the end of World War II. After detailing the highfalutin ‘art 
criticism’ ‘l’inoffensif loufoque [the inoffensive madman]’ might be exposed to, 
Beckett suggests the one thing the madman would never be told: ‘There is no painting. 
There are only paintings’ (Disj 123). Beckett’s critical response to the Platonic ideal of 
painting in contemporary art criticism is to say, like Diogenes, ‘I do not see painting, 
only paintings’.  
Borges’s and Beckett’s kynics are different. Borges’s kynic becomes a metaphor 
for the writer’s relation to politics (and to individual dictators), while Beckett’s kynic is 
an image that exposes the failings of bourgeois culture. This difference does not mean 
that Beckett fails to engage with politics.
61
 Links between this world in ruins, Beckett’s 
tramp and the ancient kynic have already been made, most notably in essays by Angela 
Moorjani and Willie Van Peer.
62
  
Moorjani and Van Peer both explore the potential explicative force that accounts 
of the kynics provide for understanding Beckett’s work. Moorjani examines the critique 
of social inequalities embodied by the kynic and its correspondence in Beckett’s work, 
but she does not commit unequivocally to a direct line of influence. She invokes Roger 
                                                          
61 Andrew Gibson has argued that Beckett’s postwar texts show Beckett’s nostalgia for the Third 
Republic and antipathy to the Fourth Republic, which emerged in the wake of Charles de Gaulle’s rule 
from 1944 to 1946. Despite echoes in Beckett’s relationship to de Gaulle of Borges’s relationship with 
Perón, Beckett’s antagonism to the Fourth Republic’s rhetoric of rejuvenation does not evoke Borges’s 
dialectic between the ascetic and the king. Andrew Gibson, ‘Beckett, De Gaulle and the Fourth Republic 
1944-49: L’Innommable and En Attendant Godot’, Limit{e} Beckett, No. 1 (2010). Accessed: 19 April 
2014. 
http://www.limitebeckett.paris-sorbonne.fr/one/gibson.html 
62 Angela Moorjani, ‘Diogenes Lampoons Alexandre Kojeve: Cultural Ghosts in Beckett’s Early French 
Plays’, Drawing on Beckett: Portraits, Performances and Cultural Contexts, ed. Linda Ben-Zvi (Tel 
Aviv: Assaph, 2003). Willie Van Peer, ‘Beckett’s “First Love” and Cynical Philosophy’, Samuel Beckett 
Today/Aujourd’hui, Vol. 7 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998).  
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Blin’s statement that Godot contained everything everyone saw in it, while disagreeing 
with the supplementary condition that Beckett had inscribed all these meanings into the 
text himself.
63
 Moorjani argues that while there are many strong implicatures (indirect 
messages) in the text, which constrain meaning to a particular context, there are also 
many weak implicatures, which do not do so. Moorjani identifies allusions to Diogenes 
and the kynic tradition in the weak implicatures of Beckett’s texts: dog men, tramps, 
philosophising by praxis. She finds this particularly in Molloy, when Molloy takes the 
place of Loy/Lousse’s dog. Van Peer suggests a stronger implicature of kynicism in 
Beckett’s texts, arguing not only that the characters of the story ‘First Love’ are ‘direct 
heirs’ to the kynical worldview, but that Beckett’s texts ‘aim to express and pass on the 
[k]ynical philosophy’.64   
This thesis will not trace kynic figures in the texts. Beckett’s kynical figures are 
interesting, but they ultimately obscure our point, which is that Beckett’s writing 
strategy is itself kynical and cosmopolitan. Beckett makes direct reference to the kynics 
in his texts. However, this is less significant for its allusive implications than for 
following Beckett’s kynical practice. J.M. Coetzee alerts us to a (failed) kynical subtext 
in Beckett’s writing, when he criticises Beckett’s failure to ‘dream up the whale’ 
(‘EWSB’ 24).65 But when Coetzee himself writes of kynicism and cosmopolitanism, the 
first trope comes from Beckett: the ‘dog man’.66 
In Coetzee, the most obvious evidence of the kynics is the recurrent trope of the 
‘dog man’, in which the protagonist is likened or gradually ‘reduced’ to the state of a 
                                                          
63 Moorjani, ‘Diogenes’, 69. 
64 Van Peer, ‘Cynical Philosophy’, 409. 
65 Coetzee is not referring to a failure to think of a textual project as vast as a whale; for Coetzee, Beckett 
fails to engage with otherness as extreme as Herman Melville’s white whale.  
66 Since the ‘dog man’ is a fairly static trope in Beckett, I have not subjected his use of it to the same 
scrutiny as Coetzee’s. There does, however, seem to be a parallel between the gradual reduction of the 
narrator’s body in the novellas – ‘Premier Amour [First Love]’ (1945), ‘L'Expulsé [The Expelled]’, ‘Le 
Calmant [The Calmative]’ and ‘La fin [The End]’ (1946) – and Three Novels – Molloy (1951), Malone 
meurt [Malone Dies] (1951) and L’Innommable [The Unnamable] (1953) – and the development of the 
‘dog man’ in Coetzee.  
- 53 - 
dog. The protagonist may be the beneficiary of political or economic disparities brought 
low, such as the Magistrate from Waiting for the Barbarians (1980) or David Lurie 
from Disgrace (1999). He may already be a vagrant (Vercueil in Age of Iron (1991)) or 
a vagrant in the making (Michael K in Life & Times of Michael K (1983)). The ‘dog 
man’ may be a description of a function or activity (as it is for Petrus in Disgrace) that 
develops into an ontological category (as it does for David). In this developmental 
capacity, it affects female characters as readily as male characters: Mrs Curren is 
‘reduced’ to the dispossessed state of Vercueil over the course of Age of Iron (whose 
classical allusions make it the most obvious point of reference for any discussion of the 
kynics).  Since the Magistrate repeatedly likens himself to a dog, in his eating habits,
67
 
his whining and his only possible way of dying,
68
 Coetzee’s preoccupation with dog 
men appears to begin in Waiting for the Barbarians, although the first use of the 
specific term ‘dog man’ is only in Age of Iron, with Vercueil. Michael K is only 
referred to in passing as being ‘like a dumb dog’, but his vagrancy, and his later 
engagement with December (a more urbane cynic), highlights Coetzee’s interest in this 
aspect of kynicism (LTMK 28). Vercueil, however, initiates a particular trajectory of the 
vagrant/dog man that passes through Age of Iron and The Master of Petersburg (1994), 
and culminates in Disgrace.  
In Age of Iron, this trope remains fairly straightforward. Mrs Curren, the aging 
classics professor dying of cancer in Cape Town, refers to Vercueil, the homeless man 
she finds outside her house, as a ‘dog-man’ because of his dog (AI 52). Mrs Curren 
herself will become a ‘dog-like’ vagrant, as she suffers the vicissitudes of traumas 
internal (her cancer), personal (her relationship with her estranged daughter), social (her 
relationships with black and white South Africans) and political (her relationships with 
activism and the Apartheid state). The version of this doubling – of Curren to Vercueil’s 
                                                          
67 He ‘guzzles’, ‘licks’ and ‘bolts’ his food ‘like a dog’ (WB 87; 136; 140).   
68 ‘There is no way of dying allowed me, it seems, except like a dog in a corner’ (WB 128). 
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‘model’ – presented in The Master of Petersburg is significantly more complex, where 
Dostoevski, Coetzee’s character based on the novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky, finds himself 
becoming the ‘dog-father’ to the ‘thing that does not concern him, a dog howling for its 
father’ (MP 80). Awakened by a dog howling in the street, Dostoevski originally 
mistakes it for his son Pavel, whose death he is investigating in St. Petersburg. He 
realises that it is ‘a dog, not his son’ (MP 80). This, in a paradoxical turn of logic, 
becomes the reason that he ‘must answer the call’: ‘Because it is not his son’ (MP 80). 
When he finds the dog, he frees her but he also asks himself whether he will be ‘peering 
into the eyes of dogs and beggars’ for the rest of his days. His link to dogs and beggars, 
to ‘fathering’ dogs and beggars, comes from a possible injunction he never receives 
from Pavel: ‘Raise up that least thing and cherish it’ (MP 81). But, if he knows that the 
words do not come from Pavel, working out what ‘that least thing’ might be is as 
difficult: ‘Is the dog the thing he must release and take with him and feed and cherish, 
or is it the filthy, drunken beggar in his tattered coat under the bridge?’ (MP 82). From 
Age of Iron’s identification with the ‘dog-man’, we move to the more complex task of 
parental surrogacy for both dog and man.  
These two readings coalesce in Disgrace, where, after David assumes the care of 
dogs from Petrus, Petrus will become the surrogate father of Lucy’s baby, the offspring 
of her rape by three youths. While Petrus originally occupies the role of the ‘dog man’ 
as a description of his work with dogs, David takes on the care of dogs, as well as 
‘becoming: stupid, daft, wrongheaded’ (D 64; 146). If being a ‘dog man’ shifts from a 
work function (as a part of the labour economy) to a way of being (as exempt from, or 
in excess of, the labour economy), this is not simply an elaboration of the doubling 
motif in Age of Iron. Petrus’s later declaration that he is ‘not any more the dog-man’ 
together with Lucy’s decision to give her land to Petrus and ‘to start at ground level [...] 
like a dog’ suggest that paternal surrogacy has a particularly important political 
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currency in undermining ‘essential’ familial relationships (D 129; 205).69 What was a 
trope in Age of Iron has become something more structurally integral to Disgrace.  
Kai Wiegandt and Richard Northover have identified David as a kynic.
70
 But 
they do not ascribe a structural purpose to the trope; the reference is understood as being 
purely intertextual. Stuart Taberner’s more recent appraisal of Lurie as a kynic does not 
refer to Northover or Wiegandt, but it does make some effort to locate a structural 
purpose to the allusion by identifying in it a cynical cosmopolitanism.
71
 Unlike 
Northover and Wiegandt, Taberner fails to draw on classical scholarship, which may 
account for why he conflates the kynics with the stoics. In fact, Taberner’s cynical 
cosmopolitanism seems to draw on the most patronising aspects of stoic 
cosmopolitanism, since emotions ‘scarcely matter as long as the white man recognizes 
both Petrus’s alterity and the dignity of his belonging to existence’.72 Apart from 
following a particularly Lurie-like logic of racial paternalism, Taberner’s cynical 
cosmopolitanism recapitulates the problems inherent in philosophically naïve responses 
to the kynics: for Taberner, cynical cosmopolitanism ‘declares citizenship of the world 
precisely in order to escape the claims of a particular nation’ and refuses ‘to concede the 
knowability of the self or the other’, which ‘is lonelier for the individual and less 
emotionally appealing for readers but perhaps also more respectful of the fundamental 
alterity of others, less colonizing and indeed more profoundly empathetic’.73 While 
Taberner’s optimism is to be commended, this kynical empathy may as easily become 
an excuse for cynical disengagement or a policy of Separate Development. Taberner 
                                                          
69 Simon bears this out in his treatment of the boy David in The Childhood of Jesus. Simon, of course, 
repeatedly and explicitly rejects his paternity. 
70 Kai Wiegandt, ‘J.M. Coetzee’s “Dog-man” and the Cynicism of Disgrace’, Anglia, Vol. 131, No. 1 
(2013); Richard Alan Northover, J.M. Coetzee and Animal Rights: Elizabeth Costello’s Challenge to 
Philosophy (Pretoria: U Pretoria DLitt Thesis, 2009). Accessed: 1 May 2013. 
 http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-05152010-234034/  
71 Stuart Taberner, ‘Memory, Cosmopolitanism and Nation: Christa Wolf’s Stadt der Engel (2010) and 
J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace (1999)’, Comparative Critical Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2014), 51. 
72 Ibid, 61.  
73 Ibid, 60; 50.  
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fails to note that the kynics primarily aimed to challenge, rather than respect, alterity. In 
following Lurie’s logic, Taberner ignores the real kynical figure in the novel. Here, we 
return to Lucy as the kynical figure par excellence in Coetzee’s oeuvre, not because she 
replays her father’s becoming-dog-man, but because she challenges existing notions of 
ownership in her relation to the land. We find less kynicism in the ‘dog-men’ kynics of 
Coetzee than in his kynical treatment of them. Our engagement with Coetzee’s allusions 
to the kynics gives way to an engagement with his more general response to ‘cynicism’. 
In Doubling the Point, Coetzee distinguishes between ‘Cynicism’, as the ‘denial 
of any ultimate basis for values’ and ‘Grace’, as ‘a condition in which the truth can be 
told clearly, without blindness’ (DP 392). This is a debate that, for Coetzee, ‘is staged 
by Dostoevsky; the interlocutors are called Stavrogin and Tikhon’. The preference 
Coetzee has for the term ‘stage’, when referring to the exposition of ideological 
positions, is shared by many of his leading commentators. But it also, in this 
description, serves to permit Coetzee to grant Cynicism (an ephemeral, momentary 
‘denial’) the substance to argue with Grace (a more concrete, durable ‘condition’).  
In her PhD thesis, Michelle Kelly argues that critics have not as yet managed to 
account for the ‘uneasy and uneven dialogue between the two’.74 By considering this 
dialogue in relation to Coetzee’s ‘simultaneous and persisting interest in the form and 
conventions of the confessional narrative itself’, Kelly describes ‘the relationship 
between cynicism and grace, or confession and absolution, in terms of a fundamental 
discontinuity. The relationship between the terms [...] is not transformative, but 
iterative’.75 Reconsidering the function of confessional narrative in its linguistic, rather 
                                                          
74 Maria Michelle Kelly, “So I sing for my keep”: J.M. Coetzee and Confessional Narrative (York: U of 
York Thesis, 2008), 7. 
75 Ibid. 
- 57 - 
than spiritual, framework reframes Elizabeth Costello’s notion of a ‘belief without 
belief’.76  
In the Eighth Lesson of Elizabeth Costello, Costello refers to herself as having 
‘beliefs but I don’t believe in them’ in her first defence to the Kafkaesque judges who 
preside over her trial in ‘At the Gate’ (EC 200). This is a response to an attempt by one 
of the judges to label her capability ‘of holding opinions and prejudices at bay’, 
‘negative capability’. Costello’s defence precipitates further accusations by the judge as 
to ‘this lack of belief’ and ‘cynicism’.77 Where Costello has referred to her ‘own 
emptiness’ of humanity, the judge substitutes ‘your own cynicism, you mean to say’.78 
This substitution recalls Coetzee’s earlier definition of Cynicism, in Doubling the Point, 
but Costello modifies this sense to something closer to what we are calling kynicism:  
About myself, yes, I may well be cynical, in a technical sense. I cannot 
afford to take myself too seriously, or my motives. But as regards other 
people, as regards humankind or humanity, no, I do not believe I am 
cynical at all.
79
 
 
Costello is cynical because she ‘cannot afford to’ take herself too seriously. Clearly, 
Coetzee’s judge is using ‘cynicism’ in the contemporary sense, but Costello modifies 
this sense to something close to ‘kynicism’. She may have opinions, but she does not 
wish to take them too seriously. However, Costello is not entirely kynical because she 
still believes in the power of the sympathetic imagination to know the other. She is 
pulled between this stoic knowledge and a kynical self-deprecation, while resisting 
accusations of cynicism.  
The figure of the kynic turns into a metaphor for Borges’s own politically 
ambivalent relationship with Perón and Argentina. For Beckett, the figure is an image to 
be distorted in his antagonism to bourgeois complacency. But for Coetzee, neither 
                                                          
76 Coetzee uses this syntax in his discussion of ‘dignity without dignity’ and ‘innocence without 
innocence’ in Giving Offense (15). 
77 Ibid, 200; 201. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
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metaphor nor image suffices to describe the dialectic between cynicism and grace, since 
Coetzee’s kynic cannot defer actual political exigencies. How then can we integrate 
these political insights into the aesthetic acts of Borges, Beckett and Coetzee? To 
answer this question, we must first consider how these writers integrate themselves into 
literary traditions. 
From Tradition to Precursorship 
 
In ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, T.S. Eliot declares:  
No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His 
significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the dead 
poets and artists. You cannot value him alone; you must set him, for 
contrast and comparison, among the dead. I mean this as a principle of 
aesthetic, not merely historical, criticism.
80
 
 
An artist’s meaning includes an appreciation of ‘his’ relation to the dead. This is not a 
one-sided appreciation (which would categorise a ‘traditional’ notion of tradition), since 
adding another artwork to ‘the existing monuments’ will alter ‘the whole existing 
order’.81 But this addition does not disrupt the canon: the addition enforces the canon. 
Paul Lawley observes that Eliot’s notion of tradition is monolithic and ‘inhibits the 
notion of plural traditions’.82 By contrast, Borges ‘implies plurality of perspective’ in 
‘Kafka and His Precursors’. Before we turn to Borges’s plurality of perspective, 
however, we should interrogate the context of Eliot’s utterance. Coetzee frames this, 
albeit in response to the Eliot of the 1940s, in his 1991 lecture ‘What is a Classic?’ 
For Coetzee, Eliot’s notion of tradition is ‘an order you cannot escape, in which 
you may try to locate yourself, but in which your place gets to be defined, and 
continually redefined, by succeeding generations’ (SS 8). Canonicity is inevitable, and 
                                                          
80 T.S. Eliot, ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism 
(London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1920), 44. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Paul Lawley, ‘Failure and Tradition: Coleridge/Beckett’, Samuel Beckett Today/Aujourd’hui, Vol. 18 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007), 34.  
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inevitably changing, for those whose work is taken up by tradition. Tradition is, in a 
cultural sense, what stoic cosmopolitanism is in a political sense, since both revel in a 
‘transpersonal’ movement to a shared goal: the cultural monolith of Eliot’s tradition is a 
cosmopolitan ideal (a world republic of letters). But Coetzee also identifies a personal 
decision in Eliot’s ‘transpersonal order’, ‘to redefine the world around himself’ (SS 8). 
Coetzee describes the process  
of a writer attempting to make a new identity, claiming that identity not on 
the basis of immigration, settlement, residence, domestication, 
acculturation, as other people do, or not only by such means – since Eliot 
with characteristic tenacity did all of the above – but by defining 
nationality to suit himself and then using all of his accumulated cultural 
power to impose that definition on educated opinion, and by resituating 
nationality within a specific – in this case Catholic – brand of 
internationalism or cosmopolitanism, in terms of which he would emerge 
not as a Johnny-come-lately but as a pioneer and indeed a kind of prophet 
[...] (SS 7) 
 
Coetzee’s analysis contextualises Eliot’s ‘tradition’ in terms of Eliot’s effort to redefine 
himself as a European. But Coetzee also points to three stages in any émigré writer’s 
process of self-fashioning. First, the writer ‘defines nationality to suit himself’ rather 
than being defined by immigration, settlement or acculturation. Second, the writer 
imposes that definition on educated opinion, through an accumulated cultural power. 
Third, the definition and its imposition shift the context in which the writer is received, 
which affects how the writer is received. The writer uses a specific cosmopolitanism to 
redefine this context because it permits ‘him’ to impact the way in which ‘his’ work will 
be received. Rather than being passively absorbed into the canon, the writer can 
effectively adhere ‘himself’ to the tradition that most suits ‘him’. Eliot is deliberately 
eschewing passive models of tradition – he refers to it as ‘handing down’ – in favour of 
a modification of ‘the whole existing order’ by ‘the introduction of the new (the really 
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new) work of art’. The existing order is complete before the new artwork, and complete 
after.
83
 
This modification is possible because of the poet’s ‘individual talent’, an 
important qualifier since Eliot is working towards a theory to explain both tradition and 
poetic innovation. Individual talent involves both a historical sense and a catalytic 
quality. Eliot’s ‘historical sense’  
compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, 
but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer 
and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a 
simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order.
84
  
 
The historical sense produces in the writer the perception of the ‘presentness’ of the past 
in ‘his’ work. It allows the whole of literature (or at least the literature of Europe) to be 
present together in a timeless moment. At the same time, the writer is curiously 
unaffected by the results of this perception, since, like a catalyst, the writer transforms 
experiences and feelings into poetry without being changed. Eliot’s impersonal poet 
(and here we may recall Eliot’s own fondness for Seneca) displays all the apatheia, or 
absence of feeling, desirable to the stoic, in a tradition that progresses towards a 
homogenous cosmopolitan ideal. But, as Coetzee’s historical analysis of Eliot suggests, 
the writer is not unaffected by these experiences, which in turn dictate the plural 
traditions in which ‘he’ comes to be interpreted. Moreover, two essays by Borges 
splendidly turn Eliot’s theory on its head.  
In ‘Kafka and his Precursors’, Borges marks a difference between his initial 
impression of Kafka, ‘as singular as the fabulous Phoenix’, and his subsequent 
recognition of ‘his voice, or his habits, in the texts of various literatures and various 
                                                          
83 Beckett, in ‘The World and the Pants’, parodies both notions of tradition when he enumerates the 
various critical positions his ‘inoffensive madman’ might hear about painting. The madman is told that 
everything good in painting ‘is located on a line that leads from the caves of the Eyzies to the Gallery of 
France’. But, Beckett wryly remarks, ‘it is not specified whether this is a pre-established line, or if it is a 
track that unrolls progressively, like the slime of a slug’. Tradition is either pre-established or it 
progresses, neither of which particularly impresses Beckett. (Disj 121)    
84 Eliot, ‘Tradition’, 44. 
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ages’ (TL 363). While the ‘heterogeneous pieces’ Borges enumerates ‘resemble Kafka’, 
‘not all resemble each other’ (TL 365). Borges grants more significance to this lack of 
resemblance, since the shared ‘quality’ that we see in these texts is ‘Kafka’s 
idiosyncrasy’: only ‘Kafka’ makes sense of these diverse texts as a group (TL 365). 
While Eliot notes that it is the elements of past masters in the contemporary writer that 
evidences ‘his’ adhesion to tradition, for Borges a quality in the contemporary writer 
establishes a new tradition in heterogeneous, culturally disconnected texts. This leads 
Borges to his declaration that ‘each writer creates his precursors. His work modifies our 
concept of the past, as it will modify the future’. This shows Borges’s debt to Eliot, who 
similarly has his writer modifying our concept of the past. But it also marks the 
difference between Borges’s approach and Eliot’s, as may be seen in a second Borges 
essay: ‘The Argentine Writer and Tradition’. 
Borges, in his lecture ‘The Argentine Writer and Tradition’, refers to the 
‘problem of the Argentine writer and Tradition’ as a ‘rhetorical theme [...] an 
appearance [...] a simulacrum [...] a pseudo-problem’ (TL 420). Rather than finding an 
authentically Argentinian form of literature, Borges argues, Argentinian writers should 
become aware that their tradition is ‘all of Western culture, and I also believe that we 
have a right to this tradition, better than that of the inhabitants of one or other Western 
[read: European] nation’ (TL 426). The other examples he cites of people with such 
rights are Jews, ‘because they act within that culture and, at the same time, do not feel 
attached to it with a special devotion’, and the Irish, who display a comparable ability 
‘to innovate in English culture’ (TL 426). ‘We are in an analogous situation, 
Argentinians, South Americans in general: we can use all the European themes, use 
them without superstition, with an irreverence that can have, and already has, fortunate 
consequences’ (TL 426). The result: ‘we must not be afraid and we must think that our 
patrimony is the universe’ (TL 427). Borges here advocates a radical rethinking of 
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European aesthetics where trans-European literature is only possible in her colonies, 
reframing minor literature as a cosmopolitan ideal.
85
 Our concern with Borges’s 
polemic and his problematic cultural and national essentialism should not distract us 
from the way in which such an ideal comes about. This culture is not made by 
advocating a new state in the manner of the stoics (or the advocates for a distinctly 
Argentinian literature), but by recognising an already existent inheritance that may be 
used with impudence or shamelessness. Such impudence is only possible in people who 
receive a culture without a special devotion, whether the Jews or the Irish or the South 
Americans (or, perhaps, the South Africans).
86
  
Eliot’s historical sense, with its simultaneous order of apprehension, still applies 
to Borges’s Argentinian literature, as the latter takes as its tradition ‘all of Western 
culture’. This is still a provincial appropriation of the ‘West’ as a homogenous entity, 
and it is also a reverent inculcation of the individual talent into an existing tradition. 
Borges’s stated irreverence perverts Eliot’s historical sense into something far more 
kynical and contingent. At the same time, Borges’s historical sense is necessarily more 
fragmented than Eliot’s, since Borges’s traditions are not only formed retrospectively 
(as are Eliot’s) but via the influence of the latter-day writer on the reading of disparate, 
heterogenous texts. Borges’s tradition is necessarily cosmopolitan because its 
component texts range across space and time. But it is not homogenous because these 
texts are only quilted together by their similarity to the particular writer.  
If Borges subverts, or perverts, cultural homogeneity with his notion of tradition, 
Beckett similarly subverts culture in the 1949 ‘Three Dialogues with George Duthuit’. 
‘B’ compares the ‘Italian painters’ to Matisse and Tal Coat. Their similarity is not in 
                                                          
85 Alistair Cormack usefully compares Borges’s ‘El escritor’ to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s 
Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature in Yeats and Joyce: Cyclical History and the Reprobate Tradition 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2008), 63.   
86 This recalls Beckett’s impudence in his parody of bourgeois sensibilities in ‘Dante ... Bruno.Vico .. 
Joyce’. Here, Beckett does not aspire to receive Joyce with a special devotion; he is advocating a Joyce 
that has already received European culture without that devotion. 
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their ‘mere means’ of artistic production, but because ‘they never stirred from the field 
of the possible, however much they may have enlarged it’ (SB4 556). The only thing 
disturbed by the revolutionaries Matisse and Tal Coat is ‘a certain order on the plane of 
the feasible’ (SB4 556). B’s respondent, D, asks what other plane might be possible, to 
which B gives the second most famous response of ‘Three Dialogues’: ‘Logically none. 
Yet I speak of an art turning from it in disgust, weary of pretending to be able, of being 
able, of doing a little better the same old thing’ (SB4 556). B advocates, instead, the 
‘expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from 
which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation 
to express’, which D finds to be ‘a violently extreme and personal point of view, of no 
help to us in the matter of Tal Coat’ (SB4 556).87 Now, the art that ‘turns from it in 
disgust’ is either cynical or kynical; in seeing through the value of ‘doing a little better 
the same old thing’, this art either disengages with the value of art or seeks new 
alternatives to it. Beckett, in his permutations that expression is without substance, 
without means, without origins, without force and without desire, nevertheless asserts 
an obligation to express. This may, rightly, be associated with Theodor Adorno’s 
comments about the impossibility and necessity of poetry after the Holocaust, since 
both insist on an impoverishment of culture, even a defacement of culture, that does not 
simply give up on culture.
88
 Unlike Adorno, Beckett acknowledges that it is ‘a violently 
extreme and personal point of view’, which involves the particular impoverished subject 
in his or her bodily engagement with culture.  
This ‘violently extreme and personal point of view’ also describes Coetzee’s 
rereading of Eliot. Eliot’s ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ and ‘What is a Classic?’ 
                                                          
87 B’s phrase is quoted approvingly by Coetzee as his basis for dismissing Nabokov’s hermeneutic games 
in ‘Nabokov’s Pale Fire and the Primacy of Art’, University of Cape Town Studies in English, No. 6 
(1974), 6. 
88 ‘To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this corrodes even the knowledge of why it has 
become impossible to write poetry today’. Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Cultural Criticism and Society’, Prisms 
[1967], trans. Shierry Weber Nicholson and Samuel Weber (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), 34. 
Adorno’s regard for Beckett is evident in his intention to dedicate Aesthetic Theory (1969) to the writer.  
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seek to define a transpersonal order for our understanding of tradition, talent and the 
classic. Coetzee reads this transpersonal order as the product of Eliot’s ‘personal point 
of view’. Like Borges, Coetzee follows Eliot’s theory closely in order to invert it. The 
three stages that Coetzee describes in Eliot’s self-construction (alluded to earlier) are, 
moreover, three stages of self-construction identifiable in Borges, Beckett and Coetzee 
himself. First, they redefine their nationality to suit themselves, through negotiating 
what it means to be an Argentinian, Irish or South African writer. Second, they use their 
increasing cultural influence to impose this definition on existing paradigms.
89
 Finally, 
their shifting context alters the way they are received as cosmopolitan or national 
writers and as theorists of world literature. These stages are kynical because the writers 
are not catalytic (since they are affected by this process) nor do they insist on a 
homogenous historical sense (or a form of stoicism). In the passages quoted, Borges, 
Beckett and Coetzee are all too aware of the impact of their personalities on the 
reception of their work and on the historical particularities of any literary canon: 
Western, national or otherwise.  
Their kynical specificity shows in the way they treat their precursors. To follow 
this line of evidence, we will examine their relationships to each other. Beckett becomes 
a precursor for Borges and Borges becomes a precursor for Beckett, since the concerns 
of the one seem to slip easily into concerns of the other. Coetzee’s early debt to Beckett 
and Borges develops into a relation of precursors when his focus shifts from an 
ahistorical engagement with their stylistic devices to a historical concern with the 
consequences of these stylistic devices. His shift in focus, in turn, modifies our reading 
of these two writers. Finally, these primarily subjective and aesthetic responses are 
                                                          
89 In Postcolonial Writers in the Global Literary Marketplace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 
Sarah Brouillette argues that postcolonial authors critically and creatively participate in, rather than 
simply submit to, the marketing of their works as exotically other. This thesis extends Brouillette’s thesis 
to argue that the personas produced by this marketing become themselves platforms for engaging with 
politics. 
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rooted in particular political concerns that address cosmopolitan ideals without 
wholeheartedly endorsing them.  
Adopting a kynical paradigm of precursorship, which understands so-called 
‘influence’ to be arbitrary and retrospectively enforced, is difficult to sustain as a purely 
theoretical enterprise, although it is endorsed by the three writers’ conceptual rewriting 
of Eliot’s ‘tradition’. The remainder of this chapter will therefore seek to ground this 
interpretive strategy in historical points of coincidence between the writers in this study.  
Borges on Waiting for Godot 
 
Given Borges’s critical role as translator and introducer of so much European, 
especially Anglo-Irish, literature to Latin America, his lack of response to Beckett’s 
impact seems striking. This may account for why studies of Beckett and Borges have 
resorted to the two writers’ interest in linguistic play, under the influence of Joyce or 
Dante, and common thematic concerns, via medical science or cultural conditions like 
‘extraterritoriality’, postmodern ‘exhaustion’ and ‘replenishment’.90 And yet, a string of 
quotations indicate that Borges was not as silent about Beckett as has been thought.  
In an interview between Richard Kearney, Seamus Heaney and Borges in Dublin 
for the 1981 celebration of Bloomsday, Kearney tries to extend Borges’s panegyric on 
the greatness of Irish literature to a direct response to Beckett. In context, Borges’s 
response is a surprising departure from his recognition of his debt to Irish writing, 
particularly to Joyce and Oscar Wilde, since Beckett proves to be an exception to 
Borges’s admiration:   
                                                          
90 Anthony Cordingley, ‘Keeping their Distance: Beckett and Borges Writing after Joyce’, Samuel 
Beckett Today/Aujourd’hui, Vol. 14 (2004); Sam Slote, ‘Stuck in Translation: Beckett and Borges on 
Dante’, Journal of Beckett Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2010); Ciaran Cosgrove, ‘Radical Propensities and 
Juxtapositions: Defamiliarization and Difficulty in Borges and Beckett’, NUI Maynooth Papers in 
Spanish, Portuguese and Latin American Studies, No. 3 (February, 2002); Patricia Novillo-Corválan, 
‘Literature and Disability: The Medical Interface in Borges and Beckett’, Medical Humanities, Vol. 37, 
No. 1 (2011); Steiner, Extraterritorial; John Barth, ‘The Literature of Exhaustion’ and ‘The Literature of 
Replenishment’, The Friday Book: Essays and Other Non-Fiction (London: The Johns Hopkins UP, 
1984). 
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Kearney: And what of Beckett – perhaps Joyce's closest Irish literary 
disciple? […] 
 
Borges: Samuel Beckett is a bore. I saw his Waiting for Godot and that was 
enough for me. I thought it was a very poor work. Why bother waiting for 
Godot if he never comes? Tedious stuff. I had no desire to go on to read his 
novels after that.
91
  
 
It is easy to take this criticism as the resentful mutterings of a rival writer. But what is 
the kynical significance of such a rivalry? There are three kynical complexes woven 
into Borges’s response, which echo earlier responses by Borges to Beckett’s play: the 
role of the body, the language of stoic resignation and the connotations of names.  
Borges, by his own admission, was already completely blind by 1956 (OC3 303) 
– the year Waiting for Godot was first performed in Argentina.92 So his first ‘sight’ of 
the play is already metaphoric: he could not have ‘watched’ the play in the conventional 
sense.
93
 This raises interesting questions about the phenomenological impact of 
Borges’s body on his understanding of a work as rigorously particular in its visuals as 
Beckett’s.94 Moreover, as the work was performed in what Beckett considered an 
inferior Spanish translation, under the title Esperando a Godot, the nuances of Beckett’s 
French or English would have been lost.  
If Borges’s body impedes a ‘vision’ of the play, his impatience with the play’s 
tedium inverts an earlier, parodic response to Waiting for Godot, given when he found 
out that he would share the Prix Formentor with Beckett in 1961. Alejandro Vaccaro in 
Borges: Vida y Literatura [Borges: Life and Literature] cites this from a 1961 article in 
La Razón:  
Naturally I should have to say that I feel very honoured by the company of 
the author of Waiting for Godot. But I can no less than bear it stoically 
                                                          
91 Jorge Luis Borges, Seamus Heany, Richard Kearney, ‘Borges and the World of Fiction: An Interview 
with Jorge Luis Borges’, The Crane Bag, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1982), 74-5. 
92 Jorge Dubetti, Samuel Beckett en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 2000). 
93 While Borges’s habit was to go to the theatre and the cinema with friends, who would describe the 
visual elements to him, one might imagine that the impoverished visuals of Waiting for Godot would be 
particularly difficult to explain, assuming he actually attended a performance. 
94 See the discussion of Beckett’s use of image in Chapter 3. 
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[estoicamente]. You can say that in the same way, I bore, stoic and 
resignedly [estoica y resignadamente], the performance of that piece. And I 
even stayed until the third act.
95
  
 
Borges tacitly suggests that, although he might have found it tedious, he nevertheless 
understands the play in terms of stoicism and resignation. But Borges alludes to this 
stoicism in a way that is playful and humorous. Borges invents a third act for Beckett’s 
tragicomedy to parody his own efforts to ‘bear it stoically’. But he achieves this by 
extending the play beyond Beckett’s actual two acts. This relative impudence on 
Borges’s part contrasts with stoic modesty, which, in David Hume’s distinction, ‘has a 
natural tendency to conceal a man’s talents, as impudence displays them to the 
utmost’.96 Borges’s impudence reveals that his stoicism is, in fact, a kynical subversion 
of stoicism. It remains to be determined whether Borges’s subversion concerns itself 
with ‘truth’ (in a kynical sense) or not (in a cynical sense). We will address this question 
in Chapter 2. 
Borges’s responses to Godot suggest a consistent critical response to the play, 
even if his tone varies dramatically from 1961 to 1981. To expand on this critical 
consistency, we find an earlier conversation recorded in the diary of Borges’s lifelong 
friend and collaborator, Adolfo Bioy Casares: ‘We speak of En attendant Godot. 
Borges: “It examines some vagabonds that wait for some guy, Godot. 
Godot=God=Dios, it’s clear. Which is why there should be no surprise, Godot doesn’t 
arrive”’.97 Borges makes a standard associative leap that Coetzee will parody in his 
‘Eight Ways of Looking at Samuel Beckett’: Godot is God. This leads us to a similar 
leap from Waiting for Godot to Borges’s own work on the name, the third complex at 
                                                          
95 Alejandro Vaccaro, Borges: Vida y Literatura (Buenos Aires: Edhasa, 2006), 574. 
96 David Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary [1742], ed. Eugene F. Miller, 1987. Library of 
Economics and Liberty, Accessed: 4 May 2013. 
http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Hume/hmMPL43.html#Part III, Essay IV, OF IMPUDENCE 
AND MODESTY 
97 Adolfo Bioy Casares, Borges (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Destino, 2006), 259. 
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work in Borges’s 1981 response to Beckett (as a famous name) and to Godot (as the 
cipher for pointless waiting).
98
  
How does the name affect a whimsical reference to Godot=God=Dios, or the 
equally whimsical reference to Godot’s missing Third Act? It is clear that the slippage 
to God’s name from Godot’s is not clear cut. Already the slippage from Godot (as a 
proper noun) to the English word for God and, finally, to the Spanish word for God,  
indicates that Borges himself is playing a dangerous game of association – attempting to 
fix Beckett to a particular reading of Godot that Beckett himself disagreed with. As a 
master fictioneer himself, Borges should have understood that it would always be 
possible for Beckett to say that Godot might be one thing one day but that tomorrow he 
could change Godot into whatever form he liked. Vladimir and Estragon make a 
comparable effort to locate an essence for Godot in their exchanges about Godot.  
Estragon: No use struggling.  
Vladimir: One is what one is.  
Estragon: No use wriggling.  
Vladimir: The essential doesn’t change. (SB3 15)  
 
                                                          
98 In his essay, ‘Historia de los ecos de un nombre [History of the echoes of a name]’, Borges engages 
with the metaphysical consequences of the name of God. He cites three echoes of nomenclature in which 
broadly descriptivist linguistic strategies are employed to avoid revealing an essence behind the name. 
These echoes take as their point of origin the first encounter between Moses and God: when God appears 
to Moses in the form of a burning bush. Borges identifies Moses’s first question as an attempt to gain 
some sort of power over God, since to know something’s true name is to own it or control it. God’s 
response, in Borges’s words, ‘Soy El que Soy’ [I am He who I am], is a deferral of that possibility. This 
phrase does not work in the same way in early Beckett. In More Pricks than Kicks, Belacqua resigns 
himself at ‘the end of all his meditations and endeavours’ to the phrase: ‘I am what I am. He had read the 
phrase somewhere and liked it and made it his own.’ (SB4 200) ‘I am what I am’, then, fixes a person to a 
particular position in Beckett’s early work. This will, of course, shift by the time of Beckett’s Three 
Novels, when any attempt to fix the ‘I am’ will be radically problematised. Borges, by contrast, justifies 
his deferral with Martin Buber’s exegesis of the phrase:  
 
Martin Buber indicates that Ehych asher ehych can also be translated as I am that which I will be 
or I will be where I will be. Moses, in the manner of Egyptian sorcerers, would have asked God 
how he was named to have him in his power; God would have answered, in fact: Today I talk 
with you, but tomorrow I can change myself into whichever form, and also the forms of pressure, 
of injustice and of adversity. (OC2 139)   
 
Unlike Belacqua, God slips the bonds of Moses’s act of naming precisely by virtue of difference: God is 
not fixed to a particular definition in space or time. The ontological structures of ser [to be], fixed and 
impermeable, give way to a being of locality and contingency, estar [to be].  
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There is no use struggling, wriggling, or even squirming for Vladimir and Estragon 
because ‘the essential doesn’t change’, except when it does. Vladimir disavows their 
bond to Godot because it too is contingent: ‘Tied to Godot! What an idea! No question 
of it. [Pause] For the moment’ (SB3 15). The moment, like the bond, is contingent on 
the tramps’ location and their ignorance of his location, an ignorance exemplified by 
Estragon’s continued failure to remember Godot’s name: ‘His name is Godot?’ (SB3 
15). In order, however, for this deferral to occur there must be a virtual point to which it 
is being deferred. At some prospective to-come, there must be the possibility of meeting 
Godot, of finding out who or what or where he is, of relating contingency with fictional 
teleology. There is always already a Third Act to Waiting for Godot, a time after the 
performance where potentiality reaches its terminus in conceptual possibility, the point 
which, by being forecast, will never come but which leads Vladimir and Estragon to 
wait for Godot even unto the third act.   
Beckett in Patagonia 
 
Borges’s use of time to assert a retrospective order has its corollary in Beckett’s use of 
place. It is particularly Beckett’s use of Argentina as an unlocatable location that 
introduces Beckett’s intersection with Borges in the former’s work. For, while Beckett 
does not respond to Borges directly in any published material, he does refer to Borges’s 
homeland in his 1957 radio play Embers and his 1982 ‘dramaticule’, Catastrophe, 
written in support of Václav Havel.
99
 As we discuss Catastrophe (and Patagonia) in 
Chapter 3, let us restrict our comments to Embers at this point.
100
  
                                                          
99 Beckett mentions reading Guillermo de Torres’s Literaturas europeas de vanguardia (1925), in which 
Borges is quoted extensively, in a 1935 letter to Thomas McGreevy (SBL1 264-6).   
100 Embers, written for radio between 1957 and 1959 and first broadcast by the BBC Third Programme in 
1959, enjoyed the dubious reputation as ‘Beckett’s most difficult work’. Hugh Kenner, Samuel Beckett: A 
Critical Study (London: John Calder, 1962), 174. Kenner’s remark seems premature to readers of works 
written in or after 1961, radio-dramatic (The Rough for Radios, for instance) or prose (All Strange Away, 
Imagination Dead Imagine or Ping), but it did frame a general response as late as Paul Lawley’s 1980 
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Beckett described Embers as depending on an ambiguity. Lawley quotes an 
interview with P.L. Mignon in which Beckett said: ‘Embers is based on an ambiguity: is 
the character hallucinating or is this his reality?’101 Certainly, the main character Henry 
spends much of the play talking about the sea (which is heard in the background) to 
himself (or to his father) and to Ada, his wife who may or may not be dead. But Henry’s 
two monologues (directed at his father) bracket two dialogues with Ada, which, in turn, 
are divided by a memory or hallucination of their daughter, Addie having a piano 
lesson. Either Henry hallucinates his dead father and the conversation with his dead 
wife (which brings on a further, internal hallucination of his daughter) or he faces the 
actual memories of father, wife and daughter, while trying to raise his father’s ghost. 
But, while the play situates itself beside an anonymous seashore (achieved through 
background noises and Henry’s narration), there are also two obscure references to 
Argentina. First, Henry refers to the difficulties of trying to secure money held in 
probate after his father apparently drowns during an evening bathe: 
We never found your body, you know, that held up probate an 
unconscionable time, they said there was nothing to prove you hadn’t run 
away from us all and alive and well under a false name in the Argentine for 
example, that grieved mother greatly. (SB3 198) 
 
What it is that grieves mother greatly is ambiguous. Is it father living under a false name 
in the Argentine? Is it the unconscionable time of probate? Or is it the absence of the 
body?  
Henry’s rather antiquated reference to ‘the Argentine’, rather than ‘Argentina’, 
certainly appears to be an arbitrary marker of distance, much like ‘Timbuktu’. However, 
a further reference by Henry to the geography of ‘the Argentine’ suggests that the 
arbitrariness has some method to it: ‘Get away from it! Where it couldn’t get at me! The 
                                                                                                                                                                          
essay ‘Embers: an Interpretation’. Paul Lawley, ‘Embers: an Interpretation’, Journal of Beckett Studies, 
No. 6 (1980). 
101 Ibid, 10. 
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Pampas! What?’ (SB3 203)102 Henry, again arbitrarily, picks the Pampas as a place to 
get away from the sound of the sea; again an arbitrary name gestures to distance. But, 
since the Pampas are within Argentina, it also suggests that escaping the sea will be 
equivalent to his father’s ‘escape’ to ‘the Argentine’: a correspondent ‘closeness’ 
emerges in their mutual desires to ‘run away’. Moreover, just prior to the discussion of 
both ‘the Argentine’ and ‘the Pampas’, Henry hears the sound of hooves, which replace 
the otherwise constant sound of the sea that he finds so torturous, which suggests a not-
so-arbitrary metonymic link between horses and the Pampas. 
In the original BBC production, Henry refers to ‘Venezuela’ as the place to 
which his father runs away and to ‘Tibet’ as a place where he might get away from the 
sea.
103
 In his discussion of the subsequent change to ‘the Argentine’ and ‘the Pampas’, 
Clas Zilliacus quotes Elmar Tophaven as saying that Beckett wanted to avoid ‘undue 
topical associations with the Dalai Lama’.104 As Lawley contends, ‘the geographical tie-
up [...] is more than just a mechanical device’, since there is a direct link between ‘the 
Argentine’ and ‘the Pampas’, while ‘Tibet’ has no apparent relation to ‘Venezuela’ for 
Embers other than distance: distance from each other, added to the already mentioned 
distances from Henry and his mother (for his father) and distance from the sea (for 
Henry).
105
 There is a stronger structural link between ‘Tibet’ and ‘Switzerland’, to 
which Henry admits to going also ‘to get away from [the sea]’ (SB3 198). But with the 
suppression of the 1959 uprising in Tibet by the People’s Republic of China, and the 
exile of the Dalai Lama, Henry ‘getting away from it’ in Tibet has political connotations 
Beckett may have wanted to avoid. However, Beckett is not simply ‘running away’ 
                                                          
102 ‘The Pampas’ are the grasslands around Buenos Aires. 
103 In the YouTube copy of Embers, taken from the British Library’s 2006 release of Samuel Beckett’s 
Works for Radio: Original Broadcasts, it is interesting to note that Jack MacGowran pronounces 
‘Venezuela’, ‘Venezweela’. This promotes a regional, rather than universal, reception of the name. 
‘Samuel Beckett – Embers [1959]’, Youtube, 23 Feb 2012, Accessed: 9 April 2013. 
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_wp0MDYuaQU 
104 Clas Zilliacus, Beckett and Broadcasting: A Study of the Works of Samuel Beckett for and in Radio 
and Television (Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1976), 89. 
105 Lawley, ‘Embers’, 36. 
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from world politics, since he is also avoiding a parallel between Tibet and the politically 
neutral Switzerland. ‘Living alive and well under a false name in the Argentine’ could 
make the post-1961 reader think of Adolf Eichmann, captured in Buenos Aires on the 
11
th
 of May 1960. But Beckett made these changes in 1959.
106
 Rather, Beckett’s spatial 
use of ‘the Argentine’ is comparable to Borges’s temporal use of Godot’s third act. ‘The 
Argentine’ and ‘the Pampas’ are virtual locations for Henry to consider, and reject, as 
destinations of escape. As Beckett’s characters never make good the escape to which 
they constantly refer, this rejection is necessary. But there must be a virtual option to be 
rejected for the character to have some semblance of subjectivity, etiolated though it 
may be. Here, our argument circles round on itself, since it is precisely by opening up 
the ‘virtual’ escape route of ‘the Argentine’ that Henry is given the opportunity to assert 
his subjectivity (through choosing not to escape). This virtual space is no more arbitrary 
than Borges’s virtual time.107 There are internal (stylistic) and external (political) 
significances to Beckett’s use of ‘the Argentine’ and the Pampas that do not need to be 
attached to authorial intention. First, the composite of ‘the Argentine’, ‘the Pampas’, 
‘the hooves’ and ‘living under a false name’ are all aesthetically significant to a drama 
about escaping sound and memory, especially in a radio play, a genre Beckett described 
as ‘coming out of the dark’.108 Second, this composite leads to a tension between the 
virtual as an aesthetic device and the political implications of the virtual in performance. 
After all, Godot does seem to beg a third act for its audience and people do live under 
false names in ‘the Argentine’.  
                                                          
106 However, Argentina was referred to as ‘the Nazis’ Mecca’ as early as 1950 in Ada’s favourite 
newspaper The Manchester Guardian. ‘Escape Routes to Argentina: A Profitable Racket’, The 
Manchester Guardian, 20 Feb 1950, 10. Proquest Historical Newspapers, Accessed: 9 April 2013.  
http://0search.proquest.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/hnpguardianobserver/docview/479071133/13D5547AFE42
E423D55/3?accountid=14664 
107 Or, for instance, the use of ‘Timbuktu’ a few years after the Ahmed Baba Institute was set alight. 
108 Beckett qtd. Marjorie Perloff, ‘The Silence That Is Not Silence: Acoustic Art in Samuel Beckett’s 
Embers’, Samuel Beckett and the Visual Arts: Music, Visual Arts, and Non-Print Media (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1999), 248. 
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Beckett makes no remarks about Borges but does, sporadically, share Borges’s 
interest in ‘the Argentine’, with which he illustrates a tension between lived space and 
potential space. At the same time, Borges disparages Beckett in a ‘violently extreme and 
personal’ manner as an exception to his general affinity with Ireland and Irish writing. 
His remarks are assiduously kynical, illustrating a tension in Waiting for Godot between 
experienced time and potential time. Both Beckett and Borges capture this tension 
through a politically charged use of proper nouns, which, despite their rigidity, are made 
to slip and slide. This regard for culture, aesthetics, names and geography is intimately 
bound up in kynical aesthetics and the subject we are calling the kynical cosmopolitan.  
Coetzee between Beckett and Borges 
 
Coetzee’s relationship with Beckett stretches from the discussions about Waiting for 
Godot and the description of reading Watt for the first time, recounted in Youth, through 
his PhD thesis (The English Fiction of Samuel Beckett: An Essay in Stylistic Analysis) at 
the University of Texas at Austin and early academic essays, to the strangely elliptical 
texts written for the Beckett centenary in 2006, ‘Eight Ways of Looking at Samuel 
Beckett’, ‘Introduction: Poems, Prose and Criticism’ and ‘Samuel Beckett in Cape 
Town – An Imaginary History’.109 N.C.T. Meihuizen observes a split between the 
earlier, scholarly activity on stylistics and the later quasi-historical examination of 
Beckett’s stylistic influence.110 Coetzee saw his earliest essays on Beckett’s style in the 
60s and 70s as scholarly exercises, but ‘also attempts to get closer to a secret, a secret of 
Beckett’s that I wanted to make my own’ (DP 25). But in his later works, including this 
account from Doubling the Point (1992), the short essay ‘Homage’ (1993), and the 
Beckett centenary texts, there is a creative reimagining of this relationship as filial as 
                                                          
109 Y 155; Coetzee, The English Fiction of Samuel Beckett: An Essay in Stylistic Analysis (Austin: U 
Texas Thesis, 1969); Coetzee, ‘Introduction’, SB4; Coetzee, ‘Samuel Beckett in Cape Town’, Beckett 
Remembering.  
110 N.C.T. Meihuizen, ‘Beckett and Coetzee: Alternative Identities’, Liberator, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2011), 11. 
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well as stylistic. In his ‘Imaginary History’, Coetzee considers the possibility that 
Beckett, who applied for a job at the University of Cape Town in 1937, could have 
taken the job (which, in fact, he was not offered) and stayed in Cape Town. In this 
alternate history, the young Coetzee might not have encountered Professor Beckett, but, 
‘since I would have been no less resistant to adopting Professor Beckett or anyone else 
as a spiritual father than Professor Beckett would have been to adopting me as a 
spiritual son […] I would certainly not have spent my time at the University of Texas 
labouring over a doctoral dissertation on Professor Beckett’s prose style’.111 Critically, 
Coetzee refers to the question of whether he would ‘shake off the influence of that prose 
style’ as ‘another question entirely’.112 He repeats the anecdote in ‘Eight Ways of 
Looking at Samuel Beckett’, an octet of theses given at the 2006 Tokyo Samuel Beckett 
Centenary Conference, but he does not mention his own possible relationship with 
Beckett. Rather, Beckett is transformed into an Odysseus, captivated by a ‘bronze-
limbed Calypso’ (in the ‘Imaginary History’, Beckett meets and marries ‘a South 
African belle’), who, after years ‘instructing the daughters of the merchant class in the 
rudiments of the Tuscan tongue’ (his ‘years of easy colonial life’), would have had no 
reason ‘to abandon his insular paradise and set sail again for Ithaca’ (rather more 
prosaically described in an ‘Imaginary History’ as ‘he might have found a return to war-
ravaged Europe unappealing’).113 If Coetzee’s version of Beckett’s odyssey was more 
suited to the oral nature of his Tokyo presentation, it also fits the broader context of a 
talk that links writing to seafaring and exploration. Moreover, it turns a proleptic 
imagined historical fact (the unappealing return) into a proleptic imagined historical 
metaphor (setting sail for Ithaca) for going on, in which Beckett fails to ‘try again. Fail 
again. Fail better’ (SB4 471). By observing Beckett’s failure to try again, Coetzee prises 
                                                          
111 Coetzee, ‘Beckett in Cape Town’, 75; 76. 
112 Ibid, 76. 
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himself from an ahistorical debt to Beckett’s style and places Beckett (style and man) 
into a historical moment.  
In Coetzee’s move from an ahistorical treatment of Beckett’s style in itself to a 
historical engagement with the implications of this style, we may note a shift from a 
treatment of style as inseparable from influence to a treatment of style as separated from 
Beckett’s historical status as a precursor: influence, taken for granted in the academic 
exercises of the early Coetzee, calls for mention when the later Coetzee has shaken it off 
in his historical development. By Doubling the Point, Coetzee is sufficiently removed 
from Beckett’s influence that he can pose the question, explicitly of ‘anti-illusionism’ 
and implicitly of Beckett: ‘Anti-illusionism is, I suspect, only a marking of time, a 
phase of recuperation, in the history of the novel. The question is, what next?’ (DP 27). 
The epistemological problems of anti-illusionism are outweighed by their presence in 
history. Patrick Hayes, in his study of Coetzee’s relationship to the history of the novel, 
style and politics, argues that Coetzee’s writing constitutes a ‘complex engagement with 
the form of the novel [that] should be understood as an attempt to find a way out of the 
assumptions made by this tradition’.114 Rather than ‘flattening’ literature into politics, 
Hayes argues that Coetzee plays with the boundaries of political discourse: while ‘on a 
thematic level his fiction repeatedly suggests that the condition of modernity is made up 
of competing, equally important, and yet incommensurate ways of imagining the good 
community’, his prose ‘tries to de-homogenise the concepts that differently positioned 
readers bring to the text’.115 Coetzee’s ‘writing after Beckett’ exposes a critical flaw in 
Beckett’s monist/dualist dilemma: ‘“many things” are missing from Beckett’s account 
of life, “of which the biggest is the whale”’.116 Hayes contextualises this reference in 
‘Eight Ways’ as both a criticism of Beckett’s limitations in attempting to engage with 
                                                          
114 Patrick Hayes, J.M. Coetzee and the Novel: Writing and Politics after Beckett (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
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115 Ibid, 5. 
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otherness and a provocation for an audience in Tokyo shortly after Japan’s government 
granted permission for whaling to continue. ‘[Coetzee] is a writer deeply indebted to 
Beckett’s prose, but has had the “imaginative courage” to move it beyond solipsism, 
and reinterpret it in terms of the dynamics of embodied life’.117 ‘Embodied life’, for 
Hayes, is ‘the life that has to confront not only the otherness of the self, but the 
otherness of the beings that one lives alongside, and thus the political question of what 
it means to live in a community’.118 Style, when confronted with the realities of the 
body, can either retreat into solipsism or engage with political questions of how to live 
together. Coetzee subjects Beckett to a critical, kynical revision: Beckett, as important 
as he may be to Coetzee as a stylistic precursor, fails, for Coetzee, to address issues of 
historical injustice.
119
  
Although Coetzee’s stylistic debt to Beckett has received ample attention from 
critics, not least Hayes himself, his debt to Borges has remained largely unexplored.
120
 
Since Coetzee himself does not ‘create Borges as one of his precursors’, scholars have 
made little more than brief asides: the late Stephen Watson called the example of 
Borges and Nabokov in Dusklands’s pseudoscholarship ‘palpable’ but did not explore 
this comparison further.
121
 Given that such asides begin in the first review of Dusklands 
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and continue to be made into 2013, the neglect of Borges in Coetzee scholarship is a 
critical oversight.
122
  
Indeed, Coetzee gestures explicitly to Borges the precursor in Dusklands. This 
gesture is the double death of Jacobus Coetzee’s servant Klawer, which received 
enough attention from reviewers (including Ravan books editor, Peter Randall) that a 
series of letters confirmed it was intended and not a misprint.
123
 Coetzee, significantly, 
avoids intention in his reply to Randall: ‘Regarding the alternative deaths of Klawer; I 
do not believe in the principle of authorial explication, so what I have done is ask Crewe 
[...] he discusses “the disclosure of stage machinery”’.124 Even at this early stage, 
Coetzee follows ‘death of the author’ protocols that would characterise his later 
reticence to remark on his work. Moreover, given the semi-private nature of this 
correspondence, it indicates a fidelity to the death of authorial intention, since there is 
no public to whom he might be representing himself. Finally, it also speaks, perhaps, to 
the multiple paths Coetzee intended for his novel, a member of ‘the subaltern genre’ as 
Borges would call it (OC1 513). 
In the short story, ‘El jardín de senderos que se bifurcan [The Garden of Forking 
Paths]’, Borges’s narrator, Yu Tsun, a spy on the run from the intelligence officer 
Richard Madden, finds himself at the house of Stephen Albert, a sinologist dedicated to 
the work of Yu’s ancestor, Ts’ui Pên. Ts’ui Pên’s greatest work is a ‘chaotic novel’ 
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called The Garden of Forking Paths (OC1 512). Albert discloses the novel’s stage 
machinery, previously thought to be incomprehensible:  
The phrase various futures (not all) raised for me the image of the fork in 
time, not in space [...] In all fiction, every time that a man is faced with 
diverse alternatives,  he opts for one and eliminates the others; in that of 
the almost inextricable Ts’ui Pên, he opts – simultaneously – for all of 
them. He creates, in this way, diverse futures, diverse times, that also 
proliferate and fork [...] Fang can kill the intruder, the intruder can kill 
Fang, both can survive, both can die [...] in the work of Ts’ui Pên, all the 
possibilities occur; each one is the point of departure for other forks. (OC1 
512) 
 
Ts’ui Pên writes his novel to incorporate possible times, rather than possible spaces. 
Since the diverse futures proliferate and fork, it is necessary to pursue the possibilities 
through to their possible outcomes: the situation where the intruder is killed, the 
situation where Fang is killed etc. Klawer’s double death, then, attempts to pursue the 
infinite possibilities of Jacobus Coetzee’s colonial imposition on the Great Namaqua 
simultaneously. It seems unlikely that the ‘forking paths of the inner adventure’ that 
Jacobus Coetzee traces ‘tranquilly [...] in my heart’ are not those of Borges, ‘these 
forking paths across that true wilderness without polity called the land of the Great 
Namaqua where everything, I was to find, was possible’ (Du 70-1). Jacobus Coetzee 
has escaped the polity that grounds the kynic in her political realities; in his cynical 
freedom everything is possible.  
David Attwell remarks that ‘there has been unnecessary confusion over the fact 
that Klawer’s death seems to occur twice’.125 Attwell resolves this confusion with ‘a 
simple distinction’ between ‘sujet and fabula’ (‘between narrative elements and their 
treatment or presentation’).126 For Attwell, it is an issue of historiographical 
representation: Klawer, for Jacobus Coetzee, effectively drowns in the river because he 
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is no longer useful; he develops the fever as a result and dies with Coetzee ‘lingering 
sentimentally on the moment of their passing for the purpose of self-aggrandisement’.127 
‘A proper repetition of narrative elements – with a range of other postmodern devices – 
is developed fully only in Heart of the Country’.128 Attwell’s concerns are well-
founded, since Klawer’s second death does not actually contradict his first. But the 
second death also traces a second possible fork: ‘Klawer is swept away’ leads either to 
‘Klawer drowns’ or to ‘Klawer is rescued but contracts a fever, and is left to die’. At 
this level, then, Coetzee appears to be offering a small homage to Borges in the form of 
a technical device.                                         
This technical debt develops in J.M. Coetzee’s later work, particularly Diary of a 
Bad Year (2007) and The Childhood of Jesus (2013).
129
 Here, Coetzee’s use of Borges 
follows a similar pattern to his use of Beckett: a stylistic influence (such as the double 
death) becomes a reconsideration of philosophical and historical principles. This is 
evident in Coetzee’s use of Ireneo Funes, Borges’s extraordinarily memorious character 
from ‘Funes el memorioso [Funes the memorious]’, in both novels. In The Childhood of 
Jesus, the boy called David apparently has great difficulty learning how to read, write 
and count. The problem he has is with the transition from naming specific numbers, 
words and letters to identifying the underlying conceptual systems at work in reading, 
writing and counting. David does not name his numbers according to the rule of 
naming. He names them according to personal preference. This vignette revisits as a 
case example the problem JC raises in his essay ‘On Zeno’ in Diary of a Bad Year, 
namely: at what point does the demonstration of counting become the apprehension of 
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the system of counting? This point is the moment when ‘the child gets the idea’ or ‘gets 
it, namely gets the rule for naming the next number’; this is when ‘the whole of 
mathematics takes off’ (DBY 89; 90). JC’s description, though apposite to David, is of 
Funes of ‘Funes el memorioso’. For JC, the consequence of ‘Borges’ kabbalistic, 
Kantian fable’ is that ‘the order we see in the universe may not reside in the universe at 
all, but in the paradigms of thought we bring to it’ (DBY 96). JC goes on to write that 
‘the whole of mathematics rests on my ability to count’ and then explain this count as 
‘my ability, given the name of N, to name N+1 without knowing its name beforehand, 
without memorizing an infinite list’ (DBY 96). Counting, in JC’s account, is correlative 
with the act of naming, hence the clumsy pseudo-repetition: ‘namely gets the rule of 
naming the next number’. The ‘it’ the child gets is named the rule of naming; 
mathematics is the subordination of naming to this rule, the foundational axiom on 
which the ability to count is based. When David chooses to name his numbers, he reacts 
to the rule of naming as if, to him, in JC's words, ‘the counting rule, and indeed the even 
more fundamental rules that allow us to encompass the world in language, are simply 
alien’ (DBY 96).  
The moment in which mathematics is subjectified has its corollary in earlier 
comments about perception by JC’s secretary Anya. When she shares her concerns 
about an earlier argument about children, from the essay ‘On Paedophilia’, with her 
neo-conservative ‘partner’ Alan, he ‘at once put[s] his finger on the weak link’. ‘He is 
trying to draw a line between realities and perceptions, said Alan. But everything is 
perception. That is what Kant proved. That was the Kantian revolution’ (DBY 90). 
Alan's ability is, in Anya's words, to ‘cut through the crap in no time’ (DBY 90). He cuts 
through ‘the crap’ in the opposite way to Anya. For Alan, ‘everything is perception’. 
But Anya worries that the ‘actor who looks like a child and acts the part of a child’ may 
actually be a child. ‘Get real!’ she thinks (DBY 89). Two pages later, JC will note of 
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interchangeability that, while little difference would be made to the English language ‘if 
the word krap were to replace the wor[d] park’, mathematics, on the other hand, ‘would 
be thrown into confusion if 3618 were to replace 8163’ (DBY 92).130 While some things 
are open to reinterpretation (as with Alan’s ‘perception’), others are fixed to systems of 
thought that cannot be changed (as with Anya’s ‘real’). This tension in the novel 
suggests a complication to the vulgar Kantianism at work in JC and Alan’s comments. 
As we shall show now, Alan’s engagements with Kant bring an added significance to 
Borges as Coetzee’s precursor, and not simply because ‘Borges’ kabbalistic, Kantian 
fable’ is critiquing Kant. They also contain larger implications for the reading of 
Coetzee as a kynical cosmopolitan. 
The significance of ‘Kantianism’ to Coetzee’s connection with Borges becomes 
apparent when read alongside David E. Johnson’s essay on ‘Funes el memorioso’ 
entitled ‘Kant’s Dog’.131 The starting point for Johnson’s comparative reading of Kant 
and Borges is the occurrence of a dog in Kant’s chapter on schematism in Critique of 
Pure Reason. Kant introduces a dog to prove that the imagination can  
delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner, without 
limitation to any single determinate figure such as experience, or any 
possible image that I can represent in concreto, actually presents.
132
  
 
Funes, however, encounters dogs in a manifold without being able to delineate a generic 
‘Kantian’ figure of a four-footed animal:  
Not only was it difficult for him to see that the generic symbol ‘dog’ took 
in all the dissimilar individuals of all shapes and sizes, it irritated him that 
the ‘dog’ of three-fourteen in the afternoon, seen in profile, should be 
indicated by the same noun as the dog at three-fifteen, seen frontally. (OC1 
309) 
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Funes fails to apprehend the schema of the dog.
133
 Moreover, precisely because he 
cannot apprehend the dog as schematic in its spatial and temporal variations, Funes 
encounters it in a way that Kant cannot, a way that makes Funes’s dog very like 
Coetzee’s whale in ‘Eight Ways’. While Kant proves that ‘the schemata are thus 
nothing but a priori determinations of time in accordance with rules’, Funes is unable to 
understand schematism precisely because he is incapable of determining whether 
anything is linked through time, not even the dog(s) seen at three-fourteen and three-
fifteen, in profile and frontally.
134
 Funes, as the archetypal hero of anti-schematism, 
attacks the a priori quality of schematism with his name/number system: his system 
confuses the distinction Kant is careful to make earlier in the chapter between image 
and schema, later concretised using the dog.  
The schema is in itself always a product of the imagination. Since, 
however, the synthesis of imagination aims at no special intuition, but only 
at unity in the determination of sensibility, the schema has to be 
distinguished from the image.
135
  
 
Unlike Kant, Funes cannot distinguish schema from image, since each number in his 
inverted system of enumeration is inextricably linked to the image that gives it its name. 
Yet it is through the separation of numbers from their presentation that Kant will 
distinguish the image from the schema, which in turn brings our discussion back to JC’s 
discussion of Zeno and the process of learning to count. Kant writes 
if five points be set alongside one another, thus, . . . . ., I have an image of 
the number five. But if, on the other hand, I think only a number in 
general, whether it be five or a hundred, this thought is rather the 
representation of a method whereby a multiplicity, for instance a thousand, 
may be represented in an image in conformity with a certain concept, than 
the image itself. This representation of a universal procedure of 
imagination in providing an image for a concept, I entitle the schema of 
this concept.
136
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When the child understands the axiom of naming, which JC refers to as ‘getting it’, the 
child has internalised this schema of the concept, in which ‘this thought is rather the 
representation of a method [...] than the image itself’. David, in The Childhood of Jesus, 
is capable of determining links between things over time, but realises that such 
determination inevitably discards the particular in favour of the universal. In the cases 
of David and Funes, and in JC’s discussion, their idiosyncratic number system is not 
significant because the names differ from those of conventional numbers. The system is 
significant because it does not employ a concept, as does the standard naming of 
numbers, but an image without schema, an image in its ‘unimaginable freedom’.137  
Coetzee himself engages with Kant in a way that proves productive for reading 
his work alongside that of Borges, and may account for why he calls ‘Funes’ a Kantian 
fable. Coetzee introduces us to a Kant in Doubling the Point, when he ends a discussion 
with David Attwell on freedom by stating: ‘I do not imagine freedom, freedom an sich; 
I do not represent it. Freedom is another name for the unimaginable, says Kant, and he 
is right’ (DP 341). This Kant may be right, but whose Kant is it?138 For Coetzee’s Kant, 
the practical function of freedom gives way to its empty ‘unimaginability’, because it 
relies on presupposition. Identifying freedom’s unimaginability has the opposite effect 
to that intended in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant acknowledges 
that ‘freedom is only an idea of reason, whose objective reality in itself is doubtful’. 
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Opposing freedom to the actuality of ‘natural necessity’ resolves itself in ‘no real 
contradiction […] for [philosophy] can’t give up the concept of nature any more than it 
can that of freedom’.139 Stating that freedom is the unimaginable has the reverse effect. 
It opens freedom to the possibility that the faculty of reason will fail to apprehend it as 
the dialectical partner of natural necessity. The effect is devastating to all Kantian 
morality, not least the arguments that lead him to limit cosmopolitan right to the 
condition of universal hospitality, since freedom’s unimaginable quality needs to remain 
functional in order to maintain moral certitude about the limitations of rights by laws. 
Here, Coetzee lays the very site of freedom open to a critical scrutiny that it cannot 
sustain; as Foucault found in Borges’s Chinese Encyclopedia, we find Coetzee 
disrupting the ground on which Kant will lay his Groundwork. Where early Coetzee 
was happy to take the pleasing image of the labyrinth from Borges, late Coetzee uses 
Borges’s logic to disrupt correlationist epistemology.   
We find similar transformations in Coetzee’s treatment of Beckett and Borges as 
precursors. With both writers, Coetzee moves from a relatively faithful stylistic 
resonance of tropes and images to a more radical, playful, implementation of their style 
as a historical object and a mode of thought. Coetzee’s evolution in this regard is not 
unique to his treatment of Beckett or Borges but it does exemplify a process similar to 
Beckett’s thoughts on image and voice and Borges’s thoughts on metaphor and 
enumeration. Coetzee’s use of Beckett and Borges develops from a general concern 
with their style as such, to the manipulation of that style as itself an object. From his 
early concern with picking up rhetorical flourishes, his style increasingly focuses on the 
use of such rhetorical objects.  
We began this chapter with a number of cosmopolitan statements by the three 
authors. These described conventional stoic forms of cosmopolitanism, but something 
                                                          
139 Ibid, 63. 
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in the way they were made suggested a form of kynicism. To diagnose what we mean 
by kynicism and cynicism, we turned to those moments when the writers refer directly 
to the ancient kynics. This prepared us to reconsider the writers’ subversion of stoic 
traditionalism with kynical precursorship. Finally, we showed how this subversion plays 
out in their relationships with each other. Our path, then, passed from politics to 
subjectivity to aesthetics, since the kynical subject determines a cosmopolitan politics 
and a kynical subject is the aesthetic formulation comprised by the writers’ works. The 
aesthetic formulation requires some aesthetic act, and so we will dedicate the next three 
chapters to examining what these writers do in their fictional work. For chronological 
reasons, we begin with Borges (b. 1899) in Chapter 2, move to Beckett (b. 1906) in 
Chapter 3 and conclude with Coetzee (b. 1940) in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 2 
Kynical Metaphor and Enumeration in Borges’s parables 
 
Jorge Luis Borges enacts a kynical cosmopolitanism in parables he writes in the 1950s, 
later collected in El hacedor [The Maker; first translated as Dreamtigers] (1960/1964). 
This period precedes Borges’s rise to international fame in the 1960s, his ‘return’ to 
poetry with the publication of El hacedor in 1960, and the concomitant shift of theme, 
tone and diction Donald Shaw observes in the mature poetry.
1
 It marks a point in 
Borges’s oeuvre where, as Shaw notes, there are exemplary poems of two particularly 
important ‘Borgesian’ themes: ‘his sense of Americanness (and especially of 
argentinidad) and the notion of a man reaching the centre of his personal labyrinth and 
coming face to face with destiny and death’.2 On the one hand, Borges presents a 
nuanced poetic engagement with cosmopolitan questions of European and Argentinian 
identity. On the other, he reflects on the poetic relationship between the public and the 
private self, where the poet resides in this relationship and how this affects the creation 
of ‘personal labyrinths’. Neither is reducible to the other, nor can they be considered in 
isolation from each other; they form together a non-sublative dialectic that is kynically 
cosmopolitan. Kynical cosmopolitanism is, we might recall, neither a stoic system nor a 
cynical disavowal of system, but a suspension of conventional narratives of belonging 
and exclusion. Borges achieves this state of suspension by interrogating the relation 
between his public and his private selves, and the fictional status he accords to both 
constructions of self. This interrogation is kynical and cosmopolitan because Borges 
integrates his critique of ideological belonging with a reflexive critique of his 
                                                          
1 Donald L. Shaw, Spanish American Poetry after 1950: Beyond the Vanguard (Woodbridge, Suffolk: 
Tamesis, 2008), 45. 
2 Ibid. 
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complicity with belonging. He presents these twin critiques in the form of the parable, 
which he explores through the technical possibilities offered by metaphor and 
enumeration. 
In reading the parables as dialogues between the public and the private 
responsibilities of the artist, we will depart from reading El hacedor as an arbitrary 
miscellany, ‘accumulated rather than wrote’, as Borges himself would claim in his 
‘Autobiographical Notes’.3 Linda Maier has demonstrated the internal congruencies 
between the parables and the lyrics in El hacedor by showing how the lyrics ‘double’ 
the themes raised in the parables.
4
 Maier’s essay builds on early work by Zunilda Gertel 
and Paul Cheselka, which argued for a deliberate collective coherency in the lyric half 
of El hacedor.
5
 Yet, for all this work on the coherency of El hacedor as a collection, the 
parables continue to be examined in isolation, or as illustrative of Borges’s longer 
ficciones [fictions].
6
 As recently as 2013, William Rowlandson could still complain that 
many of the ‘enigmatic shorter pieces’ have ‘generated scarcely any critical response’.7 
While ‘each piece was written for its own sake and out of an inner necessity’ according 
to Borges (a point borne out by the publication history of the parables), they clearly 
form a substantive collective response to the position of the artist in relation to a public 
history of political identity and a more personal history of aesthetic development.
8
 
Moreover, by pursuing the ‘political’ implications of El hacedor, we note a further 
                                                          
3 Jorge Luis Borges, Norman Thomas Di Giovanni, ‘Autobiographical Notes’, The New Yorker, 19 
September 1970, 94.  
4 Linda Maier, ‘Structural and Thematic Doubling in Borges’s El hacedor’, Variaciones Borges, No. 32 
(2011). 
5 Zunilda Gertel, Borges y su retorno a la poesía (New York: U Iowa and Las Américas Publishing 
Company, 1967); Paul Cheselka, The Poetry and Poetics of Jorge Luis Borges (New York: Peter Lang, 
1987). Cheselka convincingly disproves Gertel’s thesis that Borges ‘returned’ to lyric poetry in El 
hacedor after a long hiatus by showing Borges’s extensive work on the lyric form between Cuaderno San 
Martín [San Martin Notebook] (1929) and El hacedor.     
6 An exception is Gene Bell-Villada, who dedicates a significant part of his chapter on Borges’s later 
works to Dreamtigers in Borges and His Fiction: A Guide to His Mind and Art, rev. ed. (Austin: Texas 
UP, 1999). 
7 William Rowlandson, Borges, Swedenborg, and Mysticism (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2013), 206. 
8 Borges, ‘Autobiographical Notes’, 94. The publication history extends from the earliest parable, 
‘Dreamtigers’, published in Crítica in 1934, to ‘Mutaciones [Mutations]’ and ‘Una rosa amarilla [A 
Yellow Rose]’, which appear for the first time in El hacedor in 1960. 
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departure from standard readings of the collection which Borges himself would call ‘his 
most personal’ (Dr 93; OC2 248).  
The ‘personal’ aspect of the collection is most evident in the final parable of the 
collection, ‘Epílogo [Epilogue]’:  
a man set himself the task of drawing the world. After years, he populates a 
space with images of provinces, of kingdoms, of mountains, of bays, of 
ships, of islands, of fish, of houses, of instruments, of stars, of horses and 
of persons. Shortly before he dies, he discovers that that patient labyrinth 
of lines traces the image of his face. (Dr 93; OC2 248)
 
   
 
A lifetime of artistic creation, aimed at an external, ‘cosmopolitan’, projection of the 
world, produces lines of intersection that retrospectively indicate patterns of thought 
which foreground a consistency of which the artist-subject was not entirely aware. This 
is by no means a new or innovative observation but it has led to a critical tendency to 
follow Borges in a ‘personal’ reading of El hacedor, without much reflection on the 
cosmopolitan task Borges’s artist has set himself. In his Introduction to Dreamtigers, 
the 1963 English translation of El hacedor, Michael Enguídanos identifies as Borges’s 
theme throughout his work ‘simply Borges himself’.9 Cheselka quotes Enguídanos 
approvingly in his analysis of El hacedor, adding that the parable ‘El hacedor’, from 
which Borges draws his title for the collection, dispels any doubts that the reader might 
have about this affirmation.
10
 This insular response to Borges as a solipsistic writer has 
engendered a certain tradition of reading his work as autobiographical.
11
 While Borges’s 
writing is indubitably autobiographical, especially in El hacedor, Enguídanos and 
Cheselka by emphasising this aspect of his work risk disengaging it from its particularly 
rigorous examination of aesthetics and politics. This engagement with aesthetics and 
politics is important. Even Bell-Villada suspends his diatribe against the simplicity of 
the ‘later fiction’ to note the superiority of ‘Los espejos velados [The Draped Mirrors]’ 
                                                          
9 Michael Enguídanos, ‘Introduction’, Dreamtigers, 12. 
10 Cheselka, Poetry and Poetics, 150-1. 
11 The psychoanalytic tendency is well reviewed by Rowlandson in his conclusion to Borges, 
Swedenborg, and Mysticism, 227. 
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to its longer, ficciones, counterpart ‘El Zahir [The Zahir]’, since the parable, ‘with its 
directness and its absence of esoteric baggage, carries far more dramatic impact’.12 He 
goes on to note that ‘the bitterness and immediacy of those sketches portraying aspects 
of the Rosas and Perón dictatorships suggests the Perón regime […] was still in 
effect’.13 This critical emphasis on interwoven aesthetic and political questions, despite 
the apparent solipsism of El hacedor, indicates the shortcomings of an entirely 
‘personal’ approach to the collection. However, an approach that sacrifices this personal 
element to a purely political aesthetic also fails to appreciate the complexity of this 
collection. The conceptual strength of the kynical cosmopolitan, in this light, is its 
juxtaposition of personal and political forms of disjuncture.   
We focus on the parables from El hacedor, to the exclusion of the verse poems 
that make up the other half of the book, because they constitute the bulk of Borges’s 
work in this ambiguous genre and illuminate our reading of Borges as a kynical 
cosmopolitan. Borges’s parables – often referred to as minificciones [mini-fictions] or 
‘prose poems’ – exist in the interstices between poetry and narrative. They are also the 
creative form favoured by Borges in the 1950s, when he was beginning to go, or had 
gone, blind.
14
 Of the 25 parables in El hacedor (excluding the seven ‘Museo [Museum]’ 
texts originally published with Bioy Casares), 15 are specifically about the relationship 
between the artist, the poetic artwork and the means the former uses to communicate the 
latter. Thirteen relate to the work and the personas of particular poets, many of whom 
are canonical writers: Shakespeare, Cervantes, Dante and Borges are the objects of two 
                                                          
12 Bell-Villada, Borges and His Fiction, 248. Bell-Villada does not note that ‘Los espejos velados’ was, 
with ‘Dreamtigers’ and ‘Las uñas [Toenails]’, the earliest of the parables published (Crítica, No. 58, 15 
September 1934). Similarities between Bell-Villada’s not altogether satisfactory dismissal of the later 
work and J.M. Coetzee’s own comments about an elderly Borges are striking. Given that Coetzee makes 
similar grumblings about the later work of Beckett (at least up until Company and Stirrings Still), this 
may just be a trope in Coetzee’s response to late style; ironic, given the devolution of his own late style.  
13 Ibid. 
14 This happens before many of the poems in Elogio de la sombra [In Praise of Darkness] (1969) or his 
later stories, collected in El informe de Brodie [Dr Brodie’s Report] (1970), El libro de arena [The Book 
of Sand] (1976) and La memoria de Shakespeare [Shakespeare’s Memory] (1985). 
- 90 - 
parables each (‘Everything and Nothing’ and ‘La trama’; ‘Un problema’ and  ‘Parábola 
de Cervantes y de Quijote’; ‘Paradiso, XXXI, 108’ and ‘Inferno, I, 32’; ‘Dreamtigers’ 
and ‘Borges y yo’);15 Leopoldo Lugones, Homer, Giambattista Marino, the poet of the 
Yellow Emperor and José Hernández’s Martín Fierro are the objects of one parable 
each (‘A Leopoldo Lugones’, ‘El hacedor’, ‘La rosa amarilla’, ‘Parábola del palacio’ 
and ‘Martín Fierro’). Two parables observe how figures of representation are reformed 
over the passage of time (‘Mutaciones’ and ‘Epílogo’). A concern with time links these 
two parables to the presiding concern with forms of history in the other ten parables, of 
which two are elegies for women (‘Los espejos velados’ and ‘Delia Elena San Marco’), 
two are metaphysical inquiries akin to those of Swedenborg and the medieval 
scholastics (‘Diálogo sobre un diálogo’ and ‘Argumentum ornithologicum’), three are 
the imagined afterlives of figures (famous or not) in Argentinian history (‘El cautivo’, 
‘El simulacro’ and ‘Diálogo de muertos’), two detail the twilight of the gods (‘El 
testigo’ and ‘Ragnarök’) and the last is a curious examination of toenails (‘Las uñas’). 
The parables in the collection are divided between those concerned with the writer and 
the writing process, and those that address the aesthetic forms in which such processes 
take place (the elegy, the metaphysical inquiry, the national narrative, the apocalyptic 
dream and the phenomenological account). 
El hacedor also demonstrates a change in Borges’s thought on aesthetics. By 
1960, Borges claims that he had ‘come to realize that fine writing is a mistake, and a 
mistake born out of vanity. Good writing, I firmly believe, should be done in an 
unobtrusive way’.16 Nevertheless, Borges worries about an ‘essential monotony’ in El 
hacedor, ‘this miscellany (that time has compiled, not I, and that includes past pieces 
that I have not dared to amend, because I wrote them with another concept of literature)’ 
(D 93; H 248). Alí Víquez Jímenez notes of El hacedor that ‘in the apparent diversity 
                                                          
15 The English titles are given as such in the original Spanish publication. 
16 Borges, ‘Autobiographical Notes’, 94. 
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there is a real unity’.17 This assessment corroborates Borges’s observations about the 
collection’s consistency, albeit not to the point of complaining about monotony. 
However, any effort to claim a unity for the collection does obfuscate the subsequent 
appearance of the pieces in El hacedor (synchronous publication) and their original 
appearances in individual journals (diachronous publication). It appears that this unity is 
less real than retrospectively authorised by Borges’s declaration in the epilogue that 
‘time’ compiled the collection. The epilogue becomes an aesthetic act, or an act of 
retrospective authorisation. This aesthetic act itself gestures to the way that Borges’s 
aesthetics intertwine with his politics in ways that are directly linked to his sense of self. 
This begs the question what exactly is meant by an ‘aesthetic act’.  
Aesthetic (f)acts 
 
Borges refers to the aesthetic act [hecho estético] in his essay ‘La muralla y los libros 
[The wall and the books]’ in Otras inquicisiones [Other Inquisitions]: 
music, states of happiness, mythology, faces moulded by time, certain 
twilights and certain places—all these are trying to tell us something, or 
have told us something we should not have missed, or are about to tell us 
something; this imminence of a revelation that is not yet produced is, 
perhaps, the aesthetic act [el hecho estético]. (OC2 15)  
 
‘Hecho’ may be translated into English either as ‘act’ or as ‘fact’. At first glance, it 
would appear Borges is referring to an aesthetic fact: the aesthetic facticity of an 
imminent revelation. Borges enumerates a series of activities, moments or places in 
which a revelation is not produced, but is close to being produced. The situations in 
Borges’s enumeration are linked through causality: they each lead to an imminent 
revelation through the intersection of time, space and perception, without the faculty of 
judgment. The revelation is imminent but not yet produced, which means that the 
faculty of judgment has not turned them into revelation. However, the revelation may be 
                                                          
17 Alí Víquez Jímenez, ‘El “Poema de los dones” en El hacedor: La penumbra del símbolo’, Kañina: 
Revista de Artes y Letras de la Universidad de Costa Rica, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1994), 62. 
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brought from imminence to immanence through the aesthetic act of the artist. ‘La 
muralla y los libros’ conjectures the causes behind Qing Dynasty Emperor Shih Huang 
Ti’s two most famous commands: the building of the Great Wall and the burning of all 
books written before his reign. That two such large operations – ‘the five to six hundred 
leagues of stone opposing the barbarians, the rigorous abolition of history, which is to 
say the past’ – should have been orchestrated by a single man both fascinates and 
unsettles Borges’s narrator.18 Yet the conclusion is not to favour one cause over another.  
It is likely that the idea itself touches us, apart from the conjectures it 
permits. (Its virtue may be in the opposition of construction and destruction 
on a large scale). Generalizing the aforementioned case, we could infer that 
all forms have their virtue in themselves and not in the conjectured 
‘content’. (OC2 15) 
 
Here, Borges argues that the implications of an idea are less important than the idea 
itself, largely because of the form that idea takes. The form of the story is more 
important than its content because the form apprehends the connection made through 
the aesthetic act. Alberto Moreiras differentiates the aesthetic fact from literary writing: 
‘Literary writing is not the aesthetic fact [el hecho estético], but a response to its 
incomplete imminence, which then transmits the unpresentability of the Real’.19 
Moreiras links this to ‘Una rosa amarilla [A Yellow Rose]’ (1960), one of the parables 
from El hacedor, where, he concludes, ‘there is no possibility of expression, only of 
allusion’.20 This glosses Borges’s description of the day the illustrious Giambattista 
Marino experienced the hecho ‘that was, in truth, the last of his life’:  
then the revelation occurred. Marino saw the rose, as Adam was able to see 
it in Paradise, and felt that it was in its eternity and not in his words and 
that we can mention or allude but not express and that the tall and proud 
volumes that formed a golden penumbra in a corner of the room were not 
                                                          
18 Given how often Borges foregrounds his performance as narrator, and the instability of this presence in 
the parables, in which narrative voice shifts from paragraph to paragraph, I explicitly differentiate the 
narrator from Borges for the sake of clarity. 
19 Alberto Moreiras, Tercer Espacio, Literature y Duelo en América Latina (Santiago: ARCIS/LOM 
Ediciones, 1999), 51. 
20 Moreiras, Tercer Espacio, 51. 
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(as his vanity dreamed) a mirror on the world, but a thing added to the 
world. (Dr 38; OC2 184) 
  
This ‘last day’ of Marino’s life is not the day he dies, or even the day he stops writing. It 
is the day he realises that what he writes does not itself reflect the world but simply 
becomes a thing within the world. Hecho estético designates a situation in which the 
inexplicable takes place. Does it designate some fabulous beyond? According to 
Moreiras, it does. However, Moreiras does not explicate the tension of the ‘act’ in 
hecho, the literary creation [poiesis] of writing itself, preferring to consider this ‘fact’ a 
modernist mourning of the ‘unpresentability of the Real’. Bruno Bosteels, by contrast, 
argues that Borges’s hecho estético does, in fact, lead to an act, a radical declaration of 
the unpresentability of the Real.  
Beyond the horizon of language, antiphilosophers indeed typically posit 
the possibility of some radical act such as [...] Borges’s own ‘aesthetic 
fact,’ el hecho estético, better translated as ‘act’ than as ‘fact’, in the sense 
that hecho should retain the echoes of an active hacer, as in hacedor, or 
poet, from poiein. This ‘act’ or ‘fact’ does not produce a new truth but 
what matters is rather its effect on the subject, the ‘thrill’, which in 
principle disqualifies any systematic theoretical or conceptual purpose.
21
 
 
While it does not produce a new truth, the radical act does not reject truth. Rather it 
permits a reshaping of the subject’s reception of truth. In this sense, it accords with our 
understanding of the kynic’s efforts to puncture the standing order or cosmos with a 
new way of seeing things, and the effect this has on the subject. ‘What matters’, 
according to Bosteels, ‘is the experiential content or effect caused in the subject, 
particularly as speaking subject’.22 As early as the 1928 collection, El idioma de los 
argentinos [The Language of the Argentinians], Borges would argue that this order, or 
cosmos, has not, in fact, come from literature, which, as Marino realises, is just a thing 
added to the world. It is erroneous to suppose that literature has already confirmed this 
                                                          
21 Bruno Bosteels, ‘Borges as Antiphilosopher’, Vanderbilt e-Journal of Luso-Hispanic Studies, Vol. 3 
(2006), 6. Accessed: 6 August 2013.  
http://ejournals.library.vanderbilt.edu/ojs/index.php/lusohispanic/index 
22 Bosteels, ‘Borges as Antiphilosopher’, 7. 
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order through essential presentations of the eternal; if anything, literature has failed to 
provide ‘valid presentations of the eternal’ in its obsession with ‘minute belabourings’.  
We usually suppose that literature already has stated the essential words of 
our lives and that innovation comes only in grammaticalities and 
metaphors. I dare to assert the opposite: there is an overabundance of 
minute belaborings but a lack of valid presentations of the eternal: of 
happiness, of death, of friendship.
23
 
 
For Borges, true poetic innovation requires presentations of the eternal and it achieves 
these through ‘aesthetic acts’, which, despite their apparent ‘monotony’, bring about an 
imminent revelation.  
However, if the theoretical possibilities of the hecho estético are particularly 
captivating, it is important to indicate the hecho’s correspondence with particular 
rhetorical tropes in linking order or cosmos to poetic devices, in order to challenge a 
cosmos that is unitary in conception with the reality that it is not. This is possible 
through highlighting the aesthetic value of ideas (form) in constructing their 
implications (content). In his Epilogue to Otras inquisiciones, Borges notes two 
tendencies that he ‘discovers’ while correcting its proofs. The first tendency is ‘to 
appreciate religious or philosophical ideas for their aesthetic value [valor estético]’ 
(OC2 163). The second, indicative of Borges’s fascination with the generic, is ‘to 
presuppose (and to verify) that the number of fables or metaphors for which the 
imagination of men has capacity is limited’ (OC2 163). The figurative devices that 
consistently manifest the aesthetic value of philosophical ideas – across the themes and 
topics that appear in Borges’s limited number of fables – are enumeration and metaphor. 
Enumeration and Metaphor 
 
Enumeration, as Jaime Alazraki notes, marks the life-long influence of Walt Whitman 
on Borges’s poetry; poetry which itself, in turn, uses enumeration as a device to 
                                                          
23 Borges qtd. Bosteels, ‘Borges as Antiphilosopher’, 8. 
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condense the poet’s life. ‘With the years, the list will become longer, the lines shorter, 
the voice deeper, the tone calmer, but the effort to survey his whole life through 
enumerations will remain the same’.24 What Borges identifies in Whitman’s use of the 
device is its potential to evince the dialectic between chaos and cosmos already 
established.
25
 In his endnote to the poem ‘Aquél [That]’ in the 1981 poetry collection La  
cifra [The Cipher], Borges makes this explicit:  
this composition, like almost all the others, abuses chaotic enumeration 
[enumeración caótica]. Of this figure, which Whitman enjoyed with so 
much felicity, I can only say it must appear a chaos, a disorder and be 
intimately a cosmos, an order. (OC3 371) 
 
Enumeration, therefore, is the figure by which the chaos of difference can be 
contemplated in cosmic sequence. Since it figures as the listing of heterogeneous 
qualities, it appears chaotic; these chaotic qualities conceal an underlying order. As with 
all Borges’s binaries, this apparently simple division is itself undercut through a closer 
reading of the work, as is demonstrated in Foucault’s famous preface to Les Mots et Les 
Choses [The Order of Things], when he refers to Borges’s use of the bestiary of the 
Chinese Encyclopedia in ‘The Analytical Language of John Wilkins’: 
this book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that 
shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought – 
our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography 
– breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are 
accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing 
long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old 
distinction between the Same and the Other.
26
 
 
Foucault identifies the source of this shattering laughter not in ‘the oddity of unusual 
juxtapositions’ that characterise the Chinese Encyclopedia; rather, the landmarks of 
                                                          
24  Jaime Alazraki, ‘Enumerations as Evocations’, 151. 
25 Hernán Díaz has written persuasively on Borges’s engagement with Whitman’s poetry, particularly 
regarding Borges’s interest in Whitman’s involvement of the reader to create a democratic literary 
moment. Díaz follows Borges in believing that chaotic enumeration is distinguished from mere mess 
because of a secret order or cosmos. Hernán Díaz, Borges, Between History and Eternity (London and 
New York: Continuum, 2012).   
26 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences [1966] (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1994), xv. 
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thought are shattered because Borges’s enumerations collapse the common ground on 
which such juxtapositions might be made.
27
 
The monstrous quality that runs through Borges’s enumeration consists, on 
the contrary, in the fact that the common ground on which such meetings 
are possible has itself been destroyed. What is impossible is not the 
propinquity of the things listed, but the very site on which their propinquity 
would be possible.
28
 
 
In doing away with the site where the enumeration might be possible, Borges, according 
to Foucault, makes it impossible ‘to define a common locus beneath them all’. Here, 
Foucault uses Borges to clarify his distinction between utopia and heterotopia. ‘Utopias 
afford consolation: although they have no real locality there is nevertheless a fantastic, 
untroubled region in which they are able to unfold’.29 Utopias allow for a common 
ground, albeit fictional, where enumeration does not call into question the local ordering 
of the world. By contrast, ‘heterotopias are disturbing, possibly because they secretly 
undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that […] they 
destroy “syntax” in advance […] which causes words and things to “hold together”’.30 
Borges’s enumeration creates a heterotopia insofar as it breaks with the utopian 
language that allows an intimate cosmos to cohere. Moreover, this break does not 
simply occur in language: it also occurs in a localised conception of the world (in this 
particular case, Borges’s China).31  
                                                          
27 John King, in his seminal work on the journal Sur, notes a similar use of enumeration by Borges in 
1927 to undercut the tendency to divide Buenos Aires writers along class grounds. The Florida (middle-
class) and Boedo (working-class) groups were named after particular streets or areas in Buenos Aires, but 
Borges redefines the divisions on linguistic (rather than geographic or class) grounds. John King, Sur: A 
Study of the Argentine Literary Journal and Its Role in the Development of a Culture, 1931-1970 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986).   
28 Foucault, The Order of Things, xvi. 
29 Ibid, xviii. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Richard Robinson has written persuasively about a disjuncture between two notions of the 
‘heterotopia’ in Foucault’s work in Narratives of the European Border: A History of Nowhere 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 34. First, it appears as a linguistic atopia in the ‘Preface’. 
Later, in ‘Of Other Spaces’, it occurs as ‘a material social reality […] for the space that is not here’. 
Between the two understandings of heterotopia, the virtual space of language correlates to a reality in the 
world. 
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For Noé Jitrik, Foucault’s ‘shattering laughter’ demonstrates Borges’s ability to 
act as an ‘operator’ or catalyst; unaffected by the ends to which his conjectures or 
suggestions are taken, he is employed as the impetus for paradigm shifting thought, 
while remaining untouched by it.
32
 This is Jitrik’s principal reason for calling Borges a 
cynic in his ‘Complex Feelings about Borges’. It also leads to two important issues for 
enumeration, kynicism and cosmopolitanism. First, as Jitrik himself intimates, the 
paradigm we are dealing with in Borges is of a theoretical framework that functions as 
if untouched by the ramifications of the ‘linguistic turn’ (poststructuralism in 
particular), even if it is often taken up as a shaping influence of this turn. This catalytic 
function requires some refinement. When Foucault highlights the ‘shattering laughter’ 
brought about by Borges’s text, he points to a function of the text that is desirable to 
Borges (as a thinker of new forms of belonging) and yet beyond his understanding (as a 
believer in an intimate cosmos). The success of Borges’s enumeration for his Chinese 
Encyclopedia is not in his ability to theorise it: it is in his ability not to theorise it. He 
allows it to stand as ‘simple’ enumeration without attempting to co-opt it into those 
systems of knowledge (utopia or cosmos) he already understands. It is less the case that 
this theoretical framework remains untouched than that it is able to gesture to patterns 
of thought properly beyond its own reliance on essentialist categories. This success is 
complicated by a second issue. Borges, with the international fame and prestige he 
acquired in the 1960s, was often invited to speak about his poetry. This meant that, 
when he appeared on such occasions simply to be recapitulating his metaphysical 
concerns, he often reshaped and rephrased them. A notion such as ‘cosmos’, which 
appears to be constant, changes even as Borges himself is changed by circumstance.
33
 
These issues suggest that Borges is not as unchanged by his enumerative operations as 
                                                          
32 Jitrik, ‘Complex Feelings about Borges’.  
33 See the discussion of Borges’s views on democracy and cosmos in Chapter 1. 
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Jitrik believes him to be: he does not function as a catalyst, in the way that T. S. Eliot 
expects of his stoic-poet-catalyst.
34
  
While enumeration has a constant aesthetic presence (if a shifting political 
implication) in Borges’s poetic rhetoric, the metaphor occupies a far more polemical 
position.
35
 Borges, as a young man, was involved in the Ultraísta movement in Spain 
(late 1910s to early 1920s). Ultraísmo like many of the movements of the time (such as 
Futurism, Imagism and Vorticism) sought to modernise language to comprehend the 
modernisation of daily life. Borges, as a young adherent of the movement in Madrid and 
the primary source of its brief flowering in Buenos Aires, wrote a succession of 
manifestos and aesthetic tracts in 1921. From the ‘passive aesthetic’ of the mirror, 
Borges proposed a movement to the ‘active aesthetic’ of the prism, since  
guided by the first, art transforms itself into a copy of the objectivity of the 
environment or of the psychic history of the individual. Guided by the 
second, art redeems itself, makes of the world its instrument, and forges – 
beyond spatial and temporal prisons – its personal vision. (TR1 86)  
 
By looking for ‘the sensation in itself [la sensación en sí] within his lyric energies 
[esfuerzos líricos]’, rather than ‘the description of the spatial and temporal premises that 
surround it’, Borges the Ultraist proposed a poetry that was immanent and synthetic 
(TR1 95). The first principle was the ‘reduction of the lyric to its primordial element: 
the metaphor’ (TR1 126). In 1966, Borges would satirise the movement’s ideals, aiming 
his opprobrium at this principle particularly: ‘The primacy of the metaphor was its 
dogma. That dogma was false; in good logic, it only requires one good non-metaphoric 
verse to prove that the metaphor is not an essential element. I have here a stanza’ (TR3 
128). Nevertheless, his later treatment of the metaphor itself retains his early reverence; 
                                                          
34 See the discussion of Eliot’s catalyst and ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ in Chapter 1, in which 
Eliot adumbrates a stoic traditionalism. 
35 The opinions Borges expresses on enumeration are not entirely unpolemical; in the 1942 essay, ‘Sobre 
la descripción literaria [On Literary Description]’, Borges complains about the use of the ‘enumeration 
and definition of the parts of a whole’ to ‘coordinate them into a single coherent image’. Borges’s 
condemnation of such use of enumeration to achieve ‘a single coherent image’ does not extend to lists 
with ‘exclamatory value’ or those that ‘exist verbally, even though they are unrepresentable’, which 
suggests that Foucault’s ‘shattering laughter’ is precisely the effect Borges aims to achieve. (TL 234)  
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what shifts is the importance Borges gives to metaphoric innovation. In a 1967 
interview with Ronald Christ for The Paris Review, Borges identifies the shift in his 
aesthetic thinking about the metaphor:   
when I was a young man I was always hunting for new metaphors. Then I 
found out that really good metaphors are always the same. I mean you 
compare time to a road, death to sleeping, life to dreaming, and those are 
the great metaphors in literature because they correspond to something 
essential.
36
 
 
Borges enumerates the comparatively few generic metaphors, tying a specific theme to 
a specific object. Unlike the early Borges, who constantly sought to break this generic 
specificity, later Borges attempts to secure it as something ‘essential’. Borges will go on 
to fictionalise this dialectic, as Mercedes Blanco has noted, in the story ‘El otro [The 
Other]’ (1976), where the older Borges realises that his alter ego expounds a theory of 
metaphor that he would reject years later.
37
  
The dialectic develops over Borges’s career. His satiric reconstruction of his 
position on metaphor is also perceptible in a shift in the style of essays discussing 
metaphors. Borges begins his earliest essay on metaphor, ‘La metáfora [The Metaphor]’ 
(1926), by considering the similarities between metaphors and phenomena, as a 
deliberate link made between two distinct things: ‘both are a plotted link [vinculación 
tramada] between two distinct things, one of which is shuffled [se la trasiega] into the 
other’ (TR1 114). In his work on Icelandic kenningar, metaphors become the means of 
transmitting a cultural understanding of objects: ‘they define the object less by their 
figure than by their use’ (OC1 395). By his 1951 essay on Pascal, ‘La esfera de Pascal’, 
Borges considers metaphor itself to provide a link to a universal history: ‘Perhaps 
universal history [la historia universal] is the history of a few metaphors’ (OC2 16). He 
partially repeats this allusion to universal history in the 1953 ‘Diálagos del asceta y del 
                                                          
36 Jorge Luis Borges, Ronald Christ, ‘Interview: The Art of Fiction No. 39’, The Paris Review, No. 40 
(Winter-Spring, 1967). Accessed: 6 August 2013.  
http://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/4331/the-art-of-fiction-no-39-jorge-luis-borges 
37 Blanco, ‘Borges y la metáfora’, 6. 
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rey’, where universal history is the history of a few fables. From its place as a mode of 
connecting ideas, the metaphor becomes a generic quotient of universal history. In the 
Charles Norton Lectures Borges gave at Harvard in 1967 and 1968, he ironically 
referred to his use of ‘the same stock metaphors’, while emphasising that ‘what is 
important about metaphor is the fact of its being felt by the reader or the hearer as a 
metaphor’. This insistence on the ‘cadence’ of the metaphor in the reader or hearer 
corresponds, in the poetry, to an emphasis on the figurative power carried by words 
through their accretion of cultural significance: the ‘secret complexity’ of the word 
‘luna [moon]’.38 But the accretion of significance also contributes to a ‘universal 
history’ and a kind of ‘world literature’ already packaged and marketed for export.  
Although he does not comment on the economics of this practice, Borges 
implicitly identifies the possibilities raised for world literature by a universal history of 
story forms in his conclusion to ‘Diálogos del asceta y el rey’ (on which we drew for 
our discussion of kynics in Chapter 1): 
Apart from their worth, which may be greater or lesser, the above texts, 
disseminated in time and in space, suggest the possibility of a morphology 
(to use Goethe’s term) or science of fundamental forms of literature. Once 
I conjectured in this column that all metaphors are variants of a reduced 
number of archetypes; perhaps this proposition is also applicable to fables. 
(TR2 306)  
 
All stories and metaphors are, perhaps, variants of a reduced number of archetypes.
39
 
These archetypes do not emerge ex nihilo; they are derived from morphology, the study 
of forms. Borges’s typology is less a matter of ‘archē [origin]’ than of ‘epiphanēs 
                                                          
38 Thorpe Running considers this complexity already to
 
 
 
exist in the ‘complex script’ of human experience. It lies in the multiple associations a word has 
gathered over the centuries […] it involves stripping away the word’s timeworn complications in 
order to experience the original astonishment that fabricators of language felt when they made 
their first metaphorical connections between words and objects. 
 
In fact, while the rationale of Running’s response is correct – Borges moves from metaphors using the 
moon to considering the implications of the word ‘luna’ in itself – it seems incorrect to see this as 
stripping away the timeworn complications to experience some ‘original’ astonishment. Thorpe Running, 
‘The “Secret Complexity” of Borges’ Poetry’, Borges the Poet, 105-6. 
39 For a detailed examination of Borges’s debt to Jung in thinking about archetypes, see Rowlandson’s 
Borges, Swedenborg, and Mysticism. 
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[coming into view]’, since the types emerge from his readings of texts, not vice versa. 
As the types ‘emerge’ from his reading experience, he attests to their transhistorical 
value despite their geographical and cultural disparities, which also justifies the 
heterogeneous nature of the texts he alludes to in ‘Diálogos’ (as with ‘Kafka y sus 
precursors [Kafka and His Precursors]’, Borges lifts otherwise unrelated examples from 
across the world). By referring to the morphology of fundamental forms, Borges allows 
for a synthetic, a posteriori typology that avoids empiricism by still gesturing to the 
archetype. Moreover, the allusion to Goethe and the collocation of these geographically 
diverse exemplars places Borges in kynical dialogue with the cosmopolitan concept of 
‘Weltliteratur’ or ‘world literature’. 
The term ‘Weltliteratur’, also coined by Goethe, is understood by the German 
writer to ‘develop in the first place when the differences that prevail within one nation 
are resolved through the understanding and judgment of the rest’.40 This resolution is 
possible through the identification of a literary morphology that dates back to the 
Ancient Greeks.  
If we really want a pattern, we must always return to the ancient Greeks, in 
whose works the beauty of mankind is constantly represented. All the rest 
we must look at only historically; appropriating to ourselves what is good, 
so far as it goes.
41
 
 
Here, Goethe navigates between strictly realist and nominalist positions by 
counterpointing the ideal represented by the Greeks with whatever other cultures have 
produced that can be verified as ‘good’ through the historical evidence of their effect. 
This is nothing less than the instantiation of a canon, where an unassailable ideal form 
(Greek Art) becomes the standard against which the efficacy of art in other cultures may 
                                                          
40 Goethe qtd. Fritz Strich, Goethe and World Literature, trans. C. A. M. Sym (London: Routledge, 
1949), 349. 
41 Goethe qtd. David Damrosch, What is World Literature? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003), 12. 
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be measured. This provides the ideological basis for a universal history and a 
concomitant universal literature.  
It is obvious that for a considerable time the efforts of the best writers and 
authors of aesthetic worth in all nations have been directed to what is 
common to all mankind. In every field, whether the historical, the 
mythological, the fabulous, or the consciously imagined, one can see, 
behind what is national and personal, this universal quality becoming more 
and more apparent.
42
 
 
The universal quality, ‘becoming more and more apparent’, is implicitly linked to a 
Kantian universal history, which also directs its efforts to what is common to all 
mankind. Kant develops this common interest in relation to a cosmopolitan ideal.  
In Borges’s criticism, we may deduce a relation between the world and literature 
similar to that proposed by Goethe, a relation that relies on the notion of a universal 
history. However, Borges’s universal history is best understood as a subversion of 
Kantian universal history, and, concomitantly, a subversion of Goethe’s ‘world 
literature’.43 As we have seen in our discussion of ‘Diálogos del asceta y del rey’, 
Borges maintains a healthy disregard for the Kantian ideals of a Universal History, 
preferring to highlight the inevitable collapse of the political order (the king) when its 
artificiality is exposed by the scrutiny of the non-participant (the ascetic). This takes a 
darker turn in ‘Museo’, the collection of fragments at the end of El hacedor, with the 
later parable ‘In memoriam J.F.K.’ (published in a subsequent edition of El hacedor and 
therefore not presented in the Boyer/Morland translation). Written in response to John 
F. Kennedy’s assassination, ‘In memoriam J.F.K.’ delineates a history of violence 
attached to the bullet that killed him – ‘This bullet is ancient’ – from the 1897 
assassination of the president of Uruguay, via the assassination of Lincoln, the death in 
                                                          
42 Goethe qtd. Strich, Goethe and World Literature, 13. 
43 This subversive quality is most evident in his Historia universal de la infamia [A Universal History of 
Infamy] (1935). Borges’s Historia universal is a collection of narrative prose pieces, purportedly giving 
biographical accounts of criminals from a variety of cultural backgrounds. When it was republished in 
1954, Borges would affectionately dismiss it as ‘baroque’, ‘the final stage of all art, when it exhibits and 
squanders its methods’ (OC1 307). 
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battle of Gustavus Adolphus, the executions of Christ and Socrates, to the stone with 
which Cain killed Abel (OC2 247). Theodor Adorno, writing on the notion of universal 
history in Negative Dialectics, outlines a similar trajectory: ‘No universal history leads 
from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the 
neutron bomb’.44 Moreover, Adorno notes that ‘to say that a plan for a better world is 
manifested through history and unites it – after the catastrophes that have happened and 
in view of the catastrophes to come – would be cynical’.45 He does however qualify 
this:  
not to be denied for that reason, however, is the unity that cements the 
discontinuous, chaotically splintered moments and phases of history – the 
unity of the control of nature, progressing to rule over men, and finally to 
that over men’s inner nature.46           
 
Is this diagnosis germane to the Borges who constructs universal histories of violent 
repetition? Certainly there is a substantive similarity in their claims to a universal 
history of barbarity, if not infamy, and to a process of cementing chaotically splintered 
moments and phases of history. Yet, while any attempt to advocate a ‘plan’ for a 
‘better’ world would be ‘cynical’, in Adorno’s use of the term, and Borges does not 
argue for a ‘plan’ as such, he does highlight the active role of the subject in constituting 
this unity amidst historical discontinuity, even if the subject is not aware that it has this 
function. This resistant, albeit ignorant, subject is the kynical cosmopolitan. 
A further parable from El hacedor exemplifies the emergence of an ignorant, 
cosmopolitan subject, formed retrospectively in relation to history. ‘La trama [The 
Plot]’ (1957) follows a similar pattern to other Borges parables: it is divided into two 
paragraphs with the first recreating a specific scene and the second considering the 
consequences devolving from this scene. ‘To make his horror complete, Caesar, pressed 
to the foot of a statue by the impatient daggers of his friends, discovers among the 
                                                          
44 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics [1973], trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1990), 320. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
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blades and faces the face of Marcus Junius Brutus’ (Dr 36; OC2 182). Borges adds this 
first sentence to an adapted translation of ‘Et tu, Brute’: ‘Tú también, hijo mío! [You 
too, my boy!]’ (Dr 36; OC2 182). ‘Shakespeare and Quevedo’, he notes, ‘revive this 
pathetic cry’ (Dr 36; OC2 182). The second paragraph begins: ‘Destiny takes pleasure 
in repetitions, variations, symmetries’ (Dr 36; OC2 182). The repetition, variation or 
symmetry in question is that of a gaucho in the south of Buenos Aires province, set 
upon by other gauchos, who recognises a godson ‘and says to him with gentle reproof 
and slow surprise (these words must be heard, not read), “¡Pero, che!” He is being killed 
and he does not know that he is dying so that a scene might be repeated’ (Dr 36; OC2 
182). It is difficult to translate the regional significance of the words, which ‘must be 
heard, not read’. ‘Che’ – a term made famous as the sobriquet of the Argentinian 
revolutionary, Ernesto Guevara, and given to him because of his tendency to use it in 
conversation – is an Argentinian and Uruguayan dialect marker meaning ‘guy’ or 
‘hey’.47  The phrase, ‘¡Pero, che! [But, guy!]’, is an expression indicating indignation or 
betrayal in the Argentinian and Uruguayan dialect. It is a phrase that must be ‘heard’ 
because, like many such ambiguous markers, the tone in which it is said inflects it with 
either indignation or a more horrified sense of betrayal. Here we have a re-enactment of 
the scene, made famous by Shakespeare and Quevedo (and Plutarch), but in a way that 
has translated it into a distinctly Argentinian idiom. Moreover, this dislocation of the 
scene has begun to take place in the so-called archetype, where the ‘Et tu, Brute’ has 
already been hispanised as ‘Tú también, hijo mío!’ While the participants – the 
murdered gaucho, his murdering compatriots, and the assisting godson – are therefore 
subjects of this re-enactment, the murdered gaucho is unaware that he is dying to repeat 
                                                          
47 For a discussion of the use of che as simultaneously an intimate term and as a source of authoritarian 
‘one-upmanship’, see Isolda E. Carranza, ‘Discourse Markers in the Construction of the Text, the 
Activity, and the Social Relations: Evidence from Courtroom Discourse’, Current Trends in the 
Pragmatics of Spanish, eds. Rosina Márquez-Reiter and María Elena Placencia (Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins B.V., 2004), 220. 
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a scene. History repeats itself, but this is evident only in retrospect, not to the actors 
repeating the scene. Goethe’s development of ‘world literature’, as something becoming 
more and more apparent, is not apprehended by the actors within ‘world literature’: 
rather, ‘world literature’ becomes the system by which historical subjects 
retrospectively make sense of their existence in a cosmopolitan order of their own 
making.  
The aesthetics of this tendency towards the generic and its relationship with a 
retrospective historical subject are developed in a lyric poem from El hacedor, ‘Arte 
Poética’. Mercedes Blanco has described ‘Arte Poética’ as an ‘anti-manifesto that marks 
the return of Borges to verse’.48 Traditionally, the Ars Poetica is a poetic statement on 
poetics.
49
 The authority of the poet over the poem also gives the poem an authority over 
meaning. For instance, Archibald MacLeish states in his 1926 ‘Ars Poetica’ that ‘A 
poem should not mean / But be’.50 While this accords with our previous discussion 
about Borges’s aesthetic act, his own ‘Arte Poética’ is far less prescriptive. Rather, in a 
succession of phrases that each begin with a verb in the infinitive, the speaker 
counterpoints the acts of seeing particular images (‘the river made of time and water’, 
‘death’, and ‘sunsets’) and of feeling (‘that wakefulness is another sleep / that dreams it 
does not dream and that death / that frightens our flesh is that death / of each night, 
which is called sleep’), with the knowledge that these things reflect, through art, the 
consistencies in our lives (Dr 89; OC2 236). But it is also an ability to see the generic 
poem in these events that particularly identifies the poet: ‘To see in death the dream, in 
                                                          
48 Blanco, ‘Borges y la metáfora’, 31. 
49 Horace, in the first century before Christ, dictates what is right and what is wrong for a writer to do. 
Vincente Huidobro, the poet-thinker behind the early 20
th
 century avant-guard movement, Creacionismo 
[Creationism], which Borges was responding to with his Ultraismo, countered in his own ‘Arte Poética’ 
with the phrase ‘El poeta es un pequeño dios [The poet is a small god]’. Horace, Horace: Satires, Epistles 
and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1929); Vincente Huidobro, 
Obra Poética, ed. Cedomil Goic (Madrid: Allca XX, 2003). 
50 Archibald MacLeish, The Collected Poems of Archibald MacLeish (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962). 
Borges may or may not have read MacLeish’s ‘Ars Poetica’ but he did have a copy of the 1932 epic, 
Conquistador. 
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the sunset / a sad gold, that is poetry / which is immortal and poor’ (Dr 89; OC2 236). 
‘At times in the afternoons a face / looks at us from the depths of a mirror; / art must be 
like that mirror / which reveals to us our own face’ (Dr 89; OC2 236). This is the 
poem’s most prescriptive statement: it reiterates the personal, retrospective ability of the 
poem to show the poet or the reader their own face. We have, it seems, returned to our 
starting point: the solipsism implicit in a closed relationship between poet and his world 
(or the reader and their own face). How are we to resolve this impasse?  
Borges, for Noé Jitrik, engenders complex feelings because he seems not to 
concern himself with the material world or its discontents. Written in 1981, Jitrik’s 
essay accuses Borges of failing to respond to the 1976-83 dictatorship in Argentina. 
According to Jitrik, the practical considerations of the marginalised (‘blacks or 
Indians’), those kidnapped and murdered by the dictatorship (‘the disappeared’), the 
conditions of other writers (‘Alfonso Reyes’), or the questionable use of the FIFA 
World Cup as a political crutch (‘soccer players’) do not seem to interest him: he is, for 
Jitrik, a cynic. Moreover, 
he [is] so at the cost of whomever or whatever, manipulating that 
‘whomever or whatever’ but doing so in order to thwart his interlocutor at 
the same time that his attitude, focus, or manner are affirmed, and not in 
order to thwart that ‘whomever or whatever’. In other words, taking 
advantage of the ‘subjectified object’ in order to destroy the ‘objectified 
subject’.51 
 
Jitrik’s Borges is not interested in the object of discussion, apart from its utility as a 
means for thwarting his interlocutor. Cynicism, according to Jitrik, places far more 
importance on advantages afforded by the slippage of terms between different 
discourses than in the political ends, whether ‘good’ or ‘evil, to which this slippage is 
taken. But Jitrik’s references to cynicism blur into ancient kynicism, rather than dealing 
exclusively with contemporary cynicism, since Jitrik, in his explanation, must resort to 
‘truth’ in order to explain his point.  
                                                          
51 Jitrik, ‘Complex Feelings’, 9. 
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I’m beginning to think that if there is a truth about Borges, it is the truth of 
the cynic – and not even that of cynicism, which would have a more 
general, systemic scope. Rather his truth, in the final instance, has the 
subjugating attention of his intuitive character, capable of scorning all 
fundamental principles. But this is not all: like all cynics, he has the ability 
to fragment or break the apparent totalisation presented by an obstacle, and 
from that, to present a model of the world that has precisely that 
attraction.
52
 
 
Jitrik does not assume this truth is the Truth, but he does refer to it as a truth. It is the 
truth of an operator: ‘he triggers a process in the other, and when he is not suggesting 
necessary but fertile paths of differentiation, he forces us to at least re-examine 
things’.53 Borges’s fiction may break with existing modes of thought, but it implements 
this break in a way that maintains a certain consistency or ‘fidelity’ to Borges’s own 
truth: ‘he imposes nothing personal at the same time that he destroys the personal 
beliefs of the other’.54 The destruction of the other’s personal beliefs is not a reciprocal 
effect of affirming his own. Instead, the question of belief itself – the categories it 
contains and the assumptions it makes – is raised. Jitrik states this rather more 
acerbically.  
From the history of the cynics he has extracted one element that explains 
his triumph: have the last word, which implies having created the 
conditions such that you are asked for a word, and having astutely taken 
enough time that your word appears to be the final one.
55
 
 
The common feature of the three kynical cosmopolitans considered in our study is their 
creation, in poetry, drama and the novel, of conditions ‘such that they are asked for a 
word’ because of their status as established writers. However, Jitrik’s summation does 
not include the significance of virtue in either the kynics or the writers under discussion. 
Jitrik’s analysis of Borges does not go far enough precisely because his complex 
feelings about Borges’s complicity with the dictatorship bring him too close to Borges’s 
troubling decisions. It is difficult to reconcile Borges’s behaviour during the 
                                                          
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid, 10. 
55 Ibid. 
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dictatorship with the questioning of totalities that he undertakes in his work, and it is 
therefore tempting to dehistoricise it into a formulaic response.  
This formula maintains that Borges’s work is structured around unreality. The 
landmark study in this regard, Ana Maria Barrenechea’s La expresión de la irrealidad 
en la obra de Borges [The Expression of Unreality in the Work of Borges] (1957), has 
proved (justifiably) so persuasive that it led the Nobel Laureate, Mario Vargas Llosa, to 
claim, in 2002, that it ‘continues to be the most solid and lucid on Borges’.56 Vargas 
Llosa goes on to add that, ‘the Borgesean universe has many unmistakeable features, 
but the principal and supreme one is to be unreal, to be outside of this concrete world in 
which we, his enchanted readers, are born, live and die’.57 Borges’s cosmos turns away 
from the chaos, instead of engaging with it. For Vargas Llosa, Borges is Sloterdijk’s 
contemporary cynic: emblematic of enlightened false consciousness. For Jitrik, this 
unreality must be treated with more circumspection. 
Jitrik attributes the cause of his ‘complex feelings’ to the tension between 
Borges’s support of the dictatorship and the ‘catalytic’ function of his work. But he does 
not think his ‘catalytic’ with reference to Borges’s historical generic. This threatens to 
collapse his reading into ‘mere’ confirmation of Borges’s ‘unreality’. Borges’s prologue 
to El otro, el mismo [The Other, The Same] (1964), suggests that the catalytic is itself a 
historical generic in the fate of the writer, since ‘the fate of the writer is curious. At first, 
he is baroque, vainly baroque, and over the years he can achieve, if the stars are 
favourable, not simplicity, which is nothing, but a modest and secret complexity’ (OC2 
252). This modest and secret complexity finds its most perfect form in Borges’s 
parables. 
 
                                                          
56 Mario Vargas Llosa, ‘¿Por qué? ¿Cómo?’, El País, 8 January (2002): 5-6, 5. 
57 Ibid. 
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Borges’s Parables 
 
In a 1977 interview with the editors of Philosophy and Literature, Borges differentiates 
philosophical and literary temperaments by associating the former with a rigorous form 
of thinking and the latter with an interest in narrative and metaphor.
58
 When asked 
whether a short narrative might be rigorous in a philosophical sense, he responds that 
such a narrative would be a parable. As philosophically rigorous short narratives, 
Borges’s parables consist of two or three ‘idea-clusters’, often structured in individual 
paragraphs. The first idea-cluster begins with a visual image, which is quickly spun into 
a narrative sequence, culminating in a sudden or surprising occurrence. The second 
idea-cluster introduces an element of narrative doubt, through the sudden reference to 
dissenting views on the matter or on the consequence this has in a historical frame. The 
result is a double estrangement: the story is given a historical arc that calls its veracity 
into question, and the immediate priority of the initial narrative, the first idea-cluster, is 
ruptured by the retrospective awareness of its position as just one of many possible 
interpretations, another being the second idea-cluster. The third idea-cluster, when it 
occurs, appears to follow the pattern of the second. However, it is as close to a ‘moral’ 
as Borges will come – usually an exclamation or an observation of the failure of the first 
two clusters to effect change, despite the obvious evidence of human failing they 
present. This narrative progression has led novelist and critic, Ricardo Piglia, to use 
Borges as an exemplar to show how short stories always tell two tales: the manifest tale, 
and the tale of the tale being told.
59
  
We favour the word ‘parable’ to refer to Borges’s prose poems for two reasons. 
The first reason is biographical. ‘Parable’, as Edwin Williamson notes in Borges: A 
                                                          
58 Jorge Luis Borges, Denis Dutton, Michael Palencia-Roth, ‘“Merely a Man of Letters” Jorge Luis 
Borges: An Interview’, Philosophy and Literature, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1977): 337-41. 
59 Ricardo Piglia, ‘Theses on the Short Story’, New Left Review, Vol. 70 (July-August, 2011): 63-66. 
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Life, was a term Borges used to refer to early short narrative pieces in a 1917 letter to 
his friend Roberto Godel.
60
 Two of Borges’s earliest published pieces were parables.61 
The term emerges again in work in the 1940s and 1950s, and several of the short 
narrative pieces in El hacedor are titled ‘Parábolas’. The second reason is idiomatic and 
associative. The Spanish word ‘parábola’ may be translated either as ‘parable’ or as 
‘parabola’. While Borges’s parables contain a formal juxtaposition of ideas, in a 
narrative, ‘parable’ sequence, they also function parabolically, by which we mean they 
have an inherent symmetry (between an opening paragraph that is imagist and 
narratorial, and subsequent paragraphs that are interrogative of assumptions in the first 
paragraph) that does not prevent their devolution into infinite implications at either their 
beginning or at their end (through the ambiguity of the opening image and the 
recursivity of the closing interpretation). The form has a generic constant, while the 
implications spin out into a range of intertexts and parallel readings. Borges’s use of the 
parabolic form calls into question any attempt to tease out a strict moral teaching from 
the narrative: the function of Borges’s parables cannot be understood pedagogically in 
any conventional sense of the word.
 
 
Their effect is similar to the chreia, or fragmentary anecdotes, Diogenes Laertius 
writes of Diogenes of Sinope. Although the chreia are short narrative accounts of 
moments in the life of Diogenes of Sinope, they also provide a critical ‘vertex’, or high 
point of intensity, for each of these moments. Each describes a situation that Diogenes 
then upsets through a pointed phrase or action. They do not continue with a conclusion 
or resolution for the situation. For example, when Plato gave as his definition of man, ‘a 
hairless biped’, Diogenes produced a plucked chicken, saying, ‘here is your man’. As a 
result, Plato added ‘having broad nails’ to his definition. The ‘vertex’ in this case is the 
                                                          
60 Borges qtd. Edwin Williamson, Borges: A Life, 62. 
61 ‘La lucha [The Battle]’ and ‘Liberación [Liberation]’ were both published in Gran Guignol in February 
1920 (TR1 32-3). For a discussion of Kafka’s influence on these texts, see Daniel Balderston, ‘Borges y 
sus precursores’, Itinerarios, Vol. 14 (2011): 113-120. 
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act of producing the chicken, to which the statement ‘here is your man’ is 
supplementary. It indicates the baselessness of the definition that goes before it – man 
as hairless biped – without suggesting a corresponding solution. In fact, it suggests that 
the act of defining ‘man’ is itself already flawed by virtue of its reliance on association 
and metaphor. Plato’s subsequent extension of the definition implies an infinite regress 
of conjecture and refutation in philosophical precision. Plato’s response mirrors our 
own response to the action of the chreia itself: we attempt to co-opt it back into 
structures of thought we understand and find comfortable. The same logic is at work in 
the account of Plato, Diogenes of Sinope and the chicken. While the chreia can be taken 
as refutation of Plato’s definitions, it also illustrates the indeterminacy in the analogous 
[parabolic] nature of such definitions without attempting to resolve or homogenise it to 
our epistemic structures. In other words, it allows for the laughter that, as for Foucault, 
shatters all the landmarks of our thought.  
This indeterminacy is particularly pertinent to Borges’s parables, especially 
when these are read in relation to their immediate antecedents, the parables of Franz 
Kafka.
62
 While a sustained comparison with Kafka’s parables is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, Kafka’s meditation on parabolic indeterminacy in his meta-parable, ‘On 
Parables’, can hardly be overlooked.63  
Many complain that the words of the wise are always merely parables and 
of no use in daily life, which is the only life we have. When the sage says: 
‘Go over,’ he does not mean that we should cross over to some actual 
place, which we could do anyhow if the labor were worth it; he means 
                                                          
62 Borges’s debt to Kafka is explored by Julio Chiappini in Borges y Kafka (Buenos Aires: Editorial Zeus, 
1991). Efraín Kristal notes that while the 1925 Spanish translation of Metamorphosis cannot be ascribed 
to Borges with any certainty, Borges did publish a translation of ‘Before the Law’ in El hogar in 1938. 
Borges would recall that he read Kafka in 1917, the same year that he uses the term ‘parable’ in his letter 
to Gidal. Efraín Kristal, Invisible Work: Borges and Translation (Nashville: Vanderbilt UP, 2002). 
63 Michael Wood has written on the significance of this parable in relation to the space of reading. It is 
worth noting two points from Wood’s argument. First, all parables are about parables. Second, attempting 
to locate a definite meaning for a parable inevitably indicates the reader’s ‘inaptness’ for parabolic 
lessons. Wood’s insights about this parable permit him to discuss Kafka’s use of China as ‘a place of 
infinite, elaborate, patient, uncertain interpretation’. This response resonates with Borges’s own use of 
China, which Foucault uses in his description of a linguistic heterotopia (although Wood does not refer to 
it in these terms). Michael Wood, ‘Kafka’s China and the Parable of Parables’, Philosophy and 
Literature, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1996): 325-337. 
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some fabulous yonder, something unknown to us, something too that he 
cannot designate more precisely, and therefore cannot help us here in the 
very least.
64
 
 
The division of words, on the part of the ‘many’, into those useful for ‘daily life’ and 
those that are ‘mere parables’ implies a hierarchy: parables are necessarily subordinate 
to daily life because they are ‘of no use in daily life’ and ‘therefore cannot help us here’ 
in ‘the only life we have’. Moreover, inutility arises because ‘all these parables really 
set out to say merely that the incomprehensible is incomprehensible, and we know that 
already’. This would be true if a parable were simply a coded message, for which we 
already possessed both key and moral. However, if the parable is more than its 
‘Aesopian messages’, something that does gesture to a ‘fabulous yonder’ past the 
curtailments of morals and allegories, then we need to understand things precisely via 
their similars and dissimilars, without imagining that we have either a man or a plucked 
chicken when we refer to a featherless biped. In order to gesture to this ‘fabulous 
yonder’, there must be some effort to transfer meaning from one thing, through its 
similarity or dissimilarity, to another. This effort to create the transference of meaning, 
or a metaphor, is exemplary of the aesthetic act. It also leads us to the question central 
to the parables about writers: what are the aesthetic and political roles of the writer in 
relation to metaphoric transference?                                               
Writerly Parables  
 
The role of the writer forces us to ask: ‘Which I [yo] compiles El hacedor?’ ‘Borges and 
I [Borges y yo]’ (1957), the most famous of the parables in El hacedor, considers the 
relationship between ‘Borges’ the public figure and ‘I’ the private figure. Borges, in his 
comments on this text, distinguishes between the doubling in Robert Louis Stevenson 
(Jekyll and Hyde) and Oscar Wilde (The Picture of Dorian Gray), where the double is 
                                                          
64 Franz Kafka, ‘On Parables’, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, Parables and Paradoxes, ed. Nahum N. 
Glatzer (New York: Schocken Books, 1961), 10-11. 
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the pure evil counterpart of a man ‘compounded, as are all of us, of good and evil’, and 
the doubling in ‘Borges y yo’, where ‘Borges stands for all the things I hate’.65 It is not 
inconsequential that Borges begins his analysis with references to Robert Louis 
Stevenson and Oscar Wilde: the theme of the double as it occurs in both oeuvres exerted 
a considerable influence on the Argentinian.
66
 But this point of departure also stems 
from one of the enumerations present within the text:  
I like hourglasses, maps, typography from the 18
th
 century, etymologies, 
the flavour of coffee and the prose of Stevenson; the other shares these 
preferences, but in a vain way that turns them into the attributes of an 
actor. (Dr 51; OC2 197) 
 
As Balderston notes in an interview with Borges, this is the only mention of a particular 
writer in the parable.
67
 The name has a metonymic function, displacing the internal 
reference to doubling to the associated ‘prose of Stevenson’. These preferences are 
shared with the Other (given the proper name, Borges), though the Other prefers them 
in a superficial way. ‘[Borges] stands for publicity, for being photographed, for having 
interviews, for politics, for opinions – all opinions are despicable I should say’.68 
‘Borges’, in other words, stands for all those things represented by the enumeration; 
‘yo’ stands for all those things presented by the enumeration. The kynical twist in this 
cosmos is that the ordering structure, given by the enumeration, is sufficient for 
understanding both Borgeses, while the manner in which this structure is received 
differs wildly. Political opinion is despised by the ‘yo’, because it represents a structure 
endorsed by ‘Borges’ into which the ‘yo’, in its ‘feeling, dreaming, writing’, finds itself 
                                                          
65 Borges, ‘I stand simply for the Thing I Am’, Borges at Eighty: Conversations, ed. Willis Barnstone 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1982), 49. Borges is the only one of my kynics who does not explicitly defer 
comment on his own work. He prefers to make deprecating remarks on his ability as a ‘reader’ of his own 
work. 
66 Daniel Balderston has considered the manifold implications of Stevenson on Borges’s work in El 
precursor velado: R. L. Stevenson en la obra de Borges, trans. Eduardo Paz Leston (Buenos Aires: 
Sudamericana, 1985). It is worth noting that, in his short note on film adaptations of Dr Jekyll and Mr 
Hyde, Borges refers to it as a ‘dualist parable’ (OC1 301).  
67 Borges; Daniel Balderston, ‘Interviews with Borges. Buenos Aires, August-September 1978’, 
Variaciones Borges, Vol. 8 (1999): 187-215, 189. 
68 Borges, ‘I stand simply for the Thing I Am’, 49. 
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unnaturally fixed.
69
 Borges emphasises the problem with the fixity in a telling allusion 
to Shakespeare’s All’s Well That Ends Well. In Act IV Scene iii, Captain Parolles, 
misremembered by Borges as ‘Sergeant Rolles’, is caught in an ambush and brought 
before Bertrand to answer for his treachery. He pleads for his life, ‘or let me see my 
death [i.e. banishment, loss of rank, and the shame that attends such dishonour]’.70 He is 
granted this banishment – a symbolic death, a loss of representation – and the other 
characters leave. He then gives a short soliloquy: 
Yet am I thankful: if my heart were great, 
’Twould burst at this. Captain I’ll be no more; 
But I will eat and drink, and sleep as soft 
As captain shall: simply the thing I am 
Shall make me live. […] and, Parolles, live 
Safest in shame! being fool’d, by foolery thrive! 
There’s place and means for every man alive. 
I’ll after them.71 
 
Happy to ‘live / Safest in shame’, Parolles notes that even if he is not a ‘Captain’ in 
rank, he will ‘eat and drink, and sleep as soft’. Borges, however, is particularly 
interested in the lines, ‘simply the thing I am / Shall make me live’: 
And that of course reminds us of the great words of God: “I am that I am.” 
Ego sum qui sum. Well, you may think I stand simply for the thing I am, 
that intimate and secret thing. Perhaps one day I will find out who he is, 
rather than what he is.
72
 
 
The ‘intimate and secret thing’, like the ‘modest and secret complexity’, is that critical 
remainder behind the personas of the kynical writer that prevents them from lapsing into 
a disconnected cynicism. While the writer is ‘put on stage’ in the poetry, the poetry 
itself acknowledges that the voice of the writer contains ‘a thing’ that is lost in 
representation. We can lapse into a Hegelian ‘bad infinity’ and insist on the infinite 
reflections of the mirror, with obvious repercussions on the representation of this 
                                                          
69 Ibid. 
70 William Shakespeare, All’s Well That Ends Well, IV iii.  
71 Ibid. 
72 Borges, ‘I stand simply for the Thing I Am’, 49. 
- 115 - 
presentation. What this response misses, however, is the transformative effect this 
pseudo-opposition has on the subject in retrospect: the subject is affected by the 
transformation and is not simply catalytic in its operation. This is most evident in a 
string of three parables, which will serve to justify our insistence on the importance of 
the kynical and the cosmopolitan in Borges’s parables, and their relation to enumeration 
and metaphor.  
The three parables are ‘Dreamtigers’, ‘Argumentum Ornithologicum’ and 
‘Mutaciones [Mutations]’. These works span the period of the composition of the 
parables in El hacedor: ‘Dreamtigers’ was first published in Crítica in 1934; 
‘Argumentum Ornithologicum’ was first published in the first edition of Otras 
inquiciones [Other Inquisitions] (1952), with ‘Dreamtigers’ and the other two texts 
from Crítica under the title ‘Inscripciones [Inscriptions]’; ‘Mutaciones’ was first 
published in the first edition of El hacedor in 1960. ‘Dreamtigers’, the third parable in 
El hacedor’s sequence, introduces a standard Borgesean trope: the tiger. Four types of 
tiger haunt the parable: the tiger he sees in the zoo as a child, the illustrations of tigers 
that serve as the basis for his value judgements about his ‘vast encyclopaedias and 
books of natural history’ and the tigers that appear in his dreams all occur in the first 
paragraph, and the tiger that he aims to ‘cause’ in his dreams appears in the second 
paragraph (Dr 24; OC2 171). This final effort to ‘cause’ a tiger fails: a creature appears, 
but one better suited to a Chinese Encyclopedia than any of those on the basis of which 
the young Borges evaluated his books. He enumerates its qualities: ‘stuffed or flimsy, or 
with impure variations of shape, or of an implausible size, or all too fleeting, or with a 
touch of the dog or the bird’ (Dr 24; OC2 171). Spatial qualities of shape and size are 
juxtaposed with temporal permanence, tactile density and an anomalous association 
with beast or fowl. This failure to dream a satisfactory tiger indicates the inadequacy of 
reading Borges as merely cynical: the cycle of presentation and representation does not 
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produce an infinitely reproducible image of a tiger. The experience of the tiger, 
reciprocally engaged with those images reproduced in encyclopaedias and books of 
natural history, do not permit the narrator to ‘cause’ a satisfactory tiger, even when 
compounded with those tigers already ‘prevailing’ in his dreams. Despite longing for a 
wild beast, his efforts to engender it do not produce something stable or constant. The 
tiger becomes a metaphor for the artist’s failure to conceive, fully and deliberately, all 
aspects of his work. For Borges, something stabilises the dream in which the actual tiger 
meets its image, but this something is clearly not the ‘pure diversion of my will’, since 
he cannot produce a satisfactory tiger (Dr 24; OC2 171). While the nature of this 
something is not specified in ‘Dreamtigers’, in ‘Argumentum Ornithologicum’ it is 
called God. 
‘Argumentum Ornithologicum’ is a parable of a single paragraph in which the 
narrator closes his eyes and sees a flock of birds for an uncertain amount of time (Dr 29; 
OC2 176). He does not know if the number of birds is definite or indefinite. If the 
number is definite, God exists, ‘because how many birds I saw is known to God’ (Dr 
29; OC2 176). If it is indefinite, God does not exist. If the number is indefinite, then no 
whole number will solve his problem. Since he saw fewer than ten birds and more than 
one, but none of the numbers between, he reasons, ‘that number, as a whole number, is 
inconceivable; ergo, God exists’ (Dr 29; OC2 176). As soon as any single whole 
number is fixed on, it necessarily becomes definite; ergo, God exists. We might short-
circuit a logical explanation by posing a semantic solution: since the number is 
inconceivable, it is necessarily defined as inconceivable; ergo the number is definite and 
God exists. Mathematic or semantic, Borges’s ‘Bird Argument’ resolves the sophistical 
problem of assigning a definite number to the indefinite ‘flock’ by making ‘God’ the 
ground of observation. ‘God’ is a useful metaphor for a comparative ground, not least 
because God’s qualities may be enumerated purely in response to the problem he is 
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being invoked to resolve: in this case, his ability to count responds to the problem of the 
birds. Yet the interest of the parable does not lie in God’s ability to resolve the dilemma, 
but the dilemma’s ability to generate God. If Borges’s parables create grounds on which 
comparison may take place, these grounds are engendered by a comparison already 
present in the process of producing this site. For Borges, cosmopolitan grounds are 
created to house already existent ‘arguments’ formed by kynical subjectivities. Borges 
inevitably involves history in this debate between space and subjectivity. This history is 
always personal (as in ‘Dreamtigers’), but often also cultural (as in ‘Mutaciones’).  
‘Mutaciones’ identifies three moments in which the narrator sees three different 
‘inoffensive symbols’ in everyday contexts. The three symbols are an arrow, a lasso and 
a cross. As the narrator muses in the final paragraph, these ‘former tools of man’ are 
‘debased or exalted now to the status of symbols’ (Dr 41; OC2 187). Each of the three 
preceding paragraphs ‘places’ the narrator in a situation in which he observes the three 
objects in symbolic positions: an arrow in a hall, a decorative lasso in a photograph and 
a runic cross in a cemetery. These three symbols precipitate thoughts, learning and 
figures of these objects as tools. To divulge their use as tools, he enumerates their 
qualities and their histories. Their historical specificity has become disconnected from 
their symbolic function. The narrator wonders that he marvels at this, ‘when there is not 
a single thing on earth that oblivion [el olvido] does not erase or memory change, and 
when no one knows into what images he himself will be transmuted by the future’ (Dr 
41; OC2 187). Again, Borges exposes the insecurity of metaphoric associations by 
enumerating histories erased by el olvido and changed by memory. This contingent 
approach to past, present and future does not suggest an abandonment of reality, even if 
it does destabilise the ground on which reality is presumed to function. The histories 
Borges’s narrator recaptures for the three ‘inoffensive symbols’ are particularly bloody. 
This offsets the apparent arbitrariness of their metaphoric functions, since, as tools, they 
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were all instruments of death. Despite this common ground, the point of comparison is 
not their real function as tools but precisely their ‘virtual’ metaphoric function, which is 
then made contingent by mutability (the titular ‘mutation’ through oblivion, memory 
and the future). The ground, since it is virtual, shifts according to symbolic function. 
However, this shifting ground is always tied to a reality (a history of bloodshed). This 
reality is not itself sufficient to be the basis, as it is always liable to be forgotten or 
misremembered, but it does prevent the shifting ground from completely divorcing 
itself from material circumstance. The material circumstances in each of the three 
parables help us to define Borges as a kynical cosmopolitan, despite the apparently 
endless multiplication of selves identified by Alan Pauls.     
Alan Pauls, in his fascinating, inventive and very funny book, El factor Borges 
[The Borges Factor], states that ‘to find in Jorge Luis Borges the Borges Factor, the 
property, the fingerprint, that molecule that makes Borges Borges and that [...] makes 
the world every day a little more Borgesian: that was the original aim of this book’.73 
Yet, he confesses, what he found was ‘a happy form of failure: there is not one Borges 
element, but many’.74  The enumeration of possible Borgeses, with their correspondent 
elements, seems to be a recurrent feature of criticism. The multiplication and bifurcation 
of selves radiates out into a manifold of elements, each with their own critical function. 
Perhaps, insofar as this is a feature of kynical cosmopolitans, it also indicates the critical 
inability to fix a particular significance to a particular feature, text, or personality trait. 
This leads us inevitably to question the ethical force of such duplications and 
bifurcations. What is clear, however, is that Borges himself sees this dilemma as central 
to the role of the poet. In the discussion that follows, we will consider a number of those 
parables that take as their central conceit a famous writer or a famous literary character. 
While these parables appear to be simply the way in which Borges inserts himself into a 
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literary canon, they challenge the dominant role poets are given in the creation of their 
works, appealing to a sense of literary vocation beyond the ken of the writer. These 
parables do not achieve this vocation by establishing a faux mysticism. Rather, they 
undercut the conceptual bases for understanding the ‘intentions’ of a unified 
cosmopolitan writer and the grounds for our assumptions about their works as 
exemplars of ‘world literature’. 
Two parables that secure a materialist dissolution of the cosmopolitan writer as a 
unified intentional consciousness are the eponymous ‘El hacedor’ (1958) and 
‘Everything and Nothing’ (1958). ‘Everything and Nothing’ only mentions the name of 
its protagonist in the final paragraph and ‘El hacedor’ does not even make that 
concession, but, with mention of ‘Anne Hathaway’, ‘London’ and ‘Iago’ early in the 
former, and ‘Odysseys and Iliads’ late in the latter, the reader realises that ‘Everything 
and Nothing’ is about Shakespeare and ‘El hacedor’ is about Homer. Despite the 
enumeration of events in these parabolic biographies, both lives lack pathos in Borges’s 
treatment (for Homer, because stoic modesty had not yet been invented; for 
Shakespeare, because he is overcome with disgust at adopting so many identities). 
Borges establishes this lack by beginning each parable with a negation: ‘He [Homer] 
had never dwelled on memory’s delights’ and ‘there was no one in him [Shakespeare]’ 
(Dr 22, 46; OC2 169, 192). For both writers, writing becomes a compensation for some 
insufficiency; Homer ‘descends into his memory’ when he goes blind and Shakespeare 
turns to writing when acting does not suffice to prevent ‘the hated sense of unreality’ 
(Dr 22, 46; OC2 169, 192). There are differences: while Homer loses his unconditional 
acceptance of reality only when he goes blind, Shakespeare is always ‘nothing but a 
little chill, a dream not dreamed by anyone’ behind his face and his words (Dr 46; OC2 
192). Homer turns his memories of particular aggressive and amorous encounters into 
the generic themes personified by Ares and Aphrodite; while ‘these things we [the 
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readers] know’, we do not know ‘those that he felt when he descended into the final 
shade of all’ (Dr 23; OC2 170). Since Shakespeare playacts at having these intimate 
memories, his body ‘fulfilled its destiny as body’, while the soul ‘was Caesar […] Juliet 
[…] Macbeth […] Nobody was ever as many men as that man, who like the Egyptian 
Proteus managed to exhaust all the possible shapes of being’ (Dr 46; OC2 192). 
Shakespeare’s lack of quiddity permits us to know the things he speaks of ‘before or 
after he dies’; he tells God that he, who has been so many men in vain, ‘want[s] to be 
one man: myself’ (Dr 47; OC2 193). God responds: ‘Neither am I one self; I dreamed 
the world as you dreamed your work, my Shakespeare, and among the shapes of my 
dream are you, who, like me, are many persons – and none’ (Dr 47; OC2 193). Bell-
Villada observes the link between this parable and a letter from George Bernard Shaw 
to Frank Harris (quoted by Borges in ‘El enigma de Shakespeare [The Enigma of 
Shakespeare’): ‘Like Shakespeare I understand everything and everyone; and like 
Shakespeare I am nobody and nothing’ (TL 470).75 Like the God of ‘Argumentum 
Ornithologicum’, Shakespeare and the God of ‘Everything and Nothing’ are empty 
ciphers. They provide the space in which action may take place. Their function, 
however, is contingent on their emptiness; a void that they seek to fill through their 
creations. Since, in ‘El hacedor’, Homer’s memory is fragmented and must be plumbed 
before it produces ‘a forgotten recollection that shone like a coin under the rain’, the 
generic ‘world literature’ initiated by Homer can only be produced through the 
extremely particular intersection of memory and ability in the artist’s psyche. A similar 
message emerges in the late story, ‘La memoria de Shakespeare [Shakespeare’s 
Memory]’ (1983), where a Shakespeare scholar receives Shakespeare’s memory but 
finds it no help in writing about Shakespeare’s work. Memory, it seems, is of little 
practical value in understanding what makes a poet tick. However, the overtly 
                                                          
75 Bell-Villada, Borges and His Fiction, 251.  
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prescriptive nature of this message in ‘La memoria de Shakespeare’ is nuanced in the 
parables, primarily because they are presented with other parables where poet and work 
are placed in dialogue with one another. Since the biographical accounts of Homer and 
Shakespeare are placed in conversation with the production of works, they necessarily 
foreground the artist’s role in producing these works. However, these artists remain 
incomplete, inadequate, separated from the perfection of their creations. Other parables 
shed more light on this particular challenge to the supremacy of the artist, by focusing 
on the role of the work itself as a historical phenomenon. One such parable, of particular 
local concern for Borges as an Argentinian writer, is ‘Martín Fierro’ (1957).       
‘Martín Fierro’  is a parable that takes as its title the name of the protagonist of 
José Hernández’s epic poems El Gaucho Martín Fierro [The Gaucho Martin Fierro] 
(1872) and La vuelta de Martín Fierro [The Return of Martin Fierro] (1879). Martín 
Fierro has an interesting place in Argentinian history. Leopoldo Lugones, the poet to 
whom Borges dedicated El hacedor, claimed in El payador [The Gaucho Minstrel] 
(1916) that Martín Fierro was Argentina’s national epic, equivalent to Dante’s Divine 
Comedy or Cervantes’s Don Quixote. Borges disagreed with Lugones: in the final 
chapter of his 1953 book, El “Martín Fierro” (written in collaboration with Margarita 
Guerrero), Borges argues that insisting on an epic status for the work conflates its 
aesthetic value [valor estética] with the moral virtue of its protagonist.
76
 The 
significance of Martín Fierro for the parable ‘Martín Fierro’ is not simply its 
intertextual references: it is the poem’s ability not to function as an epic. The first three 
paragraphs of the parable enumerate historical or mythological events. Paragraph one 
describes those armies that marched out of an unnamed city (Buenos Aires) and 
                                                          
76 Jorge Luis Borges, Margarita Guerrero, El “Martín Fierro” [1953] (Buenos Aires: Emecé Editores S. 
A., 1979), 79. It is worth noting that Borges establishes a link between Lugones’s Hellenism and his 
efforts to turn Martín Fierro into an epic: Borges’s resistance to both tendencies recalls my earlier 
argument that Borges challenges Goethe’s notion of a Hellenised ‘world literature’ by insisting on a more 
fragmented notion of ‘universal history’.  
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‘seemed great, and afterwards were, when glory had magnified them’, to fight major 
battles in Argentinian history (Dr 40; OC2 186). Paragraph two describes, in 
conjunction, the tyrannies of Rosas and Perón, enumerating their abuses without naming 
the two dictators. Paragraph three describes the naming of all plants and birds by an 
unnamed man (Adam), who ‘wrote in metaphors of metal the vast chronicle of the 
tumultuous sunsets and the shapes of the moon’ (Dr 40; OC2 186). Each paragraph ends 
with the refrain: ‘These things, now, are as if they had never been’ (Dr 40; OC2 186). 
Whether through glorious distortion, shameful humiliation or attachment to an inaugural 
myth, with time all historical facticity loses its intrinsic connection to certainty, since it 
is also turned into art. The final paragraph notes that ‘here too the generations have 
known those common and somehow eternal vicissitudes which are the stuff of art’ (Dr 
40; OC2 186). The narrator does not specify where ‘here’ is: the reference to Martín 
Fierro suggests it could be as easily the space of ‘Argentinian literature’ as Argentina 
itself. The paragraph continues with the refrain that concludes each previous paragraph, 
but qualifies it with a ‘but [pero]’: ‘But in a hotel room in the 1860’s, or thereabouts, a 
man dreamed about a fight’ (Dr 40; OC2 186). In Mildred Boyer’s translation, this ‘but’ 
begins a new sentence, while Borges’s original has it compound the refrain. Boyer’s 
translation crucially changes the fourth instance of the refrain into a fourth iteration of 
the mutability of ‘common and somehow eternal vicissitudes’ from history into myth. In 
the original, the ‘pero’ undermines this iterability because the literary work, already 
assumed to be ‘as if it had never been’, achieves a kind of veracity through the poet’s 
‘dream’ [Borges’s typical metaphor for literary creation]. Borges describes, as the 
poet’s dream, the knife fight at the end of El Gaucho Martín Fierro. Unlike the 
historical events, ‘this, which once was, is again infinitely: the splendid armies are gone, 
and a lowly knife fight remains. The dream of one man is part of the memory of all’ (Dr 
40; OC2 186). The work remains something that can never be lost, precisely because of 
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its iterability as something that is always ‘as if it had never been’. Moreover, this 
creation becomes, through its part in cultural memory, more real than actual historical 
events. This virtual reality is not epic, since it does not inaugurate a mythological state; 
it stems from aesthetic value uncoupled from moral judgement.  
Borges engages with this dialogue between the aesthetic value of the work and 
the life of the poet in a series of paired parables on Dante and Cervantes.The titles of 
‘Paradiso, XXXI, 108’ (1954) and ‘Inferno, I, 32’ (1955), the two parables about Dante 
and The Divine Comedy, refer to lines from the third last and opening cantos of Dante’s 
poem. They are the starting points for two separate meditations on the life of the poet 
and the poem. Canto 31, line 108 of Paradiso reads ‘or fu sì fatta la sembianza vostra? 
[Now was your face indeed like that?]’.77 In context, ‘Paradiso, XXXI, 108’ considers 
the philosophical implications of wanting to experience as actual what feels like mere 
semblance. It describes the moment after Beatrice has left Dante in the care of Bernard. 
Dante, looking on Bernard’s beatitude, compares himself to a pilgrim who, seeing the 
Sudarium of Veronica, asks himself whether this is an actual representation of Christ’s 
face: ‘Segnor mio Iesù Cristo, Dio verace, / or fu sì fatta la sembianza vostra? [My lord 
Jesus Christ, true God, now was your face indeed like that?]’78 The implication of this 
metaphor is that he wonders how he might feel the peace that Bernard feels. Bernard 
advises him that the only way to feel the same peace is through turning his gaze to the 
inner circles of Paradise and contemplating the Queen of Heaven. Borges does not 
resolve this problem, as Dante does, through turning the gaze towards heaven; the 
parable poses the question without suggesting that any solution could be certain: ‘if we 
truly knew what [the face of Jesus] was like, the key to the parables would be ours and 
we would know whether the son of the carpenter was also the Son of God’ (Dr 43; OC2 
                                                          
77 Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri: Volume 3: Paradiso, ed. and trans. Robert M. 
Durling, intro. Ronald L. Martinez and Robert M. Durling (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011), 624; 625. 
78 Ibid. The sudarium is a cloth, supposedly used by Veronica to wipe the face of Jesus Christ, which 
carries the imprint of Christ’s face. 
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189). While Paul, John and Teresa are enumerated as people who saw Jesus’s face, ‘we 
have lost those features, as one may lose a magic number made up of the usual ciphers, 
as one loses an image in a kaleidoscope, forever’ (Dr 43; OC2 189). The face is not lost 
because it is extraordinary; it is lost because we do not remember it, and so cannot 
distinguish it from other faces. Insofar as the parable engages with the problem of 
recognising the truth behind semblance, it recapitulates the problem of fixing a reality 
on which to ground appearances. But it also speaks to the role of the poet’s belief in 
securing this reality, as becomes evident when the parable is read in conjunction with 
another of Borges’s meditations on Canto 31 of Paradiso, ‘La última sonrisa de Beatriz 
[Beatrice’s Last Smile]’ (OC3 408).  
Originally a lecture, and later published as one of Borges’s ‘Nueve ensayos 
dantescos [Nine Dantesque Essays]’, ‘La última sonrisa’ explores the significance of the 
moment when Beatrice disappears and is replaced by Bernard. Dante looks up and sees 
her in the third circle. She smiles at him and then turns away. While Borges notes that 
Dante’s poetic intention is not to lament this separation, his emotions betray him. Dante, 
rejected by Beatrice in life, creates a moment where they can meet in poetry. But if the 
scene is ‘very real’ for us, ‘for him, it was less so’ (OC3 410). ‘Unhappily for him, 
happily for the centuries that would read him, the consciousness [conciencia] that the 
meeting was imaginary deformed the vision’ (OC3 410). Even in fiction, Dante 
separates himself from Beatrice because his consciousness and his conscience 
(conciencia implies both) will not allow him to stay with her. When it comes to 
‘resolving’ the parables (of Christ or of Borges), Borges realises in his rigorous 
exploration of the problem of line 108 that artistic integrity is based on not yielding to 
one’s desire for a happy solution (the metaphorical face of Christ) at the expense of 
effacing the problems with such solutions.      
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Canto 1, line 32 of Inferno reads ‘una lonza leggiera e presta molto [A leopard 
light and very swift]’.79 ‘Inferno, I, 32’ engages with the relationship between the poet, 
the poem and the creature formed in the line. In context, the leopard is the first animal 
Dante encounters after he finds himself in the dark wood. Unlike ‘Paradiso, XXXI, 
108’, ‘Inferno, I, 32’ does not consider any internal paradox to the line: rather, it 
considers the relationship between God and, first, an actual leopard, and, second, Dante. 
In the first paragraph of the parable, the leopard, living in a cage, is described as unable 
to know its desire for ‘love and cruelty and the hot pleasure of tearing things apart and 
the wind carrying the scent of a deer’ (Dr 50; OC2 196). Borges juxtaposes this 
enumeration of the leopard’s desires with God’s justification for the leopard’s life: the 
enumeration of the steps by which the leopard will be transformed into a word in The 
Divine Comedy. God gives this justification in a dream. The animal understands the 
reasons and accepts his destiny, ‘but when he awoke there was only a dark resignation 
in him, a valiant ignorance, for the machinery of the world is far too complex for the 
simplicity of a wild beast’ (Dr 50; OC2 196). In the second paragraph of the parable, 
Dante, too, is illuminated with a sense of purpose by God in a dream: ‘on waking, he 
felt he had been given – and then had lost – something infinite, something he would not 
be able to recover, or even to glimpse, for the machinery of the world is far too complex 
for the simplicity of men’ (Dr 50; OC2 196). Borges doubles the leopard’s ‘simplicity’ 
with the ‘simplicity’ of Dante to highlight their mutual inability, as created entities, to 
understand the workings of the ‘machinery’ of which they are a part. The near repetition 
of the final lines of the first and second paragraphs shows how close ‘wild beasts’ and 
‘men’ are in their inability to understand the complexities of the world. For all their 
similarities, however, the leopard and Dante are treated differently by Borges’s parable. 
While the reader is treated to the full narrative of God’s justification to the leopard in 
                                                          
79 Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri: Volume 1: Inferno, ed. and trans. Robert M. 
Durling, intro. Ronald L. Martinez and Robert M. Durling (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996), 28; 29. 
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the first paragraph, in the second, God simply ‘declared to [Dante] the secret purpose of 
his life and work’ (Dr 50; OC2 196). Here, Borges gestures again to a point beyond the 
limits of thought: a point outside his own system of thought, constituted by the word 
‘God’ and ultimately beyond the reach of reason. The animal, which operates according 
to a non-human rationality, can be told his purpose through a narrative that follows the 
precepts of human rationality; Dante, who operates in the field of human reason, cannot 
be given his purpose within that field. This recapitulates the ignorance of the field that 
underpins the narrative consistency of ‘Paradiso, XXXI, 108’. It is not for want of 
opportunities to see Christ’s face that we fail to recognise him: we do not recognise him 
because we do not collectively ‘remember’ what he looks like. This failure of 
recognition is particularly important in discussing the role of the poet, since the poet 
does not recognise his or her purpose in any rational way. Borges engages most 
effectively with an extra-rational relationship between poet and creation in his treatment 
of Cervantes and Don Quijote.        
The two parables about Cervantes and Don Quijote are ‘Parábola de Cervantes y 
de Quijote [Parable of Cervantes and of Quijote]’ (1955) and ‘Un problema [A 
Problem]’ (1957). In the former, Borges tells the story of an old soldier who looks for 
solace in the vast geographies of Ariosto. He creates a character able to find 
enchantments in prosaic places. ‘For the two, for the dreamer and the dreamed, the plot 
was the opposition of two worlds: the unreal world of books of knights, the quotidian 
and common world of the 17
th
 century’ (Dr 42; OC2 188). What they do not realise is 
that this opposition would fade over time, until ‘La Mancha and Montiel and the lean 
figure of the knight would be, for the future, no less poetic than the voyages of Sinbad 
or the vast geographies of Ariosto’ (Dr 42; OC2 188). All presentation will inevitably 
become a representation. But, this does not constitute a loss of that ‘intimate and secret 
thing’ Borges is speaking about as the critical remainder behind all personas. However 
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the ‘intimate and secret thing’ is communicated, it cannot itself be translated into a 
representation without that representation itself containing a further ‘intimate and secret 
thing’. In time, the subjects will be seen to have been something that they themselves 
could not see. What they retain is the difference between those things that they present 
as their interests or passions and those things that they represent as the interests or 
passions they should have.  
 ‘Un problema’ poses a familiar Borges paradox: ‘Let us imagine that in Toledo 
is discovered a paper with an Arabic text and that the palaeographers declare to be of 
the hand and letter of that Cide Hamete Benengeli from whom Cervantes derived his 
Don Quijote’ (Dr 37; OC2 183). The fragment is an anecdote in which Quijote realises 
he has killed a man, and ‘the problem is to guess, or conjecture, how Don Quijote 
reacts’ (Dr 37; OC2 183). Borges suggests three possible responses ‘for all I know [Que 
yo sepa]: ‘nothing special occurs’ and he goes on with his adventures; seeing the body 
‘awakes him from his complaisant dream perhaps forever’; or Quijote ‘cannot admit 
that the tremendous act is the work of a delirium, the reality of the effect makes him 
presuppose an alternate reality as the cause and Don Quijote never leaves his madness’ 
(Dr 37; OC2 183). He then suggests a response beyond ‘all I know’. ‘There remains a 
conjecture that is outside the Spanish sphere and even the sphere of the West and 
requires an ambit older, more complex and more fatigued [fatigado]’ (Dr 37; OC2 183). 
Don Quijote – ‘who is no longer Don Quijote but a king of the Indostan cycles’ – 
realises when he sees the corpse that ‘to kill and to conceive are divine or magical acts 
that notoriously transcend the human condition’ (Dr 37; OC2 183). This realisation 
leads him to understand that all is illusion: the body, the blade, the world and himself. 
The three responses Borges’s narrator can conceive, and the one that he cannot, all react 
to Don Quijote and its protagonist brought to a limit point: the death of an other. This 
death can either be subsumed into Quijote’s fantasy or break it. If it breaks the fantasy, 
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either the fantasy is discarded or the fantasy becomes Quijote’s reality. The option that 
he cannot know – the situation of the Indostan king – involves a conceptual framework 
other than that which advocates the centrality of the subject. Obviously, we should feel 
uneasy with Borges’s wilful exoticism of ‘Indostan’ and its ‘cycles’, since this effort to 
make an ‘oriental’ pattern of thought wholly Other recapitulates the very worst 
stereotypes of Stevenson and Kipling. But the force of this othering process leads us to 
an interesting conceptual split that, even if it is riddled with crass orientalism, manages 
to rebound precisely onto our understanding of Borges as a kynical cosmopolitan.  
For Borges is not attempting to claim any knowledge of this Other as part of the 
parable: the fourth possibility is beyond the conceptual capacity of his narrator. If 
anything, the narrator’s conceptual capacities are inadequate, precisely because he 
cannot conceive of a de-essentialised subject. The three possibilities are all the reactions 
of an integral Quijote adhering to a reality, fictional or factual, according to his 
psychological needs. Quijote either continues in his delusion, or he completely breaks 
with it, or he completely surrenders himself to it, in order to maintain an integrated 
sense of self. However, the fourth option is not possible for an integral Quijote and is 
thus beyond the conceptual capacity of the narrator, though not the writer (given that he 
is able to mention it). This means we must distinguish between the narrator and the 
writer of the story, against the apparent unity of the speaking ‘I’. But it also raises the 
question of cosmopolitanism in the negative. While the writer is able to deploy the 
‘Indostan cycles’ in his parable, the narrator cannot conceive the consequences of this 
deployment. We do not have a total understanding of universal history, but we do have 
an awareness of different understandings of history. Borges’s cosmopolitanism does not 
resolve problems of human difference; it perpetuates, even exaggerates them. This does 
not result in hospitality, understanding, or even the recognition of Otherness; it frames 
difference as wholly beyond the ken of the narrator. Cosmopolitanism for Borges rests 
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on an awareness of incommensurability. We cannot even speak, in this particular 
parable, of a localised cosmopolitanism because there is no exchange, no moment of 
‘conviviality’ in Paul Gilroy’s sense of the word.80 What cosmopolitanism in this 
instance brings is entirely negative; it negates the apparent totalities of conceptual 
integrity. This negation reflects back onto the subject, which, under the force of its own 
inability to think the all, is radically divided across the points of understanding 
(narrator) and awareness (writer). The most radical of Borges’s examples is the parable 
‘Borges y yo’.      
‘Borges y yo’ begins with the startling revelation that it is ‘To the other, Borges, 
to whom the things happen’ (Dr 51; OC2 197). This is apparently a parable about the 
split between the public figure of the author (the ‘other, Borges’) and an essential self. 
The author is already displaced, since his name is taken as the name of this other. 
Moreover, ‘things’ do not happen to this essential ‘I’ but to this other called Borges. 
The ‘I’ is led in part by habit, but these habits are immediate to itself; the habits of the 
other Borges are mediated by texts: ‘I walk the streets of Buenos Aires and stop myself 
[me demoro], perhaps even habitually [mecánicamente], to look at the arch of a 
doorway and the outer door; of Borges I have news by mail and see his name on a short 
list of professors or in a biographical dictionary’ (Dr 51; OC2 197). The syntax is 
paratactic: at this point there is no clear relationship between the habits of the ‘I’ and 
‘Borges’, except insofar as the ‘I’ receives ‘Borges’ via texts like the list and the 
biographical dictionary, but receives itself through the physical acts of walking, 
stopping and looking. The reflexive verb ‘stop myself [me demoro]’ halts our 
assimilation of this parable into a narrative dividing a public author figure from an 
‘essential’ self. The verb literally means ‘I stop myself’ but has implications of 
‘lingering’ because it does not suggest a conscious decision on the part of an active 
                                                          
80 Gilroy, After Empire, 9. 
- 130 - 
subject to stop. There is a supplementary split between the I that walks and the I that 
stops that walking, perhaps mechanically or by habit. The ‘essential’ subject has itself 
split over the question of ‘habit’ or ‘mechanics’. The question itself remains vague, 
since it is only a ‘perhaps [acaso]’, but its consequence is clear: walking the cityscape 
under the aegis of public ‘Borges’ does not confer an essential identity on the ‘I’. 
Rather, it indicates the fragmentation that the I will go on to describe: ‘Little by little I 
am giving over everything to him, although I am aware of [me consta] his perverse 
custom of falsifying and magnifying’ (Dr 51; OC2 197). While ‘me consta’ may be 
translated as ‘I am aware of’, it is worth noting that in the di Giovanni translation (the 
only translation that Borges himself played a part in producing), this part of the phrase 
is ‘I have evidence of his stubborn habit’.81 This departs from a literal definition of ‘me 
consta’ to emphasise the possible, but quite improbable, implication of ‘evidence’. 
Andrew Hurley, the translator sanctioned by Borges’s widow, Maria Kodama, translates 
the phrase to be ‘I know the perverse way’, which implies a knowledge that ‘me consta’ 
does not necessarily have.
82
 But this still does not attest to the materiality of ‘evidence’. 
If we assume that there is a materiality to the phrase ‘me consta’, how does that impact 
on our understanding of the line? Since the parable’s use of prepositions is occasionally 
peculiar, there is the possibility that Borges’s ‘knowledge’ of his perverse habits also 
evokes the reflexive form of the verb-phrase ‘to consist of [constar de]’. As much as an 
‘awareness’, ‘me consta’ implies an integration of the self through this awareness. This 
being the case, an alternative implication would then be: His perverse custom of 
falsifying and magnifying makes me/gives me my consistency. We do not propose this 
‘false’ translation to replace the idiomatic meaning, since this phrase is about an 
awareness the I has about the habits of ‘Borges’. But a specular translation allows us to 
                                                          
81 Jorge Luis Borges, ‘Borges and I’, trans. Norman Thomas di Giovanni, Borges: A Reader, ed. Emir 
Rodriguez Monegal and Alastair Reid (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1981), 279. 
82 Borges, Collected Fictions, trans. Andrew Hurley (New York: Viking Press, 1996), 324. 
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read the reciprocal uncertainty the I has about its own ‘consistency’ and the way it too is 
made up of ‘habits’. This is why the I must identify with Borges via hourglasses, maps, 
typeface of the eighteenth-century, etymologies, the flavour of coffee and the prose of 
Stevenson, albeit that ‘Borges’ shares these preferences in a vain or showy [vanidosa] 
way that ‘turns them into the attributes of an actor’ (D 51; H 197). Habit becomes the 
guarantor of a consistent identity for the I. When this guarantor is shared with ‘Borges’, 
however, it is turned into a process for performing or mimicking this identity.   
Habit in ‘Borges y yo’ shifts between two traditions of thinking clearly 
delineated by Catherine Malabou in her preface to Felix Raivaisson’s Of Habit:  
Initiated by Aristotle, continued by Hegel [...] the first sees in habit a 
primary ontological phenomenon. For beings subject to change, habit is the 
law of being. Without a general and permanent disposition, a ‘virtue’, 
which is developed as a result of change, as resistance to this change, the 
finite being cannot endure [...] For such a being, being is suffused with the 
habit of being. The second way, initiated by Descartes and continued by 
Kant, sees in habit the epitome of inauthenticity, a simulacrum of being, an 
imitation of virtue. Pure mechanism, routine process, devitalization of 
sense, habit is the disease of repetition that threatens the freshness of 
thought and stifles the voice, repeatable but never stale, of the categorical 
imperative.
83
   
 
According to the first tradition, habit provides a basic continuity for beings that change. 
In this sense, habit is a virtue that integrates the self. According to the second tradition, 
habit is a great deadener. It provides the appearance of virtue, but turns this virtue into 
mere mechanism and process. It is inauthentic and stifles the voice of the categorical 
imperative to treat humans as ends not means. For the narrator of ‘Borges and I’, habits 
that appear to integrate the self become mechanisms for a specular, public self. 
Moreover, these habits devolve to the specular self more and more, as the public self 
subsumes the private. The private self responds to this threat of ‘losing myself, 
definitively’, by trying ‘to liberate myself from him and [move] from the mythologies 
of the slum [arrabal] to the games with time and with the infinite’ (Dr 51; OC2 197). 
                                                          
83 Catherine Malabou, ‘Addiction and Grace: Preface to Félix Ravaisson’s Of Habit’, Félix Ravaisson, Of 
Habit, trans., intro. & comm. Clare Carlisle and Mark Sinclair (London: Continuum, 2008): vii-xx, vii.  
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But attempting to avoid the public persona by shifting the schema inevitably fails: 
‘those games are Borges’s now and I will have to devise [idear] other things’ (Dr 51; 
OC2 197). The ‘I’ that writes must always break with those habits that identify his 
writing style: the recurrent themes or metaphors. As soon as they become fixed as his 
habits in the minds of his readers, they become the ‘games of Borges’. This is the 
transition that is described in the final line: ‘I do not know which of the two writes this 
page’ (Dr 51; OC2 197). As soon as ‘Borges and I’ becomes heralded as the 
emblematic text of Borges’s work (as it does, in combination with ‘Funes el 
memorioso’, ‘El jardín de los senderos que bifurcan’ and ‘Pierre Menard, autor del 
Quijote’), it becomes the work of ‘the other, Borges’.   
The result of this appropriation for the narrator, the ‘I’, is that ‘my life is an 
escape [fuga] and I lose it all and it all belongs to oblivion or to the other [todo es del 
olvido, o del otro]’ (Dr 51; OC2 197). Borges’s translators universally translate this 
occurrence of ‘el olvido’ as ‘oblivion’ and we should not seek to replace this 
desubjective noun with the more subjective ‘forgetfulness’. But we should bear in mind 
that ‘el olvido’ shuttles between the subjective and the desubjective, since Borges’s 
treatment of ‘el olvido’ always runs between the creation of the possibility of 
subjectivity and a loss of subjectivity.  
Borges also considers ‘el olvido’ in ‘Parábola del palacio [Parable of the Palace]’ 
(1956). This parable describes the Yellow Emperor showing a poet his palace. After 
enumerating its qualities, they reach a series of towers that range in colour from scarlet 
to yellow: the gradations are so fine that the towers next to each other appear identical. 
At the foot of the second to last tower, the poet recites a poem that contains the palace: 
the emperor exclaims that the poet has robbed him of his palace and has his executioner 
kill him. Borges proposes a series of possible outcomes. One outcome is that the poem 
of the poet ‘fell into oblivion [el olvido] because it deserved oblivion [el olvido]’ after 
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its writer is killed by the Emperor for writing the poem that ‘has snatched my palace 
from me [¡Me has arrebatado el palacio!]’ (Dr 45; OC2 191). The oblivion of the 
artwork follows the death of the author; this is the ‘all’ that belongs to ‘el olvido’. 
However, there is also a sense in which such ‘oblivion’ is necessary for all Borges’s 
subjects to function. Ireneo Funes, in ‘Funes el memorioso’, is trammelled by his 
capacity to remember, since to remember, for Funes, is necessarily to remember 
everything.
84
 It is the narrator of ‘Funes el memorioso’ who is able to function because 
he is able to forget.  
The functionality provided by forgetfulness returns us to ‘Borges and I’. The 
position of the ‘I’ runs between oblivion and forgetfulness. As we have already argued, 
Borges’s notion of ‘el olvido’ is both subjective and desubjective. In this regard, the ‘I’ 
realises its potential for subjectivity is only in its flirtation with both oblivion and 
forgetfulness: ‘my life is an escape [fuga]’. Fuga may also be translated as ‘fugue state’, 
the state defined by the DSM-IV as a confusion about personal identity that is marked by 
sudden travel and an inability to remember.
85
 It is in this act of ‘escape’ from the public 
self, from the memories of the public self, that the writing self is able to continue 
functioning. The ‘I’ will inevitably lose everything either to ‘el olvido’ or to ‘Borges’; 
its only possibility for continued existence lies in devising new strategies for expressing 
itself. But this is only possible insofar as it ‘forgets’ its prior works in favour of these 
new strategies; it enters into the paradox of a self-aware fugue state. The necessity of 
this ‘self-aware fugue state’ is correlative with why habit is both a blessing and a curse 
to the ‘I’: habit fills the vacuum left by essence with a framework of behaviour, but it is 
also the means by which the process of the writing ‘I’ becomes ‘Borges’. The ‘fugue 
state’ allows the ‘I’ to forget those habits that make it ‘Borges’, but this also undermines 
its claim to an integral sense of self, since its self is more or less the sum of these habits.   
                                                          
84 See the discussion of ‘Funes’ and Coetzee’s recent fiction in Chapter 1. 
85 DSM-IV-Tr, 300.13. 
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‘Borges and I’ challenges our assumptions about the place of the writing subject, 
in relation to personal preferences and public habits. For all its engagement with the role 
of the public persona of the author, there is little that links the author to their place in a 
particular society. While both ‘I’ and the public ‘Borges’ are clearly ‘cosmopolitans’ in 
their tastes, they appear to be quite conventionally cosmopolitan. This accusation may 
be levelled at all the writer-parables: they may engage critically with the places of the 
writers, but these places are often atopic. Where is the political real that justifies our use 
of cosmopolitan as a modified term? 
Historical Parables 
 
Borges’s political engagement in the parables is most evident in his treatment of 
Argentinian history. With these overtly political treatments of Argentina and its 
relationship to Europe, Borges grounds his critique of writerly personas with direct 
reference to Argentina’s history of political systems. This has the added effect of 
rebounding onto our reading of the more metaphysical parables. Evidence of political 
concerns in these parables justifies our assertions of political significance in the 
apparently atopic, apolitical narratives, dealing with subjectivity.  
Borges makes three forays into Argentinian history in El hacedor, with ‘El 
cautivo [The Captive]’ (1957), ‘Diálogos entre muertos [Dead Men’s Dialogues]’ 
(1957) and ‘El simulacro [The Sham]’ (1957). While ‘El cautivo’ deals with an 
anonymous foundling story, ‘Diálogos entre muertos’ and ‘El simulacro’ take as their 
subjects Rosas and Perón respectively, the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century politicians Borges 
would call Argentina’s dictators in his later ‘Nota a los argentinos’, discussed in the 
previous chapter. ‘El cautivo’ tells the story of a young boy abducted by Native 
Americans of the Pampas. Years after his abduction, he is found, unable to speak his 
mother tongue and incapable of remembering his parents. When he is returned to his 
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childhood home, however, he is seized by ‘a dizzying moment [instante de vértigo] 
when past and present became one [se confundieron]’, runs to the kitchen and finds a 
knife he hid in the chimney before he was taken (Dr 30; OC2 177). Gene Bell-Villada 
rightly connects this parable to an earlier story, ‘La historia del guerrero y de la cautiva 
[The Story of the Warrior and the Captive]’ in El aleph [The Aleph] (1949), in which 
Borges makes a transcultural association between the 6
th
 century conversion experience 
of a Lombard warrior and the 19
th
 century regression experience of an English woman 
on the Pampas. As Bell-Villada argues, ‘La historia’ is really two distinct stories, held 
together by ‘an intricate network of resemblances and contrasts’.86 While broadly 
sympathetic to ‘La historia’, Bell-Villada does note that it recapitulates the 19th century 
anthropological dichotomy between civilization and barbarism discussed in our 
previous chapter. Since the warrior’s experience is of a barbarian converted to 
civilization, while the woman’s experience is of a regression to barbarism from 
civilization, this remains a valid criticism of ‘La historia’. But ‘El cautivo’ does not 
follow the civilization-barbarism dichotomy from a vantage point of narratorial 
superiority. As Noemí Ulla has shown, ‘El cautivo’ is punctuated by the interventions of 
a narrator-informer who, by repeatedly stating that he would like to know [querría 
saber] things he obviously does not know, indicates his failure to understand the 
motivations or impulses of the captive boy.
87
 As with ‘Un problema’, the ultimate 
solution is not in the hands of an omniscient narrator, but in a possible conceptual 
system that the narrator cannot access. Here, we have a refinement of the 
anthropological certainties of ‘La historia’. The ‘civilized’ narrator-informer fails to 
understand the boy, who is variously described as a ‘man’, a ‘son’, and an ‘Indian’, and 
likened to an ‘infant’ and a ‘dog’. There is no correspondent association with an 
                                                          
86 Bell-Villada, ‘Borges and His Fictions’, 159. 
87 Noemí Ulla, ‘Notas sobre “El cautivo” de Jorge Luis Borges’, Variaciones Borges, Vol. 13 (2002): 
227-233. 
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uncomprehending fascination with civilization on the part of the barbarian. The 
dichotomy gives way to a more interesting meditation on the workings of memory and 
habit, and the implications for how this relates to treatments of the Other. Bell-Villada, 
who reads the parables of El hacedor as being about ‘strictly literary problems and 
literary people’, criticises Borges’s later stories for their tendency to deal with only ‘one 
single theme, one plot, or one sort of action’.88 With ‘El cautivo’, we see evidence that 
the parables, at least, were not about ‘strictly literary problems’; nor were they 
comparatively inferior for treating the same or similar stories with greater brevity and in 
isolation. If anything, Borges achieves clarity about political relations in his parables 
that, with their added complexity, the stories of Ficciones and El aleph seldom achieve.      
This political clarity does not avoid political complexity in the longest of the 
parables, ‘Diálogos entre muertos’, which explores the political history of 19th century 
Argentina. As with ‘El hacedor’ and ‘Everything and Nothing’, Borges defers the 
naming of the protagonists to later in the parable. A ruddy, obese figure, who passes for 
the archetypal John Bull, arrives from England in 1877 and is received by a group of 
people, all of who exhibit mortal wounds. A military man steps forward and startles the 
new arrival. It is only after half a page that the first proper names give some context to 
this strange reception of an apparently English stranger by the dead: the military man 
refers to Santos Pérez, following which his name is given as Quiroga and then he calls 
the new arrival Rosas. Santos Pérez led the assassination of Facundo Quiroga at 
Barranca Yaco in 1835. While Quiroga and Juan Manuel de Rosas were both 
Federalists, and Santos Pérez was a Unitarian, Sarmiento, in his ground-breaking 
biography Facundo of 1845, suggests that Rosas conspired in the assassination, since 
Quiroga was his greatest political rival. Rosas, after his downfall in 1857, was exiled to 
England until his death in 1877, which explains both the stranger’s appearance and his 
                                                          
88 Bell-Villada, ‘Borges and His Fictions’, 254; 266. 
- 137 - 
point of apparent origin. In the dialogue that follows, four important points of difference 
emerge to establish Quiroga as a stoic and Rosas as a contemporary cynic.
89
  
The first difference figures the respective positions of Quiroga and Rosas as 
parochialist and cosmopolitan in Argentinian history. While Quiroga identifies his ‘lot’ 
to be ‘to wage war in America’s lonely spots, on poor earth belonging to poor gauchos’, 
he accuses Rosas of a Eurocentric cosmopolitanism: ‘Your lot was to command in a city 
that looks toward Europe and will someday be among the most famous in the world’ 
(Dr 33; OC2 180). There are two separate distinctions at work in Quiroga’s 
cosmopolitan/parochial binary: a national division between metropole (Europe) and 
periphery (Americas), and a provincial division between the metropolis (Buenos Aires) 
and the countryside (the Pampas). Rosas conforms to the generic view of the 
cosmopolitan as belonging to a metropole and a metropolis and Quiroga conforms to a 
more rooted notion of identity, since he belongs to an obscure periphery and the 
countryside. This directly impacts on their respective understandings of fame.     
The second difference centres on their understanding of fame. Quiroga, as a man 
of action, insists that fame (‘el recuerdo [memory]’) is less important than an 
honourable death. In response, Rosas argues that flattery (‘el halago [praise]’), either 
posthumous or contemporary, is not worth much since it may be achieved with a few 
medals. Quiroga understands fame as the continued recognition of an individual through 
a collective cultural, national memory (la memoria de la gente [the memory of the 
people]); Rosas thinks of it as the adulation of an individual paid directly to their 
person. Rosas’s approach to fame is cynical, since he sees fame as entirely invested in 
the person, but also something rhetorical rather than real (‘flattery’). Quiroga does not 
                                                          
89 Here, a question of scale forces me to differentiate individuals, who are either idealistic or apathetic 
about politics, from leaders, who exploit politics for either idealistic reasons or their own ends. While 
much of this thesis is devoted to individuals, since it seeks to recuperate individual writers from 
interpretations of political apathy, here, Borges engages directly with the self-serving aspect of cynical 
politicians, who see political realpolitik as a game to be played to secure their own ends.  
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ascribe much personal value to fame either, but not because it is ‘mere rhetoric’. 
Quiroga’s response to fame is stoic: fame is only meaningful insofar as it relies on a real 
sense of cultural continuity (transmigration) and indifference to the self (apatheia).   
The difference between the personal and the impersonal leads to a third point of 
comparison in their respective treatments of courage and fear. When Quiroga accuses 
Rosas of cowardice for not accepting the glorious death offered to him, the latter rejoins 
with the rhetorical question: ‘Scared? […] Me, who busted broncs in the South, and 
later busted a whole country?’ (Dr 34; OC2 181). For Rosas, one’s resistance to fear is 
evidenced by the magnitude of one’s political achievements; it is attributed to one, 
rather than being an intrinsic personal quality. Even when he does concede his own lack 
of bravery, he claims that bravery is unnecessary for any individual who is able to 
persuade others to die in that individual’s place. ‘Bravery’, he declares, ‘is a question of 
holding out [aguante: endurance]’; this endurance (and, by extension, bravery) is 
irrelevant to Rosas, as ‘some can hold out more than others, but sooner or later they all 
give in’ (Dr 34; OC2 181). For Quiroga, bravery is indistinguishable from not knowing 
fear: ‘I do not know what fear is’ (Dr 34; OC2 181). Bravery, in Quiroga’s terms, is 
inextricably linked to a personal apatheia, or stoic absence of feeling, and an acceptance 
of fate. The responses to bravery of both Rosas and Quiroga lead to the fourth, and most 
important, difference in their responses to death. 
Quiroga, as the discussion has illustrated, is a stoic figure. As such, he accepts 
that he will ‘be obliterated [me borren], to be given another face and another destiny’ 
(Dr 34; OC2 181). As our discussion in the previous chapter showed, Borges links the 
transmigration of souls to stoic beliefs and cosmopolitanism. Crucial to this 
transmigration is Quiroga’s decision to accept this without fear (as a stoic accepts it 
with apatheia). Rosas, a cynic, is not satisfied with the idea of transmigration, since he 
is ‘satisfied to be who I am […] I do not want to be another’ (Dr 34; OC2 181; 
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translation adjusted). Quiroga responds with an unrealistic allusion to Baruch Spinoza: 
‘The stones want to be stones forever, too […] and for centuries they are, until they 
crumble into dust’ (Dr 34; OC2 181). Bravery, for Quiroga, consists not in the desire to 
remain in one’s quiddity (like a stone); it is the ability to accept the necessarily transient 
nature of identity. Rosas takes no notice of Quiroga’s insistence that they accept change 
because he is distracted by the thought that he is not actually dead but is in a dream, 
dreamed not by himself but by someone still waiting to be born (Borges). Rather than 
have Quiroga confirm or deny this, Borges ends the parable: ‘They spoke no more, for 
at that moment Someone called them’ (Dr 35; OC2 181). The capitalised ‘Someone’ 
recalls our earlier discussion about God’s role in Borges’s parables: he is an empty 
place-holder that allows discourse to happen. Rosas’s allusion to Borges, as the dreamer 
of the parable, also suggests some inter-diegetic relationship between created and 
creator. The net result is that the dialogue seems to be between two sides of Borges’s 
political psyche: a localised, Argentinian stoicism as compared with a more 
cosmopolitan cynicism. In fact, these two aspects are not so antagonistic, if one thinks 
of the dreamer, or the ‘Someone’, as being a kynical cosmopolitan addressing both sides 
of the debate at the same time. The crucial failure in the dialogue is an assumption that 
concepts such as destiny, fame, courage and fear have a single meaning in Argentinian 
history. Clearly they do not: Borges illustrates this by using two archetypal figures from 
this history. But these figures are not only archetypal. They did exist, and did have 
certain qualities, which Borges is careful to enumerate in realist fashion. Moreover, the 
parable is rich in specific detail, alluding to a number of battles and people from 
Argentinian history. If anything, the parable risks becoming a nationalist text; it does 
not only because Quiroga insists on the local specificity of his encounters and battles, 
and Rosas cynically boasts about his ability to ‘bust’ a whole country. Moreover, its 
focus on political history is mediated by those questions of subjectivity already raised 
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by the writerly parables. The cosmopolitanism that emerges is dismorphic and kynical: 
it does not suggest a world-state but a disjunction in the apparent integrity of the nation-
state.                 
This antagonism is more clearly kynical when translated to Borges’s response to 
more ‘recent’ history. ‘El simulacro [The Sham]’ is the action of a confidence man who 
appears in a small town or village in the Chaco region of Northern Argentina on ‘one of 
the days of July 1952’ (Dr 31; OC2 178). The parable is split into two paragraphs. The 
first paragraph gives the description of the situation: a tall thin man ‘aindiado [Indian-
like]’ who places a blonde doll in a cardboard box on an altar (Dr 31; OC2 178). He 
accepts, ‘with composure [entereza] and resignation’, the consolations and the money of 
the local populace, who pay to see the man and the doll (Dr 31; OC2 178). The second 
paragraph interrogates this situation and its participants. First, the narrator asks him- or 
herself, ‘what sort of man imagined and executed this funereal farce? A fanatic, a sad 
wretch, a dreamer or an imposter and a cynic?’ (Dr 31; OC2 178). Then, the narrator 
asks whether ‘he believed he was Perón to play his macabre role of mourning 
widower?’ (Dr 31; OC2 178). While the story is acknowledged to be ‘incredible’, it is 
also affirmed that ‘it occurred and perhaps not one time but many, with different actors 
and with different locations’ (Dr 31; OC2 178). What is important in this story is not 
simply the (possible) repetition of a generic theme in different locations, nor the tension 
it demonstrates as a response to the secular canonisation of Eva Duarte, Perón’s wife, 
after her death in 1952. It is important because it shows how all such political realities 
are virtual, since the sham becomes a metaphor for an unreal epoch: ‘It contains the 
perfect cipher of an unreal epoch; it is like the reflection of a dream or like that play 
within a play that is seen in Hamlet’ (Dr 31; OC2 178). Even Perón and Eva become 
anonymous, actors ‘who acted out, for the credulous love of the lower middle classes, a 
crass mythology’ (Dr 31; OC2 178). Borges airs his anti-Perón prejudice, but the 
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parable critiques what Martín Plot identifies as ‘the political’ or the grounds of 
representation as such. The confidence man and the doll were not Perón and Eva, ‘but 
neither was Perón Perón nor Eva Eva, but unknown or anonymous (whose secret name 
and whose true face we ignore) that figured in, for the credulous love of the slums [los 
arrabales; an Argentinian archaism that refers to the early slums of late 19
th
 century 
immigrants], a crass mythology’ (Dr 31; OC2 178). The ‘secret thing’ that Perón and 
Eva were, is not what is represented; the crass mythology is about figures not people. In 
this way, they are just as artificial as the farcical reconstruction of the confidence man. 
It exposes Perón and Eva, not by arguing against their politics but by showing how their 
politics is a matter of pure representation. 
In the interview with Philosophy and Literature we alluded to previously, 
Borges refers to an idea from Ralph Waldo Emerson he would iterate throughout his 
work: ‘Arguments convince nobody’.90 This rather fatalistic sentiment, however, does 
not lead Borges to suggest there is no hope for persuading people. Rather, 
in that case, if arguments convince nobody, a man may be convinced by 
parables or fables or what? Or fictions. Those are far more convincing than 
the syllogism – and they are, I suppose. Well, of course, when I think of 
something in terms of Jesus Christ. As far as I remember, he never used 
arguments; he used style, he used certain metaphors. It’s very strange – 
yes, and he always used very striking sentences. He would not say, I don’t 
come to bring peace but war – ‘I do not come to bring peace but a sword.’ 
The Christ, he thought in parables.
91
 
 
Christ has often been thought of as a kynical figure.
92
 But the parallel is more 
significant in Borges’s meditation on Christ’s method: using style instead of arguments, 
supplementing direct statements with metaphors. Similarly, Borges’s kynical method 
                                                          
90 Borges, Dutton and Palencia-Roth, ‘“Merely a Man of Letters” Jorge Luis Borges: An Interview’, 340. 
91 Ibid. 
92 John Moles addresses the evidence for this school of thought quite comprehensively in ‘Cynic 
Influence upon First-century Judaism and Early Christianity?’, The Limits of Ancient Biography, ed. B. 
McGing and J. Mossman (Swansea: Wales UP, 2006): 89-116. His final conclusion, however, is that the 
argument is indeterminate; it is primarily based on the associative power of certain shared traits (poverty, 
parrhesia, homelessness), rather than verifiable evidence from the classical world. William Desmond also 
discusses this in his history of the Cynics, but the links he makes are mainly associative. William D. 
Desmond, Cynics (Berkley and Los Angeles: California UP, 2008).  
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uses parables, because arguments convince nobody. He gives us lists that do not form 
neat, composite wholes. He communicates these composites in metaphors that do not 
quite transmit all their implications in a clearly delineated way. The chaos in Borges’s 
kynical writing does not reveal a hidden ‘cosmos’: it calls into question the site of the 
cosmos itself.  
In conclusion, Borges uses enumeration to list the qualities of people, places and 
actions, and metaphor to relate these lists to certain canonical tropes. On the face of it, 
these standard rhetorical methods gesture to a conventional, privileged sense of 
cosmopolitanism: enumerated components forming a conventional image, to be 
broadcast by a universal, ‘Enlightened’, metaphor. Since the themes of Borges’s work 
are both ‘Argentinian’ and ‘European’, we can identify his work as ‘rooted’ but 
‘cosmopolitan’: Borges is both ‘Quiroga’, rooted in Argentina, and ‘Rosas’, looking 
towards Europe. However, this assessment fails to do justice to the complexity of 
Borges’s work, precisely because Borges’s enumeration and metaphor do not work with 
such conceptual ease. 
Borges’s enumeration and metaphor upset sites of understanding. These 
functions occur outside the polemics about enumeration and metaphor that Borges 
himself would wage, since his own theories remain surprisingly conservative. However, 
these techniques in his writing necessarily extract from Borges the conservative 
supporter of military dictatorships and naïve reader of Victorian adventure stories, the 
kynical cosmopolitan writer, whose work does challenge subjective ideologies, 
established political mores and pre-conceived aesthetic theories without giving up an 
adherence to truth.  
As was mentioned earlier in the chapter, Borges dismissed the use of 
enumeration to form a coherent image, since enumeration offers the opportunity to put 
qualities together that might otherwise be conflicting or contradictory. Here, we may 
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mark our passage from Borges as a kynical cosmopolitan to Beckett as a kynical 
cosmopolitan, since Beckett’s preferred technique is the image (and the voice) in his 
later work. The image and the voice, however, are no more settling than Borges’s 
enumerations or metaphors. The question of Beckett’s image and voice leads us to our 
next chapter: Kynical Image and Voice in Beckett’s late plays. 
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Chapter 3 
Kynical Image and Voice in Beckett’s late plays 
 
Early responses to Beckett interpreted his work as cynical.
1
 Later, critics would find 
Beckett’s response to the world stoic. In this chapter, we argue that neither response is 
satisfactory, which leads us to Beckett the kynical cosmopolitan. A cynical response to 
Beckett finds either nihilism or self-serving opportunism at work in an oeuvre that, as 
Shane Weller has shown, leaves its reader in no position to say whether or not it is 
nihilistic or self-serving.
2
 A stoic response to Beckett attempts to recuperate Beckett 
from this impasse by defending him against accusations of nihilism. Such responses 
foist a philosophical system on an oeuvre which resists and ridicules philosophical 
systems. Weller, who sets out to read Beckett neither as a nihilist nor as a writer to be 
redeemed from nihilist readings, opens our discussion, since he shows how Beckett's 
work plays across these positions. Weller's subsequent work calls this play ‘anethical’, 
which ‘troubles distinction between the ethical and the unethical’.3 We build on 
Weller’s work by positing the kynical. Rather than a nihilist (or cynical) Beckett, or an 
anti-nihilist (stoic) Beckett, we find a kynical Beckett, who maintains a consistent 
critique of bourgeois complacency.
4
 
                                                          
1 Philip Toynbee’s review of the English translation of Molloy for instance: ‘the whole point of the thesis 
that life is horrible and meaningless and nothing else must be that there is no more than this to be said 
about it’. Philip Toynbee, ‘Molloy’, Samuel Beckett: The Critical Heritage, ed. Lawrence Graver and 
Raymond Federman (Abingdon: Routledge, 1979), 75. 
2 Shane Weller, A Taste for the Negative: Beckett and Nihilism (London: Legenda, 2005).   
3 Shane Weller, Beckett, Literature and the Ethics of Alterity (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 
131. 
4 Adorno’s seminal ‘Trying to Understand Endgame’ shows how Beckett resists bourgeois sentiment. For 
Adorno, Beckett achieves this not through an existential philosophy – ‘in Beckett, history devours 
existentialism’ – but by exposing a basic falsity in life: ‘the moments when the bourgeois acts like a real 
bourgeois, he besmirches the concept of humanity on which his claim rests’ (122; 133). Bourgeois 
cynicism resists existentialist critique because ‘the irrationality of bourgeois society on the wane resists 
being understood’: it may no longer be critiqued ‘by its own ratio’ because ‘it has thrown this ratio on the 
junk-heap and virtually replaced it with direct control’ (122). By showing how interpretation itself 
collapses into cynicism, and yet refusing to deal in interpretation, Adorno’s Beckett manages to achieve a 
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He stages this critique through a technical use of the image and the voice, which 
we find deployed in his last three plays, Ohio Impromptu (1981), Catastrophe (1982), 
and What Where (1983), in a dialectic that does not sublate. This non-sublative dialectic 
permits him to critique his own absorption into bourgeois mainstream theatre, the 
politics of theatrical representation, and extra-theatrical politics of censorship without 
resorting to a stoic ‘comprehensive image’ or ‘voice’ or returning to previous models of 
nihilism.  
By the 1980s, Beckett was a playwright of international repute, and these three 
works were written in response to the invitation of academics and festival organisers. 
This context explains why they give the sense of being written to be ‘Beckett’ plays.5 In 
defining a ‘Beckett’ play, we turn to Anna McMullan’s succinct description:  
Beckett’s dramaturgy resists the presentation of a coherent mimetic world: 
rather he worked to create a non-specific, meta-theatrical environment on 
stage […] in which fragments of a past – that of the fictional persona and 
that of the author and his multilingual cultural ‘appurtenances’ – are 
articulated as memories, ghosts or echoes.
6
  
 
McMullan’s observations are exaggerated in Beckett’s last three plays, which come 
close to parodying this resistance to a coherent mimetic world, with their emphasis on 
non-specific, meta-theatrical environments and their interplay between fictional persona 
and biographical fact. The meta-theatrical environment of Beckett’s late plays becomes 
a ‘microcosmos’: the term Beckett’s Murphy gives to the ‘little world’ where one is 
                                                                                                                                                                          
dissociation without ‘pure, unpolemical, innocent pluralism’ (133-4). If I agree with Adorno in what 
follows, my conclusion differs, since for me the result is kynical and for Adorno, Endgame’s ‘only 
consolation’ is ‘a stoic one’: 
 
Clov: There are so many terrible things now. 
Hamm: No, no, there are not so many now. 
 
Rather than take this as ‘consciousness’ looking its ‘demise in the eye’, I take it as a continual kynical 
challenge both to consciousness and demise. Theodor Adorno, ‘Trying to Understand Endgame’, New 
German Critique, No. 26 (Spring-Summer, 1982).   
5 As early as 1956, Beckett plays with a notion of what ‘Beckett’ might be. In a letter to George Devine, 
dated December 5
th
 1956, he suggests that he could write another mime [Devine is planning to present 
Acte sans paroles] but that this ‘would be perhaps too much wordlessness and too much Beckett’ (SBL2 
683). 
6 Anna McMullan, Performing Embodiment in Samuel Beckett’s Drama (New York and Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2010), 4. 
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‘“cut off” from reality’ (SB1 107). These memories, ghosts and echoes appear to have 
little external political significance, since they arise in the confines of the mind. If this is 
true, they are stoic, in Sloterdijk’s sense of ‘a philosophy of the comfortable’: they 
gesture to impoverishment by ‘having as if they did not have’, but do not break the 
confines of this ‘little world’.7 We will show that Beckett’s ‘fragments of the past’ are 
kynical because they do disrupt the limits of these microcosmoi.   
To show that Beckett’s late style is kynical, we explore how his treatment of art 
and politics in his ‘microcosmos’ is not cut off from reality, since he exposes basic 
inconsistencies in art and politics. Although he regulates the conditions of this exposure 
in the microcosmos of the theatre, Beckett seems to disrupt this closed space by 
grounding his interrogation of art and politics in extra-theatrical ‘fragments of a past’.  
However, we should recall that the ‘fragments of the past’, or biographical 
elements, in the last three plays follow the appearance of Deirdre Bair’s 1978 
biography, Samuel Beckett: A Biography, and the near contemporaneous appearance of 
the autobiographical Company (1980). John Pilling identifies Company as an effort to 
‘establish the proper conjunctions and disjunctions’ between life and art after the Bair 
biography.
8
 Bair begins her biography with Beckett’s birth: ‘birth is usually without 
ambiguity [...] In Samuel Beckett’s case, even this is obscured in irony and confusion’.9 
Company satirises this play between certainty and uncertainty when it compares that 
‘small part’ which ‘can be verified’ (‘you are on your back in the dark’) with that 
‘greater part’ which ‘cannot be verified’ (‘you first saw the light on such and such a 
day’) (SB4 427). In Richard Ellmann’s review of Bair’s biography, ‘the relation of 
Beckett’s writings to his life is problem-ridden’ which is not simply because the 
                                                          
7 Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 165. 
8 John Pilling, ‘Company by Samuel Beckett’, Journal of Beckett Studies, No. 7 (September 1982), 52. 
9 Deidre Bair, Samuel Beckett: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 3. 
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biography takes Beckett at his word.
10
 Ellmann’s conclusion is that Beckett allowed the 
release of the biography – he told her that he would neither help nor hinder her in its 
production – for Schopenhauerian reasons: ‘To forbid others to act involves the pretense 
that one can forbid oneself, and that one knows what to forbid and what not. Beckett 
makes no such claim’.11 In Ellmann’s critical reading of the biography, it appears that 
Beckett’s resignation to its publication becomes itself a form of authentic self-creation. 
Presented with the facticity of his fame, Ellmann’s Beckett turns fame itself into an 
ethical exercise. Ellmann concludes that Beckett turns the biography to his own 
advantage:  
His ultimate reason for permitting her biography is to let his infirmities 
become public knowledge and so challenge [his] success. Yet the success 
is real and deserved. What Miss Bair has presented […] is a simulacrum, 
Sim Botchit rather than Sam Beckett. Happily Beckett exists somewhere 
else.
12
  
 
For Ellmann, Beckett (in the cosmopolitan ‘somewhere else’) avoids this simulacrum 
(‘Sim Botchit’). As we shall see, Beckett’s relationship with his ‘Sim Botchit’ proves to 
be more involved than Ellmann surmises.   
If Beckett’s ‘fragments of the past’ merely reinforce preconceived conclusions 
about the late work, these preconceptions are also informed by the contexts for which 
these plays were written. As with Borges’s El hacedor, these plays were originally 
written as occasional pieces and only subsequently collected into a single production, 
directed by Alan Schneider at the Harold Clurman Theatre in New York in 1983.
13
 
                                                          
10 Richard Ellmann, ‘The Life of Sim Botchit’, The New York Review of Books, 15 June 1978, 4. 
11 Ibid, 4. 
12 Ibid, 8. 
13 The Harold Clurman production gives a comparative basis for discussing these three ‘dramaticules’. In 
each case, it was the first production of each piece to occur outside of the context for which the piece was 
originally written. While the Clurman production was aimed at a ‘standard’ theatre audience, the 
audiences for which Beckett wrote the plays were quite specific. Ohio Impromptu was written in English 
at the request of Stan Gontarski for the 1981 conference, ‘Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives’. 
Catastrophe was written in French at the request of the organisers of the 1982 Avignon Festival for their 
Havel Night, a night of productions written in solidarity with the Czech playwright and politician Václav 
Havel. Quoi où [What Where, later, in German, Wo War] was written in French at the request of the 
organisers of the 1983 Autumn Festival in Graz, Austria. The diverse audiences Beckett was expecting 
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However, this contextual disjuncture gives us a grip on how Beckett manipulates these 
‘fragments of the past’ and their context to make this late writing kynical. This grip 
takes these works as performances as well as texts.
14
 Our discussion of Borges’s 
parables highlighted the split between a manifest tale and the tale of a tale being told 
(theorised by Ricardo Piglia). In Beckett, the split is between the dramatic text and its 
performance as theatre.   
We focused on Borges’s use of enumeration and metaphor to bridge the manifest 
and reflexive tales. Here we address the visual and auditory devices Beckett uses to 
bridge text and performance in the theatre: namely, the image and the voice.
15
 Again, 
Diogenes of Sinope provides us with a useful paradigm to explain the significance of 
the image and the voice to the kynical cosmopolitan. When Diogenes challenges Plato’s 
definition of the human as a featherless biped by showing his plucked chicken and 
stating, ‘here is your man’, he interrupts the narrative continuity of Plato’s philosophical 
utterance with a combination of an image and a statement. This combination is 
important, since the chicken without the phrase would be arbitrary and the phrase 
without the chicken would be nonsensical. It is the disparity between image and 
statement that disrupts the scene. Moreover, it is the voice that announces the image, 
even as the image gains significance through the statement, since it is primarily 
Diogenes’s voice that will call attention to the significance of the chicken, and so 
provide image and statement with their kynical force. Denis Diderot, in his 
                                                                                                                                                                          
were Beckett scholars, opponents to censorship and state oppression, and visitors to an autumn festival. 
Despite this diversity, there are certain continuities, observable by their juxtaposition in the Clurman 
production, and readily translatable to the concerns of the kynical cosmopolitan through the image and 
the voice.  
14 Enoch Brater argues that Beckett’s late plays redefine our notion of text, since they collapse ‘our 
traditional way of thinking about drama as something separate and distinct from performance’. Enoch 
Brater, Beyond Minimalism: Beckett’s Late Style in the Theater (New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1987), 4. 
15 Xerxes Mehta observes two significant ‘images’ in Beckett’s late plays: visual images and sonic 
images. I favour ‘image’ over ‘visual image’ and ‘voice’ over ‘sonic image’ to mark a fundamental 
distinction between the image and the voice. The plays share a generic tendency to crystallise visual 
elements, which they punctuate with verbal or sonic elements. Xerxes Mehta, ‘Ghosts’, Directing Beckett, 
ed. Lois Oppenheim (Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 1997). 
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controversial Letter on the Blind (1749), theorises that Diogenes would not be a 
philosopher to the blind, since, for them, living in a world without sight, Diogenes’s 
visual challenge to modesty would ultimately be of no consequence.
16
 Diderot is half-
right in his assessment, since he identifies Diogenes’s philosophical use of visual 
elements but does not extend this analysis to the equally significant role played by sonic 
elements. To his Letter on the Deaf and Dumb (1751), Diderot might have added that to 
the deaf, too, Diogenes would not be a philosopher, because, without the signifying 
power of his voice, Diogenes ceases to be a commentator on community mores and 
becomes a mere masturbating beggar, inexplicable in his tendency to hold up chickens 
and throw away drinking bowls. Diogenes’s dialectic of image and voice provides a 
paradigm for understanding Beckett’s dialectic of image and voice. Diogenes’s image 
and voice illustrate how Beckett’s work is kynical (disruptive) rather than stoic 
(cohesive).17 It remains to be determined why we find this kynical (ethically consistent), 
rather than cynical (self-serving).  
Stoicism, Criticism and the ‘Nothing New’  
 
By arguing that his method is kynical, we depart from reading Beckett in the stoic 
tradition. Hugh Kenner opens his comparative study of Flaubert, Joyce and Beckett by 
referring to the Stoic: 
The Stoic is one who considers, with neither panic nor indifference, that 
the field of possibilities available to him is large perhaps, or small perhaps, 
but closed [...] he can hope for nothing that adequate method could not 
foresee.
18
 
 
                                                          
16 Denis Diderot, ‘Letter on the Blind for the Use of Those Who See’, Diderot’s Early Philosophical 
Works, trans. and ed. Margaret Jourdain (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 
1916), 81. This has obvious parallels to Borges’s analysis of Waiting for Godot, discussed in chapter 1.  
17 In this regard, I am indebted to Laura Salisbury’s reading of Beckett’s style of comic timing as ‘fixated 
on syncopations [and] hiccups’. Laura Salisbury, Samuel Beckett: Laughing Matters, Comic Timing 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2012), 3. 
18 Hugh Kenner, The Stoic Comedians: Flaubert, Joyce and Beckett (Berkley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1974), xiii. 
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The Stoic is limited to this closed field of possibilities; after the ‘Gutenberg Revolution’ 
this aspect of stoicism becomes a necessary part of all ‘literary composition’.19 He 
clarifies this as the moment when writing, by virtue of its mechanisation, ceases to be 
mediated by the human voice.  
This means we have grown accustomed at last not only to silent reading, 
but to reading matter that itself implies nothing but silence [...] The 
language of printed words has become, like the language of mathematics, 
voiceless [...]
20
  
 
Stoic voicelessness, implying nothing but silence, grants no significance to the sounds 
that writing evokes, in part because such sounds necessarily explode the field of 
possibilities.  
Kenner’s ‘Stoic Comedian’ responds to this curtailment by obeying scrupulously 
the rules of literary composition to their point of impasse. If Flaubert and Joyce 
prototype this style, Kenner identifies Beckett as its apotheosis: 
Beckett has been the first writer to exploit directly the most general truth 
about the operations of a Stoic Comedian, that he selects elements from a 
closed set, and then arranges them inside a closed field.
21
 
 
For Kenner, Beckett designates his field and its elements, and then combines these 
elements in this field until he has exhausted all their possible permutations. Kenner’s 
‘stoicism’ refers less to the ancient stoics than to a stylistic resignation common to 
Flaubert, Joyce and Beckett: the resignation that the possibilities available to one are 
closed. But Beckett’s writing exceeds Kenner’s ‘stoic’ resignation, since it interrupts 
this voiceless ‘closed field’, or microcosmos, with images and voices that come as if 
from the outside. Beckett’s writing is kynical in this interruptive excess, rather than 
stoic (an ethics defined by a closed field) or cynical (a disengagement with the field 
because it is closed). 
                                                          
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid, xv.  
21 Ibid, 93-4. 
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Anthony Uhlmann shifts a stoic Beckett from the voice to the image. If Kenner’s 
stoic responds to the ‘voicelessness’ of the written word, Uhlmann understands the 
stoics to be philosophers of the image: ‘for the Stoics, the point of departure for 
knowledge is the image (phantasia)’.22 ‘The “image”, then, belongs to a primal 
perceptual moment: in the Stoic system it is that which impresses itself upon us and 
asks us to respond, to understand’.23 Our apprehension of this ‘comprehensive image’, 
which ‘is immediately impressed on the senses like a “signet ring into wax”’, leads 
Uhlmann to conclude that ‘wisdom can be achieved through immediate apprehension of 
the object (the comprehensive image)’.24 For Uhlmann, Beckett’s work creates such 
comprehensive images.  
Contra Uhlmann, we argue that the voice disrupts the comprehensive image in 
Beckett’s late plays. Only in Quad, the television play where four figures silently 
traverse the sides and diagonals of a square, does the voice not disrupt an apparently 
comprehensive image.
25
 Rather than the apprehension of his images granting stoic 
wisdom, Beckett’s plays kynically interrupt our reception of the image with a voice.    
These references to Beckett’s ‘stoicism’ form part of a critical focus on the 
image and the voice, particularly evident in the work of Gilles Deleuze and Maurice 
Blanchot.
26
 In their responses to Beckett, a dialectic emerges between the image and the 
                                                          
22 Uhlmann, Samuel Beckett, 15. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid, 131. 
25 Quadrat I+II was originally broadcast on the 8
th
 of October 1981 by Süddeutscher Rundfunk. There is 
a shift in sound from the first part (frenetic drumming) to the second (shuffling footsteps), which disrupts 
the apparently comprehensive image created by the characters traversing the quad.  
26 Deleuze wrote two pieces on Beckett: a lengthy introduction to the film version of Quad (1981) called 
‘L’Épuise [The Exhausted]’ and a shorter, elliptical piece that does prioritise the stuttering voice in 
Beckett called ‘He Stuttered’. Since the point in raising this dialectic is to illustrate the play between 
voice and image, rather than a faithful reproduction of Deleuze’s engagement with Beckett, and since ‘He 
Stuttered’, like ‘The Exhausted’, develops the voice into an image of language itself made to stutter, I 
focus on Deleuze’s more extended reading of image in ‘The Exhausted’. Blanchot reads the structural 
significance of the voice into each of his three responses to Beckett’s prose work: the reviews of 
L’Innommable and Comment c’est, later published in The Book to Come and The Infinite Conversation as 
‘Where Now? Who Now?’ and ‘Words Must Travel Far’, and the late essay ‘Oh tout finir’. Gilles 
Deleuze, ‘The Exhausted’, trans. Anthony Uhlmann, Essays Critical and Clinical (Minneapolis: 
Minnesota UP); Deleuze, ‘He Stuttered’, Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy, eds. Constantin 
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voice. Deleuze interprets Beckett’s work as progressing from the combinatory logics of 
enumeration and metaphor through the voice to the image. Blanchot understands the 
image in Beckett to be underpinned by an already present voice. Between Deleuze and 
Blanchot, we find a tension over Beckett’s priorities: for Deleuze, Beckett’s work 
progresses towards an image, while for Blanchot, it is founded on a voice.
27
 Admittedly, 
if one compares the texts they are discussing, and the time at which they are writing, 
this tension dissolves. Deleuze’s focus is the later television works, particularly Quad, 
for which his essay is an introduction. Blanchot’s foci are Beckett’s last two extended 
prose works, L’Innommable/The Unnamable (1953/1958) and Comment c’est/How It Is 
(1961/1964), which his essays review. Deleuze and Blanchot respond to particular 
works in discrete genres that do not lend themselves to comparison. We risk this 
theoretical clumsiness to emphasise the dialectic between image and voice, since 
Beckett stages his kynical resistance to voicelessness and comprehensive images in the 
performance of this dialectic.
28
  
Beckett’s late plays observe this dialectic by playing across his dramatic and 
prose genres. Enoch Brater argues that Beckett’s late theatre is a ‘genre under stress’.29 
‘The theatre event is reduced to a piece of monologue and the play is on the verge of 
becoming something else, something that looks suspiciously like a performance 
                                                                                                                                                                          
V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski (Abingdon: Routledge, 1994); Maurice Blanchot, ‘Where Now? 
Who Now?’ The Book to Come, trans. Charlotte Mandell (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2003); Blanchot, 
‘Words Must Travel Far’, The Infinite Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 
1993); Blanchot, ‘Oh tout finir’, Critique, No. 519-20, August-September (1990).  
27 Since both writers ostensibly claim to respond to Beckett, I respond to the primacy Blanchot gives the 
voice to the primacy Deleuze gives the image, not their diverse and conflicting philosophical systems.  
28 Recent work by Sarah West and Bruno Clément also produce this dialectic. West’s study of the voice 
has informed my reading, but she makes a productive slip in her opening sentence in insisting that ‘the 
acts of speaking and listening are paramount in Beckett’s dramatic works’, while qualifying this 
importance with the clause, ‘seeing is not enough’. Clearly, however paramount the voice may be, it 
always interacts with ‘seeing’. In Clément, the image is similarly obliged to interact with the voice. West, 
Say It, 11. Bruno Clément, ‘What is this voice’, trans. James Martell, Samuel Beckett and the Encounter 
of Philosophy and Literature, eds. Arka Chattopadhyay and James Martell (London: Roman Books, 
2013).  
29 Enoch Brater, Beyond Minimalism, 3. 
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poem’.30 Again, we find correlative biographical causes in the increased demand for 
dramatisations of his prose texts after the 1960s. But these ‘performance poems’ stress 
the structural difficulties in delivering a prose text coherently in a theatrical situation. 
Beckett’s late theatre is riven between two orders of image and voice: the prosaic and 
the dramatic. In this rift, Beckett explores a kynically cosmopolitan relationship 
between the writer and his world. Here we depart from both Deleuze and Blanchot, who 
see Beckett’s work as voiding the authorial subject entirely. Beckett does not void the 
authorial subject; he plays with it, and with our expectations of ‘Beckett’. So if criticism 
tends to read Beckett as recapitulating ‘comprehensive images’, Beckett interrupts the 
‘comprehensive image’ of ‘Beckett’ with two interrelated kynical methods. He 
punctuates the theatrical microcosmos with references to extra-theatrical locations or 
histories, and disrupts its ‘comprehensive images’ with voices.    
Criticism tends to agree that Beckett’s final three plays, Ohio Impromptu, 
Catastrophe and What Where, are exemplary ‘Beckett’ pieces, since little is new or 
different in these plays. When John Pilling remarked of Ohio Impromptu in 1985 that 
‘of course, there is “nothing new” here, nor should we expect there to be’, he 
acknowledged the play’s recapitulation of generic themes in ‘Beckettian’ style.31 Adam 
Seelig’s discussion of the Ohio Impromptu manuscripts begins by noting a generic 
process in Beckett’s oeuvre, whereby ‘autobiography provides the foundation for 
writing that then undergoes a painstaking process that purges the text of the author’s 
identity’.32 Angela Moorjani surmises that ‘for Catastrophe, Beckett appears to have 
dipped deep down into his store of obsessive images to fashion this play solicited for the 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 The ‘nothing new’ to which Pilling is referring is the opening sentence of Murphy (1938): ‘The sun 
shone, having no alternative, on the nothing new’. John Pilling, ‘Review Article: Three Occasional 
Pieces’, Journal of Beckett Studies, No. 10 (1985), 158.    
32 Adam Seelig, ‘Beckett’s Dying Remains: The Process of Playwriting in the Ohio Impromptu 
Manuscripts’, Modern Drama, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Fall 2000). Samuel Beckett Resources. Accessed: 6 
December 2011. http://www.samuel-beckett.net/remains3.html#1  
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1982 Avignon Festival’s Havel Night’. 33 Anna McMullan identifies a similar generic in 
Catastrophe’s Protagonist, who ‘mirrors many of the personae of Beckett’s late theatre 
and may be seen as an ironic commentary on Beckett’s own production of subjected 
bodies as theatrical spectacle’.34 McMullan also notes the repetition in What Where 
since, like Quad, ‘What Where is also subject to serial patterns of repetition: the four 
personae of Bam, Bim, Bem and Bom act out cycles of interrogation and torture’.35 
Ruby Cohn calls What Where ‘unique’ but only ‘in trying to translate to the stage the 
problems of his recent fiction’.36 Her summary of the play uses Beckett criticism’s 
staple references to split subjects, piercing holes and the stripping away of accidentals:  
The imagining self seeks distance from himself, and yet he tries to pierce 
to the whatness and whereness of that work. That process is dramatized 
through the passing seasons, as figures are stripped of individuality, down 
to the bones of their articulations. Quoi où [What Where] is also the last of 
Beckett’s ‘torture’ pieces in which a victim is coerced to speak.37 
 
Without detracting from the insight each reading brings, in the ‘nothing new’ of 
Beckett’s late plays, images ‘mirror’ those of earlier works while voices ‘repeat’ a 
standard coercion to speak. The emphasis on repetition in these images and voices in the 
criticism also recapitulates certain biographical associations for which, rightly or 
wrongly, they are held as objective correlatives. These objective correlatives include 
biographical allusions in Ohio Impromptu to Beckett’s relationship with Joyce and their 
walks along the Ile des Cygnes; analogues between Beckett’s authoritarian directing 
style, the Director in Catastrophe and the Voice in What Where; the resemblance 
between the ‘clawlike’ hands of Catastrophe’s Protagonist, a character’s failure to 
thread a needle in early drafts of Ohio Impromptu and fibrous degeneration in Beckett’s 
                                                          
33 Angela Moorjani, ‘Directing or In-directing Beckett: Or What is Wrong with Catastrophe’s Director?’, 
Samuel Beckett Today/Aujourd’hui, Vol. 15 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005), 193.  
34 McMullan, Performing Embodiment, 115.   
35 Ibid, 101. 
36 Ruby Cohn, A Beckett Canon (Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 2001), 377.  
37 Ibid. 
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hands.
38
 This presents a bind. Without detailed biographical knowledge of Beckett’s 
life, these images fail as free-standing rationales for the plays. Relying on them too 
greatly reduces the plays to mere ‘Beckett’ pieces.     
The production history mirrors these biographical interferences. We have already 
noted that the plays were invited pieces. They were each requested of Beckett to mark 
an occasion, show solidarity for a cause or celebrate a festival. Understandably, 
occasion imprinted itself on the writing, as we will discuss below. Beckett attempts to 
disavow occasion in Three Dialogues (1949):  ‘the analysis of the relation between the 
artist and his occasion […] does not seem to have been very productive either’ (Disj 
144). But dramatic works, even when they are crystallised into visual effects, are only 
productive in the occasion of their performance.  
Beckett’s writing by invitation also raises a kynical question for stoic 
cosmopolitanism. If an invitation extends an offer of hospitality to a writer’s work, what 
are the conditions of that hospitality? Moreover, how can the writer respond to this offer 
in a creative way while remaining consistent with their general style? Kantian 
cosmopolitanism (and the tensions between unconditional and conditional hospitality 
that Jacques Derrida draws out in his essay On Cosmopolitanism) concerns itself with 
the former question; the kynics concern themselves with the latter. How to maintain an 
artistic integrity (producing something new as a writer) and a recognisable style 
(producing something familiar)? In response, Beckett manipulates image and voice in a 
nexus that refers to the conditions of the invitation, maintains his audience’s 
expectations and reconciles the constraints of production to his own politics of 
engagement.
39
 
                                                          
38 See Moorjani, ‘In-directing Beckett’; McMullan, Embodiment; Cohn, A Beckett Canon; Seelig, 
‘Beckett’s Dying Remains’ cited above.  
39 In his response to Sartre’s What is Literature?, Adorno argues that Beckett and Kafka produce art that 
makes ‘officially committed works look like pantomime’: they ‘arouse the fear that existentialism merely 
talks about’; ‘they explode from within art which committed proclamation subjugates from without’; 
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John Calder captures the complexity of this politics when, in his review of the 
Harry Clurman Theatre triple bill (Ohio Impromptu, Catastrophe and What Where), he 
describes the action of the first play: ‘The reader reads to his own image, is visited by 
that image, reads about that image that is his own memory of being visited’. 40  
As with Company, the author again returns to a theme he has portrayed 
many times, that loneliness and nostalgia are too personal, after a certain 
age, to be shared with any being other than oneself.
41
  
 
Calder notes the critical repetition of the biographical facts, while claiming that they are 
‘too personal […] to be shared’. He, like Pilling, Seelig, Moorjani and Cohn, finds this 
personal Beckett at the expense of any ‘newness’. Beckett’s late plays evince a stoic 
‘philosophy of the comfortable’, since they do not extend themselves beyond well-worn 
themes. This may explain why Jonathan Kalb considers the best responses to Beckett’s 
late plays to come from people who were not critics. ‘Uninformed’ as to the details of 
Beckett’s life, lay spectators of Beckett’s plays are able to appreciate them as images 
and as performances without carrying the baggage of Beckett’s wider oeuvre. For these 
audiences too, however, Beckett ceased to be the producer of works that shocked and 
startled. As he was absorbed into a ‘bourgeois, “well-fed” existence’, he stopped being 
kynical.
42
    
Alan Schneider, Beckett’s friend and director, commented on Beckett’s 
absorption into a bourgeois mainstream. He found that the people going to watch the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
‘their work compels the change of attitude which committed works merely demand’. Kynical 
cosmopolitans do not simply say how inoperative communities are; they take us, step by wearying step, 
through a demonstration of this inoperativity. Or, in Adorno’s words,  
 
the minimal promise of happiness they contain, which refuses to be traded for comfort, cannot be 
had for a price less than total dislocation, to the point of worldlessness. Here every commitment 
to the world must be abandoned to satisfy the ideal of the committed work of art. 
 
Theodor Adorno, ‘Commitment’, Aesthetics and Politics (London: Verso, 1977), 191. 
40 John Calder, ‘Three Beckett Plays at the Harold Clurman Theatre, New York, 1983’, Journal of 
Beckett Studies, No. 11/12 (1989), 219. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Nicholas Royle problematises this tendency within Beckett studies, which he sees as giving the name 
‘Beckett’ ‘a crowded after-life’. Nicholas Royle, The Uncanny: An Introduction (Manchester: Manchester 
UP, 2001), 220. 
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1983 Harold Clurman triple bill ‘are absolutely middle class, nonintellectual, 
nonaficionados. They get much more out of Beckett than the experts’.43 Given that 
Schneider’s triple bill included Ohio Impromptu, which he had also directed for the 
conference, Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives, the negative comparison to ‘the 
experts’ is thinly veiled criticism indeed. But Schneider considered this shift an 
encouraging sign of changing times: 
What’s interesting to me is that the ellipses of Godot are now transparently 
clear to college freshmen, where before they were baffling to all these great 
critics and philosophy professors. That’s a matter of rules changing, and 
that the language of our perception is sufficient to take him in.
44
 
 
With the changes to ‘the language of our perception’, the audience has become 
comfortable enough with Beckett to take him in; it receives him with the comfort of 
Sloterdijk’s stoic. Jonathan Kalb glosses Schneider’s comment as an important 
endorsement of ‘illegitimate’ responses to Beckett’s work. An ‘illegitimate’ response is 
one dismissed as irrelevant for being made by an ‘untrained mind’, ‘but that is an elitist 
position justified neither by the plays nor by their theatre histories’.45 Kalb extends this 
egalitarianism to grant Beckett’s spectators an understanding of the works, ‘at the very 
deepest level, deeper even than the most sophisticated textual criticism, which all too 
often omits mention of the primary routes to the spectator’s understanding’.46 For this 
reason, Kalb objects to Martin Esslin’s suggestion that ‘most spectators’ entire reaction 
(to later Beckett) is to “the overall impact of a single overwhelmingly powerful image”’ 
with the suggestion that this is ‘merely an initial reaction’ and that meaning accrues to 
the play ‘as its overwhelming effect wears off’.47 In his review, Pilling anticipates 
Kalb’s disaffection with the insensate metaphysics of the ‘elitist’ Beckett scholar. Given 
the profusion of generic ‘Beckettian’ images, he asks himself whether ‘only the 
                                                          
43 Alan Schneider qtd. Jonathan Kalb, Beckett in Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989), 22. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Kalb, Beckett in Performance, 22. 
46 Ibid, 22-3. 
47 Ibid. 
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Beckettophile can derive pleasure from Ohio Impromptu’.48 It may be that the 
‘“receding stream” of analogies and allusions is a mere indulgence of Beckett’s 
penchant for infinite regress’.49 However, he argues, the presence on stage of ‘the long 
black cloak’ and the ‘Latin quarter hat’ recall us to ‘the here and the now’:  
The dramatic image in Ohio Impromptu, as indeed in all Beckett’s great 
plays, is so riveting that not even the academic mind, the corporate 
academic mind in this case, can miss the fact that it is to the here and the 
now that it must ultimately, having exhausted itself in the vicious circles of 
infinite regress, retrace its steps.
50
  
 
Kalb and Schneider defend an egalitarian, non-academic response to Beckett on the 
basis of the arresting effect evoked by his theatrical images, but it seems to be as 
comfortable a philosophical approach to Beckett as that taken by the ‘experts’. This 
response is valid but it ignores two ancillary functions of the image for Beckett scholars, 
the first of which is raised by Pilling: the arresting effect of the image is something that 
is returned to after ‘the vicious circles of infinite regress’. The images have a generic 
‘Beckett’ quality that is deliberately worked over by a kynical subject all too aware of 
his simulacrum ‘Sim Botchit’. The second, more obscure, function involves the 
spectators of these ‘transparent’, ‘egalitarian’ performances. Kynicism always exploits 
its audience. Through his use of clichéd images, Beckett pre-empts his audience’s 
response.
51
 This is not a stoic tactic, since it leads neither to voicelessness nor a 
comprehensive image, despite a comfortably ‘Beckett’ experience. Rather, the tactic 
suggests a certain structural violence, in which audience responses are short-circuited by 
this ‘Beckett’ experience. 
By the early 1980s Beckett’s theatrical avant-gardism has become either the 
preserve of the expert or bourgeois conventionalism: a comfortably ‘cosmopolitan’ 
                                                          
48 Pilling, ‘Review Article’, 159. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Elizabeth Barry’s study of cliché in Beckett shows how Beckett was ‘predisposed to the self-conscious 
cliché as verbal strategy’ as cliché provides ‘a form in which [one’s] culture already mocks itself’. 
Elizabeth Barry, Beckett and Authority: The Uses of Cliché (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 2; 3. 
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Beckett. In this case, his cosmopolitanism does not disrupt status quos; it is either stoic, 
since stoic cosmopolitanism accepts benign hegemonic structures as necessary, or 
cynical, since a cynical cosmopolitanism gains nothing in challenging their dominance. 
But Beckett does invert this status quo, since his use of ‘Beckettian’ themes disrupts the 
expectations of his audiences, academic and middle class. Beckett reflects a ‘Beckett’ in 
these plays, but the reflection is broken. Michel Foucault calls kynicism the broken 
mirror of ancient philosophy: ‘It is the broken mirror in which every philosopher can 
and must recognize himself, in which he can and must recognize the very image of 
philosophy, the reflection of what it is and should be, and of what he is and would like 
to be’.52 But this reflection is broken, insofar as it is always contains a grimace that 
eludes reflection. The contemporary criticism, with its stoic concern with the ‘nothing 
new’, attempts to evade this grimace. The hermetic references to previous plays spark 
John Pilling’s concerns, but they become a common ‘language of perception’ for Alan 
Schneider. For neither, apparently, is Beckett doing something altogether different.  
Cynical readings take Beckett’s repetitions to be a form of self-promotion. 
Stephen Dilks identifies in Beckett’s customary self-abnegation a form of self-
marketing.
53
 Dilks’s argument has interesting parallels for both Borges and Coetzee 
who have also performed a coherent authorial persona. However, Dilks’s study reduces 
Beckett’s engagement with self-marketing to a cynical bid for prestige. Dilks posits a 
Beckett deliberately marketing himself for a global cosmopolitan audience. Such 
readings take Foucault’s grimace to be self-serving. The cosmopolitan in the first, stoic 
instance is tantamount to an idealised universalist. The cosmopolitan in the second, 
cynical instance eschews idealist universalism for a network of global markets. But 
neither cosmopolitan does something wholly new, because it serves neither the idealist 
purpose nor the self-marketing schema to disrupt the way the work is already received. 
                                                          
52 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 232. 
53 Stephen Dilks, Samuel Beckett in the Literary Marketplace (Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 2011). 
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We will explore how Beckett disrupts this pattern, to perform a kynical cosmopolitan 
interrogation of idealist and materialist modes of connecting with the world. Anna 
McMullan testifies to this disruption with the dominant narrative of the ‘Beckett’ play, 
when she finds that Beckett’s late plays are marked by a change in his treatment of 
embodiment. Embodiment in the late work is dialectical: the ghostliness of the 
characters in the plays is counterpoised by an obvious and conscious exploitation of 
actors as concrete theatrical devices. Although the plays increasingly represent ‘ghost-
like figures […] exiled between presence and absence, the present and the past, the 
mortal boundaries of a life and what may lie beyond,’ McMullan also notes that ‘the 
late drama is shaped by [Beckett’s] concrete experience in the theatre’.54 She finds 
evidence in his treatment of his actors as bodies: where the emphasis in Godot and Fin 
de partie/Endgame (1957/1958) had been on dialogue, ‘in the later plays he had been 
aware of every movement of the actors even before he wrote the dialogue’.55 So, while 
the identification of these plays vacillates between hermeticism and common 
perception, these three works actually test the limits of Beckett’s ghostly themes 
through the practical limitations of the theatre (and, in the case of What Where, 
television).  
The Image and the Voice in Beckett’s microcosmos 
 
Any encounter with Beckett’s theatre, whether violent or congenial, is always intimate. 
A stoic cosmopolitanism, with its world-states, appears too expansive to describe 
Beckett’s aesthetics. But might Beckett’s kynical cosmopolitanism tend towards a 
‘microcosmopolitanism’, which, if not correlative to kynical cosmopolitanism, 
nevertheless shares certain affinities with this localised form of ‘worldliness’? After all, 
the kynical cosmopolitan is always more interested in the local than the global. This 
                                                          
54 McMullan, Performing Embodiment, 104-5; 104. 
55 McMillan and Fehsenfeld, qtd. McMullan, ibid. 
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would misrepresent the terms of the debate. Beckett’s primary concern is with closed 
systems, rather than with breadth of scope. Instead of correlating Beckett’s 
‘microcosmos’ to the kynical ‘cosmos’, we should read the microcosmos of Beckett’s 
theatre as the ground on which cosmopolitan questions (whether stoic, cynical or 
kynical) may be raised. Reducing this world to the microcosmos of the mind allows 
Beckett to stage his challenge to the notion of cosmos as a closed system. Stoic 
cosmopolitanism, expansive or not, understands the world to be a closed system we 
should support in an ethical way. The cynical cosmopolitan also sees the world to be a 
closed system, but one to be exploited for various ends. Beckett responds to these 
closed systems by showing how some key element always exceeds it: Beckett punctures 
his closed microcosmos with kynical images and voices that come as if from outside.   
Beckett describes the inmates at Magdalen Mental Mercyseat in Murphy as 
‘microcosmopolitans’, because they are ‘cut off’ from reality (SB1 107). If treatment at 
the asylum ‘translates the sufferer from his own pernicious little private dungheap to the 
glorious world of discrete particles’, Murphy finds this treatment ‘duly revolting’ 
because his ‘experience [...] obliged him to call sanctuary what the psychiatrists called 
exile and to think of the patients not as banished from a system of benefits but as 
escaped from a colossal fiasco’ (SB1 107). Murphy calls the mind a sanctuary since, for 
him, it functions ‘not as an instrument but as a place’ (SB1 107). Murphy’s refrain, ‘I 
am not of the big world, I am of the little world’, suggests that the microcosmopolitan 
resides within the microcosmos of their own mind (SB1 107). 
Unlike the kynical cosmopolitan, the microcosmopolitan clearly fails to engage 
with structural politics. Like stoic or cynical cosmopolitans, they concern themselves 
with the workings of a closed system, but the microcosmopolitan shares the kynic’s 
closeness, since both cosmopolitanisms locate themselves within the confines of the 
mind or body. If we imagine that Beckett stages the structure of the political within the 
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confines of the microcosmos as a bodily experience, we might reconcile Murphy’s 
apparent quietism with his political condemnation of  ‘outer reality’ as a ‘colossal 
fiasco’, while grounding this mind-based argument in an immanent body. We find the 
beginnings of this reconciliation in Murphy’s kynical challenge to Plato’s allegory of 
the cave. If Plato’s allegory of the cave differentiates between a cave of false shadows 
and an outer reality of truth to motivate the philosopher to seek the latter, Murphy’s 
manifestly kynical gesture is to ask why such a motivation should be tolerable: ‘how 
should he tolerate, let alone cultivate, the occasions of fiasco, having once beheld the 
beatific idols of his cave?’ (SB1 107) Here we find the conventional philosophical 
image subverted by the ‘broken mirror’ of Murphy’s kynicism: he interrupts the 
allegory of the cave by questioning whether that outer reality is what we really want.  
Whether one agrees with Murphy or not, his question interrogates the structural 
basis of Platonic philosophy: the quest for truth. However, Murphy is at best an 
imperfect microcosmopolitan, since he remains ‘unresolved’ (SB1 107). ‘In fact’, 
Murphy is almost a kynical cosmopolitan himself, since his desire to enter completely 
his own ‘microcosmos’ requires him to interrogate the bases of conventions that 
dissuade such forays into this ‘pernicious little private dungheap’ (SB1 107). Murphy 
firmly disagrees with puncturing the closed system of the dungheap, which is why he is 
ultimately not a kynical cosmopolitan, but his continued engagement with the dungheap 
defines Beckett’s interventions into these closed systems. By the late plays, these 
‘pernicious little private dungheaps’ are occupying the entire stage, and yet Beckett 
continues to puncture their closed systems with images and voices from the outside. The 
plays do not form discrete microcosmoi; rather they interrogate, through their 
consideration of the microcosmos, the conventions of so-called ‘outer reality’. Since 
they achieve this primarily through a reflexive engagement with the image and the 
voice, it would seem apt to turn to Beckett’s own engagement with these devices.        
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Beckett would comment on the image and the voice throughout his work. A 
younger Beckett, in his 1929 response to James Joyce’s Work in Progress, replaces ‘or’ 
with ‘and’ in Stephen Daedalus’s definition of the image: ‘Temporal [and] spatial, the 
esthetic image is first luminously apprehended as selfbounded and selfcontained upon 
the immeasurable background of space [and] time which is not it ... You apprehend its 
wholeness’ (SB4 504). The image, therefore, is as much in time as it is in space, 
although the background that time and space form ‘is not it’. Here, we find ample 
evidence for reading Beckett’s images as comprehensive, and therefore stoic. However, 
as his thought develops he opens the image up to causality, and thus to the disruption of 
its wholeness. ‘Time and space taken together’ are, by the time of Beckett’s essay on 
Proust, a parenthetic description of causality. Exempting the object from causality, 
possible when the subject is exempt from will, results in the image being ‘purified in the 
transcendental aperception that can capture the Model, the Idea, the Thing in itself’ 
(SB4 552). Beckett derives this insight from the botanical images in Proust:  
[Proust] assimilates the human to the vegetal. He is conscious of humanity 
as flora, never as fauna […] And, like members of the vegetable world, 
they seem to solicit a pure subject, so that they may pass from a state of 
blind will to a state of representation. Proust is that pure subject. He is 
almost exempt from the impurity of will. (SB4 552)  
 
Beckett’s humanity is all-too-fauna, perpetually failing to achieve the desired flora-
state. When Proust’s pure subject, exempt from will, projects the object as ‘the Model, 
the Idea, the Thing itself’ by means of the image, this may achieve the microcosmos 
desired by Beckett’s Murphy, but, for Murphy, the microcosmos slips out of his reach 
precisely because it is desired as an image. The image is not even comprehensive for the 
pure subject, since it evolves from ‘a state of blind will to a state of representation’ or 
from a state of presentation to a state of representation. Beckett intimates just such an 
evolution in his 1936 review of Jack B. Yeats’s The Amaranthers: ‘There is no symbol. 
The cream horse that carries Gilfoyle and the cream coach that carries Gilfoyle are 
- 164 - 
related, not by rule of three, as two values to a third, but directly, as stages of an image’ 
(Disj 90). Rather than the symbol, which is necessarily loaded with the meanings 
imbued it by a wilful subject, the cream horse and the cream coach are ‘stages of an 
image’, suggesting that they do not signify in themselves, but necessarily develop in 
stages.  
The review of The Amaranthers anticipates Beckett’s interest in the visual arts, 
and the role the image plays in lifting from the eyes ‘before rigor vistae sets in, some at 
least of the weight of congenital prejudice’ (Disj 95).56 In his Three Dialogues [with 
George Duthuit], when remarking on the painter André-Aimé-René Masson’s 
contending with ‘his own technical gifts’, Beckett has the character ‘B’ respond with an 
image:  
Allow me to note his concern with the amenities of ease and freedom. The 
stars are undoubtedly superb, as Freud remarked on reading Kant’s 
cosmological proof of the existence of God. With such preoccupations it 
seems to me impossible that he should do anything different from that 
which the best, including himself, have done already. (Disj 141) 
 
This is a sophisticated use of the image qua image. First, there is Freud’s reading of 
Kant, as a cosmological image. Freud does not respond to the cogency of Kant’s 
argument, he responds to the aesthetic quality of a philosophical image. Beckett’s use of 
Freud as an image of a reader implies a second transfer of the image, from reference to 
the imagic quality of the stars qua cosmology to the presentation of philosophical 
argument as ‘merely’ image. Beckett reflects Kant’s proof, and Freud’s rebuttal of this 
argument, through a ‘broken mirror’: their cosmological philosophy is reduced to mere 
image. Finally, the image represents Masson’s ‘dramatic predicament’, articulated by 
‘D’: 
He seeks to break through their [objects’] partitions to that continuity of 
being which is absent from the ordinary experience […] with this notable 
                                                          
56 This image, given in Beckett’s review of Thomas MacGreevy’s book on Jack B. Yeats’s art, takes 
MacGreevy’s efforts to turn Yeats into Ireland’s first great painter as ‘overstated’, since Yeats’s greatness 
lies in bringing ‘light […] to the issueless predicament of existence’ (Disj 97).  
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difference, that Masson has to contend with his own technical gifts, which 
have the richness, the precision, the density and balance of the high 
classical manner. (Disj 141)  
 
Here we have an artist who is not simply preferring the oft-quoted ‘B’ description of Tal 
Coat, ‘the expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, 
nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with 
the obligation to express’ (Disj 139). Indeed, ‘B’ does evoke this response in the 
Masson dialogue: ‘So forgive me if I relapse, as when we spoke of the so different Tal 
Coat, into my dream of an art unresentful of its insuperable indigence and too proud for 
the farce of giving and receiving’ (Disj 141). But ‘D’ stymies this reading, turning it 
back on ‘B’, when he asks: 
But must we really deplore the painting that admits ‘the things and 
creatures of spring, resplendent with desire and affirmation, ephemeral no 
doubt, but immortally reiterant’, not in order to benefit by them, not in 
order to enjoy them, but in order that what is tolerable and radiant in the 
world may continue? Are we really to deplore the painting that is a 
rallying, among the things of time that pass and hurry us away, towards a 
time that endures and gives increase? (Disj 141-2)  
 
In other words, even if there is a need to maintain a ruthless honesty about the farce of 
giving and taking, should we not appreciate art that attempts to construct the 
‘impossible’ transcendental signification?57 B’s response is a simple stage direction, a 
cue to a theatrical image: ‘B. – (Exit weeping.)’ (Disj 142). Rather than working as a 
strict philosophical dialogue, such as those of Plato, Beckett’s dialogue parodies the 
possibilities of philosophical dialogue by making use of extra-philosophical theatrical 
images.  
One example of Beckett’s use of extra-philosophical theatrical language in 
response to philosophical interrogation occurs when D questions the inexpressive 
quality of Bram van Velde’s painting: 
                                                          
57 On Beckett’s theories of the impossible in his art criticism, see Jean Michel Rabaté, ‘Bataille, Beckett, 
Blanchot: From the Impossible to the Unknowing’, Journal of Beckett Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2012), and 
Adam Winstanley, ‘A “Whispered Disfazione”: Maurice Blanchot, Leonardo da Vinci and Three 
Dialogues with George Duthuit’, Journal of Beckett Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2013). 
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D. – One moment. Are you suggesting that the painting of van Velde is 
inexpressive? 
B. – (A fortnight later) Yes. (SB4 561)58 
 
Beckett explains this theatrical use of temporality in a letter to George Duthuit: 
For me, that is the only possible answer. To answer, as I have already been 
cowardly enough to do, that it expresses the impossibility of expressing 
anything is just to march him back into line with the others. Because I have 
this frantic urge to fix up for myself a situation that is literally impossible, 
what you call the absolute, there I am dragging him along beside me. 
(SBL2 170) 
 
This comment is of importance to Beckett scholarship in general, which has, for the 
most part, accorded greater significance to the generic assertion of the impossibility of 
expression than its ‘cowardice’ might merit.59 But it also raises again the importance of 
the image to Beckett’s work where the theatrical image apparently supersedes the 
spoken word. For Beckett, the theatrical image is more important than the philosophical 
message the image is meant to convey. Moreover, it requires more than the reification 
of ‘expressing the impossibility of expressing anything’.  
The image of time passing, foregrounded in the dialogue, isolates a ‘shape’ in the 
idea that the expression of the idea fails to communicate. Beckett indicates his 
preference for the shapes ideas have in a letter to Harold Hobson, written in 1956:   
I take no sides. I am interested in the shape of ideas even if I do not believe 
them. There is a wonderful sentence in Augustine, I wish I could remember 
the Latin. It is even finer in Latin than in English. ‘Do not despair: one of 
the thieves was saved. Do not presume: one of the thieves was damned.’ 
That sentence has a wonderful shape. It is the shape that matters.
60
 
 
The shape of Augustine’s idea is formed from parallel syntax. The syntax is echoed to 
indicate a parallel between the clauses while the use of antonyms secures the 
                                                          
58 This is the line as it appears in published versions of Three Dialogues. The line Beckett quotes in the 
letter does not cite ‘One moment’, which suggests that it was inserted to give a phatic formalism 
(narrative realism) to the interruption that the phrase constitutes in the larger dialogue. It is also worth 
noting that the characters are denoted ‘B’ (for D) and ‘A’ (for B) respectively, prioritising the ‘B’eckett 
and ‘D’uthuit characters of the final piece as the speaker and the interlocutor respectively.  
59 David A. Hatch addresses the uncritical manner in which critics take up Beckett’s auto-commentary in 
Three Dialogues in his PhD thesis. David A. Hatch, Beckett in (t)Transition: “Three Dialogues with 
George Duthuit” (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Florida State University, 2003). 
60 Samuel Beckett qtd. Michael Worton, ‘Waiting for Godot and Endgame: Theatre as Text’, The 
Cambridge Companion to Beckett, ed. John Pilling (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), 75.   
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contradiction in the semantic content. Beckett’s interest in the rhetorical shape of the 
idea, however, hovers close to the sophistry of contemporary cynicism, since he, like 
Borges, ‘takes no sides’ in appreciating the ‘shape of ideas’ that he may or may not 
believe in. The fortnight B waits might as easily be a jocular disregard for the 
significance of the question as a tortured attempt to come up with a significant yes. 
Without resorting to the letter Beckett writes to Duthuit, detailing this as the only way 
out for the dialogue, how are we to differentiate the cynical disengagement where the 
image is rhetorical sophistry and the kynical engagement with the image as the means 
of rhetorical critique? This requires a renewed engagement with the image’s 
relationship to the voice. 
When we return to Beckett’s essay on Joyce, and particularly to his meditations 
on Work in Progress where ‘form is content, content is form’, we find that the work is 
not written merely to be read: ‘It is to be looked at and listened to’ (SB4 503). Not only 
is it to be looked at (in the sense of a visual object), it is to be listened to (in the sense of 
an aural object). ‘Its adequate apprehension depends as much upon its visibility as its 
audibility’ (SB4 504). In his efforts to show how the words facilitate this (‘the language 
is drunk’), Beckett neglects to specify what kind of object Work in Progress actually is. 
Are we looking at a book or the copies of transition where it was first published? Are 
we looking at the typesetting of words on a page or the metaphorical ‘shape’ of those 
words? As difficult as the visual question is to answer, the aural question is more 
difficult: How are we to listen to this ‘it’? What is ‘its’ voice? 
The means by which we ‘listen to’ Work in Progress are clearly as important to 
Beckett as the processes of seeing or reading it, but if the latter two processes imply the 
reader’s direct engagement with the text, the former requires the mediation of a voice 
(even if this voice is the reader’s own). Already, we have moved far from Kenner’s 
stoic ‘voicelessness’. Beckett is unwilling or unable to identify what this voice is in 
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‘Dante … Bruno. Vico .. Joyce’, but the voice emerges once again in Proust, this time 
to confirm or suspend the narrator’s pact with Habit.61  
‘Habit’, Beckett writes, ‘is the ballast that chains the dog to his vomit. Breathing 
is habit. Life is habit. Or rather life is a succession of habits, since the individual is a 
succession of individuals’ (SB4 515). The memories of this succession of individuals 
are joined together through their mutual pact with habit, since ‘the laws of memory are 
subject to the more general laws of habit’ (SB4 515). Beckett’s awareness and 
exploitation of habit’s ubiquity turns a universal ‘life’ into a ‘succession of habits’. But 
Beckett’s chain between the dog and its vomit makes this universalism kynical. Kynics 
consciously use their habits to foreground a conventional unconscious reliance on habit, 
and Beckett’s upsetting metaphor challenges us to remember our own use of habit as 
ballast. Proust disrupts this ballast, as Beckett shows in two examples from A la 
recherché du les temps perdu. Both foreground a pact between memory and habit via a 
voice that eschews the comfort of the pact. In the first example the pact is ‘renewed’ 
and in the second it is ‘waived’. Both make some use of a ‘voice’, broadly conceived, to 
foreground habit.  
Beckett’s first example comes from the narrator’s first arrival at Balbec-Plage 
with his grandmother in Within a Budding Grove. The narrator is unable to sleep, 
because habit has not had time to familiarise the room to him, by ‘silenc[ing] the 
explosions of the clock’, amongst other things (SB4 518). His grandmother comes in to 
comfort him, and, when she leaves, ‘makes him promise to knock on the partition that 
separates her room from his, should he require anything during the night. He knocks, 
and she comes again to him. But that night and for many nights he suffered’ (SB4 518). 
                                                          
61 Ulrike Maude writes perspicaciously on Beckett and habit. Since Maude’s argument tends towards a 
consideration of where Beckett might have developed his thinking on habit (a combination of Proust and 
Bergson-in-Proust), and restricts her exploratory article to a discussion of Happy Days, her work 
influences this discussion, but is not immediately relevant to my current concern. Ulrike Maude, ‘Samuel 
Beckett and the Laws of Habit’, Modernism/Modernity, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2011). 
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He interprets the anxiety as coming from a refusal to accept the new surroundings 
without certain people he loves. ‘But this terror at the thought of separation […] is 
dissipated in a greater terror, when he thinks that to the pain of separation will succeed 
indifference’ (SB4 519). Greater than his terror at the separation, is the terror that he 
will no longer feel terror at the separation. This is why he will not allow himself to be 
habituated to the new surroundings; he is too frightened of losing his old habits not to 
renew his pact with these habits. The one habit he does acquire, however, is the habit of 
‘calling’ his grandmother with a series of three knocks. These knocks serve to interrupt 
his suffering with a constant (his grandmother), who links his old habits to his new 
situation. By functioning in lieu of a voice, the knock permits the narrator a degree of 
control over his own suffering, since it permits him to call his grandmother and have her 
respond ‘in which it contrived to waft to me the soul of my grandmother, whole and 
perfect, and the promise of her coming, with the swiftness of an annunciation and a 
musical fidelity’.62 While Beckett does not explicate the narrator’s desperate effort to 
cling to habit in terms of the voice, the scene prepares us for our discussion of the 
Listener’s knock as a voice in Ohio Impromptu, and the knock’s relation to memory and 
habit.  
The ‘pact’ between memory and habit is ‘waived’ in Beckett’s second example, 
when the narrator receives a phone call from his grandmother. He hears her voice ‘in all 
its purity and reality, so different from the voice that he had been accustomed to follow 
on the open score of her face that he does not recognize it as hers’ (SB4 519). The voice 
is ‘strange’ and ‘real’ but it is also a ‘symbol of her isolation, of their separation, as 
impalpable as a voice from the dead’ (SB4 519). Following the conversation, Proust’s 
narrator has an irresistible urge to see his grandmother. He takes the train, arrives at her 
house and sees her reading her book. Since she does not know he is there, he is ‘not 
                                                          
62 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time: Within a Budding Grove, trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff and 
Terence Kilmartin (New York: Random House, 1992), 720. 
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there […] he is present at his own absence’ (SB4 520). It permits him to see her clearly, 
without the abeyance of his habitual tenderness for her. What he sees horrifies him. The 
woman before him becomes a stranger; the grandmother of his youth exists no longer.  
Despite his assertion that such ‘examples [...] abound in Proust’, Beckett’s 
choice of these scenes links them to concerns with the image and the voice in his Joyce 
essay. Moreover, the concerns have developed by Proust, since looking and hearing are 
now related to habit, and the suspension of this relationship has a process: the voice 
interrupts the regime of habit, and the image subsequently confirms this interruption to 
be an actual break. We find this process reiterated in the late plays where voices will 
interrupt the dramatic action, which collapses before a climactic image. We can identify 
the process by which the voice and the image interact; we have not yet addressed what 
this voice is for Beckett.  
According to Bruno Clément, the voice is an image, since for The Unnamable, 
Beckett’s most sustained interrogation of the function of the voice, ‘it is solely a 
question of voices, no other image is appropriate’ (SB2 340-1). Clément, following in 
the tradition of Deleuze, argues that all moments of the voice in Beckett primarily 
concern themselves with the image of the voice: the voice, in this sense, is subordinate 
to a stoic ‘comprehensive image’. The voice is often tied to an image in Beckett’s work, 
but this does not mean it is reducible to an image. The voice is not simply an image in 
the telephone conversation in Proust, since Beckett compares Proust’s conversation with 
the hysterical telephone conversation in Jean Cocteau’s Voix humaine, and calls the 
latter ‘not merely a banality but an unnecessary banality’ (SB4 519). Something in 
Proust’s telephonic voice functions in excess of the image he shares with Cocteau. So 
while ‘the question of voices’ is the only ‘image’ appropriate to The Unnamable, clearly 
something is happening in Beckett’s correlation of voice and image that cannot be 
collapsed into an identity. This means that the image is not ‘comprehensive’, nor is the 
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work ‘voiceless’. Rather the voice functions as a transgressive incursion into the 
apparently comprehensive image or the ‘voiceless’ medium to destabilise their 
philosophical integrity. It is not stoic, but kynical. 
The narrator of The Unnamable will speak of the voice as a possession: 
‘Possessed of nothing but my voice, the voice, it may seem natural, once the idea of 
obligation has been swallowed, that I should interpret it as an obligation to say 
something’ (SB2 305). The narrator then questions whether ‘it’ is possible. We imagine 
‘it’ refers to the obligation to say something, but the narrator will then invoke an image 
of lack: ‘Bereft of hands, perhaps it is my duty to clap or, striking the palms together, to 
call the waiter, and of feet, to dance the Carmagnole’ (SB2 305). If we look back to the 
narrator’s reference to possession, we find the key to this lack in a leitmotif that will 
recur several times in The Unnamable: ‘my voice, the voice’. The auto-correction is 
telling; ‘my voice’ is not ‘mine’. Now syntax, ‘possessed of nothing but my voice’, and 
image, ‘bereft of hands’, combine to make sense. For if the narrator is possessed of the 
voice and is bereft of hands and feet, the voice exists in excess of a body. This is 
possible only because the narrator is possessed by the voice, which is not his and is, in 
itself, only ever ‘nothing but the voice’.63 The body is imagined in the negative to allow 
the voice to exceed this image. The image of the hands supplements the voice’s refusal 
of image. If anything, the voice is a wound, or a gap, in the visual cohesion of the 
image. As a result, the voice and the image function in a constitutive, dialectical tension 
with each other, neither fully reducible to the other, nor sublative into a synthesis. We 
will mark this tension as correlative to a kynical resistance to stoic resolution.  
The dialectic of voice and image reaches its apogée in the play, Not I (1972). Not 
I holds the image and the voice in a symmetrical counterpoint: the evocative image of 
the free-floating, continuously speaking mouth provides a point of stability amidst a 
                                                          
63 Mladen Dolar considers the voice as a Lacanian object a in precisely these terms. Mladen Dolar, A 
Voice and Nothing More (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006). 
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rush of words, which Billie Whitelaw would describe as ‘a terrible inner scream, like 
falling backward into hell’.64 She and Beckett ‘got back to’ this scream in their 
discussions, despite Beckett’s desire for the voice to be ‘flat, no emotion, no colour, 
flat’.65 The scream was ‘something not acted; it just happens’.66 Behind the ‘flat’ way in 
which the words are spoken, there is an implicit scream. But we should not think of this 
as a primordial scream, even though Whitelaw’s initial response is to explain it with the 
image of a grief-stricken mother: ‘It was the scream I never made when my son was 
desperately ill’.67 Such a scream is not strictly primordial because, like the voice, it can 
only be recognised in retrospect: ‘… words were coming… imagine! … words were 
coming ... a voice she did not recognize … at first … so long since it had sounded … 
then finally had to admit … could be none other … than her own …’ (SB3 408). It takes 
some time but Mouth eventually recognises her own voice, amidst the stops and starts 
of Beckett’s ellipses, through ‘… certain vowel sounds … she had never heard … 
elsewhere …’ (SB3 408). In fact, Mouth will attempt to fix the voice at various points 
during Not I; here, through accent, and later, through the mechanics of the mouth:  
… not her voice at all … and no doubt would have … vital she should … 
was on the point … after long efforts … when suddenly she felt … 
gradually she felt … her lips moving … imagine! … her lips moving! … as 
of course till then she had not … and not alone the lips … the cheeks … 
the jaws the whole face … all those - … what? … the tongue? … yes … 
the tongue in the mouth … all those contortions without which … no 
speech is possible … (SB3 408) 
 
Unable to follow what the voice is saying, Mouth persuades herself that the voice is not 
hers. Then she discovers that she ‘feels’, ‘suddenly […] gradually’, the muscle 
mechanics of the lips, cheeks, jaws and tongue, which one ordinarily does not feel at all, 
‘… so intent one is … on what one is saying …’ (SB3 408). Habit inures us to the 
                                                          
64 Billie Whitelaw, Mel Gussow, ‘An terrible inner scream, like falling backwards into hell’, Mel 
Gussow, Conversations with (and about) Beckett [1996] (London: Nick Hern Books, 2000), 85. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
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physical sensation of the voice, as well as its acoustic quality. When this habit is waived 
or suspended, however, our awareness of the voice as both internal (a part of us) and 
external (apart from us) makes it particularly difficult to define what the voice is, in 
excess of what it is saying.
68
 When we attempt to define the voice, we must assign it a 
particular acoustic quality (accent) or detail the mechanics of its occurrence, since, like 
the image, the voice remains curiously resistant to definitions of quiddity. Instead of 
definition, then, the voice demands that we define a context for its use.              
This is why, rather than Three Novels, where the speaking voice produces a 
series of contingent personas, the focus of this chapter turns to the emphasis Beckett’s 
drama places on the ‘situation’ of articulation: the structured presentation through 
images and voices of the subject’s position in relation to itself. Beckett’s solution was, 
as he himself wrote, to turn to theatre to control this space:   
When I was working on Watt, I felt the need to create for a smaller space, 
one in which I had some control of where people stood or moved, above 
all, of a certain light. I wrote Waiting for Godot.
69
 
 
If Beckett’s temporary solution to this perceived impasse was to turn to a different 
medium – the theatre – what becomes clear towards the end of his life is the transience 
of this reprieve. The theatre, as the discussion of the following three plays will 
demonstrate, proves as susceptible to the problems of representation as prose.
70
  
Beckett’s later plays repeat the obsession with images and the voice, but they are 
susceptible to the problems of the prose because they are drifting in the direction of 
prose. Charles R. Lyons identifies a generic trope, present from Not I to Ohio 
                                                          
68 Mladen Dolar argues that the voice is not simply a vehicle of meaning or a source of aesthetic 
admiration, but also an object as a lever for thought.   
69 Samuel Beckett qtd. Brater, Beyond Minimalism, 176.   
70 W.B. Worthen shows how Beckett’s drama ‘traces an allegory of writing in the theatre, and so provides 
a way to reflect of the agency of dramatic writing in charting the space of the performance’. W.B. 
Worthen, Drama: Between Poetry and Performance (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 196. 
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Impromptu, of ‘an enigmatic narrative forced into a theatrical context’.71 The resulting 
paradigm is ‘an image of character whose consciousness processes a narrative’.72 The 
question he asks is whether these works are ‘inherently dramatic’ or whether they are 
‘essentially works of prose fiction enclosed in a theatrical conceit’.73 Lyons’s modifier, 
‘essentially’, has predisposed us to understand, and respond to, these texts as one genre 
masked within another. Jonathan Kalb follows this purist line of thought, when he 
examines the theatrical performances of Beckett’s prose texts: ‘the novels and stories 
are not dramas, they cannot stand alone as theatre, and any attempt to stage them is at 
least as much of a gamble as staging a new play’.74 Kalb’s response is drawn from 
Beckett’s response to Barney Rosset, his Grove Press publisher, in a 1957 letter: ‘If we 
can’t keep our genres more or less distinct, or extricate them from the confusion that has 
them where they are, we might as well go home and lie down’.75 Kalb’s analysis proves 
more nuanced than his conclusion in showing the shifting complexity of Beckett’s 
response to this form of adaptation. Noting the increasing number of performances of 
Beckett’s prose texts, starting with Jack MacGowran’s 1962 End of the Day 
performance of prose extracts, Kalb distinguishes between those productions that 
attempted to recapture the ‘action’ of Beckett’s prose texts in a mimetic stage 
production, those that simply ‘let the text speak for itself’, and those that combine the 
texts or shift visual metaphors to reconsider the texts as stage productions. While he is 
dismissive of the first and the second types, he admires the third despite acknowledging 
its transgression of Beckett’s wishes. However, he also finds a number of instances 
where Beckett contributes either to the production (as with Jack MacGowran) or to the 
                                                          
71 Charles R. Lyons, ‘Beckett’s Fundamental Theatre: the Plays from Not I to What Where’, Beckett’s 
Later Fiction and Drama: Texts for Company, ed. James Acheson and Kateryna Arthur (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan), 80. 
72 Ibid, 81. 
73 Ibid, 80. 
74 Kalb, Beckett in Performance, 143. 
75 Beckett qtd. Kalb, 118. 
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conception (as with Beckett’s discussions with Frederick Neumann, prior to Neumann’s 
1983 production of Company). This calls into question Beckett’s earlier stance on 
generic purity. His 1962 collaboration with Jack MacGowran produced a show in which 
a fairly consistent tramp-figure drew on a variety of prose texts, suggesting that the 
theatrical inclusion of a consistent figure overcame his objections about generic purity. 
Beckett objected to the Neumann production because the possibilities for staging it 
seemed limited as Company ‘all takes place in the dark’. Here, Beckett’s enthusiasm for 
the earlier production should not obscure his increasing sensitivity to the demands of the 
theatrical space, and to the numerous pitfalls of adapting prose pieces to this space.  
In the final plays, there is a trend towards staging readings (Ohio Impromptu), 
rehearsals (Catastrophe) and revisions (What Where).
76
 We may then postulate that 
these late ‘prose-plays’ form a correlative response to productions that dramatise the 
prose texts, in which Beckett exploits the disjuncture in the authorial persona in its 
translation from page to stage. There are three orders to our discussion of the three 
plays. First, it follows the chronological order in which they were written. Second, it 
follows the order of performance for the Harry Clurman production. These sequences 
permit us to note a third, thematic shift in this triptych, as it was written and staged, 
from the intimate encounter between two bodies to the structural relationship between 
three or four bodies. Ohio Impromptu stages an interaction between similarly clad 
actors, sat together at a table. Catastrophe counterpoints the intimacy of this setting 
with the privileged public space of a theatre during a rehearsal. What Where is the most 
alienating environment of the three, since, in its stage version, the stage is bare (apart 
from Voice’s megaphone) and, in its television version, the faces appear and disappear 
as ghostly images on an otherwise black screen. 
                                                          
76 Dirk Van Hulle and Mark Nixon’s work on Beckett’s 1984 ‘Bare Room’ fragment in the ‘Super 
Conquérant’ Notebook shows Beckett’s interest in the performance of writing. ‘Bare Room’ has two 
characters attempt to recall Shakespeare’s Sonnets 71 and 116. Dirk Van Hulle and Mark Nixon, 
‘Performance and Beckett’s “Bare Room”’, Journal of Beckett Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2014): v-xi. 
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      The interplay between image and voice results in a series of dialectics in 
Ohio Impromptu, Catastrophe and What Where.
77
 Each play’s ‘cadenza’ or 
‘catastrophe’ is the culmination of a rhythm whereby a stark contrast emerges between 
an image and a voice. Ohio Impromptu builds to the moment when the Reader will stop 
speaking and the two figures will sit on ‘as though turned to stone’ (SB3 476), but the 
image on stage is anticipated in the Reader’s description of this image, in the text he 
reads to his Listener, and by the very nature of his voice, which Beckett likened to that 
of someone reading a bed-time story. The moment the Protagonist raises his head in 
Catastrophe, he subverts the Director’s vision for the play with a powerful image of his 
own. In order for this subversion to succeed, however, the image of the Protagonist’s 
resistance must be contrasted with prescriptions given by the Director in a voice 
described as irritable, plaintive and indignant. Finally, the directives of the Voice 
gradually eliminate Bom, Bim, and Bem from the Playing Area in What Where, to 
culminate in the image of Bam with his head bowed. But this is also the moment at 
which the Voice, recognisably Bam’s in Beckett’s production notebook, distinguishes 
itself from Bam, since, the moment that Bam is imagined with head bowed, the voice, 
‘colourless’ and ‘pre-recorded’ to differentiate it from Bam, also says, ‘I am alone’ (SB3 
504). 
We can regard this sequence as a dialectical series, rather than the repetition of a 
single dialectical movement, because in each play the voice is more distant and the 
image is more alienated. In Ohio Impromptu, the voice belongs to the Reader, who is 
situated onstage. In Catastrophe, the voice belongs to the Director, who spends the 
performance either downstairs or offstage. In What Where, the voice is Bam’s, but it 
would be incorrect to claim that it belongs to Bam, since it presides over the stage in the 
                                                          
77 Alan Schneider, on his first suggestion that Ohio Impromptu and Catastrophe be performed as a 
double-bill, justified the juxtaposition as ‘an interesting contrast of vocal and physical image’. Maurice 
Harmon, ed. No Author Better Served: The Correspondence of Samuel Beckett and Alan Schneider 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1998), 431. 
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form of a megaphone and will ultimately divorce itself entirely from Bam. From Ohio 
Impromptu to Catastrophe, the voice gains some authority over the action on stage, as it 
is removed from the practicalities of bodily contact with the stage. However, it is still 
tied to its body (the Director), and is therefore still subverted by the Protagonist’s 
image. By the end of What Where, however, the voice has completely detached itself 
from its body (Bam) and is able to switch itself off at will. 
The images also become increasingly alienated. Beckett’s stage directions 
describe the final image of Ohio Impromptu as follows: ‘Simultaneously they lower 
their right hands to table, raise their heads and look at each other. Unblinking. 
Expressionless: Ten seconds. Fade out’ (SB3 476). Here the image crystallises in an 
ambiguous unity between the Reader and the Listener. Both heads are raised and look at 
their counterpart. The lack of expression or eye movement emphasises the sense of a 
communion between the two actors.  
By contrast, the final image of Catastrophe attempts to alienate audiences, 
imagined and real, as may be deduced from the stage directions: ‘Pause. Distant storm 
of applause. P raises his head, fixes the audience. The applause falters, dies. Long 
pause. Fade-out of light on face’ (SB3 489). The static, abject image the Director has 
been orchestrating in the play up to this point is subverted by the defiant moving image 
of the Protagonist, who raises his head. But by raising his head to challenge director and 
audience, the Protagonist also creates a stage image that crystallises in an attitude of 
defiance (rather than communion).   
Beckett’s stage directions describe the final image of What Where as follows: 
‘Bam enters at W[est exit], halts at [position] 3 head bowed […] Light off P[laying 
area]. Pause. Light off V[oice of Bam], in the shape of a small megaphone at head 
level]’ (SB3 504). This image appears to represent resignation, rather than the 
communion of Ohio Impromptu or the defiance of Catastrophe. But it also provides us 
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with the clearest moment in these plays where Beckett will think of image and voice in 
unison. In his production notebook, Beckett describes the ‘Stimme [Voice]’ as his 
‘Hauptproblem [main problem]’.78 We address his attempts to solve the problem of 
imaging the voice in our discussion of these plays.  
Ohio Impromptu 
 
Ohio Impromptu is particularly concerned with creating an authorial persona. This 
persona is split between a Reader and a Listener, who, although as alike as possible, are 
not one, even if they grow to be ‘as one’ through their habitual meetings (SB3 475). 
Thus, the persona operates in a dialectic that does not sublate or synthesise. This 
persona is properly kynical, because it does not stabilise authority in one figure or the 
other; it keeps the two figures in dynamic tension with each other. If the authorial 
dialectic operates in the relationship between the Reader and the Listener, Beckett 
creates this relationship by depicting the development of shared habits, a depiction he 
conveys through his use of image and voice. Two men, both wearing long black coats 
and ‘as alike in appearance as possible’, sit opposite each other on either side of a table, 
a wide brimmed hat between them. One reads aloud. The other listens. As the Reader 
reads his narrative, the Listener intermittently signals him to stop, repeat or continue 
with a knock on the table. The conceit is reminiscent of Krapp’s Last Tape: narratives 
of earlier events in the subject’s life are revisited with varying emphases placed on 
particular phrases, through repetition, interruption and punctuation. Instead of the spool 
tape player, however, a mirror image of the subject is responsible for reading a story, 
told in the third person, of a man whose departed lover sends him a reader ‘to comfort 
                                                          
78 Samuel Beckett, The Theatrical Notebooks of Samuel Beckett, Volume IV: The Shorter Plays, ed. with 
an introduction and notes by S.E. Gontarski (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1999), 447. 
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[him]’, who ‘drawing a worn volume from the pocket of his long black coat’ sits and 
reads ‘till dawn. Then disappeared without a word’ (SB3 475).79  
The narrative of the Reader appears diegetic of the situation presented on stage. 
The image of the Reader and Listener corresponds to the descriptions read from the 
‘worn volume’. They are similar in appearance, as if ‘with never a word exchanged they 
grew to be as one’ (SB3 475). They also do not ‘exchange’ any words; communication 
happens only through the knocks the Listener makes to punctuate the Reader’s 
recitation. But the Reader’s story does not fully correspond to the action on stage. The 
description includes the repetition of the story, night after night, ‘till the night came 
when at last having closed the book and dawn at hand he did not disappear but sat on 
without a word’ (SB3 475). The night when the Reader ‘sits on without a word’ is the 
last night he will appear. He explains that the departed lover has given him ‘word’ that 
he will not come again, even if he could, because there is no further need. Following 
this explanation, they sit on together ‘as though turned to stone’ (SB3 476). The story is 
described as ‘the sad tale a last time told’ and the final line is ‘nothing is left to tell’ 
(SB3 476). The Listener, by means of his knocks, has the Reader repeat the latter twice, 
before the book is closed. Both Reader and Listener lower their hands to the table, and, 
in contrast to the end of the narrative, they look expressionlessly at each other for ten 
seconds. So the story includes its arche and its telos, from the last attempt to obtain 
relief to the final visit. The narrative stretches from the first night to the last. This is 
made possible by the Reader’s book, which scripts all these nights and provides a 
constant point of reference. The book’s metaleptic function, or commentary about the 
narrative within the narrative, counterpoints its hypodiegesis, as a narrative within the 
play. The continuous metaleptic ‘closure’ of the narrative into a definite beginning, 
                                                          
79 If Ohio Impromptu is thematically similar to Krapp’s Last Tape in its treatment of memory, its concept 
has more in common with Rough for Radio II, where a stenographer will read out a record of Fox’s 
speech, under the exhortation of an Animator. Rough for Radio II also anticipates the abusive triangle 
between the Director, Assistant and Protagonist in Catastrophe.  
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middle and end, is interrupted and interrogated by the Reader’s double, who 
imperiously controls the hypodiegetic through his knocks. In other words, there is a 
dislocation between the narrative read by the Reader (highlighted by images evoked 
through the narrative and the Reader’s voice) and the occasion of its being read to the 
Listener (emphasised by the image of the couple on stage and the ‘voice’ of the 
Listener, represented by the knocks).
80
 
Stan Gontarski identifies this dislocation between ‘narrative and stage image’ as 
a general quality of Beckett’s late plays.81 But it is in Ohio Impromptu that we have ‘the 
most striking play of action against narrative [...] where action is played not against 
speech or an implied text but against a text itself, against writing’.82 Given this conflict, 
it is worth considering the complexities of the narrative level of the story before 
examining the context of its performance before the ‘450 or so scholars’ at the 
conference, Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives.   
John Calder, in his review of Ohio Impromptu, noted that 
It is the first Beckett play to present a Doppelganger [sic] on stage, another 
Beckett pair, but this time seen as mirror images; it belongs to Beckett’s 
ghost period, where phantoms that echo the haunting quality of memory 
and nostalgia in his work are seen or described on stage.
83
  
 
While a matched pseudocouple is a feature of many Beckett plays (Vladimir and 
Estragon, Hamm and Clov, or Winnie and Willie), Calder identifies this as the first 
instance of a dramatised double (mirror images of each other).
84
 The Reader and the 
                                                          
80 Edward Albee’s response to the play is indicative of an anxious desire to make voice and image cohere 
in Beckett’s theatre: for reasons of maximising audience understanding, and justified by the text’s use of 
repetition, he repeated the sequence twice in his 1991 production of Ohio Impromptu at the Alley Theatre 
in Houston. Albee’s repetition flattens out the performance, since it elides the disjuncture between 
repetition and singularity: the narrative repeats, through a voice, but the performance is singular, as an 
image. Edward Albee, Lois Oppenheim, ‘Edward Albee’, Directing Beckett. 
81 S.E. Gontarski, The Intent of Undoing in Samuel Beckett’s Dramatic Texts (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 
1985), 175.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Calder, ‘Three Plays’, 219.  
84 On Beckett’s couples see Brater, Gontarski, Knowlson cited above. Mary Catanzaro characterizes 
coupling and partnership ‘and their seeming impossibility’ as central to Beckett’s works. See Mary F. 
Catanzaro, ‘The Unmediated Voice in Beckett’s Couples’, Critique, Vol 32, No. 1 (1990).  
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Listener are as alike as possible. They are similarly attired and mirror each other’s 
gestures. Moreover, the parallels between the narrated events and the situation on stage 
mean that it is difficult not to interpret the Reader as the apparition sent and the Listener 
as the man to be comforted. Thus Reader and Listener gain a spectral quality in the 
reading because they are doubly represented through the account of the visits, ‘sent by – 
and here he named the dear name – to comfort you,’ and through the presentation of the 
action on stage (SB3 475). The apparition is sent to the man by the shade of this 
unnamed partner, who is designated by the phrase: ‘and here he named the dear name’. 
There is a substitution of the name by the leitmotif ‘and here he named the dear name’. 
Beckett’s subject is not absent so much as tensed around an absent centre. But Beckett 
frustrates this tension between the internal artistic impulse (the occlusion of the name) 
and the translation of that into a writing practice (the manifestation of that occlusion 
through some substitution), when he later names his ‘dear names’ to his biographer, 
James Knowlson.  
Knowlson reports that Beckett identified the departed: ‘It is Suzanne […] I’ve 
imagined her dead so many times. I’ve even imagined myself trudging out to her 
grave’.85 The hat between the actors, Knowlson confirmed with Beckett, was a 
reference to Joyce. This corresponds to the allusions within the narrative to the Isle of 
Swans (where Beckett and Joyce used to walk together and where the protagonist goes 
to be in an ‘unfamiliar room’), the old world Latin Quarter hat within the narrative and 
on the table, and the scene of two characters reading to each other. These allusions 
provide ‘fragments of a past’ to ground the critic steeped in Beckett’s biographical 
details, but they also fix the writing to a particular allegorical mode the narrative seeks 
to challenge.  
                                                          
85 Knowlson, Damned, 585. 
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We find this challenge most clearly in the character’s response to habit. In Ohio 
Impromptu, habits are not enumerated, as we found in ‘Borges y yo’; They are 
accumulated diegetically. So the shade offers to comfort him if he stays ‘where we were 
so long alone together’ (SB3 474). But ‘in a last attempt to obtain relief he moved from 
where they had been so long together to a single room on the far bank’ (SB3 474). This 
relief ‘he had hoped would flow from unfamiliarity’ (SB3 474). The attempt fails. Here, 
we may recall Beckett’s work on Proust and habit fifty years earlier, where waiving the 
pact with habit seems to compound the narrator’s awareness of the loss and death of his 
grandmother. The subsequent inclusion of ‘alone’ in the shade’s description begins a 
paradoxical interrogation of the possibility of ‘turning back’ to familiar scenes where 
‘alone together so much shared’ (SB3 474). His answer is ‘no. What he had done alone 
could not be undone. Nothing he had ever done alone could ever be undone. By him 
alone’ (SB3 474). Again, we recall Proust’s sudden awareness that his loss of his 
grandmother is absolute and unequivocal, because ‘the cherished familiar of his mind, 
mercifully composed all along the years by the solicitude of habitual memory, exists no 
longer’ (SB4 520). ‘Alone’ shifts in its signification in Ohio Impromptu. First, to be 
alone is to be together with the departed one. But his leaving, ‘done alone’, is something 
done without the departed. This could never be ‘undone’ by him ‘alone’, because the 
departed would have to return to allow him to ‘turn back’ to the point where they are 
‘together alone’. ‘Alone’, without the departed, seems to mean that the man can never 
again be ‘together alone’. This impasse is resolved when the departed sends the double 
to read to him, but we should pause for a moment to marvel at what Beckett’s narrative 
has already done. It has habituated his listeners to this character’s habits, through the 
repetition of ‘alone’, ‘flow’ and ‘relief’. The character waives his pact with old habits 
(moving to the unfamiliar) to create a relationship with more salubrious habits from 
which ‘relief’ might ‘flow’. But these ‘new’ habits, entrenched ‘day after day’ and ‘hour 
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after hour’, do not afford him the ‘relief’ he seeks; they merely secure the impossibility 
of returning to his earlier habits without the specific aloneness brought in the company 
of the departed.    
The double’s company appears to mimic this aloneness, since he does not speak 
to this double, as ‘with never a word exchanged they grew to be as one’. In fact, it is 
only through the growing to be as one, through their habitual ‘readings’, that some stoic 
comfort is brought. This stoic comfort, however, comes at the price of upsetting the 
character’s presumptions about his autonomy and his ability to take relief in 
unfamiliarity. Redoubling the subject kynically calls the subject into question; new 
habits, performed by the actors even as the narrative describes them, become images of 
habits on the stage to replace those images of habits described in the narrative from 
which the ‘he’ is attempting to obtain relief.   
To explain this shift, Gontarski usefully divides the play into two movements: 
the first considers the decision to live alone and the resultant insomnia, the second ‘an 
(apparently) successful (if mystical or imaginary) solution to the emotional turmoil, 
which was not solved by flight’.86 But Gontarski’s movements are more apposite to the 
images within the Reader’s text, where the ‘sad tale’ is ‘a last time told’, than to the 
performance of this telling. Here we must move to the performance of the tale, to secure 
our understanding of what Beckett is doing in this play.   
To reiterate, habit is not enumerated as much as cast into a narrative: the 
sequence of Ohio Impromptu’s narrative first waives, and then reaffirms, the narrative 
protagonist’s relation to habit and memory. In ‘Borges y yo’, the habits enumerated are 
the basis for a certain plasticity between ‘Borges’ and ‘yo’, where we understand 
plasticity as the capacity of the ‘yo’ to lend itself to being formed into ‘Borges’, while 
                                                          
86 Gontarski, The Intent of Undoing, 176. 
- 184 - 
resisting its utter deformation into ‘Borges’.87 In Ohio Impromptu, however, this 
plasticity resolves itself around the fissures between the narrative and the performance, 
highlighted by the voice and the image. Much as the narrative proposes that the two 
‘grew to be as one’, neither stage image nor the Listener’s periodic knocks fully endorse 
either seeing or hearing them ‘as one’.    
Beckett combines a descriptive image (in the narrative) with a visual image 
(presented on stage), and a narrative voice with a narrating voice. The visual image is 
altered periodically by the Reader turning the pages of the book, and unequivocally by 
the two figures lifting their heads at the end of the play. The narrating voice is 
interrupted periodically by the ‘voice’ of the Listener, in the form of the knock, and 
unequivocally by the final spoken line: ‘Nothing is left to tell’ (SB3 476). These 
successive combinations create a space between clearly defined ones and twos: the 
audience or reader cannot distinguish absolutely between the image described and the 
image on stage or the narrative voice and the voice narrating. For this reason, when 
Beckett on Film, a project dedicated to creating a film archive of Beckett’s plays, made 
use of cut shots to have Reader and Listener played by the same actor (Jeremy Irons), 
Anna McMullan complained that it was ‘led once again by a psychologised approach to 
performance’.88 The final contradiction between the narrative ending, ‘they stay on as 
though turned to stone’, and the stage image, ‘Simultaneously they lower their right 
hands to table, raise their heads and look at each other. Unblinking. Expressionless’, 
demonstrates ‘an ambiguity about their relationship’.89 Reader and Listener are 
embodiments of the narrated events but are not necessarily identical to them. They upset 
our efforts to absorb narrative and performance into a stoic, comprehensive image, or a 
                                                          
87 This paraphrases Catharine Malabou’s definition of the plastic. Catharine Malabou, The Future of 
Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, Dialectic, pref. Jacques Derrida, trans. Lisabeth During (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2005), 9. 
88 Anna McMullan, Studies in the Theatre: Samuel Beckett Issue. ASSAPH 17-18 (Tel Aviv: Assaph 
Publishers, 2003), 231. 
89 McMullan, Performing Embodiment, 121. 
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single narrative sequence. In much the same way, pace Calder, they are correspondent 
stage presences for each other, without being identical to each other. Here, Beckett 
writes against his own reification as an author by relentlessly demonstrating the non-
identity of the two act(or)s reading and listening. 
This correspondence without identity is particularly evident in the Listener’s 
interventions: the Listener’s knocks insist that the Reader dwells on particular phrases, 
rather than permitting an unimpeded recitation.  
R (reading): Little is left to tell. In a last — 
L knocks with left hand on table 
Little is left to tell. 
Pause. Knock. (SB3 473) 
 
The Listener’s knocks form an interesting pattern of interventions, since each time the 
Listener knocks, the Reader returns to the line he has just read, reads it again and 
pauses, waiting for a knock to signal that he can continue. The Listener makes seven 
such interventions in total. The first, quoted above, halts the Reader at the first line of 
the play, which signals that, if the play has just begun, it is nevertheless also about to 
end. The second occurs when the Reader reads, ‘Then turn and his slow steps retrace’ 
(SB3 474), a line that emphasises the circularity of the action, through habit, but also 
makes this emphasis ironic, since the Listener interrupts the narrative. The third recalls 
our interest in image and voice, since the Reader describes seeing the dear face and 
hearing the unspoken words of the departed to emphasise the advice, ignored, that the 
character stay where they ‘were so long alone together’ (SB3 474). The Listener’s fourth 
interruption is not a knock, which distinguishes it from the other six interventions and 
marks it as the climax of the piece; it is a gesture that ‘checks’ the Reader’s return to 
earlier pages (page forty paragraph four), where the symptoms of the character’s 
habitual ‘terror of the night’ are described (SB3 475). The fifth and sixth interruptions 
occur when the Reader’s narrative repeats lines that precipitated the first and third 
interruptions. The final interruption causes the Reader to repeat the final phrase of the 
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play: ‘Nothing is left to tell’ (SB3 476). This symmetry provides us with an interesting 
fugue-like series of repetitions and variations in counterpoint to the narrative continuity 
of the tale the Reader tells.90 By focusing on the Listener’s interruptions, rather than the 
Reader’s narrative, a pattern emerges in which the narrative continuity is subverted by 
musical form. Moreover, it shows a particularly kynical propensity to interrupt 
narratives, even one’s own narrative, to destabilise its apparent homogeneity. It breaks 
open the closed system of the microcosmos to form a new cosmopolitanism that is 
neither stoic nor cynical. If the play-as-text uses the image and the voice to subvert 
homogenised cosmopolitan structures, it still remains unclear what this means in the 
cosmopolitan context of its actual performance to an international audience of Beckett 
scholars.  
We should recall that Ohio Impromptu was written at the request of Gontarski, to 
be premiered at a Beckett symposium at Ohio State University in 1981. The title of the 
symposium was ‘Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives’. Brater, in Beyond 
Minimalism, provides further context. He reports that Beckett told a surprised Alan 
Schneider that the original audience gathered in Columbus would laugh when the 
curtain went up on Ohio Impromptu. He was right.
91
 Insofar as it is possible for a 
playwright to ‘script’ an audience, Ohio Impromptu provided the perfect opportunity. 
Gontarski, in his review of Ohio Impromptu, noted that the play was created for the 450 
or so literary critics in attendance. ‘Beckett is certainly meditating in Ohio 
Impromptu on the play within the occasion, the artist speaking to his critics’.92 Beckett 
could predict that the audience would laugh because the image of two mirror selves 
sitting across the table from each other contained enough cues to other plays in which 
                                                          
90 Steven Connor refers to this as a ‘problematic iterability […] built into the structure of the narrative, 
and its relationship with the spectacle presented on stage’. Connor, Samuel Beckett, 133. 
91 Brater, Beyond Minimalism, 126. 
92 S.E. Gontarski, ‘Review: The World Première of Ohio Impromptu’, Journal of Beckett Studies, No. 8 
(1982), 133. 
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the internal reflective process is staged through a physical or verbal communication 
between two bodies. The parallels with previous plays are important because Ohio 
Impromptu is precisely an effort to write not just a play but also its representation.   
Alan Schneider, the director, foregrounds this concern with representing the 
‘image’ of a Beckett play when, in a letter on the conference performance, he 
emphasises that in rehearsal he ‘would think that one of the actors was actually the 
other’.93 Of the performance itself, he thought Beckett, 
would have been pleased with the general impact […] Very pure. Direct. 
Strong image of black and white. The white table strongly lit, the two 
mirror-figures, blackness around.
94
  
 
The play was designed to be a study in contrast, but it also exaggerates this contrast.  It 
is dense in biographical detail but it was also written for an audience prepared for 
Beckett’s ‘terror of the night’ by Blair’s biography. It presents a reader of a text, 
controlled by his listener, but it was also performed in front of professional listeners 
whose profession involves fixating on particular phrases, dictating that their readers 
repeat such phrases until they are satisfied that the phrases have the importance they 
themselves impute to them. It is a critique of universal reading and listening processes, 
written at the behest of Beckett’s readers and listeners. Yet if it does critique the virtue 
of such ‘cosmopolitan’ activities, Ohio Impromptu still maintains a sense (insofar as it 
was written and was performed) of the virtue lurking behind them. Xerxes Mehta, in 
considering the relation of image, narrative and impromptu to suffering in Ohio 
Impromptu, notes that the theatrical impromptu is a specific form of meta-theatre where 
‘the playwright – usually through the vehicle of a play within a play – attacks his critics 
[and] defends his practice’.95 Dating the genre back to Molière, he notes that Molière 
wrote, directed and acted in L’Impromptu de Versailles to turn personal humiliation into 
                                                          
93 Harmon, No Author Better Served, 404.  
94 Ibid. 
95 Xerxes Mehta, ‘Shapes of Suffering: Image/Narrative/Impromptu in Beckett’s Ohio Impromptu’, 
Journal of Beckett Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), 110. 
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perverse theatre. The ‘unveiling’ of personal details becomes a creative act, in which 
personal details are reified ‘into a habitation that is neither author nor audience but the 
place where they meet. In the process, the work displaces the confessional’.96 Mehta 
argues that what Beckett was saying was: ‘this is what I try to do; this is why I need to 
do it; this is how I fail to do it; and, critically, this is what the failure feels like’.97 
Therefore, for Mehta, this is not of a type with Molière’s Impromptu, ‘a sealed and 
perfect entertainment’.98 Rather, Beckett ‘leaves himself exposed up to the bitter end. 
Ohio Impromptu thus becomes a true gift of the self, claiming no special knowledge or 
insight, offering just those “scraps” that are available to it’.99 Mehta’s ‘true gift of the 
self’ rings false beneath the reflections on reflections. But Mehta is right to detect an 
excess, beyond the mere specular games of Molière or virtuosities of the musical 
impromptu. This excess is formed through the image and the voice, which disrupt a 
comprehensive, stoic narrative of the self with an interrogative, kynical performance of 
the self. The Reader’s narrative is only apparently comprehensive in imagining a 
progression from ‘little is left to tell’ to ‘nothing is left to tell’. In fact, this narrative is 
continually disrupted and interrupted. The dialectic of the Listener and the Reader is not 
resolved by ending the play (or the narrative) with a long look and a fade out. Rather, 
this image disrupts the possibility of a narrative resolution, already marred by the 
turning of pages and the knocking of tables. Page-turning and knocks upset McMullan’s 
impossible reconciliation in the image, while the ambiguity of the long look undermines 
Mehta’s ‘true gift of the self’.  
 
 
                                                          
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid, 114. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
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Catastrophe 
 
In Catastrophe, Beckett undermines the resolutions of his critics more violently than he 
does in Ohio Impromptu through the Protagonist’s impossible defiance at the end of the 
play. Catastrophe, written in support of imprisoned playwright (and later president) 
Václav Havel, figures a Protagonist in ‘old grey pyjamas’, covered at first by a black 
dressing-gown, wearing a black broad-brimmed hat, and standing on a black block 18 
inches high (SB3 484-85). A Director sits ‘in an armchair downstairs audience left,’ 
while his Assistant stands next to him in a ‘white overall’ (C 484). Offstage Luke is ‘in 
charge of the lighting’ (SB3 484). The context is the rehearsal of the ‘catastrophe’ for a 
play: D dictates his artistic vision to A who manipulates P’s body and dress, and calls 
out technical instructions to Luke. The ‘catastrophe’ to which the title refers is intended 
to be a moment of utter abjection for P. D, when he is satisfied that P’s head is bowed at 
the right angle, says, ‘Good. There is our catastrophe. In the bag. Once more and I’m 
off’ (SB3 488). But, at the final moment, P raises his head and ‘fixes the audience’ (SB3 
489). The audience’s applause falters and dies, there is a long pause, and the light on P’s 
face fades out. Again, Beckett makes an unequivocal judgment on the play: 
Beckett told me that in referring to what one might describe as the “grand 
finale”, a reviewer had claimed that it was “ambiguous”. “There’s no 
ambiguity there at all”, he said angrily. “He’s saying: You bastards, you 
haven’t finished me yet”.100  
 
Beckett’s interpretation suggests that Catastrophe is a humourless recapitulation of 
Diogenes’s encounter with Alexander. Alexander asks Diogenes what in the world he 
desires, and Diogenes responds that Alexander should get out of the way of his sun: the 
absolute power of the sovereign-director is called into question by the powerless kynic-
protagonist’s small, yet significant, act. This interpretation is valid, if schematic, but it 
ignores the irruptive humour in both encounter and play. When we understand 
                                                          
100 Knowlson, Damned, 597.  
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Catastrophe to exceed this stoic comprehensive image, we find Beckett’s dialectic of 
image and voice.
101
    
‘Catastrophe’, from the Greek for a ‘sudden turn’ or ‘overturning’, has three 
potentially pertinent definitions in the Oxford English Dictionary. The first two define it 
as the dénouement of a dramatic piece and as a final event (usually unhappy). Beckett 
himself, in a letter to Alan Schneider, uses it ‘in the sense of a dénouement’.102 The 
third calls it an event subverting the order of things. But is the raising of the head 
dénouement or subversion? Ruby Cohn observes that P raises his head only in the final 
draft.
103
 Keir Elam refers to early manuscript versions in which the play ends ‘with D’s 
triumph: “Formidable! Il va faire un malheur. (un temps) Je les entends d’ici. Un temps. 
Lointain tourrent d’acclamations: silence. Rideau”’.104 In the subsequent draft, to which 
the ‘actual’ end was added in pencil, Beckett also changed D’s line from ‘Bon. On tient 
la fin’ to ‘Bon. On tient notre catastrophe’.105 Elam notes that the dramatic associations 
of catastrophe date back to Diderot’s Encyclopédie: ‘en Poésie; c’est le changement ou 
la révolution qui arrive à la fin de l’action d’un poème dramatique, & qui la termine’.106 
He also points out the contradiction between what D says (‘There’s our catastrophe’) 
and the lack of an actual revolution. The catastrophe that does take place (P lifting his 
head) subverts D’s use of the term as a representation of P’s suffering. It is a catastrophe 
of a catastrophe: an inversion of a post-Holocaust image of suffering by a quasi-
                                                          
101 Criticism of Catastrophe has tended to focus on the final image, and particularly the ambiguity of P 
lifting his head. Peter Fifield, for instance, notes the primacy of Levinas in a number of readings. These 
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humanist image of resistance. The comprehensive image is challenged by a subversive 
image, and the tension between these two images drives the play. However, it would be 
a mistake to view the play purely through this dialectic, since the visual tension is 
developed by a matching tension of voices: D’s commands, confirmed and carried out 
by A, contrast with P’s silence. Vocal tensions allow for the development of D’s 
catastrophe, which makes P’s catastrophe all the more discomforting, and therefore less 
stoic.         
Moreover, as these overlapping tensions are not confined to the microcosmos of 
a theatrical rehearsal space, we may identify this discomfort as properly kynical. 
Although the link between ‘ash’ pyjamas and the striped uniforms of Auschwitz and 
Birkenau is never explicit, D’s response to A raises the possibility of this interpretation: 
D: What has he on underneath? [A moves towards P.] Say it. 
[A halts.] 
A: His night attire. 
D: Colour? 
A: Ash. 
[D takes out a cigar.] 
D: Light. [A returns, lights the cigar, stands still. D smokes.] (SB3 485-6) 
 
The colour of the pyjamas, described as ‘ash’ rather than ‘grey’ as in the stage 
directions and tied, in turn, to the metonymic lighting of D’s cigar, recalls Holocaust 
iconography. James Knowlson, commenting on Catastrophe, linked the imagery with 
representations of the Holocaust: ‘The Protagonist, dressed in old gray pajamas and 
reduced to an anatomical exhibit, a victim of the Director’s wish to “whiten” the flesh to 
that of a corpse, recalls images of the concentration camp or Holocaust victim’.107 
Certainly, critics have agreed that the figure evokes comparisons with a 
‘sacrificial victim’,108 a Saint Sebastian, or a Prometheus  bound.109 This may have led 
Stephan Meldegg, the play’s director for ‘Havel Night’, to bind P from shoulder to 
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knee. Beckett disapproved of this liberty taken with his script. In a letter to Alan 
Schneider dated the 23
rd
 of July 1982, he writes: 
July 21 Havel night seems to have been a very mixed & muddled bag. Saw 
a few depressing extracts on TV including a brief flash of the Protagonist 
all trussed up with screaming white bonds to facilitate comprehension […] 
Trying to persuade myself I’m past caring.110 
 
The play itself predicts such an effort to overdetermine the text, when D responds to A’s 
suggestion to gag P: ‘For God’s sake! This craze for explicitation [sic]! Every i dotted 
to death!’ (SB3 487).111 Trussing P, according to Moorjani, strongly implies certain 
interpretations at the expense of others. But Beckett takes issue with facilitating 
‘comprehension’. This is particularly poignant, given that Catastrophe, for all its imagic 
resonances, remains a play about the dangers of directorial fascism. Moorjani may be 
right to draw on a general iconography of ‘defiant martyrdom’ in describing P.112 
Beckett himself told Mel Gussow that,  
it was not his intention to have the character make an appeal […] He is a 
triumphant martyr rather than a sacrificial victim […] and is meant to cow 
onlookers into submission through the intensity of his gaze and his 
stoicism.
113
 
 
But we should read Beckett’s ‘stoicism’ and Moorjani’s iconography with some care, 
because ‘defiance’ is not reducible to an iconography. This ‘stoicism’ does not conform 
to Sloterdijk’s ‘philosophy of the comfortable’, nor does it work to a ‘comprehensive’, 
or easily comprehended, image. P is more kynical than stoic in his defiance of his 
audience, since his gaze disrupts the comfort with which they view him as a 
comprehensive image. Here, we must understand Catastrophe against the grain of 
Beckett’s knowledge of stoicism and kynicism. P ‘cows onlookers’ as a kynical, rather 
that stoic, act.   
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If P’s catastrophe is kynical, is D’s catastrophe stoic? As D’s image represents 
P’s suffering, it may be. However, D’s references to audience suggest that the 
catastrophe is cynical, since it exploits the image to garner applause. To understand the 
difference between cynical D and kynical P, we should return to the catastrophe itself. 
The catastrophe is represented as follows: 
D: Stop! [Pause.] Now … let ’em have it. [Fade-out of general light. 
Pause. Fade-out of light on body. Light on head alone. Long pause.] 
Terrific! He’ll have them on their feet. I can hear it from here. 
[Pause. Distant storm of applause. P raises his head, fixes the audience. 
The applause falters, dies. 
Long pause. 
Fade-out of light on face.] (SB3 488-9) 
 
Despite A’s physical manipulations of P’s body at D’s instruction through the play, D’s 
final catastrophe is composed entirely of light: the transfer of light on the body to light 
on the bowed head. D’s recurring call for a ‘light’ has prepared us for this shift from 
bodily manipulation to luminous manipulation.
114
 D evidences his inability or 
unwillingness to engage directly with material bodies when he directs A to manipulate P 
on his behalf, and when he prefers that she ‘say it’ when she attempts to show P’s 
pyjamas. D disengages from the material body in favour of the body as metaphoric 
cypher. His catastrophe, designed to highlight the image of material suffering, is marked 
by his reluctance to engage with materiality. He is, after all, far more interested in 
having the audience ‘on their feet’. At first, we proposed that the play recapitulated 
Alexander’s meeting with Diogenes. However, D’s cynical interest in an image of 
materiality and P’s kynical interruption of that image turns the play into a dramatic 
encounter between the kynic and the cynic. D is a cynic because his catastrophe shows 
the distant, and inevitable, abjection of the subject (and serves his self-interest into the 
bargain). By contrast, P is a kynic, since his only ‘voice’ of protest manifests through 
the use of his body as a material object (he is, according to Beckett, ‘saying’ his 
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defiance by raising his head). If we replace our previous reference to Alexander and 
Diogenes with an opposition between cynic and kynic, Beckett’s stoicism changes 
dramatically. We are not simply seeing the dispossessed given a voice; we are seeing 
the difference between a director who wishes to ‘have them on their feet’ and an abused 
actor who wishes to arrest the audience in their complacent absorption in the tableau.  
What significance does this dialectic between cynic and kynic have? Critics are 
quick to associate Catastrophe with Beckett’s own dictatorial practices as a director. 
But Beckett is also protagonist (on stage and at the mercy of his critics and the directors 
of his work), assistant (since he is complicit in manipulating the work) and Luke (he 
shines a light on certain aspects of his work and not others). Here, Beckett is 
interrogating his own unstable position as either cynical (self-serving) or kynical 
(consistently critical). Philosophically, this dialectic is unresolvable, since the resolution 
would require the acceptance of a microcosmic, closed system in which the dialectic is 
sublated – that is, into stoicism (system) or cynicism (self-service). A kynical 
intervention requires that the dialectic not be sublated, but is this the case in the play?  
The final moments of the play appear to affirm Beckett’s defiance of the abject 
image. Against the universal ‘suffering victim’ catastrophe intended by D (which turns 
the body into a metaphor for abjection in stoic or cynical cosmopolitanism), P launches 
his own, particularist ‘triumphant martyr’ catastrophe (an interruption by a material 
body in a kynically cosmopolitan gesture). By raising his head, he ‘says’ a ‘You 
bastards’ to his spectators, whose applause then falters and dies. Although this 
allegorical reading comes closer to Beckett’s habitual use of the image and the voice in 
dialectical tension with each other (and highlights the way in which these may be used 
either metaphorically or materially), it still maintains a structural relationship between D 
and P. Thus, if critical opinion on this scene is divided between interpreting it as a 
positive moment of affirmation or as a merely scripted defiance, this divide 
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recapitulates a more material antinomy between cynical distance and kynical 
immediacy.
115
  
How can this interruption be scripted? How does the metaleptic disjuncture 
between P’s freedom from D’s script and subordination to Beckett’s script affect our 
understanding of the play? These questions recall those we raised in our discussion of 
the book in Ohio Impromptu, albeit of a more overtly political sort. Peter Fifield has 
rightly argued that the audience is complicit in the dictatorial stance of D when canned 
applause pre-empts their own applause, and that theatre as medium is implicated, and 
damned, in this dynamic.
116
 But if these illusions of agency undercut our ability to read 
P’s gesture as free, or kynical, then does this negate Beckett’s own kynical gesture? 
Here, understanding Beckett as a kynical cosmopolitan serves to rescue the play from 
the hermeneutical circle of scriptedness or freedom, and from Fifield’s resolution that 
Beckett is writing an art against art. There is a concrete political aspect to this 
production that we must consider, since it was written for a political purpose.  
The play was dedicated to Václav Havel, then imprisoned for writing against the 
Czech government, and Beckett wrote it for the 1982 Avignon Festival’s ‘Une Nuit 
pour Václav Havel’ in support of Havel. Yet the only directly political reference in the 
play is to Patagonia.  
D: For God’s sake! What next? Raise his head? Where do you think we 
are? In Patagonia? Raise his head? For God’s sake! [Pause.] Good. There’s 
our catastrophe. In the bag. Once more and I’m off. (SB3 488) 
 
Patagonia appears to be evoked as nothing more than the extreme end of the known 
world.
117
 Nothing could be further removed from the political significance of Havel 
night than Patagonia. Perversely, this anatopic device becomes a site of shattering 
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laughter, equivalent to Borges’s Chinese Encyclopedia. D invokes Patagonia as an 
extremity – lifting P’s head to show his face only has a place in Patagonia. In Patagonia 
is of course the name of Bruce Chatwin’s travelogue (1977), and the place Chatwin’s 
Emigration Committee fixes on ‘as the safest place on earth’ in the event of nuclear 
fallout.
118
 It was from the Patagonian coastline that Argentina would launch its ill-fated 
invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas archipelago some months after Beckett had started 
work on Catastrophe, but before the Avignon Festival in July 1982. The open secret is 
that the military dictatorship in power in Argentina invaded the archipelago to boost 
their failing political capital, even as the Thatcher government launched a counter-
offensive for much the same reason. Patagonia distracts people from everyday political 
realities by presenting a distant alternative site of operation. Patagonia may be 
metonymic for either Argentina or Chile, but it is also designates a place that slips any 
fixed political identification. Like the Yucatan in North America, the Kalahari in 
Southern Africa and the Gobi in East Asia, Patagonia ‘belongs’ to nation states only by 
the claims of maps and isolated settlements, whose self-identification with particular 
political identities remain uncertain. Patagonia functions, in other words, precisely as a 
referent to an Other place. D does not want to show the face, the humanity, of P. He 
chooses rather to exploit the image of a dehumanised subject, manipulated by lighting. 
Are we then to interpret P’s gesture as a moment of humanisation or transportation? If 
raising the head is constitutive of being ‘in Patagonia’, is it not ultimately a 
transportative gesture, an indication to the imagined audience (it is, after all, a recording 
of an audience, an audience already displaced from itself) that they are already in 
Patagonia, outside the limits of readily understood political boundaries? 
The success of an aesthetic tableau can cause our applause to falter, not because 
of the triumph of the human spirit, but because of who triumphs. Material conditions 
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turn Catastrophe into something more complex than a renegotiated voice for those 
unjustly silenced: it becomes a true subversion of political boundaries. This is why 
Catastrophe must be staged as a rehearsal and not as the event itself. Otherwise, P’s 
final defiant gesture may be subsumed by its symbolism. As Jim Hansen writes: 
When we leave our theater seats claiming that D is a horror and P a victim 
with whom we can sympathize and identify, we have entirely missed the 
point of Catastrophe and the point of Beckett’s oeuvre. We have, in other 
words, missed the dialectical critique implicit in our own aesthetic 
experience and pleasure.
119
  
 
Hansen recognises the auto-immune condition facing the metacritique of theatricality 
posed by a play like Catastrophe. P’s gesture is not ‘merely’ a triumphant martyr 
cowing the audience with his stoicism, since this ‘comprehensive image’ is disrupted 
precisely by Hansen’s dialectical critique. Any attempt to subvert D’s theatrical 
authority invariably turns on the question of how Beckett has already scripted P’s act. 
Rather than looking for an end to Catastrophe, Hansen proposes that we view it as a 
theatre of ‘pure means’: a theatre that is not interested in its results but in its processes. 
In this sense, it would be worth extending Hansen’s work to include a consideration of 
the ‘genre’ of rehearsal.  
Robert Baker-White calls Catastrophe, ‘a play that openly dramatizes rehearsal 
as a dialectic of authority and liberation’.120 The politics of the play, in this sense, are 
bound up in a particular dramatic genre of the represented rehearsal. Baker-White’s The 
Text in Play examines drama that performs the means of its own production: ‘rehearsal 
and performance in Catastrophe affirm theatrical practice itself as an intrinsically 
powerful, if morally questionable, medium of communication and conversion’.121 In this 
sense the rehearsal genre counteracts a state of exception in the theatre itself. The 
critical state of exception in theatre is the exclusion on performance night of the traces 
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of the performance’s own rehearsal: the process of a play’s production has no place in a 
play’s performance. Like the Malvinas/Falklands War or the trials of Havel, the politics 
of a play’s production, the testament to its internal dynamics, occurs at a distance from 
its eventual presentation as a finished work of art. The very artistry is itself to be found 
in denying the artist’s hand. Representing the bodies of the dead as a mode of witness is 
no more ‘true’ than the staging of a rehearsal is the rehearsal itself. ‘Truth’ as such is 
brought against not just the limits of its own representation, but the symbolic intrusion 
of the image into any recollection of historical event.  
Treating the play as a simple parable of victimisation and oppression has rather 
frightening consequences for both our concepts of victim and oppressor. It has become 
catastrophic in the third sense of the word: it subverts the project that even Beckett had 
in mind for it. If the final gesture was meant to be a defiance against ‘you bastards’, it 
remains ambiguous as to who these bastards might actually be. The rehearsal space 
anticipates a finished product, without expecting a flawless performance of that finished 
product. In this sense it is perhaps only through excavating the rehearsal space that we 
might find a ‘Patagonia’ where we might lift our heads. 
It is tempting to posit this Other locality (‘Patagonia’) to situate P’s resistance. 
By keeping it ambivalent and Other, resistance can be retained as such, no matter how 
problematic P’s subjectivity. But it is precisely at this point that we must not stop in our 
analysis if we are to recuperate the play from our presumptions of final veracity. 
Resistance itself needs to be meditated on in Beckett’s staging of the rehearsal space. 
Without a self-nullifying gesture to make his abjection ‘beautiful’ (meaningful) 
prospectively, P cannot turn his trial into a ‘catastrophe’. P, subject to the machinations 
of his Director and the director of Catastrophe, is the victim of an artistic violence. The 
only way that he can take control of this situation is by actively arguing that he already 
is exactly what is wanted of him: a symbolic sacrificial victim. The result is a redoubled 
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subject, or a double reflection of the subject, whereby his true freedom is achievable 
only through his sacrifice to some greater ideal. If we take this as read, however, we are 
forcing a stoic understanding onto his act, which clearly does not take into account the 
gesture’s formation in interruption.   
P’s gesture, posited already by A, is of a different order. It is directly contrary to 
D’s orders, but this, in itself, is not what makes it so interesting. The gesture in a sense 
legitimates the power D only appears to have – the power, mediated until this moment 
through the actions of A, has only been one of voice: ‘Say it’, he says when she moves 
to expose the grey pyjamas. In positing a gesture of resistance, P is presupposing the 
need to resist, or so the audience themselves posit and presuppose. The difficulty is not 
in the subjectivity of P; the difficulty is in our subjectivisation of P. We presuppose the 
gesture to be an act of defiance to posit our own reflective freedom through his 
confinement. Projecting onto him this subjectivisation in order to posit our own 
freedom, we scarcely notice the disjuncture between the audience that applauds and the 
audience whose applause falters. The Other audience falters from the look P fixes upon 
them. With their ‘Patagonia’ reflected back on them, with the Real intruding on their 
presuppositions, their applause falters and dies. How might our applause falter and die, 
were the actor playing P, on a particular night and at his own choosing, to make the 
ultimate gesture of defiance and not raise his head? This uncertainty is, we should 
argue, of the order of kynicism, because it does not waver in its engagement with the 
truth of the disjunction or the virtue of the encounter. Moreover, in its fragility, the 
image retains its disquietening quality for the community of theatre-goers because it 
does not comprehensively resolve the issue.   
Perhaps then it is fair to say that what remains for dialectical thinking to uncover 
is not the retrospective logic of sacrifice, legitimating definitions of protagonists by the 
facticity of their deaths. Perhaps what remains for dialectical thinking is to meditate on 
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the instability of the process, not in Patagonia but in the here and now – the unsteady, 
violent reflection of the theatrical self in the mirror, reflecting back the unsteadiness of a 
self reflected. 
What Where 
 
The place and politics of violence are particularly important in Beckett’s final play 
What Where. As in Ohio Impromptu, the players are as similar as possible, with long 
grey hair and wearing long grey gowns. There are four characters, Bam, Bem, Bim and 
Bom, and a megaphone that speaks with the voice of Bam. There are two areas of the 
stage, the megaphone downstage left, and the Playing area. The diagram Beckett 
included with the piece delineates three cardinal positions in the Playing area: stage left 
(W), upstage (N) and stage right (E). Voice is lit and begins by describing the situation. 
After this, the Playing area is lit with Bam stage left head haught (Beckett’s term) and 
Bom upstage head bowed. Voice interrupts with, ‘Not good. I switch off’ (SB3 498). 
The light goes off the Playing area, Voice says, ‘I start again’, and the opening is 
repeated. When the Playing area is lit, only Bam stands, head haught, to stage left. This, 
the Voice calls ‘Good’ (SB3 498). Bam, Bom, Bim and Bem then interact in a mime 
sequence reminiscent of the mathematical entrances and exits of Quad. Bam stands in 
the same space as Bom enters head bowed upstage and Bim enters head haught stage 
right. Bim and Bom exit stage right and Bim reenters head bowed stage right. Bem 
enters head haught upstage and exits upstage, followed by Bim. Bem reenters head 
bowed upstage and follows Bam when he exits stage left. Bam reenters head bowed 
stage left (SB3 498-9). Voice responds, ‘Good. I switch off’ (SB3 499). When Voice 
starts again, it is, ‘Now with words’ (SB3 499). The pattern is repeated but this time the 
violence implicit in the movement of head positions (from haught to bowed) is made 
explicit. Bam asks Bom, who has been set the task of extracting information from an 
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unseen subject, whether ‘he’ said ‘anything’ (SB3 499). The subject did not talk, despite 
Bom ‘giving him the works’ (SB3 499). The subject wept, screamed and begged for 
mercy, but ‘didn’t say anything’ (SB3 500). Voice intercedes again, with, ‘Not good. I 
start again’ (SB3 500). This time, Bam asks Bom whether ‘he’ said ‘it’ (SB3 500). 
Voice pronounces this ‘Good’ and the interrogation occurs again, with ‘anything’ being 
replaced with ‘it’. When asked why he stopped ‘giving the works’, Bam answers that 
the subject passed out and could not be revived. Bam’s responds, ‘It’s a lie. [Pause] He 
said it to you’ (SB3 500). He threatens Bom with ‘the works until you confess’ (SB3 
501). Bim appears and is told to give Bom the works until he confesses. When asked 
what it is Bom must confess to, Bam first says, ‘That he said it to him’ (SB3 501). Voice 
corrects this by stating, ‘Not good. I start again’ (SB3 501). The second time Bam adds, 
‘And what’ (SB3 501). Voice announces that the season is summer. The sequence is 
almost exactly repeated with Bim as the person interrogated, and Bem the person 
assigned to ‘give Bim the works until he confesses’ (SB3 503), except Voice insists that 
Bam change ‘it’ to ‘where’. Voice announces that the season is autumn. Bem, in turn, 
fails to extract ‘where’ from Bim and, after Bam threatens him with the works, follows 
Bam out. Voice announces that the season is winter. Bam reappears, head bowed. Voice 
announces, 
Good. 
I am alone. 
In the present as were I still. 
It is winter. 
Without journey. 
Time passes. 
That is all. 
Make sense who may. 
I switch off. (SB3 504) 
 
The present is as it was, but ‘we’, the final five, have become ‘I’, alone. When ‘I’ 
switches off, the lights fade on P, there is a pause, and the light fades on the megaphone.  
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What Where appears to be a political piece. The gradual elimination of the play’s 
characters is certainly congruent with a political erosion of community through 
hysterical accusations against an Other. The structure of this politics presents itself at 
the centre of What Where, where the questions, ‘what?’ and ‘where?’ become the basis 
for Bam’s elimination of Bom, Bim and Bem. He does this by ordering each successive 
victim to give their predecessors ‘the works’. ‘Give the works’ is easily construed as a 
euphemism for torture. The description of what happens when they are given the works 
– weeping, screaming, begging for mercy – suggests ‘the works’ are by no means 
pleasant. Transferring the works from questioned to questioner, because they might be 
lying, gradually eliminates the characters making up the play’s polis. Politics, in other 
words, is constructed in the negative, since the political action of the play consists in 
systematically excluding members from the group.  
The manifest excuse for this exclusion is the search for information. Bam 
endorses ‘the works’ because he is looking for information on ‘what’ and ‘where’. This 
search for information develops into parody as the cycle of ‘the works’ repeats itself, 
since each character’s failure to acquire knowledge is interpreted as a refusal to share 
this knowledge. These contrary interpretations are evoked visually: when the character 
realises his failure to acquire knowledge his head is bowed; before this realisation, his 
head is held up, or ‘haught’ in Beckett’s stage directions. ‘Haught’ here has a different 
significance to that in Ohio Impromptu or Catastrophe.  The Reader and Listener’s 
heads are haught at the end of Ohio Impromptu to depict their communion with each 
other, and the Protagonist’s head is haught at the end of Catastrophe as a gesture of 
defiance. In What Where, however, the head haught represents the refusal to accept the 
inability to know what or where. It is those with heads downcast who realise that they 
have failed to extract, by whatever actual violence used, the knowledge necessary to 
satisfy Bam’s Voice. Moreover, in failing to extract the knowledge, they realise the 
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underlying systemic violence of the conditions in which they exist. Whatever happens 
will be a failure, and this failure will serve to justify further attempts and further failures 
until a full cycle of the seasons has revolved, and Voice sends Bam to interrogate 
himself.  
What Where was first written in French (Quoi où) but first performed for the 
Clurman production. It was written at the invitation of the organizers of the 1983 
Steirischer Herbst, or Autumn Festival, in Graz in Austria.
122
 Knowlson notes that it 
was inspired in part by Franz Schubert’s song cycle Winterreise, or Winter Journey, 
which Beckett adored. Schubert composed the cycle in part during a stay in Graz and 
Knowlson attributes the influence in part to this.
123
 Paul Lawley has shown that 
Schubert plays a subtle but important role in shaping much of Beckett’s work.124 
Lawley notes the similarity between Schubert’s preoccupation with the ghostly 
companion and Beckett’s use of the trope in Krapp’s Last Tape, though the stronger 
parallels, of course, appear with the ghostly companion in Ohio Impromptu. But his 
analysis also shows that the generic link between Schubert and Beckett is a creative 
preoccupation ‘with journeying, with moving and “the different varieties of motion” 
[…] Being is narration, and narration is a variety of loco-motion’.125  
Winterreise was written towards the end of Schubert’s life (1827). It is a cycle of 
24 songs set to the words of Wilhelm Müller’s series of poems by the same name. 
Lawley summarizes it as ‘the aimless winter journey of a disappointed lover […] he is 
not on his way anywhere, he is simply on his way. There is no narrative, actual or 
implied, just a series of encounters and departures’.126 Yet, in What Where, although by 
                                                          
122 Knowlson, Damned, 601. 
123 Otto Erich Deutsch, Schubert: Memoirs by his Friends (London: A & C Black, 1958), 105. Beckett 
owned a copy of this work (Knowlson, Damned, 742). 
124 Paul Lawley, ‘“The Grim Journey”: Beckett listens to Schubert’, Samuel Beckett Today/Aujourd’hui, 
Vol. 11 (2000).  
125 Ibid, 259. 
126 Ibid, 260. 
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the end ‘it is winter’, Voice describes ‘in the present as were I still’ as being ‘without 
journey’ (SB3 504). There are no more people to whom to give the works. There are no 
more journeys to be made. This shifts the focus from the possibility of companionship 
that is explicit in Ohio Impromptu and the recuperative act of defiance in Catastrophe, 
both of which require a force against which to react. There is no ‘other’ from whom the 
‘what’ or the ‘where’ may be extracted. In the final lines of Schubert’s work, as part of 
the section entitled ‘Der Leierman [The Hurdy-Gurdy Man]’, the narrator asks: ‘Strange 
old man, / shall I go with you? / Will you play your hurdy-gurdy / to my songs?’127 The 
possibility of this strange companionship has been completely eliminated in What 
Where: Voice is alone, the Other has been removed. 
Aside from Knowlson, whose primary impetus is biographical precision, critics 
have not discussed the Schubert influence in conjunction with the references to violence 
and torture. Either the relationships between the characters is foregrounded, presided 
over by a dictatorial, directorial Voice, or the sad evocations of searching without 
success is noted, without much discussion devoted to the violence inherent in the 
searching. Beckett’s revisions reduce the emphasis on bodily violence. When translating 
it into German for a television production in 1985, he staged the parts of Bam, Bem, 
Bim and Bom as disembodied heads and Voice as a distorted mirror reflection of 
Bam.
128
 This may have been in part because he disagreed with the responses to the 
Harry Clurman Theatre production, which, according to Knowlson, emphasised the 
political dimension of the play.
129
 Alan Schneider attributed this response to the 
proximity of the play to Catastrophe in the triple bill.
130
 Given the importance Beckett 
                                                          
127 Wilhelm Müller, ‘The Hurdy-Gurdy Man’, trans. Arthur Rishi. The Lied, Art Song, and Choral Texts 
Archive. Accessed: 2 February 2012. 
http://www.recmusic.org/lieder/assemble_texts.html?LanguageId=7&SongCycleId=47 
128 S.E. Gontarski, ‘What Where: Revised Text and Textual Notes’, Journal of Beckett Studies, Vol. 2, 
No. 1 (1992). 
129 Knowlson, Damned, 603-4. 
130 Harmon, No Author Better Served, 449. 
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places on the image, however, we can also see this as a return to the theme of the double 
in Ohio Impromptu. The mute attendance of Listener, Protagonist and, eventually, Bam 
to the powers of the directorial voice may precipitate responses of resignation, defiance 
or defeat, but they also indicate a generic self-in-crisis or dialectical subject through 
their relationship with the voice. Beckett’s plays perform this dialectical subject, by 
exploiting the tension between the image and the voice. This supplements authoritative 
readings of Beckett as an artist of the stoic ‘comprehensive image’ or the stoic 
‘voiceless’ voice, with the simple observation that he is an artist of both image and 
voice, and, moreover, that the dialectic between image and voice is kynical (i.e. not 
sublative).   
 Having rehearsed our readings of the plays, we may now make the following 
definitive statements on Beckett’s kynical, dialectical subject. Ohio Impromptu relies on 
the image of two identical figures at a table, with the voice of one reading from a book, 
which the other punctuates with a series of knocks. Catastrophe relays the construction 
of an abject image of a silent Protagonist in a theatrical situation by a director, who 
issues commands to an assistant, who punctuates the director’s voice with affirmations 
and actions. What Where abstracts the abject image by referring to an action offstage by 
the actors, and regulating this behaviour through an abstract voice, itself offstage. The 
image progresses from mirroring to objectification to mirrored objectification in the 
three plays. The mirroring of figures in Ohio Impromptu and the objectification of 
figures in Catastrophe becomes a mirrored objectification in What Where. But this 
mirror is always broken, since the action turns around interrupting a central image with 
a voice and another, more subversive image. By contrast, the voice moves further and 
further away from the action: in Ohio Impromptu it is diegetic, as the voice belongs to 
one of the figures; in Catastrophe it is interdiegetic, as the voice of the director directs 
the performance of the play; in What Where it is extradiegetic, as Voice is removed 
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from the action of the play. These structural models rapidly deteriorate, since neither 
image nor voice remains ‘pure’ in these developments. The image is not simply 
synthesised into a mirrored objectification in What Where. Neither does the voice 
operate on strictly diegetic levels: Ohio Impromptu is primarily a metadiegetic 
description of the encounter between the two figures, while the extradiegesis in 
Catastrophe and What Where is still given by characters necessarily included in the 
production. Nevertheless, we can define a progression in structure across the three 
productions to see that Beckett is toying with precisely these rigid divisions of image 
and voice. 
What does ‘toying’ mean for Beckett, an artist who self-consciously challenges 
the comfortable reception of his work? One may say of Beckett what Beckett said of 
Jack  B. Yeats: ‘the artist who stakes his being is from nowhere, has no kith’ (Disj 149). 
Like Beckett, Yeats is less a stoic Irish artist (as for McGreevy) than a homeless kynic. 
But this conceptual narrowness does no justice to the political efficacy of this 
homelessness. Kynical cosmopolitans, if they can be described in generic terms, do not 
simply come from nowhere. But neither do they belong to their communities in a 
conventional sense. Rather, their form of belonging disrupts the microcosmoi formed by 
such communities. It is not that they are from nowhere, have no kith or kin. Rather, 
their decision to be artists subtracts them from their place within a community and their 
relations with other people. Beckett does not claim that the real Beckett is in a 
microcosmos happily elsewhere, while the critics muse on a ‘Sim Botchit’. Beckett’s 
response is to make this split itself the site of his late work, and to manifest its refusal to 
sublate by relying once more on the non-synthetic dialectic between the image and the 
voice.  
If Beckett performs his refusal to belong through a dialectic between image and 
voice, the late novels of J.M. Coetzee present us with a different kind of performance. 
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Coetzee’s late works manifest his ideological paragons, albeit paragons that he 
represents to avoid emulating. The technique he uses for this kynical performance of the 
cosmopolitan might be said to be language as such. Since ‘language as such’ is always 
also deployed rhetorically, this leads to our final chapter: Kynical Rhetoric in J.M. 
Coetzee’s Performance novels. 
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Chapter 4 
Kynical Rhetoric in J.M. Coetzee’s Performance novels 
 
On receiving his Nobel Prize, J.M. Coetzee remarked to David Attwell that ‘the idea of 
the writer as sage is pretty much dead today. I would certainly feel very uncomfortable 
in the role’.1 In the same year he published Elizabeth Costello, a collection of ‘lessons’ 
originally given as lecture-performances that centre on a writer who resists her reception 
as cosmopolitan sage. Four years later, he would publish Diary of a Bad Year, a novel 
comprising cosmopolitan sage essays and a framing narrative of their production. If the 
idea of the writer as sage is dead, Coetzee autopsies the body. But this autopsy is not 
directed at a stoic reinvigoration of the writer as sage. Nor does it cynically exploit 
financial benefits brought with the position. Rather, it exposes a general desire to invest 
in this ‘dead idea’, and it addresses the problem of its continued ideality. James Wood, 
in his review of Elizabeth Costello, called the novel’s form a paradox: ‘if Coetzee were 
merely playing it safe by dramatizing rather than propounding arguments, why make the 
arguments so violently unsafe?’2 Wood anticipates a consensus that Costello is 
Coetzee’s alter ego. This consensus will share Wood’s expectation to find, beneath the 
surface of his interpretation, a ‘real’ basis for using Costello to advocate Coetzee’s 
opinions. Either the reasons are cynical (Coetzee’s self-interest) or they are stoic 
(Coetzee’s system of ethics). Wood’s phrase, ‘merely playing it safe’, suggests an 
antinomy between the apparent safety of cynicism and the actual insecurity of stoicism. 
In this chapter, we will eschew both the unsympathetic (‘safe’) and the sympathetic 
(‘unsafe’) readings of Coetzee’s ‘depths’, by proposing a series of dialectical readings 
                                                          
1 J.M. Coetzee; David Attwell, ‘An Exclusive Interview with J.M. Coetzee’. Dagens Nyheter  
8 December 2003. Accessed: 2 April 2014. 
http://www.dn.se/kultur-noje/an-exclusive-interview-with-j-m-coetzee/ 
2 James Wood, ‘A Frog’s Life’, London Review of Books, Vol. 25, No. 3 (October 2003). 
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that deconstruct this antinomy. In these ‘surface’ readings, we will examine Coetzee’s 
use of the words ‘mere’ and ‘merely’. If Wood uses ‘merely’ to mark the superficial 
reading he will dismiss, Coetzee’s sustained use of ‘merely’ undermines easy 
oppositions of ‘mere’ superficiality and ‘actual’ depth. Examining what ‘mere’ and 
‘merely’ are doing on the ‘surface’ of Coetzee’s sentences will change our habitual 
understanding of these terms as dismissive.
3
 Coetzee’s kynical cosmopolitanism 
emerges, then, in the way that his prose challenges ethical, political or nihilistic 
readings at the level of sentence structure, and in the way his (mis)use of genre disrupts 
expectations. We will place particular emphasis on the performance-text Elizabeth 
Costello (2003) and the essay-novel, Diary of a Bad Year (2007). Our aim is to show 
how Coetzee uses language itself kynically, at the levels of sentence modification and 
genre, to expose, rather than conceal, linguistic relations of power.      
In Borges, we found kynical cosmopolitanism manifest in his response to the 
issue of world literature, and in his use of metaphor and enumeration (the means of 
constructing a world literature). In Beckett, we found kynical cosmopolitanism manifest 
in his response to the lure of the microcosmopolitan, and in his use of images and voices 
(the means of representing the internal workings of the human brain). In Coetzee, 
kynical cosmopolitanism does not stretch to universal history (as for Borges), nor does 
it contract to the confines of the mind (as for Beckett). Coetzee’s kynical 
cosmopolitanism traces the failures of communication between individuals. To be 
specific, Coetzee’s kynical cosmopolitanism shows us how, for reasons of history, 
culture, ethnic diversity or species, people (and animals) fail to communicate in this 
                                                          
3 Sarah Nuttall, following Anne Cheng and, before her, Foucault, seeks to address the question of surface 
as an epistemological place in ‘surface reading’. Although she concedes that Coetzee tries ‘to open a 
space for a surface optic’, Nuttall relegates Coetzee, William Kentridge and Nadine Gordimer to an 
episteme where the surface ‘is the place that hides the political unconscious – or both hides and reveals it, 
through its very invocation as a cover’. Coetzee treats the invocation of cover with some skepticism, in 
which surface and depth function in a dialectic that does not sublate into a relationship where one ‘covers’ 
the other. Sarah Nuttall, ‘Surface, Depth and the Autobiographical Act: Text and Images’, Life Writing, 
Vol. 11, No. 2 (2014), 3.    
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world, despite all efforts to the contrary. This failure of communication has marked 
Coetzee scholarship in both broadly sympathetic and unsympathetic ways.
4
 The two 
principal trends in sympathetic Coetzee scholarship might crudely be divided into 
responses to Coetzee’s ‘ethical’ stance towards the other5 and the political responses, 
more concerned with how these ethical responses impact on the social and historical 
aftermaths of Apartheid and colonialism.
6
 Both these trends are ‘stoic’ insofar as they 
propose an ethical system in response to either alterity or politics. ‘Stoic’ readings of 
Coetzee present the recurrent breakdown of communication with others as either an 
ethical response to the radical ‘unknowability’ of the other, or as a politico-ethical 
response to Apartheid and colonialism. But Coetzee’s refusal to speak on behalf of the 
other also justified early ‘unsympathetic’ readings. These readings take Coetzee’s work 
to be ‘a studied refusal to accept historical responsibility’, and Coetzee as lacking any 
‘conception of any positive values outside his own “civilisation”’.7 Coetzee, for 
JanMohammed and Booth et al., displays something akin to Sloterdijk’s enlightened 
false consciousness in refusing to take responsibility and denying external positive 
values. We can take Coetzee’s refusal to speak for the other too seriously, as a ‘stoic’ 
project of ethical or political depth, or we can take it too lightly, as a ‘cynical’ refusal of 
responsibility, values or human faults, when we should see these two positions as 
indicative of an anxiety about the ambivalence of the prose itself. The prose itself 
                                                          
4 See Coetzee’s discussion of sympathetic and unsympathetic readings of Eliot in Chapter 1. 
5 Such readings show Maurice Blanchot, Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida to be influences or 
philosophical analogues in Coetzee’s ethical treatment of ‘Others’, whether characters within the text, the 
text itself, or the task of speaking of and for the text as the nominal author. This summary is not to 
undermine the complexity of the work of Derek Attridge (2004), Stefan Helgesson (2004) and Mike 
Marais (2009), but to identify a rich field of study. 
6 Similarly analogous or influential readings of Coetzee alongside Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, 
Theodor Adorno, Gilles Deleuze and the broader purview of postcolonial theory tend to consider 
Coetzee’s work as a response to the Apartheid and post-Apartheid epochs, within an art that emerges after 
the Holocaust and colonialism. Again, this summary simply identifies a trend in Coetzee scholarship, 
rather than claiming that studies by David Attwell (1993), Samuel Durrant (2004), Laura Wright (2009) 
and Grant Hamilton (2011) can ‘merely’ be reduced to this framework.  
7 Abdul R. JanMohammed, ‘The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function of Racial Difference in 
Colonialist Literature’, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn 1985), 73; James Booth et al., ‘XVIII: 
African, Caribbean, Indian, Australian and Canadian Literature in English’, The Year’s Work in English 
Studies, Vol. 65 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1984), 699.  
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‘merely’ acts between these two poles, challenging calls for ‘deeper’ meanings, and 
frustrating readings that dismiss it as superficial cynicism. When we discuss Elizabeth 
Costello and Diary of a Bad Year, we will note how their cosmopolitan protagonists 
repeatedly fail to deliver the lessons they are trying to teach. Only when we examine the 
discrepancies between the genre of these messages and their linguistic modification do 
we begin to realise that Coetzee is communicating through form what cannot be 
transmitted through pure ‘deeper’ meaning: the truth is presented in the dialectic 
between surface and depth.  
This leads us to a third trend in Coetzee scholarship, which restores Coetzee’s 
professional interest in linguistics to its proper place.
8
 Coetzee’s kynical 
cosmopolitanism grounds itself in linguistic issues, as manifested in his understanding 
of the cosmos. For Coetzee, the novel is always a world, or a cosmos. JC, asked by 
Anya why he does not write another novel, demurs: ‘I don’t have the endurance any 
more. To write a novel you have to be like Atlas, holding up a whole world on your 
shoulders and supporting it there for months and years while its affairs work themselves 
out. It is too much for me as I am today’ (DBY 54). But if the novel is always a whole 
world, the world is not simply a novel. If the novel constitutes a world, this world is 
either supplemental to the historical, ‘real’ world, or it rivals the real world, going so far 
as to expose ‘the mythic status of history’ or demythologising history in a kynical way.9 
Demythologising history in a kynical way involves forms of parrhesia, or truth-telling.  
Since our concern is with the failure of communication as a structural concern of 
                                                          
8 Coetzee particularly inflects ‘care’ and ‘charity’, as in Mrs Curren’s false etymology of caritas in Age of 
Iron: ‘A lie: charity, caritas, has nothing to do with the heart. But what does it matter if my sermons rest 
on false etymologies?’ (AI 20); A.J. Rose, The Poetics of Reciprocity in Selected Fictions by J.M. Coetzee 
(Cape Town: MA Thesis, 2007). Carrol Clarkson extends this analysis of care to consider artistic 
materiality in J.M. Coetzee: Countervoices (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). Maria J. Lopez also 
writes on Coetzee’s etymological devices in Acts of Visitation: The Narratives of J.M. Coetzee 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011).  
9 In ‘The Novel Today’, Coetzee describes the relationship between the novel and history as marked 
either by supplementarity or rivalry. Coetzee, ‘The Novel Today’, Upstream, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1988), 3. 
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Coetzee’s work, our focus will be on the form this parrhesia takes, particularly the 
diatribe (as in Elizabeth Costello) and the essay (as in Diary of a Bad Year).    
However, an analysis of generic form does not seem sufficient, since Coetzee’s 
linguistic rhetoric exposes narratological and ideological short-circuits in generic truth-
telling. This may be why Coetzee disavows the ‘meaning’ of his opinions: ‘I confess I 
don’t find my opinions very interesting’.10 The comment may be taken cynically or 
kynically; as disavowal or provocation. As a provocation, prefaced to a public reading, 
it has the connotations of critique: you are here to listen to my opinions, he infers from 
his audience’s presence, and we will address them contrarily, with an opinion about 
opinions. This localised auto-critique positions Coetzee rhetorically as a kynical 
cosmopolitan. But it also catches us in a house of mirrors, as opinions proliferate upon 
opinions. Our challenge is not to break through the glass to find out the true opinions 
behind the mirror; it is to see how meaning emerges in the dialectic between this surface 
and its implied depth. 
As with Borges and Beckett, we will focus on technique, rather than imbedded 
content, to explore Coetzee’s kynical cosmopolitanism. We focused on the technical use 
of metaphor and enumeration (for Borges), and image and voice (for Beckett), to isolate 
their kynical rhetorics. We must find a comparable technique in Coetzee to isolate his 
‘surface depths’. Rather than develop a meta-language to discuss this response, which 
Coetzee would roundly reject, we will focus on the relations he creates through his use 
of modifiers, such as adjectives and adverbs. This will demonstrate how Coetzee’s 
language forms itself into a dialectical kynical critique.   
 
                                                          
10 Coetzee, ‘The Old Woman and the Cats’, ‘J.M. Coetzee reads “The Old Women and the Cats” at Jaipur 
Literary Festival’, 28th October 2011. Books Live. Accessed: 2 February 2013. 
http://bookslive.co.za/blog/2011/10/28/video-jm-coetzee-reads-the-old-woman-and-the-cats-at-jaipur-
literary-festival/  
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The Diatribe and the Essay 
 
We diagnose Coetzee’s rhetoric in his apparently insignificant use of an adverb.11 In 
‘Eight Ways of Looking at Samuel Beckett’, Coetzee marks the adverb as a possible 
solution to the dichotomy between monism and dualism. Coetzee finds the dichotomy 
illustrated in Beckett’s photographs: ‘photographs of Beckett show a man whose inner 
being shines like a cold star through the fleshy envelope’ (EWSB 31). ‘But’, Coetzee 
concludes his ‘Eight Ways of Looking at Samuel Beckett’, ‘soul can shine through flesh 
only if soul and flesh are one. If soul and flesh belong to distinct realms, and the 
conjunction is an everlasting mystery, then no photograph will ever tell the truth’ 
(EWSB 31).  
Either we are monists or we are dualists. If we are monists, the photograph will 
tell the truth of an inner being. If we are dualists, ‘no photograph will ever tell the 
truth’. To test our monism, Coetzee devises a laboratory, headed up by God.12 God is in 
charge of an experiment, in which he tests an ‘It’ by dropping nuts down a tube. As the 
It learns to associate a particular tube with a particular door, to access the nuts, so God 
changes the connections between tubes and doors, since ‘the universe is interested not 
in what you can understand but at what point you cease to understand’ (EWSB 27). But 
God has missed the point: 
God thinks I spend my time waiting for him to arrive with his apparatus for 
testing my limits[...] But I am not seriously waiting for God [...] What God 
does not understand is this ‘not seriously’ with which I wait for him, this 
‘not seriously’ which looks like a mere adverbial like ‘patiently’ or ‘idly’ – 
I am patiently waiting for God, I am idly waiting for God – not a major 
                                                          
11 Imraan Coovadia complains about Coetzee’s reference to a ‘metaphysical ache’: ‘Why can’t aches and 
pains, and wishes be aches, and pains, and wishes, without the elevating adverb?’ Notwithstanding the 
presence of an elevating adjective, Coovadia’s complaint prompts me to ask why these adjectives and 
adverbs are necessary. Imraan Coovadia, ‘Coetzee in and out of Cape Town’, Kritika Kultura, Vol 18 
(2012), 111-2. 
12 In this laboratory experiment, Coetzee plays off the popular misreading of Godot as God. Coetzee is 
alluding to this popular misreading in a more self-conscious way than Borges in his response to Waiting 
for Godot. 
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part of the sentence, not the subject or the predicate, just something that 
has casually attached itself to the sentence, like fluff. (EWSB 28) 
 
The ‘mere adverbial’ is apparently insignificant. God does not understand this ‘fluff’ 
because it opens a gap in God’s belief that ‘I am a body and a mind, miraculously 
conjoined’ (EWSB 28). ‘He’ thinks that ‘the miracle [...] of conjunction allows him to 
use a nut to get the mind to work’ (EWSB 28). But, ‘the creature, It, I, does not know it 
is a body and a mind conjoined. I think, therefore I am: that is not what It thinks. On the 
contrary, it thinks, I am! I am! I am!’ (EWSB 28). With this ‘I am’, the It asserts a 
subjectivity that God cannot understand because ‘he can never know what it is to be me’ 
(EWSB 28). Dualism deviates from monism when there is a disjuncture between 
appearance and ‘inner being’, but the only means of determining this disjuncture is by 
describing the manner of this being. Linguistically, we describe this manner of being 
with either an adverb or an adjective.     
In the chapters on Borges and Beckett, we grounded our consideration of their 
author-constructs in their own theories of metaphor and enumeration, or image and 
voice. The device we will focus on in our discussion of Coetzee is the place of adverbs 
and adjectives in the narrative rhetoric of particularly pedagogic genres, namely the 
essay and the diatribe. However, there is an anomaly in speaking about rhetoric and the 
kynics that must be resolved, not simply for the case of Coetzee, but for our reading of 
Borges and Beckett as kynical rhetoricians. Since the kynic is a parrhesiast, and, as 
Foucault was quick to point out, ‘the practice of parrhesia is opposed to the art of 
rhetoric in every respect’, there can be no ‘kynical rhetoric’.13 Indeed, ‘rhetoric, as it 
was defined and practiced in Antiquity, is a technique concerning the way that things 
are said, but does not in any way determine the relations between the person who speaks 
and what he says’.14 Given that parrhesia is exactly the determination of a relation 
                                                          
13 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 11. 
14 Ibid. 
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between the speaker, what they say and truth, rhetoric seems to obfuscate the aim of 
parrhesia to tell ‘the truth without concealment, reserve, empty manner of speech, or 
rhetorical ornament which might encode or hide it’.15 Yet, as Coetzee himself 
demonstrates quite categorically in his essay, ‘Confession and Double Thoughts’, there 
is no possibility of telling the truth ‘without concealment’. Confession is possible only 
as a process, not as a telos. Rhetoric underpins any claim to truth without concealment, 
and must eventually be revealed, confessed in a further claim to unconcealed truth.  
Claims to unconcealed truth or its connection to an unconcealed life will always 
fall short of their ideal. ‘In the Stoic mutation’, Foucault argues, ‘the ideal of the 
unconcealed life is immediately connected, not to anaideia (shamelessness), but rather 
to aidos (modesty)’.16 Kynical life in the Stoic’s conception of it is unhidden because 
‘whoever leads the philosophical life, conducting himself according to the rules of 
modesty, does not have to hide’.17 Epictetus, on whose (Stoic) account of the kynics 
Foucault draws for this argument, lays out the precepts for this modesty as a series of 
injunctions. ‘You must change your present way of acting [...]; you must suppress your 
desires entirely [...]; you must find no young girl beautiful [...]’.18 By contrast, 
Foucault’s earlier account of Kynic life – unconcealment connected to anaideia 
(shamelessness) – ‘deploys the general theme of non-concealment but frees it from all 
conventional principles’.19 ‘Applying the principle of non-concealment literally, 
[k]ynicism explodes the code of propriety with which this principle remained, implicitly 
or explicitly, associated’.20 Kynical life is less concerned with living by an ideal 
(encoded in a series of injunctions), than by an ‘absolute visibility’. In order to ‘bring to 
                                                          
15 Ibid, 10. 
16 Ibid, 297. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Epictetus Discourses qtd. Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 296. 
19 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 255. 
20 Ibid. 
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light what is natural in the human being’, it is shameless in its exhibitionism.21 
Inevitably, such exhibitionism carries with it a certain kind of rhetoric, albeit a rhetoric 
aimed at exposing the assumptions behind traditional codes of propriety. Therefore it is 
in Coetzee’s shamelessly visible use of rhetoric to expose nominal traditionalism that 
we begin to see the workings of a kynical cosmopolitan. 
Coetzee’s ‘Time, Tense, and Aspect in Kafka’s “The Burrow”’ establishes this 
line of enquiry. The essay concerns itself with the relation between ‘the time of 
narration (the moving now of the narrator’s utterance)’ and the time of narrative 
(referential time)’ in Kafka’s ‘The Burrow’ (DP 210). This relation, Coetzee argues, is 
particularly complex because the narrative’s use of a habitual, iterative present is 
maintained in descriptions of actions that are ‘impulsive, unforeseen and unforeseeable’ 
(DP 212). Coetzee proposes two explanations for this contradiction. The first, ‘less 
radical explanation’ is that ‘the lack of a morphological form in German (or English) to 
convey iterative action’ means that iterative action must be continuously emphasised 
through the use of iterative modifiers (such as sometimes, every day) or modality (will, 
used to) (DP 213). Kafka’s speaker in ‘The Burrow’ describes itself accumulating its 
stores, allocating these to various rooms and securing its burrow for defence in an 
emphasised iterative present to indicate cycles of behaviour. ‘Of course, the more this 
emphasis has to be repeated, the clumsier it sounds’, Coetzee observes (DP 213). This 
leads Coetzee to conclude: ‘Rather than maintain the emphasis throughout, Kafka 
sometimes […] dramatizes a typical event from the iterative cycle and so permits the 
reading to slip back for a while into the unmarked, noniterative mode’, as when the 
speaker punctuates its noniterative ‘periods of particular tranquillity’ with an iterative 
‘until at last I can no longer restrain myself [bis ich es nicht mehr ertrage] and one night 
[eines Nachts] rush into the Castle Keep, mightily fling myself upon my stores, and glut 
                                                          
21 Ibid, 254. 
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myself’ (DP 213; 212). This ‘less radical explanation’, Coetzee muses, is ‘rhetorical’ 
and ‘interprets the problematic verb sequence in terms of the pragmatics of “what 
works” for the reader, as manifestations of the writer’s artfulness’ (DP 213). Coetzee 
expresses reservations about this explanation, observing that  
‘Success’ in writing, like beauty, being essentially undemonstrable, some 
rhetorical coaxing or intimidation, or both, is required from the 
commentator to establish any argument that a particular strategy in a text 
‘works’, that it is ‘successful writing’, indeed that it is a ‘strategy of 
writing’ at all. (DP 214) 
 
As the repeated ‘scare’ quotes suggest, Coetzee is skeptical about evaluating writing in 
terms of ‘success’, ‘working’ or ‘strategy’. Moreover, he identifies as rhetorical the use 
of linguistic pragmatics to elide grammatical interruption for the sake of an implied 
narrative continuity. This ‘mere rhetoric’ ties the explanation into a larger metaphysical 
loop, in which linguistic structure serves to justify narrative continuity without 
acknowledging its own reliance on narrative continuity. Coetzee, participant in the 
discourses of linguistic stylistics, rejects the meaning-oriented interpretive strategies of 
pragmatics in favour of following the linguistic pattern as it merely presents itself. 
The method, he argues, leads him to conclude that ‘rather than being an obstacle 
to understanding, the problematic sequences embody a conception of time that is central 
to Kafka’s enterprise’ (DP 214). Time, in this second explanation, is aberrant.   
The second and more radical explanation is that the conception of time that 
reigns in ‘The Burrow’ is truly aberrant, that it can be domesticated only 
with a degree of rhetorical violence amounting to traduction, and that it is 
better understood as the reflection of a time-sense that does not draw a line 
between iterative and noniterative senses of the verb, or does not draw the 
line in the usual place. (DP 214) 
 
The linguistic ‘justification’ of Coetzee’s first explanation necessitates a degree of 
rhetorical coercion (‘coaxing’ or ‘intimidation’). This ‘domestication’ of ‘The Burrow’s 
aberrant conception of time detracts from the possibility that the narrative rhetoric is 
doing exactly what it appears to be doing: violating the ‘usual’ grammatical sense of the 
verb to engage with a different conception of time. Here we can detect a kynical 
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‘explosion of propriety’ in Coetzee’s exposure of the ‘deep’ pragmatic reading of 
implied narrative continuity to the ‘surface’ reading that time in ‘The Burrow’ is, as it 
appears, aberrant. Coetzee chooses to deviate from an established critical tradition in 
linguistic theory to argue that Kafka is doing what he really appears to be doing. Where 
it was the use of particular rhetorical devices that facilitated our explanations of Borges 
and Beckett, it is the consideration of ‘rhetoric’ as such that marks the intersection 
between Coetzee’s critical and creative work. Whether through the development of 
fictional etymologies or by inflecting the different meanings of particular words in 
different grammatical contexts, Coetzee reveals the ‘workings’ of rhetoric by disrupting 
the narrative assumptions of his reader. If we observed Borges’s kynical method in his 
use of metaphor and enumeration and Beckett’s in his use of image and voice, our 
examination of Coetzee’s kynical method relies on his use of genre and linguistic 
modification.     
The particular genre that serves to highlight this in Elizabeth Costello is diatribe. 
Diatribe, in its classical sense, is defined by John Moles as ‘direct transcriptions or 
literary developments of addresses given by Cynic or Stoic philosophers on the streets, 
before large audiences or to pupils’.22 While the existence of diatribe as a discrete genre 
remains hotly contested in Classical scholarship, consensus about what is being 
contested is that the term, literally translated as ‘spending of time’, refers to oral 
philosophical expositions and their disquisition, though the latter may vary from direct 
transcription to ‘quite elaborate literary development’.23 Often this disquisition would 
take the form of a lecture. Moles notes that, even if they did not originate the written 
diatribe, the kynics ‘are likely to have been the major contributors to that tradition’.24 
Generically, diatribe does not necessarily carry the contemporary connotations of 
                                                          
22
 John Moles, ‘Diatribe’, The Oxford Classical Dictionary, rev. ed., ed. Simon Hornblower and Antony 
Spawforth (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), 463. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
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invective and polemic, but most classical examples consider ethical issues in a 
sermonising manner (such as the diatribes of Zeno, Bion or Epictetus mentioned above) 
and thus anticipate the oral disquisitions that make up Elizabeth Costello’s ‘Eight 
Lessons’. As with Epictetus’s Discourses, diatribe often serves a moral, stoic end, rather 
than simply describing a lecture-event. Since the kynics are the speakers in diatribes and 
not the writers of diatribes, the diatribe tradition turned on appropriating kynic stories to 
stoic ends. Costello’s ‘lessons’ are transcripts of speeches, discussions and letters, 
framed by the context of their utterance, concerned with an ostensible moral agenda and 
often engaged with polemically. However, unlike stoic diatribe, this moral polemic is 
accompanied with a bare minimum of argument, since the philosophical bases of 
argument seem wholly contrary to Costello’s parrhesiatic impulse. In addition to being 
literary versions of oral address, Moles notes the following features of diatribe that 
might as easily describe Costello’s lessons: 
They focus on a single theme; their main aim is to attack vices; they 
employ a vigorous, hectoring, colloquial style, with colourful, everyday 
imagery; they sometimes have an anonymous interlocutor, thereby 
providing dramatic illusion, a degree of argument and (usually) a butt.
25
  
 
Elizabeth Costello and the lecture-performances from which it is derived are primarily 
descriptions of lectures, discussions, and arguments around particular themes. These 
themes (realism, the novel, animals, humanism, evil, love, death) are the concerns of the 
liberal protagonist and the descriptions involve her lecturing on the subject or listening 
to a lecture on the subject, and the arguments that follow these lectures. The treatment 
of the theme belies the academic forums in which it often takes place, with her 
appealing to experience, to feeling and to common sense, rather than to a development 
of rational, philosophical argument on the basis of clearly defined premises and facts. 
As Sam Durrant has argued, it is necessary to disentangle Costello’s views from those 
                                                          
25
 Ibid. 
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of Coetzee: Coetzee’s arguments are not necessarily those of his creation.26 Thinking of 
Elizabeth Costello as diatribe has two advantages in this regard. It permits us to identify 
a long-standing ‘fictocritical’ literary genre to which, intentionally or not, Coetzee is 
heir, and therefore eases generic concerns about the novel. It also permits us the more 
nuanced reading of Coetzee’s relationship with Costello as suggested by Durrant. As the 
diatribe is the transcription of a performance, rather than the script for such a 
performance, it had the mimetic function of restaging a performance in Ancient Greece. 
However, Coetzee’s diatribes challenge this conventional understanding of the mimetic 
since they do not recreate a previous performance. One could say that they stage their 
performance in order to achieve a mediated presentation of the self-as-construction. 
Coetzee reworks the diatribe as the transcription of a fictional oral performance by 
Elizabeth Costello in response to the challenges of twentieth and twenty-first century 
artistic mediation. The diatribe is an oral performance of personal opinions, aimed at 
connecting the self to these opinions via a structural belief in their veracity (parrhesia). 
This links it to the essay form, which also seeks to air personal opinions in the form of 
writing, a structured attempt to reveal the self to itself.   
Coetzee reworks the essay form in Diary of a Bad Year. Diary is a novel 
comprising a split-page narrative: the top, a collection of essays, purportedly written by 
an aging South African novelist JC, and the bottom, a framing narrative involving the 
author, his secretary, Anya, and her boyfriend, Alan. Coetzee’s use of the essay as the 
dominant formal genre in the novel is particularly significant. The essay is generally 
acknowledged to have been introduced by Michel Montaigne in the 16
th
 century in his 
‘attempts’ to discuss an emergent self through writing: he famously takes ‘myself [as] 
                                                          
26 Sam Durrant, ‘J.M. Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello and the Limits of the Sympathetic Imagination’, J.M. 
Coetzee and the Idea of the Public Intellectual, ed. Jane Poyner (Athens: Ohio UP, 2006).  
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the matter of my book’.27 The most obvious difference between Montaigne’s essays and 
JC’s is that JC’s ‘self-as-essay-matter’ is undermined by the streams of ‘personal’ 
information that contrast his ‘Strong Opinions’ to his relationships with Anya and with 
Alan. The essay depends on the integrity of the ‘I writing’ to validate its thinking-
process. Exposing the rhetorical contingency of its moment of writing throws this 
integrity into disarray. This disarray is not due to genetic discrepancies. Montaigne 
corrected subsequent editions of the Essais, leading modern editions to annotate the 
genetic differences between the editions with an A [1580], B [1588] or C [1595].
28
 
Montaigne’s diachronic record exposes discrepancies between the ‘self-as-essay-matter’ 
over time. By contrast, Diary of a Bad Year indicates a kind of impatience, in which a 
synchronic record must expose discrepancies in the ‘self-as-essay-matter’ over the space 
of the page, rather than over the time of successive editions. If Montaigne’s Essais 
indicate a series of diachronic iterations, as has been argued by Claire de Obaldia, 
Coetzee develops a series of synchronic iterations in Diary of a Bad Year. The 
synchronic iteration attempts to render both essay and its context at the same time. We 
retrospectively interpret Montaigne’s development via the genetic changes to his essays. 
This process is short-circuited in Diary of a Bad Year, where we simultaneously read 
the essay, its process of development and the responses of its first two critics, Anya and 
Alan. If Claire de Obaldia’s seminal 1995 study, The Essayistic Spirit, establishes the 
essay as a kind of literature in potentia, then Diary of a Bad Year presents the in 
potentia wrapped in its critical afterbirth.  
de Obaldia notes that the essay is a genre not yet literature and a genre 
particularly concerned with unwrapping a narrating self.
29
 de Obaldia calls the essay not 
                                                          
27 Michel Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Michel Montaigne, trans. M.A. Screech [1987] (London: 
Penguin, 2003). 
28 Ibid, 1284. 
29 Claire de Obaldia, The Essayistic Spirit: Literature, Modern Criticism, and the Essay (Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 1995), 15.  
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yet literature (in the diachronic sense) to illustrate its temporal frustration of static genre 
divisions. She writes, ‘the static difference between the literary and the extra-literary 
expressed by the opposition is/is not, is grasped as the temporal and therefore dynamic 
difference of the “is not yet”’.30 The essay relates to a becoming of the essayist’s 
fictional self. This fictional self never shifts from the essayist’s self-definition to 
become a character. de Obaldia captures this performative quality: ‘Its condition is to 
herald a state or moment which has not yet been accomplished but which also 
foreshadows the completion and totalization generally associated with art and more 
particularly, in literature itself, with narrative continuity’.31 It subsists, in other words, in 
a perpetual striving towards a never-completed moment of fulfilment. To appropriate a 
comment de Obaldia takes from Terence Cave, ‘The “suspension” of both writer and his 
text “between an original wholeness […] and a future reintegration” is itself permanent 
and thus subverts the very notion of anachronism’.32 The essay’s formal suspension of 
reintegration is exacerbated in Diary of a Bad Year, where the suspension of writer and 
text is presented in the draft stage of the essays’ production. Not even Anya is 
convinced by JC’s ‘Strong Opinions’. Her ‘opinion’ serves to drive a wedge between 
writer and text, since JC will discard his ‘Strong Opinions’ halfway through the novel in 
favour of ‘Softer Opinions’. JC’s rhetoric does not persuade. It exposes itself, and JC’s 
pretensions. Like the ‘rehearsal’ in Beckett’s Catastrophe, Diary of a Bad Year 
inscribes a performance of production that leaves the text always open to revision. The 
conscious participation in the reception of the text by a reader indicates that we should 
read this rhetoric ‘aberrantly’, as a commentary on the life of a text and the lives of its 
readers. But the layers of framing narrative in both Elizabeth Costello and Diary of a 
Bad Year can obscure the exposition of this commentary as a form of kynical 
                                                          
30 Ibid, 16. 
31 Ibid, 18. 
32 Ibid, 30. 
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cosmopolitanism, since focusing on the framing narrative can return us to the tedious 
impasse over whether these opinions are Coetzee’s or ‘merely’ those of his literary 
creations, Costello and JC. This focus ignores the primary importance the texts accord 
to engagements of generic form, in favour of the story ‘beneath’ the narrative. It also 
assumes that the rhetoric of linguistic modification is ‘merely’ the means by which 
Coetzee forms this story, when, we will argue, this rhetoric is itself the commentary on 
the manner in which the text ‘lives’. 
Mere Rhetoric 
 
If we are to use the rhetoric of linguistic modification to comment on the life of a text 
and its readers, how can we relate its textual mannerisms to the purposes of the diatribe 
and the essay to reveal the self? Both Costello’s ‘Lessons’ and JC’s ‘Strong Opinions’ 
aim to reveal the writer’s self. Moreover, this revelation has the particularly pedagogic 
purpose of using the writer’s life as both the instrument of and the justification for the 
lessons and opinions they are advocating. Here, we might say that the ends are stoic 
because the respective moral crusades have ennobling, and systematic, intentions. But, 
insofar as the former ‘lessons’ are ostensibly closer to a hybrid classical form (mixing 
oral and writing practices) while the latter is the elaboration of a modern form of 
writing, the two works also create a dialectic between the moralising effects of 
apparently unmediated oral transcription and the ethical emergence of  ‘countervoices’ 
as a result of the writing act.
33
 Both novels remain ambivalent about this dialectic: 
Elizabeth Costello’s oral defence, transcribed as part of ‘At the Gate’ – that she is ‘a 
secretary of the invisible’, or ‘open to all voices’ – is considered problematic by her 
judges when she refuses to judge between ‘the murderer and his victim’, while it is JC’s 
equivocal ‘Softer Opinions’ as much as 'the ‘countervoices’ of Alan and Anya in the 
                                                          
33 Clarkson uses Coetzee’s notion of ‘countervoices’ in J.M. Coetzee: Countervoices. 
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parallel narrative sections that undermine the ‘authority’ of his ‘Strong Opinions’. There 
is, in other words, an establishment of authority and a disavowal of this authority, and 
both are achieved through what JC would call ‘mere rhetoric’ (DBY 226).34 Stoic 
authority meets its kynical counterpart. When we go on to discuss Diary, we will have 
to determine whether the disavowal of authority is properly kynical or is, in fact, 
cynical. For the moment, however, our reading is arrested by ‘mere rhetoric’. What is 
‘mere rhetoric’? What, indeed, is ‘mere’? 
Any sustained literary treatment of ‘mere’ must consider Wallace Stevens, 
whose name Costello cannot remember in Slow Man.
35
 The ‘mere’ of Wallace Stevens’s 
‘Of Mere Being’ is, in the assessment of Harold Bloom, ‘both a litotes and a play on the 
archaic meaning, which is “pure”, and perhaps even carries a hint of the root, which 
means “flickering”’.36 But he also suggests that ‘“mere” is Stevens’ final trope for 
reducing to a First Idea’.37 If Coetzee also ‘reduces to a First Idea’, then that first idea is 
that no final reduction is possible, whether it be in response to photographs of Samuel 
Beckett or Franz Kafka’s temporal aberrance. He indicates as much in his early essay, 
‘Achterberg’s “Ballad van de gasfitter”: The Mystery of I and You’, where he decides 
that the ‘union of pure subjectivity with the Word’ proves impossible (DP 75). This 
judgement glosses a passage from Stevens’s ‘Notes to a Supreme Fiction’:  
the spouse, the bride 
Is never naked. A fictive covering 
Weaves always glistening from the heart and mind.
38
  
 
It is impossible, in other words, to strip things down to their naked truths or their ‘mere 
being’. We seem to be trapped in the house of mirrors. But, instead of trying to break 
                                                          
34 Timothy Bewes, Postcolonial Shame. 
35 C. Kenneth Pellow, ‘Intertextuality and Other Analogues in J.M. Coetzee’s Slow Man’, Contemporary 
Literature, Vol. 50, No. 3 (2009), 547.  
36 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977), 371.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Wallace Stevens, The Palm at the End of the Mind: Selected Poems, ed. Holly Stevens (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1990), 405. 
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through these mirrors, we will follow the linguistic play at work when Coetzee invokes 
‘mere’ to critique reductions to ‘a First Idea’ of ‘categories’. ‘Breaking mirrors’ 
reinstates the dichotomy between a superficial appearance and its deeper meaning. 
Rather than exploit the difference between surface and depth, Coetzee’s use of ‘mere’ 
and ‘merely’ challenges our desire for deeper meaning by bringing surface and depth 
into a non-sublative dialectic.
39
 The term, and our reading of it, is necessarily bathetic. 
But bathos is perhaps our only possible response when, as Coetzee recognises in his 
kynical cosmopolitanism, the ethical question, ‘what should we do?’, is replaced by the 
more pragmatic, ‘are we prepared to do what needs to be done?’40  
While Coetzee is not averse to using ‘mere’ in an unmarked sense, there is an 
instance in which he does register the word’s use as a particularly marked qualifier of 
bathetic lack. In his ‘Kafka’ interview in Doubling the Point, Coetzee takes umbrage at 
what he interprets as Attwell’s efforts to homogenise ‘serious White South African 
writing’ into the category of ‘late-modernism’,  due to his sense of ‘the qualifier merely 
late-modernist hanging in the air’ (DP 200). Coetzee’s umbrage arises from what he 
construes as a politically charged attack on late modernism. He stages his defence in 
linguistic terms around the use of mere and merely. Not only does this anticipate the 
political-aesthetic and ethical-aesthetic traditions of criticism of Coetzee’s work that 
would subsequently form, but it also demonstrates his rhetorical use of ‘mere’: 
For I do not wish to respond from the marked or negative position, to 
embrace ethicalism or anything else from a position in the dialogue that is 
already marked as the position of the negative, the position of the mere. So, 
for instance, the last thing I want to do is to defiantly embrace the ethical as 
against the political. I don’t want to contribute, in that way, toward 
marking the ethical as the pole with the lack. (DP 200)  
 
To mark a position – in this instance ethicalism – as ‘mere’ is to mark it as negative. 
Since ‘marking’ results in thinking ethics and politics separately, Coetzee worries that it 
                                                          
39 This recapitulates the trap of the hermeneutist, referred to in the Introduction, where the search for 
deep meanings brings about the undoing of the subject.  
40 See the discussion of Coetzee’s cosmopolitanism in Chapter 1.  
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will lead to a concomitant disempowering of the ethical and an empowering of the 
political. Linguistic marking of the ethical in the negative, by using the mere, 
disempowers the ethical because such markers automatically indicate lack. As our 
discussion of Coetzee’s critics demonstrated, Coetzee’s fiction avoids an overly 
oppositional stance between politics and ethics, for the reason, as stated, that defiantly 
embracing the ethical as against the political inevitably leads to a simplified support of 
the powerless against the empowered. Kynical cosmopolitan interrogations of the 
ethical and the political aim to address precisely those structures that allow for a 
division between the ethical and political. In this sense, ‘mere ethics’, like ‘mere 
politics’, marks not so much the position of the negative, as a rhetorical effort to place 
these terms in the position of the negative. It exposes the structural tendency to use 
‘mere’ as a rhetorical short-circuit for the position of the negative. However, to 
conclude that the ‘mere’ and the ‘merely’ simply mark a lack occludes a deviant 
narrative in Coetzee’s rhetorical preoccupation with the terms in his fictional work, 
since ‘mere’ is also what Magda would call ‘that which simply is’. For the terms are 
used at least four or five times in a variety of rhetorical ways in each of Coetzee’s 
novels and, in the cases of Elizabeth Costello and Diary of a Bad Year, 26 and 15 times 
respectively. Coetzee’s concern with an ‘implicit’ merely in Attwell’s question raises 
the possibility that Coetzee’s stylistic use of merely, and mere, may highlight certain 
rhetorical conceits at work in Coetzee’s kynical method, not least for its rhetorical 
significance to the theme of truth-telling. The way Coetzee marks mere and the merely 
is particularly evident when we read the terms transversally across the novels.  
We will begin our discussion of Coetzee’s ‘mere’ by looking at its fairly 
conventional reduction of creatures to types or categories. We will then consider how 
particular examples frustrate this convention, and cause us to rethink the subjectivities 
of the characters who reduce creatures to types or categories. As we problematise the 
- 227 - 
mere, we find that what appears to be barely satisfactory behaviour may be sufficient, 
rather than excessive. From individual and interpersonal behaviour, we move to 
attitudes about nations to think about the role of the cosmopolitan in the nation. Again, 
the problematic nature of the mere subverts an apparently easy distinction between 
surface narratives and their underlying, ‘true’ meaning, by engaging in a dialectic 
between surface and depth.  
We begin by considering people and animal behaviour. When, in the first part of 
Dusklands, Eugene Dawn segues from his analysis of ‘The Vietnam Project’ to observe 
the ‘mere behaviour’ of Marilyn, his wife, her behaviour parallels the ‘mere behaviour’ 
of praying mantises alluded to by Jacobus Coetzee when he kills his ‘Zeno beetle’ in the 
second (Du 10; 96). After she kills her father and his bride in In the Heart of the 
Country, Magda’s ‘wolf howls hurled into the night’ remain ‘mere behaviour’, because 
there is no one to offend but the servants and the dead (IHC 17). ‘Mere behaviour’ 
becomes a cipher for animal activity that is not interpreted, understood or judged by an 
observer. Coetzee’s early fiction associates people with ‘mere’ animals.   
 Subsequently, the marginalised are reduced to the category ‘child’. Magda 
describes herself as a ‘mere child’ (IHC 43), a description that also used by Cruso, and 
then Susan Barton, when taking responsibility for Friday, enslaved ‘as a mere child’, in 
Foe (F 12; 23). The ‘mere child’, like the animal, is not granted the ability to respond to 
its exploitation by narrators. The phrase, like the responsibility, passes from Cruso to 
Susan Barton in a transaction that continues to deny Friday agency. 
Mere, then, appears to describe a form of ‘bare’ categorisation.41 But this 
reduction to bare categories is inflected with an irony that suggests ‘mere’ categories are 
more complex than ‘bare’ categories. When Michael K describes himself as a ‘mere 
footloose vagrant’ after his mother dies, it is precisely this quality that permits him to 
                                                          
41 As understood by Giorgio Agamben in his work on ‘bare life’, particularly in Homo Sacer (1995) and 
State of Exception (2003). 
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avoid scrutiny in Stellenbosch, while he waits to continue his journey to Prince Alfred 
(LTMK 39). Since a mere footless vagrancy must describe action as well as appearance 
and demeanour, the ‘mere’ inflects our response to persons, behaviours and actions. 
Moreover, mere vagrancy avoids scrutiny by being unobtrusive in its needs and bathetic 
in its affect. K’s vagrancy is ‘mere’ rather than ‘bare’ because it is bathetic in its 
unobtrusive contentedness.  
Imputing underlying reasons for this contentedness actually obfuscates surface 
impulses or desires. In Dusklands Eugene Dawn shows that writing obscenities on toilet 
walls achieves more than its ‘mere hidden purpose’; it manages to obscure hidden 
purposes (Du 14). This becomes politically charged in Age of Iron, when the police 
come to investigate the break-in at Mrs Curren’s house. Although they make the ‘mere 
pretext’ of a search, the police are actually interested in ‘touching’ (AI 169). As with 
Eugene Dawn’s ‘obscenities’, the search at Mrs Curren’s has a purpose: she is under 
suspicion because of her involvement with the child-revolutionary, John. But this 
purpose is less important than an overt manipulation of objects; the ‘mere hidden 
purpose’ justifies a haptic enjoyment of police power. A less ominous, more 
philosophical consideration of the dialectic between surface and purpose is provided at 
the heart of Lurie’s lecture on The Prelude, where ‘a mere image on the retina, has 
encroached upon what has hitherto been a living thought’ (D 21). Lurie’s obdurate class 
does not ask the necessary questions to clarify what Lurie means by ‘a living thought’, 
but it is clear that it relates to the usurpation of ‘pure ideas’ by ‘mere sense-images’ (D 
22). The immediacy of sensation defers questions of a wider politico-ethical debate, in 
favour of an ethical-aesthetic response to the local, the focus of the kynical 
cosmopolitan. Lurie will find himself caught out by this immediacy of sensation, when 
his rape of Melanie Isaacs demonstrably underwhelms the pure idea that he is the 
servant of Eros. Again, depth of meaning disguises a ‘mere’ surface, because, as Lurie 
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says, ‘we cannot live our daily lives in a realm of pure ideas’ (D 22). Coetzee is more 
explicit about the dialectical role of mere enjoyment in Waiting for the Barbarians, 
where the Magistrate muses: ‘When I was young the mere smell of a woman would 
arouse me; now it is evidently the sweetest, the youngest, the newest who have that 
power’ (WB 49). ‘Mere’ sets the previous ease of the Magistrate’s enjoyment against his 
current need for superlatives: the contentment in litotes with the need for hyperbole.  
At the same time that this libidinal (and sexist) mere is in play, Coetzee develops 
its association with childhood. Like ‘mere children’ in the earlier fiction, The Master of 
Petersburg refers to a ‘mere toddler’ (MP 179). Given the violence towards children in 
The Master of Petersburg, an excessive violence that, in Dostoevski’s vision of child 
abuse, is meant to generate ‘something that goes beyond mere wincing, mere bearing of 
pain’, the developing significance of an intertextual ‘mere’ grants the term ‘more’ 
meaning than the apparently synonymous ‘only a toddler’ (MP 77). The Master of 
Petersburg exposes the dialectic at work in the ‘mere’, and not only in the case of 
children. The ‘mere’ job of killing a ‘mere’ dog can also lead to an unforeseen moment 
of empathy with the victim, after which the ‘mere job’ becomes ‘the blackest betrayal’ 
(MP 98; 99). The ‘mere formality’ of Maximov’s investigation, which is nonetheless 
necessary, is performed by a man who claims not to be ‘a mere functionary’ but to have 
Dostoevski’s best interests at heart. Maximov suggests a disparity between action and 
person. His ‘mere’ actions should not be overdetermined, but his good intentions should 
be, since he is not the category he inhabits (‘a mere functionary’), even if this role 
determines the ‘mere formality’ of his actions.  
The aporia of mere formality is inverted by Dr Rassool, who protests that the 
issue at Lurie’s hearing in Disgrace ‘goes beyond mere technicalities’ and requires 
more than ‘simply going through the motions’ (D 51). Dr Rassool’s painful sincerity 
highlights the way in which the university committee cannot define their own position 
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in Lurie’s case, since their attempts to go beyond mere formalities exceed their position 
as mere functionaries. Actions marked by a ‘mere’ operate in a dialectic between 
‘hidden purposes’ and surface somatic effects. The negation of a ‘mere’ often indicates 
an excess emotional engagement that can as easily be interpreted as destructive as good-
willed. In Youth, for instance, John’s revulsion about writing is that the act will ‘spill 
mere emotion on the page’ (Y 61). The ‘mere’ in Coetzee’s creative work exposes a 
dialectic between concealment and unconcealment. From these instances, we can break 
down its marked use into categories. It often marks automatic behavioural response. It 
also marks the position of subaltern figures: animals, children, women or vagrants. 
Automatic response becomes implicitly associated with identity and both identity and 
response are bathetic. Often this bathos will carry over into hermeneutic efforts to 
derive a deeper meaning for activities, when a more visceral, obvious explanation may 
work as well. It is at its most insidious, however, when its bathos marks a character’s 
intention to present their actions as signifying more (or less) than they actually do.  
Such bathos clarifies John’s cosmopolitan pretensions in Youth. John wonders 
whether the ‘sorry’ he mutters to the man selling newspapers ‘counts as speech’ (Y 
114). ‘Has what has occurred between himself and the old man been an instance of 
human contact, or is it better described as mere social interaction, like the touching of 
feelers between ants?’ (Y 114). Here we have reiteration of ‘mere’ behaviourism, and 
the association with insects, and the exposure of social interaction as a force of habit. 
But this interaction is also emblematic of John’s failure to develop his interactions with 
people in London beyond a painful form of behaviourism. This failure to interact 
indicates the disparity between John’s desire to adopt an easy form of cosmopolitanism 
and his actual ‘behaviourist’ interactions. An idealised disdain for ‘mere living’ is what 
attracts John to Henry James (Y 67), as well as James’s purported ability to ‘show one 
how to rise above mere nationality’ (Y 64). John wishes to be a cosmopolitan (like 
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James) by rising above mere nationality, but this cosmopolitan ideal relies on two 
oppositions: the cosmopolitan and the national, which rests on a distinction between 
cosmopolitan life and ‘mere living’. Coetzee’s kynical treatment of John undermines his 
ideological rejection of nationalism and attempt to embrace cosmopolitanism. John’s 
efforts to accept one orientation (‘cosmopolitan life’) and reject the other (‘nationality’) 
are continually thwarted by his day-to-day travails in ‘mere living’. ‘Mere living’ 
disrupts ‘cosmopolitan life’, even as its depiction in Youth disrupts the reader’s easy 
assumptions about cosmopolitan ideals.  
If Coetzee questions a cosmopolitanism primarily focused on national identity, 
he also disrupts the hospitality at the heart of Kantian and Derridean cosmopolitanism in 
his treatment of ‘mere care’. The concern of Paul Rayment in Slow Man is that he will 
become ‘an object of mere nursing, mere care’, when his nurse, Marijana, responds to 
his declaration of love with irritation after he loses his leg in a car accident (SM 172). 
Paul, Elizabeth Costello suggests, might be better off setting his sights lower than 
‘loving care’, settling for ‘mere good nursing’ (SM 263). Here, again, the mere is 
associated with enjoyment, but, like the Magistrate, ‘mere’ contentment is insufficient 
for Paul; he desires the superlative and the hyperbolic. Costello reinstates the 
sufficiency of the ‘mere’, since he needs to lower his excessive expectations to ‘mere 
living’. ‘Mere living’ should not be confused with Giorgio Agamben’s notion of ‘bare 
life’, with its hyperbolic association to the Holocaust and the Musulman. Instead, ‘mere 
living’ is litotic and bathetic in advocating manageable expectations. Neither does it 
aspire to the unconditionality of Derridean hospitality, since it is about moderating the 
desire for absolute hospitality.  
We anticipate Paul’s refusal to accept ‘mere living’ in the very moment of 
accident that propels us into the novel. When he hits the road, the air ‘goes out of him in 
a whoosh’. Later this leads to incomprehension: ‘Could a mere gasp be interpreted as a 
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last thought, a last word?’ (SM 83). The ‘mere’ inflects Paul’s pathos with bathos. Paul 
dismisses the gasp because this somehow seems too bathetic for something as important 
as a last thought or word. But the narrative’s bathetic treatment of this insight 
foregrounds a dialectic, in which litotic ‘mere gasps’ oppose depths of significance or 
heights of ideality. If the concern of Coetzee’s narrators is manifestly to get beneath the 
surface of things, or to understand the overarching ideals by which they might make 
sense of their lives, these things are obdurately ‘merely’ manifest. 
Coetzee’s engagement with ‘mere living’ and ‘mere action’ moderates a ‘bare’ 
equivalent. But we find living and action at work in verb form when we consider the 
adverb ‘merely’. The darkness that, for Magda, ‘does not signify but merely is’, when 
she ‘deals in signs merely’, is as difficult to identify and as pitiless as the sky, which ‘is 
merely clear, the earth merely dry, the rocks merely hard. What purgatory to live in this 
insentient universe where everything but me is merely itself’ (IHC 10; 29; 73). Magda’s 
description of her world’s ontological obduracy becomes more politically inflected in 
Waiting for the Barbarians when Colonel Joll asks the Magistrate to account for the 
wooden slips found in his rooms. Before he pretends to interpret them as a series of 
missives for the barbarians in the novel, the Magistrate wonders whether the signs on 
the slips have a more abstract representational significance or whether the circle ‘merely 
stands for circle’ (WB 121). But an ontological obduracy of things will prove, time after 
time, sufficient in itself. K, learning to love idleness on the Visagie farm, lies all 
afternoon staring at the corrugations in the roof-iron, but his mind ‘would not wander 
[...] the rust was merely rust’ (LTMK 115). ‘Some of us’, Susan Barton meditates, ‘are 
not written, but merely are’ (F 143). In a narrative that plays with authorship and 
authorial life as overtly as Foe, Susan Barton’s words play with her own status as a 
fictional character, but also, and perhaps even more importantly, with the pretentions of 
the author (Foe and herself included) to claim to have ‘written’ a character such as 
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Friday. The narratological unease with authority occurs again in Age of Iron when Mrs 
Curren wonders whether Vercueil chose her house, ‘merely’ because it was the one 
without a dog, which would undermine her assumption that he has an angelic purpose 
(AI 12). Lucy, for David Lurie, is ‘merely a transient’ compared to Ettinger with his 
more ‘essential’ link to the soil. Yet Lucy’s ‘mere transiency’ is more grounded in the 
realities of her situation than Ettinger’s ‘essential’ adherence to a tradition of white land 
ownership in South Africa. Lucy, we may recall from our discussion in our 
Introduction, is all the more kynically cosmopolitan for being able to give up her 
adherence to traditions of ownership, her ceding of property over to Petrus. This 
identification of people as ‘merely’ occupying a position stretches back to Dusklands. 
Eugene Dawn’s supervisor, the coffee-drinking Coetzee, suggests that Dawn revise the 
tone of his proposals to include stylistic genuflexions that indicate he is ‘merely a 
functionary’, much as Maximov does (Du 2). Elizabeth Costello notes that Paul 
Rayment’s anger about Drago’s photographic forgery is out of proportion to his claim to 
be ‘merely guarding [the photos] for the sake of the nation’s history’ when ‘Drago is 
part of that history too’ (SM 220). The ideological claim to a ‘mere’ guardianship of 
history, like the claim to a ‘mere’ guardianship of the land or the state, exploits a 
bathetic relationship with the object (historical, terrestrial, bureaucratic) to disavow self-
interest. Marking this ‘mere’ permits us to see this self-interest. 
Again we may find a kynical cosmopolitanism at work, since ‘merely’ also strips 
the character’s function of its allegorical power. Shorn of its allegorical significance, the 
character no longer functions within Benedict Anderson’s imaginary community, since 
the rhetoric Coetzee uses to write about these characters exposes the allegory of 
nationhood (and stoic cosmopolitanism) to be a narrative conceit.
42
 Jacobus Coetzee’s 
                                                          
42 According to Anderson, the nation ‘is an imagined political community […] it is imagined because the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even 
hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’. Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
- 234 - 
death is ‘merely a winter story [...] A world without me is inconceivable’ (Du 107).43 
The Magistrate, sceptical of his efforts to wait for a sign, decides that ‘the space about 
us here is merely space, no meaner or grander than the space above the shacks and 
tenements and temples and offices of the capital. Space is space, life is life, everywhere 
the same’ (WB 17). The Medical Officer, eager to understand Michael K, tries to 
convince himself, via his call to an imagined fleeing K: ‘Your stay in the camp was 
merely an allegory, if you know the word’ (LTMK 166). But Susan Barton advises 
Friday that they will never make their fortunes ‘by being merely what we are, or were’ 
(F 82). Mrs Curren would like to photograph Vercueil for her daughter, but thinks he 
might come out as ‘merely a bad spot on the emulsion’; his allegorical meaning will fail 
to be communicated (AI 177). Allegorical meaning is communicated when the ‘joy 
breaking like a dawn’ Dostoevski experiences is eclipsed, ‘not merely’ by clouds 
crossing ‘this new, radiant sky’ but by ‘another sun [...] a shadow sun, an anti-sun 
sliding across its face’ (MP 68). Coetzee’s Dostoevski, like the historical Dostoevsky, 
has premonitions of his epileptic fits. But these premonitions are not allegorical. Rather, 
they are somatic effects of the fits, the immediate evidence of life without the protection 
of convention. This is why Dostoevski must employ a stoic-like ‘modesty’ in managing 
‘the shame of the fit’ (MP 68). Before the impulses of his body, he can only ‘manage 
the episode as best he can’ (MP 68). David Lurie presumes that Lucy wishes to occlude 
connotation by sealing off the memory of ‘that day’, the day they are attacked, ‘so that 
one day she may be able to say, “The day we were robbed”, and think of it merely as the 
day when we were robbed’ (D 141). What he eventually realises is that she can never 
seal off the day; its effects are on her body, as they are on his. Lurie’s failure to think 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism [1983] (London and New York: 
Verso, 1991), 6.  
43 Here, the implicit reference is to Shakespeare’s A Winter’s Tale, where ‘a sad tale’s best for winter’. 
Shakespeare’s play also links to ‘The Vietnam Project’, since both involve a jealous husband who brings 
about his son’s death. 
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through to ‘the plain sense of things’ is not a failure of imagination as Costello might 
understand it; if anything, ‘thinking through things’ produces an all-too-excitable 
imagination. It dismisses what is on the surface, the facticity of the crime, rape, and 
pregnancy, to infer what these things mean, without realising that they do not need to 
mean in order to be real. 
Where ‘mere’ functions as an ironic marker of lack, indicating that which is 
conspicuously absent in the object it describes, ‘merely’ is the means by which 
description is reduced or raised to an obdurate quiddity, resistant to further explication. 
‘Mere’ and ‘merely’ share this ambivalence about reduction, as might be expected from 
an oeuvre in which kenotic abnegation, the evacuation and humiliation of the self, plays 
such an important role. However, we consider these permutations of ‘mere’ and 
‘merely’ less as a consequence of the traditional kenotic reading of Coetzee’s authorial 
abnegation, and more as an effect of his ‘austere clarity of style’ (D Cover).  
Coetzee’s style, as Patrick Hayes has argued, has an important role to play in our 
understanding of his ‘distinctive approach to the politics of writing’.44 By exploiting the 
tension between the serious and the comic, inherited from Beckett,
45
 Coetzee ‘tries to 
conceive of writing instead as a type of serious, or to use the term he borrows from 
Joyce, “jocoserious” play with the rules and boundaries that govern political 
discourse’.46 To identify how Coetzee thickens relations between literature, politics and 
the novel genre, Hayes reads Coetzee’s relationship to the history of the novel. Here, 
Beckett’s deadlock over The Unnamable becomes Coetzee’s starting point; the central 
question of Hayes’s book is one posed by Coetzee himself: ‘Anti‐illusionism is, I 
suspect, only a marking of time, a phase of recuperation, in the history of the novel. The 
                                                          
44 Hayes, J.M. Coetzee and the Novel, 2. 
45 Coetzee responds to David Attwell’s question about Beckett’s influence, and its relation to Coetzee’s 
stylistic analysis of Beckett’s novels, that his stylistic work on Beckett was a conscious attempt to ‘get 
closer to a secret, a secret of Beckett’s that I wanted to make my own’ (DP 25). 
46 Hayes, J.M. Coetzee and the Novel, 3. 
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question is, what next?’ (DP 27). Rather than identify Beckett’s anti-illusionism as the 
terminus for the novel (the ontological consequence of continued efforts to ‘uncover’ 
the self that writes), Coetzee takes Beckett’s Three Novels as a moment in the novel’s 
history, one method among many. It is a Hegelian response to the impasse wrought by 
the decomposition of subjectivity in the Kantian Critique: the marking of any 
ontological examination as bound to the context in which it appears. But how is this 
continuing history of style related to ‘mere rhetoric’? What, indeed, is style’s 
relationship with rhetoric? These questions turn on a writer’s ‘style’ becoming 
recognisable through the repetition of certain rhetorical devices. As readers, we are 
habituated to a particular writer’s habits of writing or ‘tics’.47 A writer is most obviously 
kynical when these habits are used to interrogate aesthetic assumptions about their 
work, and most obviously a kynical cosmopolitan when this challenge to aesthetic 
assumptions correlates with a challenge to political complacency. Rather than plumb the 
‘depths’ of this political complacency, Coetzee, as a kynical cosmopolitan, highlights its 
reliance on rhetorical ‘surfaces’, which he will juxtapose with writerly style.    
Coetzee defines rhetoric as ‘the discipline that investigates and describes 
accommodations between form and meaning in the practice of artful speech’ (DP 149). 
In speaking about his ‘wrong turning’ towards statistical and generative stylistics, 
Coetzee notes that ‘Beckett’s prose, which is highly rhetorical in its own way, lent itself 
to formal analysis’ (DP 23). By this, we might infer, without leaping too far ahead of 
ourselves, that rhetoric, for Coetzee, is the codified study of style, and that the study of 
style, in a formal sense, may draw on the conventions of rhetoric.  
 
                                                          
47 Coetzee refers to Beckett’s prose as the product of ‘a central nervous flexion which causes the tics we 
see on the verbal surface’. If ‘mere’ is similarly a ‘tic’ for Coetzee, it also shows how problematic any 
search for the ‘central nervous flexion’ may prove to be. J.M. Coetzee, The English Fiction of Samuel 
Beckett, 78. 
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Diary of a Bad Year 
 
JC’s tautological expression, ‘mere rhetoric (“mere” rhetoric)’, at the end of Diary of a 
Bad Year, serves as an interesting example of Coetzee’s ‘editorial metalanguage’ in 
dealing with the issue of rhetoric and style.
48
 The context of this quote is JC’s 
discussion of Ivan’s suicide speech from Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. Of the 
possible reasons that JC invokes for not agreeing with Ivan’s logic, the idea that it might 
be ‘mere rhetoric’ is the only one to be accorded a parenthetic skeptical query: ‘even as 
one asks whether it is not mere rhetoric (“mere” rhetoric) that one is reading’. As with 
Coetzee’s reference to ‘success’ mentioned earlier, the quotation marks indicate 
Coetzee’s skepticism. However, the overt marking of the ‘mere’ overemphasises the 
irony, since we are already questioning the integrity of the ‘mere’ as a synonym for 
‘only’, ‘simply’ or ‘just’. Given the inflections the word ‘mere’ receives throughout 
Coetzee’s oeuvre, we can induce that the scare quotes are themselves markers of an 
irony already implicit in the ‘mere’, which JC feels he must indicate with a heavy hand 
(through repetition and punctuation), for fear that his own rhetoric will be dismissed as 
Ivan’s might be, as ‘mere’. JC ‘shows’ his hand, in this instance, to make his opinions 
‘merely what they are’. We might wonder about the ideology at work in this revelation.  
Either these are still ‘opinions’ and share the rhetorical pretensions of the ‘strong 
opinions’ or he must mark his irony in order to speak in his own voice. But, irrespective 
of his ideals, it appears that this example introduces, in the final pages of the book, a 
particular rhetorical device that might recursively expand our understanding of 
Coetzee’s rhetorical treatment of some of the themes raised through litotes and bathos. 
Is this ‘merely’ the use of understatement to affirm a positive statement ironically? The 
                                                          
48 Coetzee glosses this expression in ‘Samuel Beckett and the Temptations of Style’, as ‘a level of 
language at which one talks about the language of fiction. It is the language not of cogito ergo sum but of 
cogitate ergo est: the speaking “I” and its speech are felt not securely as subject but as object among other 
objects’ (DP 44). 
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rendering of the statement both ‘apparent’ and ‘self-evident’ may be undercut by the 
irony with which it is presented (a stylistic function), but it is also autophagic; it is a 
style that eats itself. Both a statement about rhetoric and the performance of that 
rhetoric, the phrase is ‘apparently’ ironic about the marginal role accorded to rhetoric in 
communicating ideas, while also manifesting a ‘self-evident’ argument that Ivan’s 
response maintains its affect, despite its argumentative and stylistic failings: the 
complexity leads Coetzee’s stylistic irony to eat itself. In early Coetzee, we might find 
this affect maintained in the authority of the suffering body, as detailed by Sam 
Durrant.
49
 In these later, etiolated works, it is confined to the parrhesic authority of the 
writer as sage, which is, itself, the object of ironic ridicule. Thus the binary opposition 
between the Tolstoyan ‘speaking in one’s own person’, exemplified (for JC) by Harold 
Pinter, and the Dostoevskian ‘ironic authorial self-dramatisation’, exemplified by JC 
himself, becomes difficult to maintain.   
In addressing the problems with this binary opposition, Julian Murphet questions 
whether we are to understand JC’s utterances as a confessional dialectic, the univocal 
and direct parrhesia of an authorial ideology, or the opinions of an intradiegetic 
mouthpiece constructed for the ends of ironic authorial self-dramatisation.
50
 Noting 
Coetzee’s preferential treatment of Dostoevsky over Tolstoy (and Coetzee’s association 
of the former with dialogic irony and the latter with ‘strong opinions’), Murphet 
observes that the ‘whole, elaborate but brittle formal apparatus of the novel stands as a 
working allegory of how the parrhesic, Tolstoyan impulse is to be outflanked by a 
Dostevskian polyglossia and irony today – not immanently, but extrinsically’.51 Despite 
the best efforts of Elizabeth Costello and JC to ‘short-circuit self-doubt and self-scrutiny 
in the name of an autonomous truth’ – Murphet notes Costello’s and JC’s shared insight 
                                                          
49 Sam Durrant, ‘J.M. Coetzee’s Inconsolable Works of Mourning’, Contemporary Literature, Vol. 40, 
No. 3 (1999): 430-63. 
50 Murphet, ‘Diary of a Bad Year’, 73. 
51 Ibid, 76. 
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that ‘life is too short’ for plotting out stories – they are inevitably the straw (wo)men of 
Coetzee’s ironic challenge to authority as such.52 Murphet is right to see this aspect of 
Diary as subordinated to the erotic truth of JC’s relationship with Anya (whose 
correlative we might find in Costello’s act of fellatio in ‘The Humanities in Africa’). 
Where his consideration of JC and Costello leads us, however, is to the proximity of 
that ‘ironic authorial self-dramatisation’ to Coetzee himself. This is not to recapitulate 
Murphet’s examination of Dostoevsky’s form and Tolstoy’s ‘fixed ideas’ since the 
tension Murphet outlines between form and ideas is ‘felt as artificial and forced […] it 
separates out into parallel dimensions what ought to be imperfectly amalgamated on the 
same textual plane’.53 Rather, we should consider the possibility that Coetzee constructs 
this ironic authorial self-dramatisation to expose a tension between telling the truth and 
knowing that what one tells is the truth, a tension at the heart of kynical parrhesia. We 
find Coetzee enacting this tension in the process of ‘taking offense’, highlighted in his 
work on censorship, Giving Offense. 
Returning to the essays in Giving Offense provides an interesting point of 
comparison for our discussion of Diary. Although we may readily observe the 
similarities between texts by Coetzee and Costello (Foe and The House on Eccles 
Street) and the shared bibliography of Coetzee and JC (Waiting for the Barbarians and 
a collection of essays on censorship), we should also note that this is a selected 
bibliography. These characters do not share all of Coetzee’s works (nor all of his 
successes). This raises the question: what is the quality in these books that establishes 
the particular kind of self-dramatisation Coetzee intends? If we discard the possibility of 
personal preference, which merely serves to reinforce the coincidence of author and 
character, Waiting for the Barbarians and Giving Offense have something in common 
with Diary of a Bad Year, over and above those themes germane to Coetzee’s other 
                                                          
52 Ibid, 72. 
53 Ibid, 77. 
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work. All three open, we find, with their privileged, intellectual, focalising characters 
‘taking offense’.  
This requires some justification, since it is endemic to all Coetzee’s narratives 
that his protagonists – intellectual raznochintsy, excepting only Michael K – ‘take 
offense’ at some point or another, usually because they reach an impasse with their 
positions within the status quo and cannot continue to justify their intellectual 
complacency.
54
 It is, of course, possible to mark a shift in Coetzee’s trajectory as an 
international writer after Waiting for the Barbarians, with the award of the Booker Prize 
for the Life and Times of Michael K. But Waiting for the Barbarians also features an 
intellectual of the sort outlined by Coetzee in the opening chapter of Giving Offense.
55
 
‘Rational, secular intellectuals [read stoic cosmopolitans] are not’, Coetzee notes in a 
subheading titled ‘The Intellectual’, ‘notably quick to take offense’ (GO 3).  He adds: 
When they do take offense, they try to do so programmatically, setting (or 
believing themselves to set) their own thresholds of response, and allowing 
themselves (or believing themselves to allow themselves) to respond to 
triggers only when such thresholds are crossed. (GO 3)  
 
Coetzee’s kynical jibes (given in parentheses) at a more conventionally cosmopolitan 
subjective position are made explicitly self-referential when he calls his own 
explanation of taking offense one of those ‘well-developed explanations (“theories”) of 
the emotions’ (GO 3). Such barbed remarks are often present in analyses of David 
Lurie’s self-justification in his ‘service to Eros’, the self-pity of Mrs Curren’s letter to 
her daughter and the self-condemnation in Dostoevski’s occupation of Pavel’s life in St. 
Petersburg. The difference between the Magistrate, JC and Elizabeth Costello, and 
                                                          
54 ‘Raznochintsy’ is a term Coetzee invokes when referring to himself, in the third person, in the 
‘Retrospect’ of Doubling the Point. It designated a class of lower noblemen in the Russian Code of Law, 
until the category was abolished in the mid-18
th
 century. It subsequently came to refer to non-noble 
people who, by dint of their education, were excluded from taxable status and who were able to apply for 
the status of personal distinguished citizenship. Coetzee derives the term, in all probability, from his 
reading for his Dostoevsky essay, as Dostoevsky occupied this position.    
55 David Attwell shows that the political concerns of the manuscript versions of Waiting for the 
Barbarians shift dramatically to questions of torture and complicity after the political activist Steve Biko 
was murdered in detention in 1977. David Attwell, ‘Writing Revolution: The Manuscript Revisions of 
J.M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians’, Life Writing, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2014): 201-216. 
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Coetzee’s other raznochintsy, is their starting position. All of Coetzee’s protagonists are 
complacent about the lives they lead to some degree or another (Lurie’s solution to ‘the 
problem of sex’ is but the most striking example), but the Magistrate, JC and Elizabeth 
Costello are the only characters who begin as representatives of some political or 
cultural authority.
56
 They are, in fact, the immediate authority. Here, the question of 
Colonel Joll emerges, and of the Magistrate’s subordination to Joll. But in the opening 
pages of the novel, this relationship is necessarily one of an ostensible equality: Joll 
needs the support of the Magistrate (the local authority) and the Magistrate must support 
Joll (the representative of the Empire). ‘Taking offense’ is not then strictly a matter of 
their ‘positions of subordination or weakness’ (GO 3). Rather it is ‘the belief in fair play 
(that is, the belief that under the rules of fair play they [the intellectuals] win more often 
than they lose) that constitutes one of their more deeply entrenched values and also 
encourages sympathy for the underdog’ (GO 3). In order to have ‘sympathy for the 
underdog’, it is necessary to be ‘tolerant’ of the underdog’s ‘taking offense’, though this 
tolerance may be ‘without empathetic participation in the feeling of outrage, and 
perhaps even privately deeming outrage in itself to be backward’ (GO 4). This 
tolerance, ‘either deeply civilized or complacent, hypocritical, and patronizing’, is only 
possible for the intellectual when ‘complacent, and yet not complacent’, in a position of 
relative authority, or, in other words, without anxiety (GO 4). Coetzee injects into this 
narrative of the complacent intellectual a confessional first person: ‘I myself am (and 
am also, I would hope, to a degree not) an intellectual of this kind’ (GO 5). At risk of 
misrecognizing a purely rhetorical gesture of Coetzee’s academic writing in his hybrid 
academic/creative writing (Elizabeth Costello and Diary of a Bad Year), this 
                                                          
56 Many of Coetzee’s principal characters start as subordinate to some immediate authority or law: 
Eugene Dawn to Coetzee; Jacobus Coetzee to the Cape Authority; Magda to her father; Michael K. to the 
Apartheid authorities; Susan Barton to Cruso; Mrs Curren to her cancer; Dostoevski to his conditions of 
exile; David Lurie to his marginal position in Communication Studies; Paul Rayment to his disability; 
Simon to his refugee status. The autobiographical fictions are excluded because they stage Coetzee’s own 
feelings of exclusion from South African society, in a dialectical opposition to the complacent authority 
enjoyed by the Magistrate, Elizabeth Costello and JC at the beginning of their respective novels.  
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confessional skepsis seems to justify a reading of an iterative confessional narrative in 
Coetzee’s creative work, Murphet’s identification of a play between ‘parrhesia’ 
(speaking in one’s own person) and ‘opinion’, and the possibility of using the iterative 
confessional form to justify a dialectical reading of the shift from parrhesia to opinion 
in its content. For if, in his critical work on censorship, Coetzee is equivocating about 
being a complacent intellectual – an equivocation that echoes his treatment of the 
intellectual complacency of the Magistrate, and foreshadows the critical responses by 
Costello’s interlocutors in Elizabeth Costello and Alan and Anya in Diary of a Bad Year 
– at what point are we meant to take him ‘seriously’, if ‘seriously’ is how we are 
‘meant’ to take him? Perhaps aesthetic questions are not meant to be taken ‘seriously’ at 
all. Perhaps they are meant to be taken kynically, that is to say, with a greater sense of 
the surface of things. 
Carrol Clarkson questions what Coetzee’s ‘seriousness might consist in’ if, 
following Coetzee’s statement in Giving Offense, ‘seriousness is, for a certain kind of 
artist, an imperative uniting the aesthetic and the ethical’.57 While this pursuit proves 
productive and intellectually rewarding, it maintains a fidelity to reading Coetzee as 
such an artist. However, as Coetzee goes on to write, seriousness ‘is also 
deconstructible as a feature of the ideology of so-called high art and the drive to power 
of the high artists’. Coetzee is, at this point in Giving Offense, considering a rebuttal to 
Catherine McKinnon’s arguments on pornography by proposing a hypothetical male 
writer-pornographer, whose pornographic attempt to write an account of power and 
desire ‘does not’, as with Coetzee’s McKinnon, ‘close the book on desire (by defining 
its genesis and its ends), but on the contrary sees (but also does not see), in its own 
desire to know its desire, that which it can never know about itself’. Would the only 
defense from ‘delegitimisation’, Coetzee’s male writer-pornographer asks, ‘be its 
                                                          
57 Clarkson, Countervoices, 4. 
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seriousness?’ Coetzee’s consideration of this seriousness – within the discourse of a 
hypothetical male writer-pornographer able, like David Lurie, to rationalise his desire 
and rationalise with his desire – engages obliquely with the problems inherent in 
counterpointing parrhesia to irony. Parrhesia seeks to ‘short-circuit’ self-doubt by 
avowing an autonomous truth. Ironic resignation equivocates about truth in order to 
present argument as a form of rhetoric. Coetzee’s unstated argument is that if an art is 
only legitimated through its seriousness, and that seriousness is always already 
predetermined by an ideology complicit with the notion of high art, texts that manifest 
their truths in a manner too humorous, popular or obvious to receive the defense of 
seriousness are difficult to defend. This might be the reason that, in all the studies of 
Coetzee, only a handful attempt to move their discussion from irony to humour, despite 
the deeply offensive humour that runs through Coetzee’s  parody of self-satisfaction in 
his principal characters. Rather than follow the line of ethical aesthetics that Coetzee’s 
novels all-too-willingly provide their readers, or reconsider the dialectic implicit in 
Coetzee’s treatment of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, we will consider the offensive truth 
that Costello and JC are constantly battling – that the seriousness with which they ‘take 
offence’ is itself subject to humorous consequences, raising the challenging kynical 
possibility that the truth is only possible when the parrhesist is open to rhetorical 
ridicule. 
The clearest example of the tension between rhetoric ridicule and the parrhesist 
occurs in JC’s essay ‘On Harold Pinter’. Harold Pinter, too ill to travel to Stockholm to 
accept his Nobel Prize, ‘makes what can fairly be called a savage attack on Tony Blair 
for his part in the war in Iraq’. JC’s prognosis for this attack is negative:  
When one [by which he means the artist] speaks in one’s own person – that 
is, not through one’s art – to denounce some politician or other, using the 
rhetoric of the agora, one embarks on a contest which one is likely to lose 
because it takes place on ground where one’s opponent is far more 
practised and adept. (DBY 127) 
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Speaking in one’s own person is parrhesia, truth-telling: a stance antithetical to the 
rhetorical third person conjectural ‘one’ that JC uses. But such truth-telling is still a 
form of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the agora. The alternative is to speak through one’s art; 
to speak in one’s own person is specifically not to speak through one’s art. The ideal 
would be to speak one’s opinions through one’s art, yet with regard for one’s own 
person. Apparently this is impossible, or, at least, ‘a contest which one is likely to lose’. 
However, Pinter does it anyway, which earns him JC’s respect: 
So it takes some gumption to speak as Pinter has spoken. Who knows, 
perhaps Pinter sees quite clearly that he will be slickly refuted, disparaged, 
even ridiculed. Despite which he fires the first shot and steels himself for 
the reply. What he has done may be foolhardy but it is not cowardly. And 
there come times when the outrage and the shame are so great that all 
calculation, all prudence, is overwhelmed and one must act, that is to say, 
speak. (DBY 127) 
 
At the point when calculation is overwhelmed by outrage and shame, even the artist 
must go beyond the rhetoric of ‘one’s own person’, and speak, literally, as themselves. 
But, although this comes about through overwhelming outrage and shame, it is Pinter’s 
‘gumption’ that leads Pinter to speak ‘as Pinter has spoken’. Pinter is perhaps 
commonsensical enough to ‘see quite clearly that he will be slickly refuted’. But Pinter 
observes that sometimes a writer must act to ‘reveal’ the truth: 
When we look into a mirror we think the image that confronts us is 
accurate. But move a millimetre and the image changes. We are actually 
looking at a never-ending range of reflections. But sometimes a writer has 
to smash the mirror – for it is on the other side of that mirror that the truth 
stares at us.
58
 
 
It is something like this act of smashing the mirror that concerns JC, since on the page 
facing his analysis of Harold Pinter he admits that the writer is ‘because of his vocation 
as much interested in the liar and the psychology of the lie as in the truth’ (DBY 126). 
The reflections are at least as interesting as the truth ‘on the other side’, and ‘smashing 
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the mirror’ may be tantamount to giving up the rhetorical advantage the writer has over 
political directness.  
Coetzee apparently shares JC’s attitude, since they both publish a work titled 
Giving Offense and, in Coetzee’s version at least, he acknowledges the inherent 
theatricality of this play of mirrors when he refers to Erasmus’s Folly: 
Life [...] is theater: we each have lines to say and a part to play. One kind 
of actor, recognizing that he is in a play, will go on playing nevertheless; 
another kind of actor, shocked to find he is participating in an illusion, will 
try to step off the stage and out of the play. The second actor is mistaken. 
For there is nothing outside the theater, no alternative life one can join 
instead. The show is, so to speak, the only show in town. All one can do is 
go on playing one’s part, though perhaps with a new awareness, a comic 
awareness. (GO 15)  
 
Coetzee’s concern with ‘illusionism’ (Coetzee’s alternative word for the formal mode of 
‘realism’) is evident as early as his 1974 essay on Nabokov. Is it a response to Beckett’s 
‘anti-illusionism’, the ‘what comes next’ in the history of the novel? In the Nabokov 
essay, Coetzee juxtaposes the ‘radicalism’ of Pale Fire, which he finds ‘half-hearted by 
the standards of such a radically impoverished aesthetic as Beckett expresses’ in Three 
Dialogues.
59
 But he is also quick to note that ‘we will not reach the Kernel of the 
subject by looking behind the mirror. If the artist has left anything behind (“inside”) the 
mirror, it is likely to be a joke. Eystein’s nutshell is a joke on Realism. So is Botkin’s 
madness’.60 Simply breaking the mirror cannot produce any ultimate meaning. This 
concern perhaps explains in part Coetzee’s reluctance to submit to the psychologising 
analysis of the interview. In a 2001 interview with Peter Sacks, Coetzee responds to a 
question about his literary influences by noting that ‘it does one no practical good as a 
writer to scrutinise’ the motivation to write.61 This is in harmony with other statements 
by Coetzee on resisting the urge to explicate his work for his audience. While Coetzee 
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uses this position to deflect efforts to read his ‘literary paternity’ (to use an expression 
from his 1993 ‘Homage’), it is internally consistent with his awareness of his own 
impulse to ‘uncover’ concealed meanings.62  
Coetzee’s conflicted language of kernels and surfaces has significance for the 
fictional performance of writing a collection of essays, or ‘self-as-matter’, in Diary, but 
it also raises pertinent questions on positioning Diary as a South African or Australian 
novel. The positions of place and self are necessarily interrelated. Coetzee is a kynical 
cosmopolitan, because he uses this interrelation to create a non-sublative dialectic 
between self and place. The self-as-South African (or Australian) finds its antithesis in 
the self-as-matter. We find this regional tension mixed with the tension over the self, in 
the Sacks interview, where he responds to a question about the place in his work of a 
South African ‘core’ by saying, ‘The core of South Africa for me belongs to my 
childhood. I have never acculturated elsewhere’. Apparently, this resolves the tension, 
since his cosmopolitanism is rooted and nostalgic of a younger self (written about in 
Boyhood). But we must recall a criticism he makes about Nabokov: ‘he balked at facing 
the nature of his loss [the reality that took Russia away from him] in its historical 
fullness’ (DP 28). The difference he implicitly marks between himself and Nabokov is 
not the sentimentality with which they think of their childhoods, but the unflinchingness 
with which they critique that childhood. When Sacks pushes the question ‘beyond 
questions of mere landscape’, Coetzee interrupts him with the enigmatic phrase ‘there’s 
no mere landscape’.63 This piques Sacks’s interest; he asks what Coetzee means and 
Coetzee replies: ‘there is no landscape that is mere landscape when we are talking about 
landscape as a formative influence’, which he explains as ‘a power of attachment to 
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particular regions or particular places’.64 This negation of Sacks’s ‘mere’ lends authorial 
justification to Elleke Boehmer’s argument that Coetzee’s ‘Australian novels’ (i.e. those 
novels written after his emigration to Australia) indicate a sensitivity to Australian 
realism, as a national literary mode, and a preoccupation with describing an Australian 
reality.
65
 Written in Australia, set in Australia and related to the political business of 
Australia, Diary should be considered an Australian novel, despite having, at its ‘core’, 
a South African novelist-émigré who, when he makes critical remarks about pending 
security regulations, is told ‘if I didn’t like Australia [I] should go back to where I came 
from, or, if I preferred Zimbabwe, to Zimbabwe’ (DBY 172). While this tension about 
the ‘Australian-ness’ of Coetzee’s Australian fiction is a thought-provoking line of 
enquiry, it evokes the national-cosmopolitan binary that this thesis is concerned to 
skew. After all, the negative conditional hospitality of the letter writer (i.e. ‘If I didn’t 
like Australia’) arises in response to his words about state-sponsored terrorism in 1970s 
South Africa. The more things change, JC seems to argue, the more they stay the same.  
This cliché needs to be reinvigorated: both clauses are necessary to understand 
the relationship between ‘cores’ and ‘surfaces’ at work in Diary of a Bad Year. Or, to 
counter Pinter’s analogy, breaking the mirror might be necessary, but the mirror might 
also be the only thing standing between you and nothing. Both the appearance of 
difference and the structural similarity of the situations have their place in the analysis. 
JC renders as follows the justification Realpolitik gives to its ‘real’: ‘If it happened that 
the moral law was sometimes broken, that was unfortunate, but rulers were merely 
human’ (DBY 17). The pragmatics of politics require that we allow that it is flawed, that 
it aspires to ideals but falls flat in its realization of these ideals because people are 
‘merely human’. But the human flaw itself is coded into the system of justification, so 
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that failing politicians can trot out cynical corruptions of a Beckettian ‘fail again, fail 
better’. JC’s irony shows that ‘merely’ being human allows politicians to justify the 
non-existence of that ‘merely’ in their expectations and their ideological moorings; their 
built-in flaws permit them to make suprahuman decisions that treat humans as 
subhuman. This pattern of thinking is also taken up in JC’s ‘softer’ opinions about 
numbers: ‘Is stealing a million dollars worse than stealing one dollar? What if that one 
dollar is the widow’s mite? Questions like these are not merely scholastic. They must 
exercise the minds of judges every day’ (DBY 204). Again, Coetzee deploys a negative 
‘merely’ to emphasise the importance of thinking these questions in a way that is not 
scholastic and to imply that they are usually treated as only scholastic. The allusion to 
the widow’s mite – a term translated into the King James Version to designate the 
lowest contemporary unit of currency (the ‘mite’) – is biblical: the widow who gives 
two mites because she cannot afford more is more likely to enter the Kingdom of 
Heaven than the rich man who, though he gives more, still gives a smaller percentage of 
his total wealth. If Jesus Christ relativises the worth of money to what people need and 
can afford, JC, his acronymic heir, extends this result to establish the punishments for 
theft and murder.     
Six million deaths are not the same as – do not ‘add up to’, in a certain 
sense do not ‘exceed’ – one death (‘merely’ one death); nevertheless, what 
does it mean – what exactly does it mean – to say that six million deaths 
are, in ensemble, worse than one death? It is not a paralysis of the faculty 
of reason that leaves us staring helplessly at the question. It is the question 
itself that is at fault. (DBY 206) 
 
This is the first instance where JC uses a parenthetic ‘mere’ to make an ironic comment 
on the term repeated (the second is ‘“mere” rhetoric’). It is reminiscent of arguments 
posed by Sam Durrant and Michael Rothberg in their respective introductions to 
Postcolonial Narrative and the Work of Mourning (2004) and Multidirectional Memory 
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(2009).
66
 Both Durrant and Rothberg stress the importance of not comparing the 
numbers in acts of atrocity and genocide, whether it is the Holocaust or the trans-
Atlantic Slave Trade. Yet the problem for JC is not the pathology of reason in response 
to the question, but the question itself. Here, the unlikely figure of Eichmann arises: 
Eichmann, made to stand in for ‘the six million Jews who died in the Holocaust’, is 
condemned both to death and desecration. But if the automatic response is ‘not enough’, 
JC interestingly turns this ‘not enough’ on its head to show that any effort to assert 
equivalence or inadequacy has already fallen into what Rothberg calls ‘the zero sum 
game’. Ultimately, this is Abraham Stern’s mistake in The Lives of Animals and 
Elizabeth Costello: when Stern refuses to attend the banquet held in Costello’s honour 
as a protest about her use of the Holocaust ‘in a cheap way’ the gesture communicates 
the protest in a meaningful way (EC 94). However, his attempt to reason this in his 
letter, while entirely reasonable, falls into the trap of negotiating the deaths of ‘the 
murdered Jews of Europe’ against the deaths of animals, of speaking about ‘merely’ the 
deaths of animals (EC 94). It is impossible for Eichmann’s death to ‘respond’ to the 
deaths of the Jews of Europe not because reason is rendered pathological before the 
question, but because the question itself involves a pathological desire for a response. 
The banality of Eichmann, according to Hannah Arendt, was the banality of a 
bureaucrat: his idiocies undermined the image of a monster painted by the 
prosecution.
67
 This insight makes a retrospective examination of JC’s statements about 
the Howard government telling: ‘The American administration has raised vengefulness 
to an infernal level, whereas the meanness of the Australians is as yet merely petty’ 
(DBY 44). ‘Merely’ petty in comparison to the Americans or South Africans, not even 
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the grand gesture of suicide can redeem the Australians from their ‘dishonour lite’: a 
faux term indicating a faux state, according to JC, as the state is absolute – ‘if one is in 
dishonour one is in dishonour’ (DBY 43). Again we reach an impasse in the rhetoric. 
Degrees of difference should be acceptable but are not. Any attempt at comparison 
negates the exceptionality of the particular atrocity. Any attempt to compensate is either 
not enough or too much. In this respect, the only strategy writing has left is a rhetorical 
strategy. The meanness of the Australians is both apparently, and insufficiently, petty. 
One death is both apparently, and insufficiently, one death. Questions of judicious 
numbers are neither apparently nor insufficiently scholastic, but are often treated as 
such. JC’s logic, if it is a logic, is a logic that requires a patient hand to unbind it from 
its rhetorical casing. But this unbinding may have the same result as burying X in the 
earth:  
If X had been buried in the earth, the parts of ‘his’ body that had lived 
most intensely, that were most ‘he’, would have rotted away, while ‘his’ 
teeth, which might have felt to have merely been in his care and custody, 
would have survived long into the future. (DBY 61)  
 
The ideas may survive long into the future but the cost would be the parts that live most 
intensely; the parts that cry ‘in spite of myself’. 
JC’s final ‘Softer Opinion’ is on Dostoevsky. In response to the rhetorical 
question, ‘So why does Ivan [Karamazov] make me cry in spite of myself?’, JC decides 
that ‘the answer has nothing to do with ethics or politics, everything to do with rhetoric’ 
(DBY 224-5). It is not Ivan’s reasoning that ‘sweeps’ JC along, but the ‘tones of 
anguish’ in his ‘voice’ (DBY 225). While this gives rise to a number of objections, these 
are simply given as enumerations of exception, formulated by the repetition of ‘even 
as’, which give way in the midst of it all to ‘the space enough to think too, Glory be! At 
last I see it before me, the battle pitched on the highest ground!’ (DBY 225). That Ivan’s 
speech might be ‘mere rhetoric’ is the only objection to be queried, in parenthetic, 
skeptical repetition in inverted commas. 
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The word ‘mere’ is deployed ten times and the word ‘merely’ five in Diary of a 
Bad Year. While it would be erroneous to claim that the novel (or even the essays that 
form part of the novel) may be explained through the exegesis of these instances, they 
do provide interesting points of reference to an argument about Coetzee’s rhetoric, and 
how it interacts with the generic purpose of the essay to write the self-as-matter. Anya 
quips, in response to a discussion with JC about the possibility that she might be 
included in his opinions, ‘if you are going to use me, remember, you owe me an 
appearance fee’, a remark she considers ‘pretty smart […] for a mere Segretaria’ (DBY 
56; 57). But if Anya is deploying the ‘mere’ to a positive ironic effect in an 
interpersonal relationship, the ‘mere’ can also be quite devastating to any conventional 
sense of the self as a political entity. In considering the problem of national shame, JC 
compares political action to ‘mere symbolic actions […] burning the flag, pronouncing 
aloud the words “I abhor the leaders of my country and dissociate myself from them”’ 
(DBY 40). In comparing human reason to ‘virus thinking’, the pure drive or instinct to 
multiply, replicate and take over more host organisms, JC muses that reason ‘has held 
the upper hand a mere instant in evolutionary time’ (DBY 71). ‘In the case of 
Guantanamo Bay’, he notes, ‘it is intended that when prisoners at last emerge from 
incarceration they will be mere shells of me’ (DBY 113). In the essay on Tony Blair, 
placed prior to that on Harold Pinter, JC wonders whether ‘the mere writer (to speak 
just of the writer)’ will be able to satisfy the ‘hunger (a mild hunger, it must be 
admitted)’ felt by ‘ordinary people [...] tired of hearing from their rulers [...] 
declarations that are never quite the truth: a little short of the truth, or else a little beside 
the truth, or else the truth with a spin to it’ (DBY 126). How can the ‘mere writer’ 
satisfy this hunger when his or her grasp of the facts is incomplete, when his or her 
access to ‘the so-called facts’ occurs ‘via media within the political field of forces, and 
when, half the time, he [or she] is because of his [or her] vocation as much interested in 
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the liar and the psychology of the lie as in the truth?’ (DBY 126). These expressions of 
‘mereness’ do not exceed their categories, as does Anya’s ‘mere Segretaria’. Rather, 
they suggest that the self-as-matter cannot exceed these categories when they are treated 
as political entities. Here, the ‘mere’ becomes the marker of shame. Given that one of 
the central concerns of kynicism was the workings of shamelessness (as discussed in the 
opening to this chapter), we need to address this relationship between ‘mere’ and 
‘shame’. Timothy Bewes, in The Event of Postcolonial Shame, provides one account for 
Coetzee’s ‘shame’ in Diary of a Bad Year: that it comes from his position as a ‘mere’ 
writer who falls into the gap between his ethical claims and his actual writing.  
Bewes identifies this gap in Coetzee’s commentary on his work as that which 
subsists ‘between the gesture of ethical “disavowal” and the authority that is 
presupposed and demonstrated in the very capacity to make such a gesture’.68 Bewes 
locates this gap in the structural incongruity developed by Coetzee in Age of Iron, and 
in the response to Age of Iron Coetzee gives to David Attwell in one of the interviews of 
Doubling the Pointː  
What matters is that the contest is staged, that the dead have their say, even 
those who speak from a totally untenable historical position [...] What is of 
importance in what I have just said is the phrasingː the phrases is staged, is 
heardˑ not should be staged, should be heard. There is no ethical 
imperative that I claim access to. Elizabeth is the one who believes in 
should, who believes in believes in. (DP 250) 
 
Bewes considers this response to be disingenuous and locates ‘shame’ in the gap, 
between disavowing access to ethical imperatives and asserting the authority necessary 
to make such imperatives, that this disingenuity creates. While it provides a provocative 
counter-response to the tendency to read the passage as a meta-ethical refusal to pass 
judgment on the work, we will steer Bewes’s reading of the passage away from its 
function in Bewes’s wider project on ‘postcolonial shame’. Shame, as Bewes argues, ‘is 
an event of incommensurabilityː a profound disorientation of the subject by the 
                                                          
68
 Bewes, Postcolonial Shame, 142. 
- 253 - 
confrontation with an object it cannot comprehend’; even those texts that are explicitly 
concerned with shame in theme and form will also carry a second, unnamed, secret 
shame, ‘as an unspoken, embodied relation to its own actuality as a piece of writing’.69 
While there is much to be gained from Bewes’s fascinating analysis of shame, a 
difficult tension emerges in his treatment of Coetzee as JC, when the former is a writer 
who is careful to talk about his own treatment of shame by mediating it through the 
opinions of JC. Coetzee’s openness to this topic does not preclude the existence of an 
‘unnamed shame’ in the act of writing; rather it suggests the possibility that a certain 
ludic openness to the inevitability of disavowal is at work in Coetzee’s texts.70 
Moreover, it is a feature of Coetzee’s criticism that it always concerns itself with the 
point at which the writer reveals an unconscious desire, anxiety or ‘shame’ at work 
when most concerned to unlock unconscious desires, anxieties or shames.
71
 This would 
suggest a certain ‘gap’ between the manifestations of shame in Coetzee’s work (as 
theme and as event) as Bewes reads it and the degree to which Coetzee is already 
playing with the voices that articulate this shame and the place where it is ‘staged’.72 
This is evident in Bewes’s identification of a conflation in Coetzee’s ethical disavowal 
of ‘saying’ and ‘staging’. For Bewes reads the line ‘what matters is that the contest is 
staged, that the dead have their say’ as tautologous: ‘If all that mattered were that [...] 
there would be no reason to stage either the contest or the withholding of a solution – 
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for the work of the novel is the staging, not the saying’.73 But is the ‘contest [being] 
staged’ equivalent to ‘the dead having their say’ in Coetzee’s subordination of two 
dependent clauses to ‘what matters is’? This question also opens up a further inquiry 
into the stylistic function of dependent clauses in Coetzee’s work, but for the moment 
we will focus on the implications of Bewes’s analysis. The possible points of contact 
between the staging and the saying, the giving voice to the novelist’s countervoices, 
would subordinate saying to staging, poetry to drama. But that also suggests a 
conflation of the voice with the place of the voice, that the all-too-obvious need to speak 
from a place means that speaking is inextricably linked to the conditions of that place. 
This kynical locality has been the declarative mode of much of Coetzee’s oral 
presentations (the subject of his talk ‘The Novel Today’ and the concern of his 
‘Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech’, but also evoked in the context-driven narrative of 
Elizabeth Costello’s speaking engagements and the catachresis in ‘He and His Man’). 
Coetzee’s performances, however, have always also challenged this assumption: there is 
the possibility of speaking about something other than the place from where he speaks, 
and the proof is that he is doing just that. It is this split that is observable in the slight 
slippage of Coetzee’s dependent clauses, from ‘staging’ something to ‘saying’ 
something.  In the tradition of Foucault’s ‘stoic mutations of kynic life’, Bewes seeks to 
‘normalise’ Coetzee’s treatment of shame against the (inverted) ideal of postcolonial 
shame: the shame postcolonial writers feel in the act of writing. Although Bewes does 
not distinguish between the shame of writing and the shame of publishing that writing, 
there is clearly something to his critique of postcolonial writing as a writing thoroughly 
engaged with, and held captive by, its sense of shame. However, there is a ‘minimal 
difference’ in Bewes’s engagement with the shame of postcolonial writing in general, 
and his engagement with Coetzee. The shame of other postcolonial writers is a shame of 
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form or of time, but Coetzee’s shame is an ‘event of shame’, which, given the book’s 
title, leads the reader to the conclusion that this is Bewes’s real site of contestation. 
However, if Bewes can note a failure to address structural issues of shame in other 
writers’ thematics of shame, his treatment of Coetzee necessitates an event: the 
reconstruction of a concealed moment that has been effaced. Bewes’s ingenuity in 
reading an event of shameful occlusion, despite Coetzee’s structural and thematic 
exposure of shame’s function, is useful because it identifies the minimal difference 
between Coetzee’s treatment of shame and its treatment by other postcolonial writers. 
This minimal difference is between the modesty of stoic ideals and the shamelessness of 
kynic practice. Where other writers seek to obscure a structural shame that reveals itself 
in their writing, Coetzee exposes the structural elements of shame precisely because 
they call into question traditional rules of propriety. The ‘staging’ of shame is not the 
‘saying’ of shame as Bewes attempts to show, but they are connected, since speaking 
about shame is always intimately linked to acting it out.   
We see an example of this slippage from staging to saying in an interview in 
Doubling the Point, which also serves to show a certain kynical engagement with 
unconcealment, need, diacriticism and shame: ‘Let me add, entirely parenthetically, that 
I, as a person, as a personality, am overwhelmed, that my thinking is thrown into 
confusion and helplessness, by the fact of suffering in the world, and not only human 
suffering’ (DP 248). The content of the phrase extends suffering beyond the human, 
which Derek Attridge identifies as sympathetic to the themes of both Disgrace and 
Coetzee’s Tanner lectures.74 However, there is something equally important happening 
on the level of sentence structure.  
The modifying sub-clause, ‘I, as a person, as a personality’, registers the co-
existence in the ‘I’ of a person and a personality. This ‘I’, both person and personality, 
                                                          
74 Attridge, J.M. Coetzee, 192. 
- 256 - 
is overwhelmed by the fact of suffering. The ‘overwhelming’ quality of ‘the fact of 
suffering’ is precisely the response of shame in Bewes’s terms; this ‘overwhelming’ of 
the person and personality leads to the throwing of his thinking ‘into confusion and 
helplessness’.75 Thinking gives way to Being, especially when it is exposed to the 
facticity of ‘suffering’. The crucial, dangerous, supplementarity of the ‘fact of suffering’ 
is that it is ‘not only human suffering’.76 Before, we may not have realised that we 
assumed that the adjective, ‘human’, came before ‘suffering’ in the phrase, ‘the fact of 
suffering’ because ‘suffering’ is always already ‘human suffering’ in anthropocentric 
universalism. After, the subordination of other forms of suffering to ‘human’ is all the 
more obvious for being noted in ‘mere’ supplement to the ‘fact of suffering’. This 
supplementarity also inflects our reading of the whole passage, which, after all, is a 
supplement that Coetzee ‘adds, entirely parenthetically’. The supplement affects our 
understanding of the double-term ‘person-personality’, and the parenthetical confession 
serve to justify misgivings about Bewes’s reading of Coetzee’s shame. 
  The effect of the run-on phrases, ‘as a person, as a personality’, appears at first 
to be a refinement of the holistic ‘person’ into the psychological ‘personality’. This 
corresponds to the idea that the ‘I’, as a personality, feels overwhelmed. However, the 
‘feeling’, though it may develop psychologically, is ‘felt’ in the body, which requires a 
broader term than simply the ‘personality’. Hence, ‘person’ is necessary as it describes 
the experience of the personality within the body: the body in this case being a 
supplement of the ‘person’ – that is, the fact of the person is ‘not only’ the personality 
of the person. This is entirely congruent with Coetzee’s references to the facticity of the 
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body, subsequent work on the body in Coetzee’s work by Attwell and Wright, inter 
alia, and the embodied quality of shame as proposed by Bewes. Here we have a 
classical kynicism that prioritises the functions of the body. There is, however, an 
additional quality to this phrase that bears thinking about. For Coetzee is, by 1991, not 
simply a person with a personality, but also a literary personality for whom the person is 
‘mere’ supplement: he has become a ‘name’. Moreover, he is a literary personality who 
will lend his name increasingly in support of causes, while, increasingly, giving voice to 
the problems associated with literary personalities who unproblematically lend their 
names to causes. This is the development of a modern kynicism: the manipulation of 
celebrity status as itself a manifest body, manipulable through a conscious self-parody 
of stylistic habits and the exposure of that self to the shame of not living up to the 
expectations of a human being, not of a postcolonial author. This tension is caught in 
the anguish of Paul Rayment, when he says to Elizabeth Costello: 
In my earlier life I did not speak as freely about myself as I do today […] 
Decency held me back, decency or shame […] Since my accident I have 
begun to let some of that reticence slip. If you don’t speak now, I say to 
myself, when will you speak? (SM 156) 
 
If this confession is immediately subjected to Elizabeth Costello’s criticism, it 
nevertheless captures something of the anxiety at work in the ‘mere’ shame of JC’s 
opinions. The ‘mere’ exposures uncover something that Bewes, in his analysis, chooses 
not to recognise: that Coetzee’s shame is itself a rhetorical exposure. Shame functions 
like an inverse confession. The more one seeks to justify it, the more it retreats away 
from the heart of the discussion. But it is also, by its nature, hyperbolic. ‘Mere’ shame is 
impossible, since it is necessarily overwhelming. So, if the essays, as self-as-matter, are 
generically overwhelmed by a sense of shame, JC’s shameful treatment of the genre is 
rhetorically subverted by ‘mere’ litotes or understatement.   
Clearly all these ‘meres’ subvert a stoic outcome, whether modest or shameful. 
No value system structures the freedom to speak. ‘Mere’ parodies the ‘modesty’ of the 
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stoic, turning the self-as-matter into a kynical exposure of both values and their obvious 
insufficiency. But what prevents this parody from falling into cynicism, which, as we 
quoted in Chapter 1, Coetzee calls the ‘denial of all values’? We know that Coetzee 
wants to avoid cynicism when we find him asking how a ‘mere writer’ satisfies the need 
to speak a truth, when, worryingly, all that is available is a lie. But shame no longer 
seems like a viable source of stability, since its hyperbolic function is undercut by the 
litotic ‘mere’. The solution that emerges for JC also returns us to our discussion of 
monism and dualism in the photographs of Beckett. JC considers the difference between 
singing and the military voice: nineteenth century art-song, ‘meant to convey moral 
nobility’, stages ‘the contrast between the mere physical body and the voice that 
transcends the body’, while the military voice uses ‘the voice in a rapid, flat, mechanical 
manner, without pause for thought’ (DBY 131; 132). The latter gives rise to machinic 
responses, such as that he receives from a librarian at Johns Hopkins University 
Library: ‘There was nothing she sought from me in the exchange [...] not even the 
salving moment of mutual recognition that two ants give each other as they brush 
antennae in passing’ (DBY 132). Here, not even the ‘mere social interaction’ described 
between John and the newspaper man in Youth takes place, so fully has the military 
voice taken control. But, crucially, there is a third option in which the voice does not 
transcend ‘the mere physical body’ or remain ‘mere social interaction’: birdsong. 
What Cartesian nonsense to think of birdsong as pre-programmed cries 
uttered by birds to advertise their presence to the opposite sex, and so 
forth! Each bird-cry is a full-hearted release of the self into the air, 
accompanied by such joy as we can barely comprehend. (DBY 132) 
 
Birdsong is neither the mechanical voice of drive, nor the separation of the body and the 
‘song [...] born as soul’, but integration of body and voice (DBY 131). We have a 
solution, in birdsong, to Coetzee’s dilemma over the monism or dualism at work in 
Beckett’s photographs. It ‘announces itself’ like the reproduction of Robert Doisneau’s 
photograph, ‘The Kiss’, on the wall of a hotel room in Burnie, Tasmania: ‘Their kiss is 
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not just one of passion: with this kiss love announces itself’ (DBY 173). Moreover, it is 
an announcement that is chosen by a disembodied voice that JC echoes as follows: 
‘Though a mere hotelkeeper, I too believe in love, can recognize the god when I see him 
– is that what its presence says? Love: what the heart aches for’ (DBY 174). The ‘mere 
bodies’ of Guantanamo, the ‘mere Segretaria’, the ‘mere writer’, the ‘mere hotelkeeper’: 
all these are terms that highlight the various cases as being ‘more than merely’ or 
turning their expected ‘mereness’ into an ironic counterpart to what they are or can do. 
Therefore, while Diary of a Bad Year is undoubtedly a text concerned with the 
workings of ‘shame’, and its relationship to ‘citizenship’ and ‘responsibility’, it is also 
concerned with the way that characters overcome the shame of their ‘mereness’, the 
kynical unconcealment, despite traditional propriety. Only by addressing the material 
conditions of this shame, in the synchronic context of JC’s essays as works in progress 
and under review, can Coetzee address written traditions of decency and shame; 
traditions that are also performed in the diatribes of Elizabeth Costello.  
Elizabeth Costello 
 
Elizabeth Costello is a proper noun that quilts together a text or series of texts that have 
been rather difficult to characterise. Part campus novel, part lecture series, part 
epistolary response, part literary homage, the text(s) appear(s) to have so many parts 
that constituting a whole is remarkably difficult. Recalling that it is a compilation of a 
series of occasional pieces, read as public lectures or written as contributions to essay 
collections, makes it all the more difficult to write about it as a single text. Responses 
since its publication have tended to read it as a single text, but only by using one form 
as an original base against which to compare the other, supplementary, form: either it is 
a novel, as in its 2003 published form, or it is a series of lectures cum readings that 
Coetzee stitched together to publish as a complete work after the fact of their 
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performance. The relatively few textual changes Coetzee made in transforming the latter 
into the former are noted; the respective differences of form are extolled; criticism 
continues with the job at hand. Yet few critics have focused on the manifestly different 
work the two forms concern themselves with, and when they have, this difference 
serves to describe a generic shift, rather than imagining a common end via different 
means.  
One response serves as a point of departure for the effect of the lecture-readings: 
Derek Attridge’s description of the auditorium in Princeton when Coetzee delivered the 
first of his two Tanner lectures (later published as The Lives of Animals).
77
 Attridge 
suggests the general sense of surprise when Coetzee started to speak, though cannot 
recall any audible reaction. There was no break in the fictional tissue and no preliminary 
remarks. Gareth Cornwell makes a bolder proposition for the reception of ‘He and His 
Man’ – ‘the audience must have wondered what the blazes he was on about’ – though 
the video of the Nobel lecture shows nothing more than attentive faces. Coetzee in the 
latter instance did make preliminary remarks about reading Robinson Crusoe as a boy of 
eight or nine, which he begins with a gloss on the title: ‘Before I read to you the lecture 
“He and His Man”, or “His Man and He”, I am not sure which […]’.78 What is clear, 
however, is that little affective is said in either analysis. These diatribes do not 
precipitate a manifest response by the audience. The lack of an ‘audible’ surprise 
suggests a certain expectation by Coetzee’s audience to the event of a ‘Coetzee 
lecture/reading’. Surprise they may have felt, but this surprise did not translate into a 
more noticeable shock or anxiety. The formal innovation of the Elizabeth Costello 
lectures as an alternative form of pedagogic practice is not found in its shock tactics. 
                                                          
77 Attridge, J.M. Coetzee, 193. 
78 Gareth Cornwell, ‘ “He and His Man”: Allegory and Catachresis in Coetzee’s Nobel Lecture’, English 
In Africa, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2007), 97; Coetzee, ‘He and His Man’, Nobelprize.org. Accessed: 30 November 
2012. http://www.nobelprize.org/mediaplayer/index.php?id=555 
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Michael Bell has written persuasively for their consideration as a critique of 
pedagogical practice.
79
 Costello’s arguments do not face up to the challenges posed by 
her fictional interlocutors and neither listener nor reader is left with any resolution to the 
problems raised. Bell notes that this places a text like Elizabeth Costello in a genealogy 
of European literature that begins with Goethe’s Werther. This genealogy reacts to the 
utopian educational system proposed in Rousseau’s Emile by examining the anxieties 
such a system would provoke in teachers. Costello’s anxieties are not those of teaching 
the wrong lesson, but of being unable to teach the most important lesson of all: how to 
be sympathetic to fellow creatures. We may agree with aspects of Bell’s response, not 
least because he identifies these texts as forming a hitherto undisclosed tradition rather 
than consciously striving to be part of an existing generic tradition. However, there is a 
crucial aspect of authorial subjectivity that supplements this pedagogical aspect which 
needs to be foregrounded. It plays with a certain structural irony and is premised on 
something coded into the texts of both Diary of a Bad Year and Elizabeth Costello, but 
is most apparent in the texts’ presentations as lectures: a literary occasionalism. This 
literary occasionalism is not demonstrative, pedagogical, a straightforward form of 
rhetorical persuasion or an art of debate. This is what makes it parrhesiatic in 
Foucault’s sense of the term. For ‘we cannot situate parrhesia in an end envisaged by 
the discourse [...] or [in] the aim which the true discourse seeks to achieve vis-a-vis the 
interlocutor, but to the speaker, or rather to the risk that truth-telling opens up for the 
speaker’.80 It is therefore as much about insisting on the risks of truthfulness for the 
writer, as it is about playing with an audience.      
Coetzee’s audiences can be played with in a way that Beckett’s audience at the 
Coconut Lounge in 1953 could not be, but Beckett’s audience at Ohio State University 
                                                          
79 Michael Bell, Open Secrets: Literature, Education and Authority from J.J. Rousseau to J.M. Coetzee 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007) 
80 Foucault, The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the College De France 1983-1984, ed. A. I. 
Davidson, trans. G. Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 56.  
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in 1981 could: the literary creation has already been apprehended as the double of the 
author, because the author is already ‘known’. Coetzee could reply to questions at the 
Tanner lectures by deferring – ‘I think what Elizabeth Costello would say is that …’81 – 
but this deferral is made on a superficial level; there is a disavowal that both author and 
audience already know the actual authorship of the lecture. Coetzee is playing at being 
Costello’s man, when Costello is really Coetzee’s woman. This argument is manifestly 
true and completely contradicts our attempts through this chapter to propose a Coetzee 
concerned particularly with surfaces. Audiences want to understand the performance of 
opinion, whether in lecture or essay form, as coming from beneath the surface. Coetzee 
recognises this in his disparagement of his own ‘Opinions’, since this beneath the 
surface is often merely what it is: the exposure of traditional values. We have a 
correlative disparagement in the short story ‘As a Woman Grows Older’.  
Elizabeth Costello is visiting her daughter who lives in the south of France. 
When asked whether she is writing on brain science she replies: ‘No […] I still confine 
myself to fiction, you will be relieved to hear. I have not yet descended to hawking my 
opinions around. The Opinions of Elizabeth Costello, revised edition’.82 In Diary of a 
Bad Year, JC has already done this. Paul Patton prefaces his essay ‘Coetzee’s Opinions’ 
with an aphorism from Nietzsche’s Human, All Too Human:  
Final opinion [Meinung] about opinions. – One should either conceal 
one’s opinions or conceal oneself behind one’s opinions. He who does 
otherwise does not know the ways of the world or belongs to the order of 
holy foolhardiness.
83
 
 
This tension, as Patton goes on to show, is between the way opinions conceal the self 
and the way this feature is used to construct a public self: ‘Concealment behind 
opinions is a recurrent theme in Diary’.84 Only in the instance where opinion and self 
                                                          
81 Attridge, J.M. Coetzee, 193. 
82 Coetzee, ‘As a Woman Grows Older’, New York Review of Books, 15 January 2004: 11-14, 13. 
83 Nietzsche qtd. Paul Patton, ‘Coetzee’s Opinions’, Strong Opinions: 53-62, 53.  
84 Patton, ‘Coetzee’s Opinions’, 59. 
- 263 - 
coincide (in Nietzsche’s exceptional man), do opinions ‘cease from being public and 
become something other than masks, finery and camouflage’.85 Where opinion and self 
coincide, we may reach a form of ‘authenticity’, but we also realize there is a radical 
instability in such authenticity. What is authentic is the unconcealment of concealment, 
the veracity of habitual style, and a taut treatment of irony as a necessary tool that 
nevertheless runs the risk of always implying a depth.  
We can observe the dangers involved in relying too heavily on irony in Johan 
Geertsema’s consideration of Coetzee’s deliberate staging of an ironic non-position.86 
Geertsema argues that Coetzee creates a non-position through his ironic deployment of 
people in authority, which allows him to critique politics without entering into its 
domain. ‘Why is it so hard to say anything about politics’, he quotes from an essay by 
JC, ‘from outside politics? Why can there be no discourse about politics that is not itself 
political?’87 Geertsema reaches towards the notion that Coetzee bypasses politics to 
address systemic problems in ‘the political’ by creating an ‘ironic non-position’. The 
problem with the ‘ironic non-position’ is that it neglects Coetzee’s desire to make a 
political statement: Coetzee does protest in his own words similar concerns to those 
uttered in Diary of a Bad Year and Elizabeth Costello, even if we find these 
protestations filled with anxiety about making a definitive statement. Geertsema 
destabilises any fixed points of protest by arguing that it is a novel that ‘responds to 
politics without power’. The consequence of this reading is the discovery of a non-
position ‘beside’ the surface of Diary. What it shuttles past is the breathtaking 
complexity of this surface, since, for Geertsema, the dialogic nature of the novel simply 
opens up this gap to the non-position beside the narrative. While Coetzee does perhaps 
create a literary non-position through a multivalent irony, he is doing so precisely 
                                                          
85 Ibid. 
86 Johan Geertsema, ‘Coetzee’s Diary of a Bad Year, Politics, and the Problem of Position’, Twentieth 
Century Literature, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Spring, 2011): 70-85. 
87 Coetzee qtd. Geertsema, ‘Coetzee’s Diary of a Bad Year’, 70. 
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because he does want to make a political statement and wishes ‘merely’ to make that 
statement on his own ground.  
If the cosmopolitan purpose is particularly political in Diary, it spreads across 
the whole of human culture in Elizabeth Costello. For instance, Dean Arendt 
acknowledges that ‘dietary taboos do not have to be mere customs. I will accept that 
underlying them are genuine moral concerns’ (EC 89). Arendt’s effort to interpret 
dietary taboos as more significant than ‘mere customs’ has its own kind of ironic 
blindness. By imagining them to be masking ‘genuine moral concerns’, he ignores the 
‘superficial’ element of Costello’s argument: that the moral concern is in the very 
behaviour itself. As the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre writes in defense of his Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? 
the philosophical conversation begins from, and from time to time renews 
an examination of, the beliefs and concepts of the social group within 
whose shared life the activities of philosophical enquiry are carried on. So 
that the philosophy both draws upon and contributes to the other activities 
of that particular social and cultural order.
88
 
 
Philosophical concerns are primary to the thinking of philosophers because they are 
seeking to solve these concerns, but also because it is the habit of philosophers to have 
philosophical concerns.
89
 What we should take note of here is MacIntyre’s notion that 
ethical systems evolve in dialogue with the particular culture that produces them, rather 
than according to absolutist, universal values. This suggests that ‘mere customs’ inform 
the ‘genuine moral concerns’ of Dean Arendt, and that there is a need to engage with 
precisely that ‘surface’ material, so quickly discarded in favour of deeper meaning. The 
play of Elizabeth Costello’s lessons – lehren in German, which is to say, doctrine or 
cant – is not entirely about irony or about uncovering the received knowledge on which 
Costello’s thoughts are based, or the process by which this doctrine is received (via 
                                                          
88 Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Précis of Whose Justice? Which Rationality?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Mar 1991): 149-152. 
89 Richard Northover has written convincingly of MacIntyre’s influence on Coetzee in J.M. Coetzee and 
Animal Rights. 
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lecture or published volume), but about the surface transmission of a mere tactic or a 
mere question.  
Costello remarks on one such literary tactic in Homer’s Odyssey: ‘The favourite 
ram of the king of Ithaca, so runs the story, yet treated in the end as a mere bag of 
blood, to be cut open and poured from’ (EC 211). The ram may be important in the 
story behind the narrative, but, for the narrative surface, it is a ‘mere bag of blood’. 
Coetzee will make use of a similar tactic in Costello’s encounter with Emmanuel 
Egudu. Here the favourite ram is the African novel. The story of the African novel 
becomes ‘a mere bag of blood’ to be sacrificed to the narrative question of African 
cultural identities before colonialism. ‘Is the novel possible without novel-writing’, 
Egudu asks. ‘Did we in Africa have a novel before our friends the colonizers appeared 
on our doorstep? For the time being let me merely propose the question’ (EC 40). Later, 
when speaking of Cheikh Hamidou’s claim to ‘an oral tradition’, Egudu sees nothing 
‘mystical’, ‘metaphysical’ or ‘racist’ in this; ‘he merely gives proper weight to those 
intangibles of culture which, because they are not easily pinned down in words, are 
often passed over’ (EC 44). Of course, this ‘merely’ indicates that Egudu is using an 
irony as powerful as Coetzee’s: the ‘intangibles of culture’ are evoked through the 
gestures of everyday life, gestures which Egudu goes on to enumerate. These gestures 
are obviously important in ‘merely’ considering Egudu’s question, since they expose, 
rather than conceal, the way that narratives conceal, rather than expose, a tendency to 
pass over the significances of the story (i.e. the favourite ram) in favour of a narrative 
progression (i.e. ‘a mere bag of blood’). This exposure has its corollary in the ‘mere’ 
defence Costello makes for the humanities in Africa. ‘I was merely saying’, Costello 
responds to a question about the outlook for the humanities, ‘that our readers – our 
younger readers in particular – come to us with a certain hunger’, a hunger she describes 
earlier as a search ‘for guidance, guidance in perplexity’ (EC 127). Of course, Costello 
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never ‘merely’ says anything, but her identification of this hunger in the reader is more 
interesting than its implications. Exposing this desire, characterised as a hunger, reduces 
it to a presentation of ‘what simply is’ but also detracts from the narrative tendency to 
make use of it as if this desire could somehow justify the place of the humanities in 
Africa. 
We can begin to identify a connection between the desire to expose (a generic 
quality of the diatribe and the essay) and a desire to present things as they are (a 
linguistic quality of ‘mere’ and ‘merely’). How can this be reconciled with Costello’s 
argument for censorship in ‘The Problem of Evil’, when she condemns Paul West’s The 
Very Rich Hours of Count Von Staffenberg? Is this a return to a ‘stoic’ modesty or is it a 
‘cynical’ attack on a book that she does not like? In discussing what censorship protects 
the reader from, she draws a similitude with a genie in a bottle, a genie that should not 
be let out: ‘The wisdom of the similitude, the wisdom of centuries (that is why she 
prefers to think in similitudes rather than reason things out), is that it is silent on the life 
the genie leads shut up in the bottle. It merely says the world would be better if the 
genie remained imprisoned’ (EC 167). The similitude is ‘merely’ what it says it is: a 
comparable image. It has no depth of argument, nor height of intellectual abstraction. 
Although not arbitrary, the similitude relies on a magisterial gesture because it is its 
own performative justification. But, because it relies on the commitment of the 
magisterial gesture, and nothing else, it also gives rise to anxieties. Thus, Costello, 
when faced with the prospect of delivering her damning indictment of the The Very Rich 
Hours of Count Von Staffenberg to an audience including the author, is riddled with 
doubts about the substance of her argument. This is also why she is sure her doubts 
about her paper would pass if she ‘could merely glance again at those pages’ (EC 168). 
‘We must be wary of horrors’, she will nevertheless go on to argue, ‘such as you 
describe in your book. We as writers. Not merely for the sake of our readers but out of 
- 267 - 
concern for ourselves’ (EC 171). She thinks of the women ‘in those intimate, over-
intimate photographs from the European war’, who were ‘not as old as she, merely 
haggard from malnutrition and fright’ (EC 178). Costello’s problem is that she cannot 
go back to the experience of reading the novel, any more than the ‘merely haggard’ 
women in the photographs, with litotic pathos, can escape from their fixity within a 
particular historical discourse about the Holocaust and their ‘meaning’ as photographic 
evidence. 
Such litotes recurs in Costello’s descriptions of alternative, animal holocausts. 
Looking out from MacQuarrie Island, Costello recalls what she has read about this ‘hub 
of the penguin industry’ in a similarly litotic fashion: ‘not clubbed to death, merely 
herded with sticks up a gangplank and over the edge into the seething cauldron’ (EC 
55). The arguments of the penguin industry shift responsibility for murder from the 
perpetrators to the systems. Costello exposes the hypocrisy of these arguments. The 
‘mere herding’, as with the ‘merely haggard’ women, undercuts many of the arguments 
employed against the banality of Costello’s reasoning in Elizabeth Costello by showing 
that it is precisely the banality of human action that leads to atrocity. ‘What if, instead 
of going to Cambridge, Ramanujan had merely sat at home and thought his thoughts?’ 
she wonders (EC 68). This question has its correlative in Costello’s decision to give her 
lectures and JC’s decision to write his essays. Again, we might reply with Paul 
Rayment’s words, that they do this because there is a need to respond. This need to 
respond requires some justification other than the academic, especially in the agoran of 
the lecture and the essay. But the immediate, irritable reaching after justification is 
exactly what the ‘mere’ short-circuits. 
We find moments in which the word ‘merely’ deprecates the significance of 
academic discourse, without providing this liberatory justification. Costello asks:  
Is the difference between G.H. Hardy, on the one hand, and the dumb 
Ramanujan and the dumb Red Sally, on the other, merely that the former is 
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conversant with the protocols of academic mathematics while the latter are 
not? (EC 69) 
 
‘Mere’ facility with the discourse of the establishment is possibly the (minimal) 
difference between the intellectual and the idiot, the genius and the beast. Costello is 
herself recipient of the critical brunt of this logic when Norma rebukes John: ‘This is the 
ground your mother has chosen. Those are her terms. I am merely responding’ (EC 93). 
Of course, Norma is not ‘merely responding’. She is mounting a sophisticated 
philosophical argument that, in part, is designed to remind the audience attending the 
second Tanner lecture of what Elizabeth Costello has said in the first Tanner lecture, 
and, in the main, addresses the problem of claiming an embodied irrationality as an 
argumentative position without a lived dimension: ‘the sort of thing a person would say 
who has never set foot inside a mental institution and seen what people look like who 
have really withdrawn from reason’ (EC 93). Although this can be taken as an 
empiricist claim, John identifies it as ‘rationalism’, which suggests we should read it 
less as a claim to evidence-based logic and more as the problem inherent in any 
argument that simply evokes an ironic non-position to a binary like ‘reason’/‘outside-
reason’. But Costello worries that recourse to a philosophical language about animals 
will not rise above debates on ‘whether they have rights in respect of us or whether we 
merely have duties in respect of them’, precisely because it does not allow itself to 
engage with this binary: ‘Even Kant does not pursue, with regard to animals, the 
implications of his intuition that reason may be not the being of the universe but on the 
contrary merely the being of the human brain’ (EC 67).  
Kant’s failure to move beyond the presence of his dog in Groundwork for the 
Metaphysics of Morals to the thinking of his dog is not a new problem to the discourse 
of philosophy. Even ‘Descartes did not invent the idea that animals belong to a different 
order from humankind: he merely formalized it in a new way’ (EC 106). But one cannot 
decry academic discourse as ‘mere’ discourse either. Or rather, one can, as long as one 
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is sure of the manifold significances of the word ‘mere’. Philosophy cannot simply 
exclude the non-rational and the animal (or conflate these two distinct categories), and 
so does not: it attempts to explain these away as ‘merely’ objects within the realm of the 
discourse. In this, laws of philosophy about how animals function have a generic 
correlative in the laws of the gods about humans. The gods, according to Costello, 
‘cannot put us out of their minds [...] That, finally, is why they do not declare a ban on 
sex with us, merely make up rules about where and in what form and how often’ (EC 
189). The rules gods make up, like the conditions of Coetzee’s laboratory, are 
conditioned in ways the gods themselves do not understand: through the adverbs and 
adjectives that dictate how these rules are carried out.  
In the final lesson, ‘At the Gate’, Costello wonders whether the man in the lodge 
is her judge or ‘merely the first in a long line leading to who knows what featureless 
functionary in what chancellery in what castle’ (EC 194). Her first attempt at a 
statement of belief does not even warrant attention from a higher authority; the man at 
the desk ‘merely shakes his head and lets the page fall to the floor’. The light she sees 
beyond the gate is not unimaginable, ‘merely brilliant’ (EC 196). After a book of 
judgements, Costello makes the surprising claim ‘not to judge what is given to me. I 
merely write down the words and then test them, test their soundness, to make sure I 
heard them right’ (EC 199). In defence of her lack of beliefs, she claims beliefs are 
‘inappropriate to the function’ of a ‘secretary of the invisible’: ‘a secretary should 
merely be in readiness, waiting for the call’ (EC 200). ‘Her books teach nothing’, she 
realises, ‘preach nothing; they merely spell out, as clearly as they can, how people lived 
in a certain time and place. More modestly put, they spell out how one person lived [...] 
the person whom she, to herself, calls she, and whom others call Elizabeth Costello’ 
(EC 207-8). This particular cliché has taken ‘Borges y yo’ and applied it to a fictional 
character. But there is a link to Coetzee as well. In his opening remarks to his Nobel 
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Prize Lecture, he qualifies the I that read Robinson Crusoe in 1948 or 1949 as ‘the one I 
call I’.90 Coetzee has always tended to mark the instability of pronouns in his works, as 
has been argued by Clarkson in J.M. Coetzee: Countervoices. But his rigorous marking 
of ‘I’, whether against a ‘he’ or by subordination to ‘the one’, also provides us with a 
crucial means of understanding Coetzee as a kynical cosmopolitan: the doubling of the 
self is the only way established writers have of approaching the representation of 
presence within their texts, while maintaining an awareness of the impossibility of 
presence in writing. This means reciprocally that the representation of presence, insofar 
as it acknowledges its own impossible paradox, also lays bare as fallacious the claims of 
authors to an authentic presence within texts that do not operate within this anxious 
matrix. Even if they are failures of the performance of presence, the enactment of 
‘mere’ rhetoric in Coetzee’s oral and essayistic work shows us ‘merely’ what we knew 
already: that there is a split between an author, his creations and their opinions, where 
the holder of the opinions is necessarily vague. It is ‘shown’, not said; a ‘mere’ 
demonstration of what, ironically, we already knew. 
But this cynical reading fails to satisfy, because it reduces Coetzee’s project to 
‘mere play’. If our examination of Coetzee’s consideration of ‘mere action’ and genre 
teaches us anything, it is that no ‘mere’ is just what it seems. Neither does it disguise a 
hidden, deeper purpose. Rather, Coetzee’s ‘mere rhetoric’ forces us to reconceive the 
political and ethical bases upon which we receive his work, not through its high ideals, 
but in the dialectic between these ideals and the all-too-evident response they require. 
                                                          
90 Coetzee, ‘He and His Man’. 
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Conclusion 
Neither Stoic nor Cynic 
 
What remains is to establish the state of our key terms (stoicism, cynicism, kynicism 
and cosmopolitanism). By now, we have established a common infrastructure for all 
three writers: the recurrence of certain technical devices (metaphor and enumeration, 
image and voice, genre and modification). These devices, operating in non-sublative 
dialectic, allow us to identify an aesthetic consistency. This consistency is 
infrastructural, rather than structural, since the devices are not simply repeated. In other 
words, the devices bespeak a strategic tendency in each writer. They are plastic; they 
change their form. This plasticity of device mirrors a plasticity of self-representation in 
the late style of Borges, Beckett and Coetzee. Plastic self-representation becomes 
inflected with political significance, which mutates over time. Notwithstanding, plastic 
self-representation retains a consistency amidst this mutability. But how does this 
aesthetic, political and subjective plasticity affect our reading of a cosmopolitan care for 
the self that concerns itself not simply with the self, but with the other?  
Here, we need to think through the consequences of this plasticity for 
cosmopolitanism. What we have been working towards coincides with work by our 
subterranean companion in this thesis: Catherine Malabou. For Malabou, the tradition of 
cosmopolitanism that finds its definition in hospitality towards the other, the ‘stoic’ 
tradition in this thesis, resists globalisation because rather than ‘originating in a 
substantial self-sufficiency, cosmopolitanism […] responds in its organization to a visit, 
the very first visit of the other person’.1 In other words, our characterisation of 
hospitality’s ‘stoic system’ proves itself anti-systemic and open to the other. Even if we 
                                                          
1 Catherine Malabou, Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction, trans. 
Caroline Shread (New York: Columbia UP, 2010), 73. 
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align Kantian hospitality with a systemic treatment of the other, Derrida’s cosmopolitan 
treatment of the other, following Levinas, seems to eschew stoic system. Why do we 
argue this unconditional opening of the self to the other is systemised? Malabou 
answers, ‘Cosmopolitanism responds in its structure to the ethical injunction of the past 
as the fact of the other’s passage, that is, as the “trace”’.2 Here, for Malabou, 
cosmopolitanism is not plastic because ‘form always appears to shut out otherness, to 
reify it, to reduce otherness to presence and evidence of the same’.3 Plasticity, whose 
manipulations of form allow the self to care for itself, is wholly concerned with the self 
at the expense of the other. Therefore, ‘hospitality defines the ethical and political place 
where form and trace are separated’.4 Either one marks the trace of the other, or one 
shuts out otherness by manipulating it into a form of the same. This double bind appears 
irresolvable. For Levinas, things conceal themselves beneath form: ‘“Beneath form”, 
says Levinas, “things conceal themselves”.’5 Malabou extends Levinas’s position to 
cosmopolitan hospitality, since ‘hospitality implies the possibility to have access to such 
a “beneath”’.6 Otherness, seemingly, is only truly respected when it eludes the 
manipulations of form. However, this thesis has shown that we can think not only 
through relations, but through literary forms and its reformations. 
Malabou gives us a further possibility, a possibility of the neither/nor. The yield 
of this possibility is that we do not return to an otherness ‘beneath’ form (as when 
Coetzee makes otherness play on the surface of language), nor give up our obligation to 
find new forms of expression (as when Beckett shuttles between prose and theatre), nor 
claim that otherness is dissociated from the imminence of its formal apprehension (as 
when Borges reflects on the imminence of his aesthetic acts). Having apparently 
                                                          
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid, 74. 
6 Ibid. 
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discarded the possibility of a ‘plastic’ hospitality, Malabou concludes that ‘when 
hospitality continues to be thought as the “counter” to plasticity or, in other words, 
against form, it is no longer possible to distinguish cosmopolitanism rigorously from 
hypercapitalism’.7 Here, the lack of stoic system means that nothing differentiates 
Derridean cosmopolitanism from self-serving cynicism. ‘Thinking out the relation 
between cosmopolitanism and globalization’, writes Malabou, 
requires thinking out another sort of relation between hospitality, on the 
one hand, and form and convertibility, on the other – a relation within 
which nothing escapes transformation or the operation of exchange.
8
    
 
Plasticity does not simply bestow, take or destroy form. It also malleates form, so that 
form may become something other than itself. Malabou’s new form of otherness 
through plasticity, this new hospitality or cosmopolitanism, does not simply respect 
otherness as something wholly untouchable. On the contrary, otherness must be touched 
to change the form of the self: ‘Ethical plasticity is thus indeed what one can call the 
sculpture or carving of the other into the rock of his absence’.9 We have concentrated on 
form in Borges, Beckett and Coetzee not to discount a ‘trace’ of the other, but to show 
how it changes its form because of the other that is the self. In a plastic 
cosmopolitanism, we choose neither the other nor the same, since otherness is precisely 
what will enable a reformation of the same. 
Our discussion of neither/nor logic necessarily responds to a prior philosophical 
discussion. For Søren Kierkegaard, either/or defines the necessary choice between the 
aesthetical and ethical individual.
10
 Either one remains in a state of aesthetic solipsism, 
or one commits oneself to ethical action. Either one disavows political agency, or one 
asserts that agency in solidarity with a particular cause. Either one is a cynic, or one is a 
                                                          
7 Ibid, 77. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid, 80. 
10 Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or: A Fragment of Life, ed. Victor Eremita, trans. Alastair Hannay 
(London: Penguin, 1992). 
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stoic. Rather than resolve this, as Kierkegaard does, with a transcendental religious third 
option, the kynical cosmopolitan chooses a non-transcendent materiality that is neither 
cynicism nor stoicism. 
By asserting a neither/nor, the kynical cosmopolitan finds him- or herself 
properly excluded from any inclusively cynical or stoic understanding of political 
agency, according to the non-sublative logic of this thesis: the ‘neither/nor’. We began 
with a question: are Borges, Beckett and Coetzee ‘merely cynical cosmopolitans’, or are 
they ‘great writers’? But neither ‘cynical cosmopolitan’ nor ‘great writer’ seemed to 
describe them. This neither/nor appeared again in our discussions of their works. 
Borges’s parables are reducible neither to their Argentinian concerns nor solipsistic 
treatments of the poet. Beckett’s dramaticules are neither nihilist nor resistant to 
nihilism. Coetzee’s performance novels seek neither to restore the figure of the writer-
sage nor wholly to dismiss it. We found these thematic concerns reflected in structures 
of language. Neither one nor the other is sufficient to describe the writer’s technique: 
neither metaphor nor enumeration; neither the image nor the voice; neither genre nor 
linguistic modification. Within the very structure of these rhetorical, performative and 
linguistic figures, the ‘neither/nor’ again emerged. For Borges, metaphor neither 
describes nor determines difference between the two things it links. Likewise, 
enumeration neither links things nor allows for a site in which they might be linked. For 
Beckett, the image is neither comprehensive nor rhetorical sophistry. Likewise, the 
voice is neither of the body nor of language. For Coetzee, genre neither heralds a truth 
about the self nor reduces such truths to ‘mere rhetoric’. Likewise, linguistic 
modification neither penetrates the depths of meaning nor remains on the surface. The 
kynic, defined in the negative, finds its uncanny homelessness in the neither/nor. 
But why, at this late stage, return to the question of hospitality, so hastily 
discarded when we discussed Jacques Derrida in our Introduction? This thesis has 
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sought to show the minimal difference between cynicism and kynicism in Borges, 
Beckett and Coetzee. We summed up this minimal difference as consistency. But 
consistency to what? These writers, in their late style, present themselves as other-than-
themselves. What kind of consistency permits this inclusion of the other in the self? A 
consistent will to reform, through prevailing techniques, the work. This reformation 
inaugurates a plastic cosmopolitanism that seeks neither to cohere in a single form, nor 
pattern itself solely in reactive critique. Neither stoicism nor cynicism: this is a merely 
kynical cosmopolitanism.   
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